controller killed

angry wrote:

Yes, that's what I ment - the ATC put unnesesary pressure to the poor pilot.
By playing the "authority" too much, he forced the pilot into taking his
advice as one that is overriding, so the russian pilot flew into the other
aircraft - this is why I call the ATC murderer. If the russian pilot had
made a mistake, be it because of CRM issues or other, I could have said that
he is a fool - but he is not. That's sad!

There's no such thing as "playing authority" in the ICAO or JAA docs,
the authority is either there or it's not. And the controller couldn't
give an "overriding advice" - he didn't have anything to override, and
there's no such thing as overriding an RA by ATC anyway. The controller
acted based on the information available and the authority granted to
him, and the BAL crew should've done the same. They hadn't, and killed
their passengers, the other crew and themselves. It's sad allright.


Dima

angry wrote:

Absurd is to see people like you believe in the newspaper stories.

And just where are you getting your information, considering that no
official accident report has been released? I have enough knowledge to
know that information from the media is suspect, particularly their
opinions about what happened and who is at fault.

The ATC did made a mistake by choosing wrong altitude to advice as so to
avoid the collision.

If the Russian plane had followed the ATC instruction, and the DHL plane
had continued without descending, there would have been no collision.
The ATC instruction was incorrect in hindsight, but given the
conflicting information from the collision warning system, the Russian
pilot should have ignored the ATC instruction. Had the pilot done so,
there wouldn't have been a collision.

You are saying that he was unaware of the other aicraft - that's
absurd - he was the only one on duty and he had ALL the aicraft in
his vicinity, their course, and their altitude displayed for him
to make a decision.

He was late in asking the Russian plane to change altitude. That was
part of the problem. However, the collision warning systems are
installed on aircraft for just that eventuality, and the Russian pilot
did not use it correctly.

As far as the altitude display available to the ATC, it is not
necessarily that accurate, since it is only updated on the radar screen
about once every 12 seconds, and relies on the altimeters in each of the
aircraft for data, which can be out of calibration by a couple of
hundred feet. That is why flight levels are at least 500 feet apart, and
automatic TCAS warnings are made earlier at high altitudes.

Beyond that, yes the aircraft were flying at essentially the same
altitude, since they had entered Swiss airspace at the designated
altitudes, which were the same. The controller eventually made the
choice to ask one to descend to avoid the collision. There was nothing
wrong with that instruction by itself, other than it was a bit late.

He made the wrong one.

The ATC likely made the right one, based on the information he had at
hand. However, neither of us can be sure of that, since the official
report has yet to be released.

He further in a tone not allowing any questioning instructed
the russian pilot to obey him and ignore the onboard TCAS
instructions.

Nonsense. Pilots are routinely told to ignore ATC instructions if
following them would endanger their aircraft. In fact, the European
traffic control rules specifically state that pilots are to obey TCAS
advisories over any conflicting ATC instructions. The pilot did not
follow that rule. Pilots have absolutely no obligation to follow ATC
instructions if safety is involved.

The poor pilot did (contrary to what he should have done) and a
lot of people died as a result.

So you are now saying the pilot was primarily at fault?

That's because of the ATC's mistake and attitude.

No. In the first place, the ATC's mistake was in not asking the aircraft
to change altitude sooner. He did not make a mistake in asking the
Russian aircraft to descend, based on the information available to him,
nor was the urgency of his instruction an error, since he was trying to
avoid an imminent collision.

In saying the ATC instruction was a mistake is a gross
oversimplification of a complex set of interactions. The ATC was
certainly involved in the events that led up to the collision, but there
were many other events, such as inadequate support from the ATC's
employer, equipment that was out of service, and questionable training
of pilots on the part of the Russian airline. The ATC was likely not
even primarily to blame. This is where the official accident report will
sort out many of the conflicting events.

Did you get it this time?

I seem to have a much better understanding of the situation than you do.

