Why not use the F-22 to replace the F/A-18 and F-14?

In message , Kevin Brooks
writes
Plus it never ceases to amaze me the number of folks who think that (a)
bringing in enough aluminum matting (and we don't use PSP anymore) to build
a fighter strip is a piece of cake (and trying to support a C-5 on one is a
mean proposition), (b) installing the matting is all there is to it (no
cut/fill, drainage work, or subbabse and base course prep required),
getting the requisite engineer equipment and units into the site is an easy
matter, and (d) this will all happen over a matter of a day or two. Laying
in a fighter-length strip from scaratch is a *major* engineer operation, and
quite different from that required to construct a minimum length rough field
C-130 strip.

Compare this with the effort needed to create HMS Sheathbill in the
Falklands (which was a basic "land, refuel, leave or GLI" strip). It's
*much* easier to pick a stretch of highway, fly in fuel bladders and
maybe ordnance & first-line servicing - than to build a fixed-wing CTOL
strip from scratch (lots of supplies and equipment needed just to build
the runway before anything else arrives) The USMC's AV-8Bs did this to
very good effect in 1991, for instance.


--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBoxatjrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

"Paul J. Adam" wrote in message
...
In message , Kevin Brooks
writes
Plus it never ceases to amaze me the number of folks who think that (a)
bringing in enough aluminum matting (and we don't use PSP anymore) to
build
a fighter strip is a piece of cake (and trying to support a C-5 on one is
a
mean proposition), (b) installing the matting is all there is to it (no
cut/fill, drainage work, or subbabse and base course prep required),
getting the requisite engineer equipment and units into the site is an
easy
matter, and (d) this will all happen over a matter of a day or two.
Laying
in a fighter-length strip from scaratch is a *major* engineer operation,
and
quite different from that required to construct a minimum length rough
field
C-130 strip.

Compare this with the effort needed to create HMS Sheathbill in the
Falklands (which was a basic "land, refuel, leave or GLI" strip). It's
*much* easier to pick a stretch of highway, fly in fuel bladders and
maybe ordnance & first-line servicing - than to build a fixed-wing CTOL
strip from scratch (lots of supplies and equipment needed just to build
the runway before anything else arrives) The USMC's AV-8Bs did this to
very good effect in 1991, for instance.

And reportedly again during OIF, where AV-8B's used FARP's.

Brooks


--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBoxatjrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

"Paul J. Adam" wrote:

In message , Kevin Brooks
writes
Plus it never ceases to amaze me the number of folks who think that (a)
bringing in enough aluminum matting (and we don't use PSP anymore) to build
a fighter strip is a piece of cake (and trying to support a C-5 on one is a
mean proposition), (b) installing the matting is all there is to it (no
cut/fill, drainage work, or subbabse and base course prep required),
getting the requisite engineer equipment and units into the site is an easy
matter, and (d) this will all happen over a matter of a day or two. Laying
in a fighter-length strip from scaratch is a *major* engineer operation, and
quite different from that required to construct a minimum length rough field
C-130 strip.

Compare this with the effort needed to create HMS Sheathbill in the
Falklands (which was a basic "land, refuel, leave or GLI" strip).

Uh-huh. Minimum size for a C-130 capable airstrip is considered to be 3,000' x
60'. AM-2 weighs 140 lb. for a 12' x 2' strip, not counting attachments and
holddowns. HMS Sheathbill was relatively convenient, being almost right on the
shoreline. It was recce'd by the head of the Engineer Squadron on D+1 (he'd also
examined an old Auster strip at San Carlos settlement, but it was too soft for
Harriers even with AM-2), the 11,000 AM-2 planks needed were unloaded from RFA
Stromness beginning on D+2, and it was finished on D+12. It was only 860 feet
long with two VL pads and a parking/fueling loop for 4 a/c, and fuel bladders
both on shore and floating in San Carlos Water, topped up from the RFAs (the rest
of the AM-2 matting to expand the runway/parking area, as well as much a/c spares
etc. went down in Atlantic Conveyor).


It's
*much* easier to pick a stretch of highway, fly in fuel bladders and
maybe ordnance & first-line servicing - than to build a fixed-wing CTOL
strip from scratch (lots of supplies and equipment needed just to build
the runway before anything else arrives)

To be precise, quoting now from the MEF Planning Manual Staff Planning Factors:
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

"Expeditionary Airfield (EAF). The EAF consists of two hundred and eighty
containers of equipment and provides the capability to build a notional EAf
2000. This capability is designated to include: 96 foot wide by 3,850 ft. long
runway, 75 parking spaces for tactical aircraft, 3 parking spaces for tactical
aircraft, fueling area and revetments, airfield lighting and visual landing aids,
and arrester gear. The EAF is normally spread to three ships in the
[pre-positioning] squadron in three modules, which support the following:

"Ship 1: 471,683 SQFT. Parking, R/W [Guy: Rotary wing] Fuel Pit, Runway to
support 18 CH-53s, 18 MV-22s/CH-46s, 24 A/UH-1s.

