3 lives lost

Gene (and others too)

Not being an instructor but a 42 year Pvt Instrument (no longer current
by a long ways) -

In biennials, in your opinions, what fraction of the experienced (say
over 10 years experience) pvt-onlys are instrument competent (not
necessarily legal) when confronted by a sudden loss of visibility?

It has really bugged me that Kennedy, who I understand was nearly
complete with his instrument rating, couldn't even make the transition
in a slowly deteriorating situation. I know another case some years
ago of a fellow that was working on an instrument that also lost a
Mooney and three other guys in a similar situation with ground fog and
a night departure, and 5 hours of fuel on board.

For that matter - what fraction of experienced instrument people could
make that same rapid transistion to the gages?

I would have thought that 25 years of experience would have at least
keyed this grandma into expecting something difficult. That's why I
would want to withhold judgement.

There is a journalistic attitude that attempts to simply blame pilots
(the tsk! tsk! type comments suggesting I wouldn't do that) rather than
search for the process where they get schnookered (sp?) into a stupid
situation.
I too hope Cessna doesn't get sued. I appreciate your thoughts. THX

"nrp" wrote in message
oups.com...

It has really bugged me that Kennedy, who I understand was nearly
complete with his instrument rating, couldn't even make the transition
in a slowly deteriorating situation. I know another case some years
ago of a fellow that was working on an instrument that also lost a
Mooney and three other guys in a similar situation with ground fog and
a night departure, and 5 hours of fuel on board.


If you read the accident reports you'll see plenty of instrument pilots lose
it in the soup too.

Good question...

A 1954 study (Stonecipher, et al) found that of 20 private pilots, of
varying levels of experience, exactly 0 'survived' a simulated
encounter with IFR conditions. 19 did graveyard spirals, and 1 was
going to do a whip stall when the data-taker/safety pilot said "I've
got it."

My experience on BFR's may not be representative, as I am considered a
'tough; insturctor and that reputation precedes me to the point that
most of the people who call me are pretty good pilots to begin with and
probably perform better than the average. Given that, my experience is
such that I think that in excess of 70% of private pilots would 'buy
it' if they wandered into instrument conditions. The real numbers may
be higher.

One of the problems we have (but is not well discussed) is that in
training the stress level (even on a BFR) is a tiny fraction of what
the pilot will experience if he runs into these conditions solo.
Stress degrades performance in every area, so I think that what we see
on the BFR is something of a best case scenario. I try to make the
hood work a little more demanding than the average CFI, to simulate
some of the stress that may occur in the real situation, but I think I
am still an order of magnitutde or two below what a
non-instrument-rated private pilot experiences in a real (solo) IMC
encounter. A clue can be had by listening to the video presentation
"17 Ways to Fall Out of the Sky"; there is an audio tape in that video
of a real life VFR-into-IMC encounter involving a VFR C310 pilot trying
to get down through an overcast. Noteably, when he first gets into
trouble his voice goes up at least two octaves. (He did not make it.)

Unlike some CFIs, I aggressively seek out actual instrument condtions
in which to take up not only my instrument students but also my private
students. I figure if they have proven to themselves that they can
indeed hold it right side up in turbulence in IMC, then their stress
will be (a little) lower if it ever happens for real. I like to train
them well beyond the PTS in this area, but not all students are willing
to do that (those that aren't have to go somewhere else--I sleep really
well at night and want to keep it that way.)

I have unique methods for teaching flight by reference to instruments,
and I have at least one known 'save' of a student pilot who got into
IMC on his first solo, and flew there for 20 min successfully before
breaking out and landing--using the methods he heard me present in a
Wings Seminar. (Please don't try this at home...!)

I think most pilots are grossly unaware of how insidious spatial
disorientation can be for the non-IMC-experienced pilot. Most people
seem to think that the accident pilot is unaware of his improper flight
attitude, and would correct to level if he or she knew; I think this is
a dangerous idea. I have personally observed a student pilot in IMC as
she rolled into a left spiral while literally screaming at me for help
because 'it's rolling to the left and I can't stop it.' Her conscious
mind could read the instruments and correctly deduce our real attitude,
but it had lost the battle for control of her hands to her unconscious,
which was following the (erroneous) inner ear indications into the left
spiral. To her it felt as if the controls were jammed, and she could
not get it to roll to the right. (I had her let go and then I rolled
out with two fingers.)

I think a major portion of the spatial disorientation accidents are of
this ilk; i.e. fully aware of the nature of the problem but unable to
move their hands to recover. JFK, for example; needle slap indicated
he had applied maximum takeoff power before he hit the water... I
suspect he knew fully well what was going on but could not stop it.

