Why not use the F-22 to replace the F/A-18 and F-14?

On 3/1/04 21:44, in article , "Kevin
Brooks" wrote:


"Woody Beal" wrote in message
...
SNIP
Not really. I was willing to let that particular passage go unanswered, but
you are so all fired up to debate it that you wanted to make a big point of
it, so you got your answer.


Fair enough. I'll put it to bed.


"CAS is available immediately because it is capping nearby--not because
SNIP
stack in that publication, either. So why don't we just both claim victory
regarding this particularly weighty matter and be done with it?


I'm done with this point too.


You have to have tankers to support the CAS stack--tankers are a
SNIP

I've got a darned good grasp of it. Perhaps you have a problem
communicating your point. Leave the sarcasm out, and we can conduct an
intelligent discussion.

Apologies if you were offended. The sarcasm introduced in my original
comment regarding whether you thought the USAF was merely making nice to the
USMC was IMO rather mild--hang around Usenet long enough and you will
experience much worse, I promise you. Suffice it to say that the USAF is not
pursuing the purchase of the STVL version of the F-35 as a minor portion of
their overall F-35 buy due to any desire to make things easy for the USMC,
OK?


OK. Now we're ebbing and flowing. Any offense taken on my part was
certainly minor. I hope that I haven't given you the impression that I'm
the thin-skinned type. I've been dealing with critique and criticism for
years (not just since I started conversing on RAMN in about 1995 either).
Frankly, the more I learn about aviation and tactics, the more I realize I
don't know.

Honestly, any speculation on my part about why the USAF is buying STOVL
F-35's is just that.

SNIP
formations a bit more versatile in terms of how we will use them). A USAF
tactical fighter force that includes some STOVL F-35B's along with the CTOL
F-35A's is by definition going to be a more versatile force than one which
is solely A model equipped.

Yes it is. It also provides them a shot at expansion and secures a foothold
in what they probably consider to be a growth area in tactical aviation.
The blue-suited brethren are fairly savvy folk.

Any evidence that STOVL kills more pilots than other fast jets? Or any
SNIP

OK, here are a couple of numbers I ran over: AV-8 accident rate per 100K
hours was 12 (admittedly an "ouch!", but I am not sure they were not lumping
together *all* AV-8 records, to include the early AV-8A)...and the accident
rate for the old CTOL F-8 Crusader through its lifetime? 16. That does not
equate to a definite case of being able to claim that STOVL is inherently
more risky than CTOL.


F-8 and AV-8B are apples and oranges (old apples, young oranges?) due to
their operating in mostly different eras. During a portion of the F-8's
life span, many of the safety programs that were input in later years (e.g.
the NATOPS program IIRC) were not in effect. Compare the F/A-18 or F-14
rates with the AV-8B.

The microcosm I mentioned at China Lake (while certainly anecdotal), speaks
to the larger issue. On the way to dinner tonight, I polled a couple of
(Hornet) pilots as to how they thought the AV-8B stacked up to the F/A-18
from a safety standpoint. Death trap was the general consensus. Granted,
they think neanderthal, like me.



According to a brief by the Navy's Aviation Safety School given a few
SNIP

So flying the AV-8B is more demanding of new pilots. Hardly an
indictment of
the STOVL concept itself.


That is simply burying your head in the sand. A more complex airplane
will
fail more often than a less complex airplane. Historically, the AV-8B has
meted this out.

And the F-8 Crusader? The F-104, which peaked at an astounding 139 per 100K
hours back in the 1960's? The Century Series fighters generally all had
accident rates that exceeded those for the AV-8. If increased complexity
resulted in a direct and irreversable increase in the accident rate, then
why are today's more complex aircraft exhibiting a much lower accident rate
than their earlier ancestors?


Time period is important in this discussion as alluded to above because of
safety programs (currency requirements, NATOPS, annual check rides, etc.
that were put into effect).

Finally, how does the AV-8 accident rate imply a direct connection with that
which can be expected for the F-35B, which will use a radically different
lift system (partly because of the past problems with the AV-8?)?


