Cirrus BRS deployments - Alan Klapmeier's comments on NPR

Richard,

but rather to a
discussion of what specific situations are appropriate to pull the chute and
what situations are not appropriate.


Yep. IF we can agree that to have the chute as an option is a good thing. THEN
we can start discussing when to pull it. And that will vary from pilot to
pilot. And as for the two accidents - we don't know enough about them to judge
it.

--
Thomas Borchert (EDDH)

Unfortunately, you are buying into exactly the reasons for the Cirrus' poor
history.

First, the chute is not an option, it is a necessity. When the airplane
reaches a particular state or meets a certain set of parameters, your only
possible course of action is to deploy the BRS. When you reach a particular
state, if you are in an Archer or a 172, you can recover. But if you are in
a Cirrus, you absolutely must deploy the BRS; there is no recovery.

Second, you made the statement: "THEN we can start discussing when to pull
it (the chute)." Unfortunately, it is not a matter that can be discussed.
Again, when the airplane reaches a particular state or meets a certain set
of parameters, your only possible course of action is to deploy the BRS.
There is no room for discussion.

Now let me give you an example that is in no way indicative of the operation
of the Cirrus. You go out to fly a new airplane. On the panel is a placard
reading: "Nose-up angles greater than 30 degrees will render this aircraft
uncontrollable and control cannot be regained. The BRS must be deployed
immediately or it will not be effective". So, you're flying along and exceed
a 30 degree nose-up attitude, and you get a warning horn. A panel scan tells
you that you have exceeded the allowed angle. So what do you do?

Unfortunately, at least half of the pilots will say: "This is bull****! I
can recover from a 30 degree nose up attitude! So they try to recover,
discover that the placard was correct, and deploy the BRS. And they find out
the placard is correct again; they have deployed the BRS too late for it to
be effective, and they end up breaking the airplane.

There's really not a problem with the Cirrus, the problem is with pilots who
either didn't educate themselves about the airplane, or who think they know
more than the people who designed and built the plane.



"Thomas Borchert" wrote in message
...
Richard,

but rather to a
discussion of what specific situations are appropriate to pull the chute
and
what situations are not appropriate.


Yep. IF we can agree that to have the chute as an option is a good thing.
THEN
we can start discussing when to pull it. And that will vary from pilot to
pilot. And as for the two accidents - we don't know enough about them to
judge
it.

--
Thomas Borchert (EDDH)

"Bill Denton" wrote in message
...
Unfortunately, you are buying into exactly the reasons for the Cirrus'
poor
history.

First, the chute is not an option, it is a necessity. When the airplane
reaches a particular state or meets a certain set of parameters, your only
possible course of action is to deploy the BRS. When you reach a
particular
state, if you are in an Archer or a 172, you can recover. But if you are
in
a Cirrus, you absolutely must deploy the BRS; there is no recovery.

Second, you made the statement: "THEN we can start discussing when to pull
it (the chute)." Unfortunately, it is not a matter that can be discussed.
Again, when the airplane reaches a particular state or meets a certain set
of parameters, your only possible course of action is to deploy the BRS.
There is no room for discussion.

Now let me give you an example that is in no way indicative of the
operation
of the Cirrus. You go out to fly a new airplane. On the panel is a placard
reading: "Nose-up angles greater than 30 degrees will render this aircraft
uncontrollable and control cannot be regained. The BRS must be deployed
immediately or it will not be effective". So, you're flying along and
exceed
a 30 degree nose-up attitude, and you get a warning horn. A panel scan
tells
you that you have exceeded the allowed angle. So what do you do?

I would leave before anyone has a chance to reach for the start switch.

Bill Denton wrote:

There's really not a problem with the Cirrus, the problem is with pilots who
either didn't educate themselves about the airplane, or who think they know
more than the people who designed and built the plane.

Maybe, but the time-honored solution to that type of problem is to quit building or
buying planes like that.

George Patterson
This marriage is off to a shaky start. The groom just asked the band to
play "Your cheatin' heart", and the bride just requested "Don't come home
a'drinkin' with lovin' on your mind".

Unfortunately, if we followed your solution, everyone would still be lying
down on the wing to pilot a fabric-covered canard that needed a rail to take
off.

Almost every technological advance requires additional training, resulting
in an upgrade in skills and mindset. Consider the transition from props to
jets. I doubt if many pilots (other than the test pilots) made the
transition without additional training.

The Cirrus is not necessarily a dangerous airplane; it is a different
airplane, that looks a lot like many other GA airplanes. Which it isn't. Too
many pilots think they can just skim the POH and go. I read an article last
night that indicated that by offering additional training, Cirrus has been
able to make major inroads in it's accident problems.

Now, the inevitable analogy:

When antilock brake systems for automobiles first began achieving widespread
market penetration, the number of accidents involving police cars increased
dramatically. There were three primary reasons for this:

Exposure - Police officers drive a lot, and much of it is stop and go
driving.

Conditions - Police officers frequently drive at high speeds, which require
"hard stops". And they frequently drive on roads in less than optimal
conditions (maintenance, weather, etc.).

Training - Police officers were trained to "pump" the brakes, a technique
that causes ABS to work with even less efficiency than conventional brakes.