"Ship 2: 445,000 SQFT. Parking, R/W Fuel Pit, Runway to support 12 CH-53s, 12
MV-22s/CH-46s, 12 A/UH-1s.

"Ship 3: 445,000 SQFT. Parking, F/W [Fixed-wing] Fuel Pit, Runway to support 20
AV-8Bs, 14 F-18.

"Any reduction in the equipment identified will result in an equivalent reduction
in capability (e.g. shorter/narrower runway, less parking, or no arrester gear).
Three ships together can be configured to support C-5 aircraft."
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Going all-STOVL a/c means no need for arrester gear. It took the brits a couple
of weeks to install arrester gear at Port Stanley airfield in the immediate
aftermath of the war, owing to the mud, lack of drainage, and cold weather.

And how long does it take to put a FARP/FOB together, if they have to lay a
runway? Let's take a representative example, one for AV-8Bs:
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
72' x 960' runway with 2 integral 96' x 96' VTOL pads. Parking hides for 11
AV-8B (designed for 32' x 56'). Net explosive weight of 3,000 lb. considered for
each a/c. Subgrade prepared to a minimum of CBR 25. Requires

(1 each) F70 - Field Tool Kit
(267 pieces) F71 - 12' AM2 Mat
(267) pieces F72 - 6' AM2 Mat.
(6 sets) Anchors and Accessories
(6 sets) F77 - H-connectors

Site preparation: A crew of 15 working 10 hrs per day can complete in 5 days
with:

2 graders
2 dump trucks
2 compactors
1 D7 dozer
2 TRAMs w/buckets
3 6-10k forklifts

Installation: A crew of 36 working 10 hrs a day can complete in 3 days.

Note: The EAF concept allows for an infinite number of configurations. The
three configurations used in this table [I've left out the other two] do not
represent any standard airfield configuration. There is no standard EAF
configuration. Per the AM-2 Tech Manual, a 16 man crew can install 3,300 ft.^2
per hour.
---------------------------------------------------------------------

You could go somehat narrower for a FARP and do without the hides, but needless
to say laying down a runway and parking pads boosts the logistic and time burden,
which is why you don't want to do it if you don't have to. This is one reason
why the Marines are looking at a V/STOL transport with the load capability of a
C-130.


The USMC's AV-8Bs did this to
very good effect in 1991, for instance.

Using a helicopter airfield with a 6,000 foot runway in very poor repair, about
half of which was usable. They also operated from poor condition forward
airfields in Iraq this past year, with fuel, weapons and sparesapparently brought
in mostly by truck.

Guy

Guy Alcala wrote:

snip

To be precise, quoting now from the MEF Planning Manual Staff Planning Factors:
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

"Expeditionary Airfield (EAF). The EAF consists of two hundred and eighty
containers of equipment and provides the capability to build a notional EAf
2000. This capability is designated to include: 96 foot wide by 3,850 ft. long
runway, 75 parking spaces for tactical aircraft, 3 parking spaces for tactical
aircraft,

That last should read "3 parking spaces for transport aircraft".

Guy

On 2/28/04 4:09 AM, in article ,
"Guy Alcala" wrote:

SNIP
The USMC's AV-8Bs did this to
very good effect in 1991, for instance.

Using a helicopter airfield with a 6,000 foot runway in very poor repair,
about
half of which was usable. They also operated from poor condition forward
airfields in Iraq this past year, with fuel, weapons and sparesapparently
brought
in mostly by truck.

Guy


Guy, it's obvious you know how to build an airfield.

The AV-8B's worked from forward airfields because they could. It was a way
to use the assets we already have in a way that reduced crowding at existing
airfields and slightly reduced tanker requirements.

It was a "nice to have" not a requirement. The war would have gone just
fine had they been F-16's or F/A-18's operating from fixed runways or
aircraft carriers. Which is why the V/STOL F-35 is unnecessary.

--Woody

"Doug "Woody" and Erin Beal" wrote in message
...
On 2/28/04 4:09 AM, in article
,
"Guy Alcala" wrote:

SNIP
The USMC's AV-8Bs did this to
very good effect in 1991, for instance.