Honestly, no one knows for sure. Most likely better because we've learned
some important lessons from the AV-8A/B and are applying a different
solution to the problem of STOVL. My guess is that because it still relies
on more moving parts than it's CTOL counterparts in a critical phase of
flight, it'll have a higher mishap rate.

Again, unofficial dinner poll: Opinion of the STOVL F-35? Not worth it.

SNIP
"Sorry, no CAS for you guys in theater B due to the range restrictions."
Versatility rules.

Brooks


Ironically, I also find myself arguing from the same perspective when I talk
to USAF dudes who say that CV's are washed up and not cost effective, so
believe me when I say, I see your points.

--Woody

"Woody Beal" wrote in message
...
On 3/1/04 21:44, in article , "Kevin
Brooks" wrote:


"Woody Beal" wrote in message
...

snip


OK. Now we're ebbing and flowing. Any offense taken on my part was
certainly minor. I hope that I haven't given you the impression that I'm
the thin-skinned type. I've been dealing with critique and criticism for
years (not just since I started conversing on RAMN in about 1995 either).
Frankly, the more I learn about aviation and tactics, the more I realize I
don't know.

Shoot, I don't know diddly about actual air tactics beyond what I have read,
so you are light years ahead of me. I have had some experience with the CAS
planning cycle from the groundpounder's perspective, and one of the biggest
gripes we had was the lack of responsiveness and that 72-48-24 hour
timeline. To give the USAF credit where it is due, it sounds like that
situation has improved mightily over the past couple of years.


Honestly, any speculation on my part about why the USAF is buying STOVL
F-35's is just that.

SNIP
formations a bit more versatile in terms of how we will use them). A
USAF
tactical fighter force that includes some STOVL F-35B's along with the
CTOL
F-35A's is by definition going to be a more versatile force than one
which
is solely A model equipped.

Yes it is. It also provides them a shot at expansion and secures a
foothold
in what they probably consider to be a growth area in tactical aviation.
The blue-suited brethren are fairly savvy folk.

That is true too. Though my take is that the term "joint" now has a
significantly more concrete meaning in all of the services than it did even
five or six years ago.


Any evidence that STOVL kills more pilots than other fast jets? Or
any
SNIP

OK, here are a couple of numbers I ran over: AV-8 accident rate per 100K
hours was 12 (admittedly an "ouch!", but I am not sure they were not
lumping
together *all* AV-8 records, to include the early AV-8A)...and the
accident
rate for the old CTOL F-8 Crusader through its lifetime? 16. That does
not
equate to a definite case of being able to claim that STOVL is
inherently
more risky than CTOL.


F-8 and AV-8B are apples and oranges (old apples, young oranges?) due to
their operating in mostly different eras. During a portion of the F-8's
life span, many of the safety programs that were input in later years
(e.g.
the NATOPS program IIRC) were not in effect. Compare the F/A-18 or F-14
rates with the AV-8B.

Twin engined aircraft with single engine aircraft? I don't think so. Take
the F-16, which does indeed have a significantly lower accident rate (a bit
under three per 100K hours IIRC). I can see your point, and acknowledge that
the AV-8 is indeed more accident prone than its contemporaries--but that
does noy IMO yield a concrete conclusion versus the F-35B.


The microcosm I mentioned at China Lake (while certainly anecdotal),
speaks
to the larger issue. On the way to dinner tonight, I polled a couple of
(Hornet) pilots as to how they thought the AV-8B stacked up to the F/A-18
from a safety standpoint. Death trap was the general consensus. Granted,
they think neanderthal, like me.