This is the difference between an instrument rated pilot and an
instrument competent pilot; the competent instrument pilot has enough
IMC experience that he has been able to condition his unconscious to
let go and let the conscious mind take control of the hands.

I think most VFR-rate pilots are nowhere near this level of IMC
experience, and when the stress maxes out, they are toast. All the
more reason to avoid situations that get anywhere close to the edge.
Gene

wrote:

Good question...

A 1954 study (Stonecipher, et al) found that of 20 private pilots, of
varying levels of experience, exactly 0 'survived' a simulated
encounter with IFR conditions. 19 did graveyard spirals, and 1 was
going to do a whip stall when the data-taker/safety pilot said "I've
got it."

My experience on BFR's may not be representative, as I am considered a
'tough; insturctor and that reputation precedes me to the point that
most of the people who call me are pretty good pilots to begin with and
probably perform better than the average. Given that, my experience is
such that I think that in excess of 70% of private pilots would 'buy
it' if they wandered into instrument conditions. The real numbers may
be higher.

One of the problems we have (but is not well discussed) is that in
training the stress level (even on a BFR) is a tiny fraction of what
the pilot will experience if he runs into these conditions solo.
Stress degrades performance in every area, so I think that what we see
on the BFR is something of a best case scenario. I try to make the
hood work a little more demanding than the average CFI, to simulate
some of the stress that may occur in the real situation, but I think I
am still an order of magnitutde or two below what a
non-instrument-rated private pilot experiences in a real (solo) IMC
encounter. A clue can be had by listening to the video presentation
"17 Ways to Fall Out of the Sky"; there is an audio tape in that video
of a real life VFR-into-IMC encounter involving a VFR C310 pilot trying
to get down through an overcast. Noteably, when he first gets into
trouble his voice goes up at least two octaves. (He did not make it.)

Unlike some CFIs, I aggressively seek out actual instrument condtions
in which to take up not only my instrument students but also my private
students. I figure if they have proven to themselves that they can
indeed hold it right side up in turbulence in IMC, then their stress
will be (a little) lower if it ever happens for real. I like to train
them well beyond the PTS in this area, but not all students are willing
to do that (those that aren't have to go somewhere else--I sleep really
well at night and want to keep it that way.)

You sound like my kind of instructor. My instrument instructor was a
real pain also, but I appreciate every minute of it now. Almost every
training flight beyond the intial time of learning the basics of flight
by instruments was partial panel from takeoff to touchdown. I told my
DE that the check ride was the first time in months that I'd seen the AI
and DG!


I have unique methods for teaching flight by reference to instruments,
and I have at least one known 'save' of a student pilot who got into
IMC on his first solo, and flew there for 20 min successfully before
breaking out and landing--using the methods he heard me present in a
Wings Seminar. (Please don't try this at home...!)

My primary instructor taught us to descend through an overcast in an
emergency by rolling full nose up trim in the C150, pulling the throttle
to idle and then use rudder to maintain wings level. This worked
amazingly well in that airplane. I never had to use the technique
fortunately.


I think most pilots are grossly unaware of how insidious spatial
disorientation can be for the non-IMC-experienced pilot. Most people
seem to think that the accident pilot is unaware of his improper flight
attitude, and would correct to level if he or she knew; I think this is
a dangerous idea. I have personally observed a student pilot in IMC as
she rolled into a left spiral while literally screaming at me for help
because 'it's rolling to the left and I can't stop it.' Her conscious
mind could read the instruments and correctly deduce our real attitude,
but it had lost the battle for control of her hands to her unconscious,
which was following the (erroneous) inner ear indications into the left
spiral. To her it felt as if the controls were jammed, and she could
not get it to roll to the right. (I had her let go and then I rolled
out with two fingers.)

I think a major portion of the spatial disorientation accidents are of
this ilk; i.e. fully aware of the nature of the problem but unable to
move their hands to recover. JFK, for example; needle slap indicated
he had applied maximum takeoff power before he hit the water... I
suspect he knew fully well what was going on but could not stop it.

This is the difference between an instrument rated pilot and an
instrument competent pilot; the competent instrument pilot has enough
IMC experience that he has been able to condition his unconscious to
let go and let the conscious mind take control of the hands.

Absolutely. I just returned to flying after a four year layoff. I'm
competent to fly instruments, but I don't have the same level of
proficiency I had when I was flying often several years ago. Although,
I was up yesterday with a safety pilot to get in my 6 approaches and it
is starting to feel like the good old days now where I actually get
bored on the approaches waiting for the next waypoint/fix. To me,
having excess time during an approach is one sign that you finally have
it together again.