Using a helicopter airfield with a 6,000 foot runway in very poor
repair,
about
half of which was usable. They also operated from poor condition
forward
airfields in Iraq this past year, with fuel, weapons and
sparesapparently
brought
in mostly by truck.

Guy


Guy, it's obvious you know how to build an airfield.

The AV-8B's worked from forward airfields because they could. It was a
way
to use the assets we already have in a way that reduced crowding at
existing
airfields and slightly reduced tanker requirements.

And improved the response time and sortie generation rates, just as a FARP
alows an attack helo to generate more sorties due to reduced transit time
back and forth to the unit operating location.


It was a "nice to have" not a requirement. The war would have gone just
fine had they been F-16's or F/A-18's operating from fixed runways or
aircraft carriers.

The groundpounder who wants responsive CAS available *immediately*
throughout an operation would differ with you as to whether having an asset
capable of hitting a FARP and returning quickly to station is just "nice to
have".

Which is why the V/STOL F-35 is unnecessary.

Logic fault. You are claiming that because it was allegedly not required in
this instance, it will never be required. Kind of hard to support that kind
of argument. Given a scenario like Afghanistan, where the CAS assets had to
transit great distances to and from the required area of operations, the
ability to get STOVL assets into the A/O early in the campaign could be a
big advantage, and reduces the load on the other assets (like those F-15E's
and F-16's transiting out of the Gulf area). If it is unnecessary, why is
the USAF now joining the STOVL bandwagon--merely to make nice with their
USMC brethren? I doubt that. Is STVL the way to go for all TACAIR? Of course
not. But eliminating it just reduces your own versatility, and that would
not be a wise move in the current environment of uncertainty (as regards
where/when/how we'll have to fight).

Brooks


--Woody

On 2/28/04 1:54 PM, in article , "Kevin
Brooks" wrote:


"Doug "Woody" and Erin Beal" wrote in message
SNIP
The groundpounder who wants responsive CAS available *immediately*
throughout an operation would differ with you as to whether having an asset
capable of hitting a FARP and returning quickly to station is just "nice to
have".


CAS is available immediately because it is capping nearby--not because it is
on some Harrier or STOVL F-35 that's on a mesh field getting fueled and
loaded. It is a function of proper planning, sufficient numbers of
aircraft, and a good DASC.

Which is why the V/STOL F-35 is unnecessary.

Logic fault. You are claiming that because it was allegedly not required in
this instance, it will never be required. Kind of hard to support that kind
of argument. Given a scenario like Afghanistan, where the CAS assets had to
transit great distances to and from the required area of operations, the
ability to get STOVL assets into the A/O early in the campaign could be a
big advantage, and reduces the load on the other assets (like those F-15E's
and F-16's transiting out of the Gulf area). If it is unnecessary, why is
the USAF now joining the STOVL bandwagon--merely to make nice with their
USMC brethren?

Precisely... With one important distinction they're more than likely hoping
to take their USMC brethren's place and to keep unit costs down by ensuring
that the STOVL version doesn't get axed.

I doubt that. Is STVL the way to go for all TACAIR? Of course
not. But eliminating it just reduces your own versatility, and that would
not be a wise move in the current environment of uncertainty (as regards
where/when/how we'll have to fight).

Brooks


What I'm claiming is that STOVL is still risky technology that kills too
many pilots in peace time and offers too little benefit in war time for that
cost.

--Woody

"Doug "Woody" and Erin Beal" wrote in message
...
On 2/28/04 1:54 PM, in article , "Kevin
Brooks" wrote:


"Doug "Woody" and Erin Beal" wrote in message
SNIP

snip


Logic fault. You are claiming that because it was allegedly not required
in
this instance, it will never be required. Kind of hard to support that
kind
of argument. Given a scenario like Afghanistan, where the CAS assets had
to
transit great distances to and from the required area of operations, the
ability to get STOVL assets into the A/O early in the campaign could be
a
big advantage, and reduces the load on the other assets (like those
F-15E's
and F-16's transiting out of the Gulf area). If it is unnecessary, why
is
the USAF now joining the STOVL bandwagon--merely to make nice with their
USMC brethren?

Precisely... With one important distinction they're more than likely
hoping
to take their USMC brethren's place and to keep unit costs down by
ensuring
that the STOVL version doesn't get axed.