Yeah, I once attended a joint course with a polyglot of participants,
including both an F-18 pilot and a P-3 bus driver. The Hornet driver was
ceaseless in his hammering of the Orion guy--I think he was mainly ****ed
because to him "deployment" meant six months on a CVN halfway around the
world, while the VP folks were pulling up to 179-day (in order to keep it
under that TDY pay maximum) rotations to Iceland, where the fishing is
outstanding (I don't recall him decrying the VP folks also having to do
those tours during the winter months...). Definitely neanderthal... :-)




According to a brief by the Navy's Aviation Safety School given a few
SNIP

So flying the AV-8B is more demanding of new pilots. Hardly an
indictment of
the STOVL concept itself.


That is simply burying your head in the sand. A more complex airplane
will
fail more often than a less complex airplane. Historically, the AV-8B
has
meted this out.

And the F-8 Crusader? The F-104, which peaked at an astounding 139 per
100K
hours back in the 1960's? The Century Series fighters generally all had
accident rates that exceeded those for the AV-8. If increased complexity
resulted in a direct and irreversable increase in the accident rate,
then
why are today's more complex aircraft exhibiting a much lower accident
rate
than their earlier ancestors?


Time period is important in this discussion as alluded to above because of
safety programs (currency requirements, NATOPS, annual check rides, etc.
that were put into effect).

I have no doubt that those factors are important. But when all is said and
done, the fact is that as aircraft complexity has increased, the accident
rate has generally decreased. This is true even *since* such safety programs
were initiated--witness the low rate for the F-16, which has within its own
career grown increasingly complex (compare a F-16A Block 10 to the F-16C
Block 52). I do believe that its accident rate is abit lower than that of
the F-4, which had that whole extra engine included...


Finally, how does the AV-8 accident rate imply a direct connection with
that
which can be expected for the F-35B, which will use a radically
different
lift system (partly because of the past problems with the AV-8?)?


Honestly, no one knows for sure. Most likely better because we've learned
some important lessons from the AV-8A/B and are applying a different
solution to the problem of STOVL. My guess is that because it still
relies
on more moving parts than it's CTOL counterparts in a critical phase of
flight, it'll have a higher mishap rate.

Maybe. But then again, maybe not. For all we know the typically "increased
risk" associated with operatins from a CVN may lead to the C model having a
worse accident record. I don't think there is enough information that
*could* be available at this point to postively conclude either way.


Again, unofficial dinner poll: Opinion of the STOVL F-35? Not worth it.

OK. But go back to those folks and ask them to earnestly try to put
themselves in the boots of the brigade commander on the ground who has
troops in contact, is outnumbered (as we can expect to be in many cases),
and needs to shift his air support quickly from one target set to a whole
new class of targets, while also needing/desperately wanting an increase of
maybe 30% in the CAS sortie count--and oh, by the way, the nearest CTOL
fighter airstrip is 1000 miles away, since they have yet to reconstruct the
airfield in his AO that is supporting him via C-130 shuttle. Do you think
that *he* might value having a squadron (USAF type, with 24 birds) of SOVL
assets capable of hitting a FARP ten or twelve klicks to the rear of his CP?

Or alternatively, when the CVN's are all clustered in (choose body of water)
handling the major contingency going down with (choose potential foe), and
your USMC BLT is forced to devite from its transit to that area while
enroute and FRAGO'd to execute operations independently elsewhere, would you
want the services of some F-35B's operating as part of your parent amphib
strike group?


SNIP
"Sorry, no CAS for you guys in theater B due to the range restrictions."
Versatility rules.

Brooks


Ironically, I also find myself arguing from the same perspective when I
talk
to USAF dudes who say that CV's are washed up and not cost effective, so
believe me when I say, I see your points.

OK. I personally find the CVN to be of immense import--in specific
circumstances and conditions. Much like the F-35B--it ain't the best
all-around strike/CAS platform available, but it does have its niches.
Neither is necessarily the best tool for *all* potentialities.

Are you still at China Lake? Wonderful place (note my sarcasm)...right next
to that other gardenspot I used to frequent on occasion, FT Irwin (even more
sarcasm). Last time I went through that area I spent the night in that
little town near the main entrance to China Lake, enroute to Lone Pine for a
few days fishing in the higher elevations.