And further to your earlier suggestion that the ATC instructed the
Russian plane to descend even though he knew that it was contrary to the
advisory from the aircraft's own collision avoidance system, here is a
link to the transcript of the flight data and voice recorders prepared
by the German investigators:

http://www.bfu-web.de/olderinfo/aktuinfo-e28.htm

As you can see, the controller would only have known about the DHL
aircraft descending after the pilot announced it over the radio. This
was 30 seconds after asking the Russian aircraft to descend, and less
than 13 seconds prior to the collision.

angry wrote:

Yes, that's what I ment - the ATC put unnesesary pressure to the poor pilot.

The ATC instruction was perfectly normal, and did not in itself put
unnecessary pressure on the pilot. The ATC wanted to avoid an imminent
collision. The apparently pilot did not react for something like 20
seconds after the ATC's instruction, instead continuing at the same
altitude, which is why the ATC had to repeat it with greater urgency.

By playing the "authority" too much, he forced the pilot into taking his
advice as one that is overriding, so the russian pilot flew into the other
aircraft -

The ATC did not force the pilot into taking his advice. If the pilot
had proper training, he would be able to sort out conflicting
instructions. That is not the ATC responsibility.

this is why I call the ATC murderer.

As I said before, murder is premeditated. The ATC did not plan on
killing anybody. You are therefore wrong not only on your
interpretation of the events leading up to the accident, but wrong in
the use of that word.

If the russian pilot had made a mistake, be it because of CRM
issues or other, I could have said that he is a fool - but
he is not. That's sad!

How can you come to that conclusion? The events as reported so far are
somewhat sketchy, and there certainly hasn't been any official report
issued that reviews the individual actions of the ATC or pilots, nor can
we be sure that the TCAS functioned properly when both planes started to
descend. (The latest TCAS systems are supposed to change RA if one of
the aircraft doesn't respond as it should.) Therefore, you cannot come
to any conclusions whatsoever about who was right or who was wrong,
except for misinformed ones.

I see that both you and I are bieased - I know that I am seeing things in
this light because I hate ATC's "policeman" attitude, irrespective of the
cisrcumstances... I have been a victim of similar attitude, fortunatelty I
am here, angry, but allive and kicking...

So let's get the facts straight -

The ATC instructed the russians to descend as part of the approachg for
landing procedure. At that time, he claims that he did not noticed the
conflict situation because the radar warning system was not operational -
this is bull, as that system is there as an aural warning, and an alert ATC
should have noticed that situation developping himself, not waiting for the
radar to ring a bell to him about it...

The desent instruction coinsided with the TCAS warning and the subsequent
RA. Although the ATC mentiones that there is a potential conflict in his
descent instruction, he fails to advise that the conflict is and will remain
on same FL, he never issues instruction to the DHL traffic although all are
on the same FRQ - that misfortunately makes the russion pilot stay put as he
has to figure out what to do - to to follow the RA (climb) or to follow the
ATC (descent)

The ATC has a 5 sec update (not 12) and the Mode C data error is +/- 100 ft,
sufficiently accurate. At the time the ATC issues his second "expedite"
instruction, the ATC fails to notice that the DHL traffic already has
desended halfway trough - still, no radio contact with the DHL traffic, no
instructions to maintain assigned FL, no query "hey, where are you
going..." - although that information is available cleraly on his radar for
almost 45 sec and the picture is there to show that the DHL is descending
from FL360 into his "other" trafic that he just instructed to descend to
FL350!

Under the pressure, the russion pilot finally decides to follow the ATC
instruction and descend. 30 sec after that decision they collide - now, I
want to know what the stupid ATC was doing for that time - 30 seconds - was
not he seeing on his radar screen ( 6 x 5 sec updates) that the he just
forced one aicraft to descent into another one that was descending on it's
own. Surely he could have just open his mouth and call the DHL traffic and
stop him. Or he could have just open his mouth and changed the clearence to
the russian guy. Or just open his mouth and say something, anything that
would give a clue to the both pilots that they are heading on a collision
course.
You see, the ATC was the only one that had a whole clear picture in front of
him and his job was to keep the things separated and not colliding with each
other... He failed... He should not have...

That's the way I see it.


"James Robinson" wrote in message
...
angry wrote:

Absurd is to see people like you believe in the newspaper stories.

