Boeing Niner Zero Niner AwwwYEAH!

wrote in message
...
On 19 Jun 2004 00:08:13 GMT, (No Such User) wrote:
Arthur Harris insisted right up to the end of the war that his bombers
bomb city centers as the most effective method of bringing the war to
the Germans and shorten it, if not cause them to surrender.

He was mistaken. For instance, when Hamburg was bombed in late 1943,
Bomber Command managed to create the worlds first "firestorm" with
it's bombing tactics. The blaze wiped out the center of Hamburg and
killed many thousands of people. Gale force winds feeding the raging
fire were so powerful they literally ripped babies from mothers arms
and wafted them into the blaze.

But did the damage halt Hamburg from producing war materials? Maybe
for a week or two.

http://www.wordiq.com/definition/Strategic_bombing

Read the bit under "Effectiveness". While the bombing was wildly
inaccurate (this was known at the time, that's why tactics were
switched to area bombing) it was relentless, with the British bombing
at night, the Americans in the day. German survivors said it had a
huge affect on them...the couldn't work effectively and were constantly
tired and weary. There was a huge diversion of resources.

Production may have increased, but the bombing ensured that the "new"
German weapons of mass destruction didn't come on-line or were
severely limited. One of the aircraft under development allegedly went to
South America (or the plans did) after the war only to be copied (allegedly)
by the Soviets. This became the Mig 15.

The relentless bombing was all part of the "total war" that was being
unleashed upon Germany.

http://makeashorterlink.com/?F30934F98

This makes interesting reading if anyone has the time to read it!

Inhuman? Yes. Ineffective? No.

Paul

Paul Sengupta wrote:

Read the bit under "Effectiveness". While the bombing was wildly
inaccurate (this was known at the time, that's why tactics were
switched to area bombing) ....

And, as Bert Harris pointed out (with tongue firmly in cheek), the Americans also
opted for area bombing just as soon as they had a big enough bomb.

George Patterson
None of us is as dumb as all of us.

"Paul Sengupta" wrote in message

Read the bit under "Effectiveness". While the bombing was wildly
inaccurate (this was known at the time, that's why tactics were
switched to area bombing) it was relentless, with the British bombing
at night, the Americans in the day.

It's also relevant to point out that the allies DID aim for and strike
specific targets such as sub pens, shipyards and heavy water plants that
would have, in fact, impaired the german war machine more than bombing an
oilfield, railyard or even a ball bearing factory. U-boats didn't get built
overnight, and the strikes on the heavy water facilities would be more
historically noteworthy, perhaps, had they not happened, allowing that
technology to develop.

The 96th sent half its group out looking for the battleship Scharnhorst, but
couldn't find it through the overcast so IIRC they bombed Gdynia, Poland
instead.

-c

On Tue, 22 Jun 2004 16:28:07 +0100, "Paul Sengupta"
wrote:

Inhuman? Yes. Ineffective? No.

If it was effective, why did Germany manage to produce the greatest
amount of war related materials late in the war when the Allied
bombing was at it's greatest effectiveness? Shouldn't things have
been the other way around?

Corky Scott

Granted, I'm no WWII historian, so I don't know how the analysis comes out,
but...

wrote in message
...
Inhuman? Yes. Ineffective? No.

If it was effective, why did Germany manage to produce the greatest
amount of war related materials late in the war when the Allied
bombing was at it's greatest effectiveness? Shouldn't things have
been the other way around?

You cannot simply look at the German production numbers and claim that
because they were higher at one point in time than an earlier point in time,
the bombing was ineffective. It's entirely possible that their production
would have been even higher than it was, if not for the bombing.

If you use the reasoning that production would be constant, and you can
judge the effectiveness of the bombing by the production change over time,
then the conclusion one must arrive at is that the bombing actually *helped*
Germany's production. Obviously that's not the case.

So, given that Germany took steps to increase production in spite of the
bombing, it's not possible to say just by looking at the total production
numbers that the bombing wasn't effective. You need to look at what
Germany's production would have been without the bombing.

That's where someone like you, with your obviously greater interest and time
spent researching the events of WWII comes in. I don't know what Germany's
production would have been without the bombing. That said, assuming the
bombs did manage to hit any component of Germany's production stream, it
seems to me it should be taken as obvious that the bombs hurt the production
stream, and that production would have been even higher had the bombing not
occurred.

Pete

"Peter Duniho" wrote in message

You cannot simply look at the German production numbers and claim that
because they were higher at one point in time than an earlier point in
time,
the bombing was ineffective. It's entirely possible that their production
would have been even higher than it was, if not for the bombing.

That's what I think. The Germans used disposable slave labor so bombing
railyards just caused delays while they rounded up more prisoners to do the
repairs, BUT, it can be argued, every factory that was built was X-number of
fighter planes, tanks, bullets, ball bearings, rifles, submarines or other
equipment that didn't make it to the front line to reenforce the German
forces. If the bombing campaign did nothing but curtail the growth or
resupply of the German infantry and Panzer divisions, it saved American
lives on the ground.

I have photographs of bf109s destroyed in the factories by allied bombing
raids. Those 109s never left the ground to shoot down folks like my
grandfather, so calling the air campaign a complete failure is a disservice
to not only the guys who endured the flak guns and FW-190s and Me262s in the
air war, but the guys on the ground who didn't have to face those Tigers,
artillery, etc.
-c

gatt wrote:

If the bombing campaign did nothing but curtail the growth or
resupply of the German infantry and Panzer divisions, it saved American
lives on the ground.