So, police departments implemented re-training programs that taught the
officers both to apply steady pressure to the brake pedal, and helped them
break their old pattern of pumping the brakes.

The accident rate returned to close to previous levels.

And this is analogous to the Cirrus situation. It requires retraining, but
given the proper training it's not an especially dangerous aircraft...




"G.R. Patterson III" wrote in message
...


Bill Denton wrote:

There's really not a problem with the Cirrus, the problem is with pilots
who
either didn't educate themselves about the airplane, or who think they
know
more than the people who designed and built the plane.

Maybe, but the time-honored solution to that type of problem is to quit
building or
buying planes like that.

George Patterson
This marriage is off to a shaky start. The groom just asked the band
to
play "Your cheatin' heart", and the bride just requested "Don't come
home
a'drinkin' with lovin' on your mind".

"Bill Denton" wrote
Now, the inevitable analogy:

When antilock brake systems for automobiles first began achieving widespread
market penetration, the number of accidents involving police cars increased
dramatically. There were three primary reasons for this:

Exposure - Police officers drive a lot, and much of it is stop and go
driving.

Conditions - Police officers frequently drive at high speeds, which require
"hard stops". And they frequently drive on roads in less than optimal
conditions (maintenance, weather, etc.).

Training - Police officers were trained to "pump" the brakes, a technique
that causes ABS to work with even less efficiency than conventional brakes.

So, police departments implemented re-training programs that taught the
officers both to apply steady pressure to the brake pedal, and helped them
break their old pattern of pumping the brakes.

The accident rate returned to close to previous levels.

Yes, it's a great analogy. A supposed safety advance was introduced
into the cars. After retraining, the result was almost as safe (not
safer) as what it replaced, and more expensive to boot. Without
retraining, it was a lot more dangerous. What was the advantage
again?

And this is analogous to the Cirrus situation. It requires retraining, but
given the proper training it's not an especially dangerous aircraft...

But it's supposed to be a safer aircraft than what we fly. It was
supposedly designed for safety. Now we think that maybe with
sufficient retraining it won't be especially dangerous.

Michael

" "Bill Denton" wrote
And this is analogous to the Cirrus situation. It requires retraining,
but
given the proper training it's not an especially dangerous aircraft...


The Cirrus was touted to be safer than all the other airplanes. Now we find
out it is 300% more lethal than the Cessna 182S.

Howdy!

In article ,
Michael wrote:
"Bill Denton" wrote

[snip ABS and police]

The accident rate returned to close to previous levels.

Yes, it's a great analogy. A supposed safety advance was introduced
into the cars. After retraining, the result was almost as safe (not
safer) as what it replaced, and more expensive to boot. Without
retraining, it was a lot more dangerous. What was the advantage
again?

Would you care to cite some independent corroboration for the columny you
offer? What is "less safe" about ABS?

Bill Denton spoke of how it caused *police officers* problems, but not
the general driving public.

Or are you just opposed to any safety advance?

And this is analogous to the Cirrus situation. It requires retraining, but
given the proper training it's not an especially dangerous aircraft...

But it's supposed to be a safer aircraft than what we fly. It was
supposedly designed for safety. Now we think that maybe with
sufficient retraining it won't be especially dangerous.

....no more dangerous than any other light single...or are you just picking
out a phrase to hilight it with (implied) scare quotes? Bad troll. No
biscuit.

yours,
Michael


--
Michael and MJ Houghton | Herveus d'Ormonde and Megan O'Donnelly
| White Wolf and the Phoenix
Bowie, MD, USA | Tablet and Inkle bands, and other stuff
| http://www.radix.net/~herveus/

(Michael Houghton) wrote
Bill Denton spoke of how it caused *police officers* problems, but not
the general driving public.

Police officers have pretty much the worst accident records of anyone.
Of course no small part of it is the fact that they have a legitimate
reason to drive agressively (chasing down murderers) whereas most
drivers don't. Still, if there is a problem, that's where it's going
to show up first.

It took insurance companies years to decide that ABS didn't warrant a
discount. It just looked so good on paper. This was a good early
indication.

Or are you just opposed to any safety advance?

Ah, that must be it. I must be anti-safety.

But it's supposed to be a safer aircraft than what we fly. It was
supposedly designed for safety. Now we think that maybe with
sufficient retraining it won't be especially dangerous.

...no more dangerous than any other light single...

Yes it is more dangerous than MOST other light singles. It has over
THREE TIMES the fatality rate of the new C-182's - and the C-182's are
basically an old, warmed-over design. The Cirrus is supposedly
designed for safety.

Michael

"Michael" wrote in message
om...

But it's supposed to be a safer aircraft than what we fly. It was
supposedly designed for safety. Now we think that maybe with
sufficient retraining it won't be especially dangerous.

Do you know why/how AOPA stated in today's Epilot newletter that the Cirrus
is as safe as the 172/182? The recent stats from Aviation Safety (BEFORE
the recent fatal accident this week) showed it clearly had a worse safety
record.

Is AOPA being less than objective here in order to suit some politically
correct agenda?

--------------------
Richard Kaplan, CFII

www.flyimc.com