And just where are you getting your information, considering that no
official accident report has been released? I have enough knowledge to
know that information from the media is suspect, particularly their
opinions about what happened and who is at fault.

The ATC did made a mistake by choosing wrong altitude to advice as so to
avoid the collision.

If the Russian plane had followed the ATC instruction, and the DHL plane
had continued without descending, there would have been no collision.
The ATC instruction was incorrect in hindsight, but given the
conflicting information from the collision warning system, the Russian
pilot should have ignored the ATC instruction. Had the pilot done so,
there wouldn't have been a collision.

You are saying that he was unaware of the other aicraft - that's
absurd - he was the only one on duty and he had ALL the aicraft in
his vicinity, their course, and their altitude displayed for him
to make a decision.

He was late in asking the Russian plane to change altitude. That was
part of the problem. However, the collision warning systems are
installed on aircraft for just that eventuality, and the Russian pilot
did not use it correctly.

As far as the altitude display available to the ATC, it is not
necessarily that accurate, since it is only updated on the radar screen
about once every 12 seconds, and relies on the altimeters in each of the
aircraft for data, which can be out of calibration by a couple of
hundred feet. That is why flight levels are at least 500 feet apart, and
automatic TCAS warnings are made earlier at high altitudes.

Beyond that, yes the aircraft were flying at essentially the same
altitude, since they had entered Swiss airspace at the designated
altitudes, which were the same. The controller eventually made the
choice to ask one to descend to avoid the collision. There was nothing
wrong with that instruction by itself, other than it was a bit late.

He made the wrong one.

The ATC likely made the right one, based on the information he had at
hand. However, neither of us can be sure of that, since the official
report has yet to be released.

He further in a tone not allowing any questioning instructed
the russian pilot to obey him and ignore the onboard TCAS
instructions.

Nonsense. Pilots are routinely told to ignore ATC instructions if
following them would endanger their aircraft. In fact, the European
traffic control rules specifically state that pilots are to obey TCAS
advisories over any conflicting ATC instructions. The pilot did not
follow that rule. Pilots have absolutely no obligation to follow ATC
instructions if safety is involved.

The poor pilot did (contrary to what he should have done) and a
lot of people died as a result.

So you are now saying the pilot was primarily at fault?

That's because of the ATC's mistake and attitude.

No. In the first place, the ATC's mistake was in not asking the aircraft
to change altitude sooner. He did not make a mistake in asking the
Russian aircraft to descend, based on the information available to him,
nor was the urgency of his instruction an error, since he was trying to
avoid an imminent collision.

In saying the ATC instruction was a mistake is a gross
oversimplification of a complex set of interactions. The ATC was
certainly involved in the events that led up to the collision, but there
were many other events, such as inadequate support from the ATC's
employer, equipment that was out of service, and questionable training
of pilots on the part of the Russian airline. The ATC was likely not
even primarily to blame. This is where the official accident report will
sort out many of the conflicting events.

Did you get it this time?

I seem to have a much better understanding of the situation than you do.

And further to your earlier suggestion that the ATC instructed the
Russian plane to descend even though he knew that it was contrary to the
advisory from the aircraft's own collision avoidance system, here is a
link to the transcript of the flight data and voice recorders prepared
by the German investigators:

http://www.bfu-web.de/olderinfo/aktuinfo-e28.htm

As you can see, the controller would only have known about the DHL
aircraft descending after the pilot announced it over the radio. This
was 30 seconds after asking the Russian aircraft to descend, and less
than 13 seconds prior to the collision.

I see that both you and I are bieased - I know that I am seeing things in
this light because I hate ATC's "policeman" attitude, irrespective of the
cisrcumstances... I have been a victim of similar attitude, fortunatelty I
am here, angry, but allive and kicking...

So let's get the facts straight -

The ATC instructed the russians to descend as part of the approachg for
landing procedure. At that time, he claims that he did not noticed the
conflict situation because the radar warning system was not operational -
this is bull, as that system is there as an aural warning, and an alert ATC
should have noticed that situation developping himself, not waiting for the
radar to ring a bell to him about it...