Brooks


--Woody

On 3/2/04 0:18, in article , "Kevin
Brooks" wrote:


"Woody Beal" wrote in message
SNIP

Shoot, I don't know diddly about actual air tactics beyond what I have read,
so you are light years ahead of me. I have had some experience with the CAS
planning cycle from the groundpounder's perspective, and one of the biggest
gripes we had was the lack of responsiveness and that 72-48-24 hour
timeline. To give the USAF credit where it is due, it sounds like that
situation has improved mightily over the past couple of years.


I know a bit--all from the perspective of Naval Aviation. I know what we
bring to the table.

SNIP

Twin engined aircraft with single engine aircraft? I don't think so. Take
the F-16, which does indeed have a significantly lower accident rate (a bit
under three per 100K hours IIRC). I can see your point, and acknowledge that
the AV-8 is indeed more accident prone than its contemporaries--but that
does noy IMO yield a concrete conclusion versus the F-35B.


Concur that it does not yield a concrete conclusion, but it does yield a
tendency based on several possible single point failures. If lift fan doors
don't open, if lift rotor fails to engage properly, if engine fails during
transition to STOVL life gets tough at a very critical and low altitude
moment. These problems (though not identical) are similar to those
experienced in the AV-8B.

Mechanical failures in the STOVL regime are unforgiving because of their low
altitude locale.


The microcosm I mentioned at China Lake (while certainly anecdotal),
SNIP
those tours during the winter months...). Definitely neanderthal... :-)


Beating up on P-3 guys is a standard Hornet pilot sport. I choose not to
participate--kind of like clubbing baby seals--no sport in it.

SNIP
Time period is important in this discussion as alluded to above because of
safety programs (currency requirements, NATOPS, annual check rides, etc.
that were put into effect).

I have no doubt that those factors are important. But when all is said and
done, the fact is that as aircraft complexity has increased, the accident
rate has generally decreased. This is true even *since* such safety programs
were initiated--witness the low rate for the F-16, which has within its own
career grown increasingly complex (compare a F-16A Block 10 to the F-16C
Block 52). I do believe that its accident rate is abit lower than that of
the F-4, which had that whole extra engine included...


Complexity is not the sole issue as you point out. Sometimes it goes toward
mission accomplishment, sometimes survivability, and some of that complexity
goes toward increasing flight safety. In the case of the F-16 or the
F/A-18, the mechanical complexity associated with the flight controls
actually keeps those aircraft in the air. In the case of the F-14, the DFCS
makes the jet more stable. The complexity of the F-35B when compared to the
C or the A only gives it an additional option for landing--a complexity with
several possible single point failures in a critical flight regime.


Finally, how does the AV-8 accident rate imply a direct connection with
that
which can be expected for the F-35B, which will use a radically
different
lift system (partly because of the past problems with the AV-8?)?


Honestly, no one knows for sure. Most likely better because we've learned
some important lessons from the AV-8A/B and are applying a different
solution to the problem of STOVL. My guess is that because it still
relies
on more moving parts than it's CTOL counterparts in a critical phase of
flight, it'll have a higher mishap rate.

Maybe. But then again, maybe not. For all we know the typically "increased
risk" associated with operatins from a CVN may lead to the C model having a
worse accident record. I don't think there is enough information that
*could* be available at this point to postively conclude either way.


My experience tells me that the STOVL will crash more than the CV which will
crash more than the CTOL.


Again, unofficial dinner poll: Opinion of the STOVL F-35? Not worth it.

OK. But go back to those folks and ask them to earnestly try to put
themselves in the boots of the brigade commander on the ground who has
troops in contact, is outnumbered (as we can expect to be in many cases),
and needs to shift his air support quickly from one target set to a whole
new class of targets, while also needing/desperately wanting an increase of
maybe 30% in the CAS sortie count--and oh, by the way, the nearest CTOL
fighter airstrip is 1000 miles away, since they have yet to reconstruct the
airfield in his AO that is supporting him via C-130 shuttle. Do you think
that *he* might value having a squadron (USAF type, with 24 birds) of SOVL
assets capable of hitting a FARP ten or twelve klicks to the rear of his CP?