That is so far out of reason it is unbelievable. Firstly, if the STOVL
version were axed, the USMC would just buy one of the other two
versions--they will have to replace those old F/A-18's and (by then) AV-8B's
with *something*, so there is no merit to this strange theory you have
postulated. Secondly, axing of the STOVL would be unlikely anyway, because
the RN/RAF have placed their bets on that version. Have you got any
*reasonable* reasons why the USAF would allegedly just toss away a few
billion bucks on STOVL aircraft it really does not want?


I doubt that. Is STVL the way to go for all TACAIR? Of course
not. But eliminating it just reduces your own versatility, and that
would
not be a wise move in the current environment of uncertainty (as regards
where/when/how we'll have to fight).

Brooks


What I'm claiming is that STOVL is still risky technology that kills too
many pilots in peace time and offers too little benefit in war time for
that
cost.

Any evidence that STOVL kills more pilots than other fast jets? Or any
evidence that the F-35B is inherently unsafe or "risky" technology? ISTR the
STOVL X-35 demonstrator did pretty well...

Brooks


--Woody

On 2/28/04 6:42 PM, in article , "Kevin
Brooks" wrote:


"Doug "Woody" and Erin Beal" wrote in message
...
On 2/28/04 1:54 PM, in article , "Kevin
Brooks" wrote:


Kevin, it's funny how you conveniently snipped the part of my post you
couldn't defend.

That is so far out of reason it is unbelievable. Firstly, if the STOVL
version were axed, the USMC would just buy one of the other two
versions--they will have to replace those old F/A-18's and (by then) AV-8B's
with *something*, so there is no merit to this strange theory you have
postulated. Secondly, axing of the STOVL would be unlikely anyway, because
the RN/RAF have placed their bets on that version. Have you got any
*reasonable* reasons why the USAF would allegedly just toss away a few
billion bucks on STOVL aircraft it really does not want?


It was actually YOU that suggested that the USAF was trying to make nice
with the USMC. Firstly, if the STOVL version were axed, the USMC would most
definitely buy CV versions in reduced numbers, still driving up the unit
costs. Secondly, I never said the USAF didn't want the STOVL version.
They've realized during OIF that CAS and their TACP program is essential to
warfare, and they see STOVL and forward basing as a way to get on board.


Any evidence that STOVL kills more pilots than other fast jets? Or any
evidence that the F-35B is inherently unsafe or "risky" technology? ISTR the
STOVL X-35 demonstrator did pretty well...

Brooks


Are you joking? How long have you been around Naval Aviation?

When I was at China Lake (for 3 years) we had two class A mishaps (in our
manned aircraft... not counting the drones)--both were Harriers--at least
one pilot was a TPS grad. For one of the pilots, it was his second ejection
from the AV-8B. The other died in a later AV-8B mishap after he'd returned
to the fleet. We had one class B mishap--a Harrier. The first guy I knew
of from flight school to die in an aircraft accident? Harrier. The only
flight school classmate I know who was a POW during DS? Harrier. (Sorry,
that last one shouldn't count... Not unique to the STOVL discussion. I was
on a roll.)

According to a brief by the Navy's Aviation Safety School given a few years
back, pilots across the TACAIR spectrum with 500 hours or less accounted for
29% of the general pilot population but were at the controls of 46% of the
"Skill Based Error" mishaps. If you split out the AV-8B community, the
percentage of less than 500 hours is 36% and they're responsible for 67% of
the mishaps. Conclusions: (1) experience counts. (2) the Harrier is a
more difficult aircraft to fly. This doesn't account for material failures
etc.

I don't know the actual rates, but the Harrier's have consistently been
higher than fleet average.

Then there's common sense. Slow an F-35 down to near stall while
simultaneously opening an upper intake door and engaging a power take-off
that activates a lift fan. Meanwhile rotate the exhaust nozzle in the back
of the jet through two axes. Any one of these single components fails, and
there's going to be trouble.

These opinions of mine were not generated in a vacuum. They were formed
through years of operating TACAIR aircraft--occasionally around Harriers...
when they weren't falling out of the sky around me. (Sorry, more rant...
and attempted dark humor.)

There's little doubt in my mind that the F-35 STOVL will be a better
platform than the AV-8B, but any slight gain in flexibility of use is still
not worth the risk and the cost when compared to a less risky CV or CTOL
version.

Now ask me if I think it's a good idea that the F-35 is a single engine
aircraft or whether I think it's a good idea that the Navy guys have decided
not to put an internal gun on their version.

--Woody

Doug \"Woody\" and Erin Beal wrote:

On 2/28/04 1:54 PM, in article , "Kevin
Brooks" wrote:


"Doug "Woody" and Erin Beal" wrote in message
SNIP
The groundpounder who wants responsive CAS available *immediately*
throughout an operation would differ with you as to whether having an asset
capable of hitting a FARP and returning quickly to station is just "nice to
have".