The desent instruction coinsided with the TCAS warning and the subsequent
RA. Although the ATC mentiones that there is a potential conflict in his
descent instruction, he fails to advise that the conflict is and will remain
on same FL, he never issues instruction to the DHL traffic although all are
on the same FRQ - that misfortunately makes the russion pilot stay put as he
has to figure out what to do - to to follow the RA (climb) or to follow the
ATC (descent)

The ATC has a 5 sec update (not 12) and the Mode C data error is +/- 100 ft,
sufficiently accurate. At the time the ATC issues his second "expedite"
instruction, the ATC fails to notice that the DHL traffic already has
desended halfway trough - still, no radio contact with the DHL traffic, no
instructions to maintain assigned FL, no query "hey, where are you
going..." - although that information is available cleraly on his radar for
almost 45 sec and the picture is there to show that the DHL is descending
from FL360 into his "other" trafic that he just instructed to descend to
FL350!

Under the pressure, the russion pilot finally decides to follow the ATC
instruction and descend. 30 sec after that decision they collide - now, I
want to know what the stupid ATC was doing for that time - 30 seconds - was
not he seeing on his radar screen ( 6 x 5 sec updates) that the he just
forced one aicraft to descent into another one that was descending on it's
own. Surely he could have just open his mouth and call the DHL traffic and
stop him. Or he could have just open his mouth and changed the clearence to
the russian guy. Or just open his mouth and say something, anything that
would give a clue to the both pilots that they are heading on a collision
course.
You see, the ATC was the only one that had a whole clear picture in front of
him and his job was to keep the things separated and not colliding with each
other... He failed... He should not have...

That's the way I see it.


"James Robinson" wrote in message
...
angry wrote:

Absurd is to see people like you believe in the newspaper stories.

And just where are you getting your information, considering that no
official accident report has been released? I have enough knowledge to
know that information from the media is suspect, particularly their
opinions about what happened and who is at fault.

The ATC did made a mistake by choosing wrong altitude to advice as so to
avoid the collision.

If the Russian plane had followed the ATC instruction, and the DHL plane
had continued without descending, there would have been no collision.
The ATC instruction was incorrect in hindsight, but given the
conflicting information from the collision warning system, the Russian
pilot should have ignored the ATC instruction. Had the pilot done so,
there wouldn't have been a collision.

You are saying that he was unaware of the other aicraft - that's
absurd - he was the only one on duty and he had ALL the aicraft in
his vicinity, their course, and their altitude displayed for him
to make a decision.

He was late in asking the Russian plane to change altitude. That was
part of the problem. However, the collision warning systems are
installed on aircraft for just that eventuality, and the Russian pilot
did not use it correctly.

As far as the altitude display available to the ATC, it is not
necessarily that accurate, since it is only updated on the radar screen
about once every 12 seconds, and relies on the altimeters in each of the
aircraft for data, which can be out of calibration by a couple of
hundred feet. That is why flight levels are at least 500 feet apart, and
automatic TCAS warnings are made earlier at high altitudes.

Beyond that, yes the aircraft were flying at essentially the same
altitude, since they had entered Swiss airspace at the designated
altitudes, which were the same. The controller eventually made the
choice to ask one to descend to avoid the collision. There was nothing
wrong with that instruction by itself, other than it was a bit late.

He made the wrong one.

The ATC likely made the right one, based on the information he had at
hand. However, neither of us can be sure of that, since the official
report has yet to be released.

He further in a tone not allowing any questioning instructed
the russian pilot to obey him and ignore the onboard TCAS
instructions.

Nonsense. Pilots are routinely told to ignore ATC instructions if
following them would endanger their aircraft. In fact, the European
traffic control rules specifically state that pilots are to obey TCAS
advisories over any conflicting ATC instructions. The pilot did not
follow that rule. Pilots have absolutely no obligation to follow ATC
instructions if safety is involved.

The poor pilot did (contrary to what he should have done) and a
lot of people died as a result.

So you are now saying the pilot was primarily at fault?

That's because of the ATC's mistake and attitude.