Absolutely. There aren't many scenarios like this in the world, though.
China maybe? Even in OIF, aircraft from ship's in the north (much further
than in the south) transited only about 350NM ro so to get into theater.

Or alternatively, when the CVN's are all clustered in (choose body of water)
handling the major contingency going down with (choose potential foe), and
your USMC BLT is forced to devite from its transit to that area while
enroute and FRAGO'd to execute operations independently elsewhere, would you
want the services of some F-35B's operating as part of your parent amphib
strike group?


Again, a luxury. "All the CVN's" tells me that you could easily spit one to
support the strike group--up to the elephants to fight out.

SNIP
OK. I personally find the CVN to be of immense import--in specific
circumstances and conditions. Much like the F-35B--it ain't the best
all-around strike/CAS platform available, but it does have its niches.
Neither is necessarily the best tool for *all* potentialities.


And I would like the U.S. Military to buy every weapons system out there...
Including F-35B's (which they will). I'd like them to have the money to
continue to recapitalize filling Carrier decks, and ARG's and MAG's with
aircraft. I'd like them to buy SATCOM for all of my Army buddies on the
ground--you get the picture.

I disagree with the way we've decided to spend our limited funds (F-35B, CV
version with no gun, F-22, etc).

Are you still at China Lake? Wonderful place (note my sarcasm)...right next
to that other gardenspot I used to frequent on occasion, FT Irwin (even more
sarcasm). Last time I went through that area I spent the night in that
little town near the main entrance to China Lake, enroute to Lone Pine for a
few days fishing in the higher elevations.

Brooks

Nope. Left there for the fleet in 1996. Loved living there though. Best
flying I've ever done. Worked for a great boss. Learned a LOT about RDT&E,
BRAC, civil servants, and the ins and outs of large organizations.

--Woody

"Woody Beal" wrote in message
...
Concur that it does not yield a concrete conclusion, but it does yield a
tendency based on several possible single point failures. If lift fan
doors
don't open, if lift rotor fails to engage properly, if engine fails during
transition to STOVL life gets tough at a very critical and low altitude
moment. These problems (though not identical) are similar to those
experienced in the AV-8B.

Actually, conversion is done at an altitude and speed that, if it fails,
you're still wing-borne. The airplane fails back to a regular engine. Just
pop the TVL forward and continue to fly conventional. THe diciest moment
for the lift-fan system is during clutch engagement, but you don't perform
that in a high-exposure kind of situation. Doors and all that aren't really
a problem, cuz you'll know there's a problem before you expose yourself.

Mechanical failures in the STOVL regime are unforgiving because of their
low
altitude locale.

Yup. But a lot of stuff in the engine/lift-fan system is monitored. Health
checking on the B model propulsion system is way beyond anything that has
been put into service to-date. THe problem here is that health monitoring
tech is really only good for known failure modes. It's the "gee we never
considered that" kind of problems that can get scary. Infant mortality. WIth
the lift-fan system, you'll typically know if you have a mechanical problem
before you go jet-borne. Once transitioning to jet-borne, you just gotta
watch all the critical temps (turbine inlet, exhaust gas....yadda yadda).

Also, much of the unforgiving nature of jet-borne flight has been addressed
through the inceptor mapping. Switching from rates to attitude commands
makes overcontrol type slip-ups much less likely. The F-35B will be much
more forgiving to exhausted pilots.

makes the jet more stable. The complexity of the F-35B when compared to
the
C or the A only gives it an additional option for landing--a complexity
with
several possible single point failures in a critical flight regime.

Keep in mind that the operational environment envisioned for the F-35B is
much more varied than what has been done with the Harrier. So, exposure to
hazards (thinking mainly weather) will be much greater.


Pete
(worked on the X-35B for a couple of years designing the yaw-axis control
laws).