I got through my ICC pretty well back in the spring and even took one
long flight in IMC with my instructor that went well, however, I always
felt a little uneasy and it seemed I was always running at 95% mental
capacity on the approaches. I don't like that feeling and won't carry
pax in weather when I feel that way. Yesterday I felt like I was
running at 70% CPU during the approaches (and it was a bumpy and windy
day in the northeast) and had some capacity left for the unexpected.


Matt

JFK Jr.

As I understand it, JFK Jr. was reported to be "50%" through his
instrument rating. By that point one should in theory have no
difficulty managing the conditions he encountered. But, the record
shows that when the windows went grey he did not have or could not
apply the required skills.

A grocery store clerk asked me, shortly after that accident, "Doesn't
it worry you, training people to go off and then maybe crash like
that?"

I had a simple answer: "If he'd been my student he wouldn't be dead
now and we wouldn't be having this converstation."

It really hurts me to see this kind of stuff happen; it is needless.
contrary to one of the other posters here, I am of the opinion that
light aircraft flying can be much safer than driving a car (ok I live
in LA and driving here is a lot more crazy, but still...) if you
properly manage the risk. In my car, I am at the mercy of every
testosterone-poisoned teenager who decides to weave through traffic at
120 mph. I cannot control his studpidity. In the airplane, I HAVE
CONTROL OF HOW MUCH RISK I TAKE.

When I go up to see my mom in San Jose, I feel MUCH safer when I fly
than when I drive up I-5. I know what the risk factors are in the
airplane, and how to mitigate them. I cannot control these idiots in
their 'hot' cars!

I wish I could just grab on to some people (pilots) and just shake them
until they hear me. YOU CAN MAKE THIS AS SAFE AS YOU WANT! STOP BEING
STUPID!

OK, sorry, off my soapbox...

Gene

wrote in message
oups.com...
JFK Jr.

I had a simple answer: "If he'd been my student he wouldn't be dead
now and we wouldn't be having this converstation."


Gene,

With all due respect to your no-doubt considerable instructing prowess, some
people are just too stupid to save themselves. I agree that the conditions
were such that he should have been able to hand-fly it out, let alone click
the autopilot on the minute things got touchy, but IMHO the real problem
happened when he took off. If you know how to train a Kennedy to not take
idiotic risks you should become a therapist and open an office in LA.

-cwk.

Colin,

You are very 'on' with both points. There are quite a few (not a
majority, but enough to drive up the statistics) for whom no amount of
education will eradicate their emotionally-driven ignorance. And I
fully agree with you that the real problem was that he took off in the
first place. The conditions were iffy enough that his own flight
instructor called him and said words to the effect "It looks pretty
bad, let me go with you." And he is reported to have replied, "No,
this is something Ive got to do by myself." That statement is all
about proving that he is 'good enough,' which is, I believe, where he
drove off into the psychological 'ditch.'

I have been told that there were two CFI's holding down a couch in the
lobby just a couple of hundred feet away when he was loading up. When
his sister in law was 2hr late, and forced his planned daylight flight
into a night departure, that was the point where he shoulda walked into
that lobby and said "Which one of you guys wants to make $300?" (He
was reportely collecting $5mil a year off of his trust. $300 would
have been pocket change.)

I have also read that he and his instructor had been having problems
with the autopilot; it apparently was prone to occaisionally doing a
roll-axis hard-over failure for no apparent reason. Given that, and
his low time in type (30hr), and thus a probable lack of familiarity
with that autopilot, it may be that he was reluctant to turn it on.
Maybe he *did* turn it on, and it did its hard-over thing and made a
marginal situation worse.

I have, as of late, made it my business to study the human factors
issues associated with these kinds of accidents, because I agree with
you that it was the decision to go under these conditions that was the
real problem. My research has led me into the psychology of
narcissism, and I believe that is a major factor in this seemingly
mysterious penchant some pilots have to go ahead and launch when
prudence would dictate another less risky course of action.

If you trace the history of the Kennedys and the behavior of the men
(date rape, skiing into trees, trophy wives, affairs with actresses,
need to prove, and angrily blaming others when something doesnt go
right), and then bounce that off the DSMV-IV diagnostic criteria for
narcissistic personality disorder, you wil find it is a near perfect
match.

Unfortunately for our industry, a large percentage of the people who
have the money to fly are highly driven, type A, take-no-prisoners
types--and these traits are often symptoms of the narcissistic
personality.

