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#1
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Well, first of all this was a center controller, not a tower
controller. I don't believe that center controllers work alone in the U.S., if they do I would be surprised. Secondly, their phone system was offline and their conflict warning system was down... what, no money for backup systems? Would that happen in the U.S.? I sure hope not... Andrew Gideon wrote in message gonline.com... -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Dean Wilkinson wrote: I think that this case is a good example of why privatizing air traffic control in the U.S.A. is a bad idea. When safety takes a back seat to cost controls and profit margins, people die. What makes you think eliminating the profit issue - that is, leaving ATC in government hands - would address the type of problem that occurred at Skyguide? Having recently read the final report on a midair near KCDW a while back, I can tell you: Federal Towers leave a single overworked controller alone too. - Andrew -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.2.4 (GNU/Linux) iD8DBQFAQTdosJzG+JC8BsgRAkJFAJ966od8E03gjqn7weGVUm nsihQ9UACglOln lcOXqiCSAbyL0DqSHF7mw4c= =XavA -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- |
#2
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![]() "Dean Wilkinson" wrote in message m... Well, first of all this was a center controller, not a tower controller. I don't believe that center controllers work alone in the U.S., if they do I would be surprised. Secondly, their phone system was offline and their conflict warning system was down... what, no money for backup systems? Would that happen in the U.S.? I sure hope not... Do the airlines have redundant (backup) systems? |
#3
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Yes, most of the avionics systems on airliners have at least one
backup if they serve a critical function. Some have more. Autoland is a triple redundant system and all three boxes have to agree in order to autoland the airplane. Nav/Com radios are also triple redundant on the 777. The Air Data Intertial Reference Unit on the 777 (ADIRU) is fault-tolerant, and it is backup up by the SAARU. TCAS is also redundant on the 777. Faults are detectable by BITE software. Dean "Tom Sixkiller" wrote in message ... "Dean Wilkinson" wrote in message m... Well, first of all this was a center controller, not a tower controller. I don't believe that center controllers work alone in the U.S., if they do I would be surprised. Secondly, their phone system was offline and their conflict warning system was down... what, no money for backup systems? Would that happen in the U.S.? I sure hope not... Do the airlines have redundant (backup) systems? |
#4
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(Dean Wilkinson) wrote
Autoland is a triple redundant system and all three boxes have to agree in order to autoland the airplane. It might have been more correct to state that Autoland from a Cat III approach is a triple redundant system. I have flown many Autolands from Cat II approaches in B-727s with only one Sperry autopilot, either the SP-50 or the SP-150. It is true that this one autoland approved autopilot was equipped with an additional "roll monitor" card that became active whenever the autoland function was engaged and the aircraft was below 500'AGL and it had two elevator channels, one controlling the left elevator and the other controlling the right elevator. But, there was still just one autopilot with just one power source and receiving ILS signals from one LOC/GS receiver. Bob Moore |
#5
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Just curious guys &(or) gals,
How many airliners are equipped with Category III Autoland? Percent wise. Also how many airports are equipped to oblige them? Marty "Robert Moore" wrote in message . 7... (Dean Wilkinson) wrote Autoland is a triple redundant system and all three boxes have to agree in order to autoland the airplane. It might have been more correct to state that Autoland from a Cat III approach is a triple redundant system. I have flown many Autolands from Cat II approaches in B-727s with only one Sperry autopilot, either the SP-50 or the SP-150. It is true that this one autoland approved autopilot was equipped with an additional "roll monitor" card that became active whenever the autoland function was engaged and the aircraft was below 500'AGL and it had two elevator channels, one controlling the left elevator and the other controlling the right elevator. But, there was still just one autopilot with just one power source and receiving ILS signals from one LOC/GS receiver. Bob Moore |
#6
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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1 Dean Wilkinson wrote: Well, first of all this was a center controller, not a tower controller. I don't believe that center controllers work alone in the U.S., if they do I would be surprised. Secondly, their phone system was offline and their conflict warning system was down... what, no money for backup systems? Would that happen in the U.S.? I sure hope not... According to the NTSB report, the controller at CDW should not have been left alone. So it "should not" happen there...yet it does. Does it happen at Centers? I've no idea. But my point is that Federal ownership doesn't seem to be a silver bullet. The government can mismanage as well as anyone else. - Andrew -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.2.4 (GNU/Linux) iD8DBQFAQjhMsJzG+JC8BsgRAlGgAJ4y3oOMTgIotWSrUqZylw PBSmU2IwCgj3RB rksZWpA+5Mt+MH+nsREwRfM= =DkyX -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- |
#7
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![]() "Dean Wilkinson" wrote in message m... Well, first of all this was a center controller, not a tower controller. I don't believe that center controllers work alone in the U.S., if they do I would be surprised. Secondly, their phone system was offline and their conflict warning system was down... what, no money for backup systems? Would that happen in the U.S.? I sure hope not... 1. Center controllers do indeed work alone in the US. We shouldn't, but because we are very understaffed, we do. Two controllers per Area is the staffing number for several midnight watches in my ARTCC. We don't have both controllers on duty together all night long for an entire 8 hour shift. 2. We *routinely* operate on a back-up radar system on mid shifts while the main bang is down for maintenance. This includes long periods of time where the conflict warning system is down and a solo controller is on duty while the other controller is on break. And yes, we generally have some air traffic all night long... Safe? Your call... Chip, ZTL |
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