No. In the first place, the ATC's mistake was in not asking the aircraft
to change altitude sooner. He did not make a mistake in asking the
Russian aircraft to descend, based on the information available to him,
nor was the urgency of his instruction an error, since he was trying to
avoid an imminent collision.

In saying the ATC instruction was a mistake is a gross
oversimplification of a complex set of interactions. The ATC was
certainly involved in the events that led up to the collision, but there
were many other events, such as inadequate support from the ATC's
employer, equipment that was out of service, and questionable training
of pilots on the part of the Russian airline. The ATC was likely not
even primarily to blame. This is where the official accident report will
sort out many of the conflicting events.

Did you get it this time?

I seem to have a much better understanding of the situation than you do.

And further to your earlier suggestion that the ATC instructed the
Russian plane to descend even though he knew that it was contrary to the
advisory from the aircraft's own collision avoidance system, here is a
link to the transcript of the flight data and voice recorders prepared
by the German investigators:

http://www.bfu-web.de/olderinfo/aktuinfo-e28.htm

As you can see, the controller would only have known about the DHL
aircraft descending after the pilot announced it over the radio. This
was 30 seconds after asking the Russian aircraft to descend, and less
than 13 seconds prior to the collision.

angry wrote:

I see that both you and I are bieased -

Perhaps, if you consider my desire to wait for the full story from the
official accident report before blaming anyone to be a bias.

I know that I am seeing things in this light because I hate ATC's
"policeman" attitude, irrespective of the cisrcumstances... I have
been a victim of similar attitude, fortunatelty I am here, angry,
but allive and kicking...

So they are simply guilty before all the facts have been collected and
sorted out.

So let's get the facts straight -

Unfortunately, your "facts" are not correct again. Hence the need to
wait for the accident report.

The ATC instructed the russians to descend as part of the approachg for
landing procedure. At that time, he claims that he did not noticed the
conflict situation because the radar warning system was not operational -
this is bull, as that system is there as an aural warning, and an alert ATC
should have noticed that situation developping himself, not waiting for the
radar to ring a bell to him about it...

The transcript of the CVR and FDRs on both aircraft indicate that the
first instruction the ATC gave was to the Russian plane to descend to
avoid the traffic. They still had a long way to go to Barcelona, so it
would be too early for starting a descent.

It is also clear that the controller was distracted, since he was
talking on a telephone.

Yes, an alert ATC should have noticed the conflict. However, backup
alarms are provided as a safety precaution. Alert pilots should never
execute a CFIT, land with gear retracted, or try to take off in a DC-9
without flaps, either. Alarms are often provided to reduce the risk of
those things happening.

The issue is that there were a number of reported problems at Skyguide,
which might have "set up" the ATC, such that an accident was
inevitable. First, the conflict warning system was inoperable; then,
there was only one controller handling the aircraft at the time, even
though there are supposed to be two when the conflict warning system was
inoperable; finally, there was only one phone line available, so German
controllers who saw the impending conflict could not contact their
Skyguide counterpart to warn him. Given those problems, how much
responsibility does the ATC's employer share in the tragedy?

The desent instruction coinsided with the TCAS warning and the subsequent
RA. Although the ATC mentiones that there is a potential conflict in his
descent instruction, he fails to advise that the conflict is and will remain
on same FL, he never issues instruction to the DHL traffic although all are
on the same FRQ - that misfortunately makes the russion pilot stay put as he
has to figure out what to do - to to follow the RA (climb) or to follow the
ATC (descent)

Yes, but the Russian pilot should not have needed to hesitate. He
should have followed the TCAS RA without any need to think about it.
That is an additional question about the accident - why did the Russian
pilot take the action he did? You can't blame the ATC for what the pilot
chose to do.

The ATC has a 5 sec update (not 12)

The updates are indeed 12 seconds on the Skyguide radar, based on the
sweep of their secondary radar antenna. There are a number of sources
for that, including a report released only one week prior to the
collision by the Swiss accident investigation branch. Skyguide was
planning to upgrade their radar systems to at least meet European
recommendations of a minimum of 8 second updates, but had not yet done
so. This would allow the implementation of reduced vertical separation
standards.

and the Mode C data error is +/- 100 ft,
sufficiently accurate. At the time the ATC issues his second "expedite"
instruction, the ATC fails to notice that the DHL traffic already has
desended halfway trough - still, no radio contact with the DHL traffic, no
instructions to maintain assigned FL, no query "hey, where are you
going..." - although that information is available cleraly on his radar for
almost 45 sec and the picture is there to show that the DHL is descending
from FL360 into his "other" trafic that he just instructed to descend to
FL350!