CAS is available immediately because it is capping nearby--not because it is
on some Harrier or STOVL F-35 that's on a mesh field getting fueled and
loaded. It is a function of proper planning, sufficient numbers of
aircraft, and a good DASC.

That also assumes that sufficient numbers of tankers and sufficient bed-down
space for them will be available, both of which were in short supply last year.
In 1991, because we had access to Saudi and Turkish bases, the USAF was able to
put 350 tankers on just 5 airbases. Last year, they only had 200 tankers (plus
100 for the airbridge; others were supporting ops in Afghanistan and the Horn of
Africa), and had to scatter them on 15 airbases. Because of the lack of ramp
space, the marines graded a FOB in the northern Kuwaiti desert with a parallel
pair of 6,000 foot dirt runways, where they based many of their KC-130s and
helos. In addition, they offloaded the helos, men and equipment from two
LHA/LHDs, operating each of them with a full AV-8B squadron, just so they
wouldn't take up space on an airfield in Kuwait that was needed by the CTOL
aircraft.

The USAF weren't the only ones with tanker problems. From an article in the
April 14th, 2003 AvLeak, "Lessons Learned", pg. 26, by AvLeak's correspondent at
a Marine airbase in Kuwait:

"Its air campaign has been shaped to a large extent by the fact that the service
has only 24 KC-130 tankers in the region, a relatively small number compared with
the number of strike aircraft it has assembled. What further complicated the
tanker issue is that most KC-130 sorties were dedicated to transporting fuel for
helicopters, as well as tanks and other ground vehicles, to forward areas. It is
a "rare occurence" for a Marine F/A-18 or AV-8B to be refueled in the air, said a
senior Marine Air Group 13 representative, who described the tanker shortage as
'huge'. Problems the USAF has had with its own tankers -- such as poor
availability because of the age of the KC-135s -- have exacerbated the dilemma,
Marine Corps officials asserted. 'Tanking was very limited,' one Royal Air Force
Harrier pilot noted . . . .

"Without refueling, fixed-wing a/c operating from here can only fly over Baghdad
or points north for a few minutes before having to return to base. Pilots from
Harrier squadron VMA-214 noted that without aerial refueling, they had little
time to find targets in the 30 x 30-mi. 'kill boxes' set up around Baghdad.

"The Marines hope to mitigate the problem by establishing forward operating bases
for AV-8Bs and potential F/A-18s. For its helicopter force, the Marines have
already built an extensive series of [FARPs]. So far, the Marines have built
more than 10 FARPs and have even closed down the first few that are no longer
tactically relevant."

They definitely established a Harrier FARP and were sitting ground alert and/or
turning AV-8Bs at an airfield east of the Euphrates that the marines had captured
on their way to Baghdad. I don't know which airfield, because the AvLeak guy
wasn't allowed to identify it during the war, but I suspect it was around al-Kut.

Which is why the V/STOL F-35 is unnecessary.

Logic fault. You are claiming that because it was allegedly not required in
this instance, it will never be required. Kind of hard to support that kind
of argument. Given a scenario like Afghanistan, where the CAS assets had to
transit great distances to and from the required area of operations, the
ability to get STOVL assets into the A/O early in the campaign could be a
big advantage, and reduces the load on the other assets (like those F-15E's
and F-16's transiting out of the Gulf area). If it is unnecessary, why is
the USAF now joining the STOVL bandwagon--merely to make nice with their
USMC brethren?

Precisely... With one important distinction they're more than likely hoping
to take their USMC brethren's place and to keep unit costs down by ensuring
that the STOVL version doesn't get axed.

And you don't think the fact that they were turning A-10s at an FOB in Iraq (a
somewhat worse for wear Tallil airbase, IIRR) to avoid the extra 100-130 mile
one-way trip back to Kuwait, played any part in their deciding that being able to
operate out of austere forward locations (by buying some F-35Bs) might be a good
thing?

I doubt that. Is STVL the way to go for all TACAIR? Of course
not. But eliminating it just reduces your own versatility, and that would
not be a wise move in the current environment of uncertainty (as regards
where/when/how we'll have to fight).

Brooks


What I'm claiming is that STOVL is still risky technology that kills too
many pilots in peace time and offers too little benefit in war time for that
cost.

And let's not forget how dangerous that helo VTOL technology is, so let's get rid
of the helos while we're at it. Hell, those things have been dropping like
flies.

Guy