The downside includes a need to constantly prove oneself 'good enough,'
trophy seeking, and the appearance of competence being valued much more
than the actual competence itself.

I wrote an article about this that was published in Plane and Pilot ,
called "The Wrong Stuff." It is available to view on my website at
www.genehudson.com if you care to read more about this stuff.

Become a therapist and open an office in LA? You are not the first
person to have said that... others have offered that I already have
done both... I don't want to advertise it too much, though, for fear
that then *all* my time would be spend wrestling with these types! (It
is, in fact, *very* hard work--getting some of these types to 'see
through their own bs.')

And, as you point out, it only works some of the time. Probably much
less than half the time.

A couple of years ago I lost one... ex-fighter pilot, took his
commercial training from me... I thought I had really made some
progress when after many hours of pushing and pulling, I finally got
him to agree to actually use a checklist. A year later he was leading
a flight of two, 'hot-dogging' at low level in mountainous terrain; he
turned up the wrong canyon, and found he could not outclimb the
terrain, and could not turn around. Both aircraft impacted the ridge
600 feet below the pass.

The unfortunate reality of this is that he and the other pilot took
four other (trusting) souls with them into the fireball. Six lives
snuffed out--and for what? To prove that you can fly up the canyon at
low level? Big deal.

He proved it all right. So did JFK Jr. ('I can do it by myself!')

I think this is in large part the answer to the painful question raised
by the accident that started this thread; why would someone who 'knows
better' take off in conditions such that the impact could be heard, but
not seen, from a hangar a 1/4 mi away?

I bristle at the notion that the weather just 'closed in'
unexpectedly.' The aircraft was airborne for about 60 seconds. I
argue that the conditions did not change that fast. She knew fully
well she was launching into a low vis condition (IMHO).

Why would Jessica Debroff's CFI allow them to depart, over-gross, in
the summer, at a high alt airport, in a non-turboed airplane, when hail
was falling on the roof of their car as they drove to the airport, with
a huge cell sitting directly on the airport, and the 414 that departed
before them called back with a windshear report, stating that he (with
620 turbocharged hp) 'almost didnt make it?'

What are we trying to prove? Can't we re-define 'good pilot' to mean
one that has the guts to tell everyone else to 'put a sock in it, I
a-ain't a-goin'?'
I gotta get a new soapbox, I am wearging this one out.

Regards,

Gene

) wrote:

What are we trying to prove? Can't we re-define 'good pilot' to mean
one that has the guts to tell everyone else to 'put a sock in it, I
a-ain't a-goin'?'
I gotta get a new soapbox, I am wearging this one out.

I hope you stick around. During your short time here you have quickly
become one of my favorite posters.

--
Peter
700 hr instrument-rated private pilot

wrote in message
oups.com...

What are we trying to prove? Can't we re-define 'good pilot' to mean
one that has the guts to tell everyone else to 'put a sock in it, I
a-ain't a-goin'?'

Maybe my take on this is a little more cynical. I tend to think that the
people like this fighter pilot are simply unrecoverable. *Maybe* if they get
into a real close call, or a good friend of theirs buys the farm doing
something stupid, the shock will wake them up. But, if they were amenable to
reason and logic, they probably would have found it on their own long before
you got there. Like motorcycling, skydiving, rock climbing, etc., flying
attracts a certain percentage of daredevils who will take the dare too far.
Perhaps the best we can hope to do with them is limit the damage they cause.
JFK was certainly part of this group, something his mother seems to have
recognized far better than he did.

However, I find cases like this one to be much more interesting, in that you
have pilots who have displayed good decisionmaking for perhaps decades, and
one day take off, VFR, into 1/4mi viz. These cases seem to me far more
interesting in that these are presumably people who can actually be helped,
because they are willing to listen. I look at these very closely because if
my research has taught me anything, it is that I am not too good to make
this kind of mistake. In this case though, I really wonder whether this lady
didn't have something physiologically bsuted in her brain. I'm
instrument-rated and current and I wouldn't take off into those conditions,
even 1mi viz. is tighter than I prefer given my skills and equipment.
Continuing VFR into IMC on a cross-country I can understand. This one simply
defies rational analysis.

-cwk.

"Colin W Kingsbury" wrote in message
ink.net...

wrote in message
oups.com...

...in that you have pilots who have displayed good decisionmaking for
perhaps decades, and
one day take off, VFR, into 1/4mi viz.


Did you read the story? She did not take off in IMC, vis was 4sm at takeoff.