You are being optimistic about what the controller can see. Given the
12 second update interval, and the 100 foot resolution of display, he
wouldn't be confident of any change for two or three sweeps of the
radar. I understand that ATC are often told not to be confident about
any information until that information has been updated twice, since
they sometimes get data with errors, which is corrected at the next
pass.

Under the pressure, the russion pilot finally decides to follow the ATC
instruction and descend.

Yet you have no criticism of the Russian pilot, even though an automatic
system has given him a clear warning? I ask that, recognizing that
there is some controversy about what pilots will do when ATC and TCAS
instructions conflict, though the JAA policies are quite clear on the
subject - the pilot should have followed the TCAS RA, and not the ATC
instruction.

30 sec after that decision they collide - now, I want to know
what the stupid ATC was doing for that time - 30 seconds - was not
he seeing on his radar screen ( 6 x 5 sec updates)

Again, the Skyguard radar sweeps are 12 seconds apart. He would only
have seen one or two updates before the collision was inevitable. It
also appears that the DHL pilot only announced that he had a TCAS RA,
and was descending, at about 13 seconds prior to the collision. This
was the first the ATC would have known about the RA, and it was too late
for the controller to take any further action.

that the he just forced one aicraft to descent into another one
that was descending on it's own. Surely he could have just open
his mouth and call the DHL traffic and stop him.

Based on the CVR information, he didn't force the Russian captain to do
anything. The captain made the decision to descend, and instructed the
first officer to do so, even though the first officer questioned the
decision. Hence the delay in beginning the descent, while they
discussed what to do. That opens up the questions of CRM and training.

As far as the ATC calling the DHL aircraft to stop its descent, if I was
the pilot on that aircraft, I would have completely ignored the ATC
instruction, and increased my rate of descent in accordance with the RA
I was getting from TCAS. That clearly is the training.

That brings up the question of what the TCAS system was doing. Both
aircraft were supposedly equipped with the latest version - TCAS II,
version 7 - which is supposed to alter the RA if one of the aircraft
does not do what it is instructed. In this case, why didn't that system
provide an RA to the DHL aircraft to stop descending and climb when the
Russian aircraft descended contrary to its RA?

Or he could have just open his mouth and changed the clearence to
the russian guy. Or just open his mouth and say something, anything that
would give a clue to the both pilots that they are heading on a collision
course.

He did give an instruction to avoid the collision. If the Russian
aircraft had descended, and the DHL remained at its assigned altitude,
there wouldn't have been a collision. With the 12 second sweep of the
radar, by the time he would have been sure the DHL aircraft was also
descending, it was too late to do anything.

You see, the ATC was the only one that had a whole clear picture in front of
him and his job was to keep the things separated and not colliding with each
other... He failed... He should not have...

The ATC did not have a full picture, since he did not have any
information about what the TCAS systems were telling the pilots.

That's the way I see it.

You are still prejudging the results of the accident investigation based
on erroneous information and assumptions. There is a whole list of
events that shouldn't have happened they way they did, and certainly the
ATC's late instruction was one of them, but so were the policies of
Skyguide, the way the TCAS system reacted, the training of the crew on
the Russian airliner, and the political divisions that require
fragmented ATC over Europe. Again, that is what the accident report will
sort out. Wait for it before assigning blame. I certainly don't know who
is at fault. I have many questions, but won't make any judgment until
the report is released.

angry wrote:

So let's get the facts straight -

The ATC instructed the russians to descend as part of the approach for
landing procedure.

The russians were going to Barcelona, which is 600 nautical miles from
the collision point. This would be a fairly long landing prcedure. So
much to your unbiased, straight facts. I think I'll skip the rest.

Stefan