And it did much more than that. Hundreds of the best pilots and aircraft were
withdrawn from the Russian front during Operation Barbarossa to attempt to counter
the growing daylight bombing campaign in the west. Hundreds of thousands of artillery
pieces were devoted to anti-aircraft batteries instead of being sent to the front
lines as anti-tank guns (the difference between an 88mm FLAK and 88mm PAK was
negligible). One week of the daylight bombing campaign was devoted simply to drawing
the Luftwaffe up for our fighters to ensure that none of them could interfere with
D-day. Without that effort, it's quite possible that we could not have remained in
France for long.

George Patterson
None of us is as dumb as all of us.

On Wed, 23 Jun 2004 13:13:26 -0700, "gatt"
wrote:

I have photographs of bf109s destroyed in the factories by allied bombing
raids. Those 109s never left the ground to shoot down folks like my
grandfather, so calling the air campaign a complete failure is a disservice
to not only the guys who endured the flak guns and FW-190s and Me262s in the
air war, but the guys on the ground who didn't have to face those Tigers,
artillery, etc.

Please, no one called the bombing a complete failure. What was a
failure was the concept of strategic bombing, as conceptualized by
people like Billy Mitchell and Giulio Douhet and fully believed by Hap
Arnold and Ira Eaker. They believed that strategic bombing would
cause such terror and destruction in the enemy camp, that they would
surrender. That bombing their vital war making industries would cause
the Wermacht to shrivel on the vine for lack of supplies. That idea
proved a failure in the crucible of war, except for the oil campaign
and the destruction of the transportation system (which was carried
out most effectively by marauding fighter bombers, not strategic
bombers), and the oil campaign wasn't actually part of the original
plan.

What also was a failure was the fanciful idea that bombers could
protect themselves against intercepters. In 1943, the AAF even
developed a purely defensive version of the B-17 called the YB-40. It
had an extra power turret where the radio operator normally stood, a
power chin turret and each waist position sported dual 50 caliber
machine guns rather than singles. That gave it 14 heavy machine guns.
Plus, it had added armor around the engines and to protect the gunners
and pilots, and a LOT more ammunition, but no bombs. The idea was for
this flying pillbox to accompany the squadrons and lend it's massive
firepower to their protection. Didn't work. The bomber was as heavy
as the normally loaded B-17F's with their bombloads. When the normal
bombers dropped their loads over the target, they suddenly became 4 to
5 thousand pounds lighter, but the YB-40's didn't. The normal bombers
turned off the target and opened up their throttles to get the hell
out of there, and the YB-40's couldn't keep up. They were quietly
retired after a few months of evaluation. The chin turret, however,
was deemed a success and was installed in the next model of B-17, the
G.

A little talked about problem with the massive formations of bombers
was the apparently frequent collateral damage from friendly fire as
the gunners hosed bullets all over the sky in a desperate effort to
protect themselves from the German fighters which often passed by
missing by mere feet occasionally. With so many airplanes occupying
airspace in so narrow an area and the speed with which the fighters
approached and flashed by, it's not surprising that the counter fire
would hit neighboring bombers accidentally. I know of no statistics
covering this situation, but it was apparently so serious a problem
that by the middle of 1944, the waist gunners were reduced from two to
one, and eventually to none. The bombardier, unless he was the lead
or deputy bombardier, really did not need to be trained to aim bombs
because only the lead bomber in each group actually did the aiming,
all the rest of the bombers dropped on his signal, or when they
sighted the bombs dropping from the lead bomber. So he became a
gunner/toggler. By that time as we all know, the bombers were being
protected all the way to the target by P-51's so high command may have
decided to kill two birds with one stone: eliminate the now
unnecessary gunners/ammo and save weight while adding to the bomb
load.

In the end, it was Allied soldiers capturing German territory that
forced the German surrender. Bombing them from afar was literally all
the Allies could do to claim they were taking the war to the Germans
during the first part of the war because they did not have the
infantry assets to confront them after their initial defeats.

Corky Scott

wrote:
On Wed, 23 Jun 2004 13:13:26 -0700, "gatt"
wrote:

I have photographs of bf109s destroyed in the factories by allied
bombing raids. Those 109s never left the ground to shoot down folks
like my grandfather, so calling the air campaign a complete failure
is a disservice to not only the guys who endured the flak guns and
FW-190s and Me262s in the air war, but the guys on the ground who
didn't have to face those Tigers, artillery, etc.

Please, no one called the bombing a complete failure. What was a
failure was the concept of strategic bombing, as conceptualized by
people like Billy Mitchell and Giulio Douhet and fully believed by Hap
Arnold and Ira Eaker. They believed that strategic bombing would
cause such terror and destruction in the enemy camp, that they would
surrender. That bombing their vital war making industries would cause
the Wermacht to shrivel on the vine for lack of supplies. That idea
proved a failure in the crucible of war, except for the oil campaign
and the destruction of the transportation system (which was carried
out most effectively by marauding fighter bombers, not strategic
bombers), and the oil campaign wasn't actually part of the original
plan.

What also was a failure was the fanciful idea that bombers could
protect themselves against intercepters. In 1943, the AAF even
developed a purely defensive version of the B-17 called the YB-40. It
had an extra power turret where the radio operator normally stood, a
power chin turret and each waist position sported dual 50 caliber
machine guns rather than singles. That gave it 14 heavy machine guns.
Plus, it had added armor around the engines and to protect the gunners
and pilots, and a LOT more ammunition, but no bombs. The idea was for
this flying pillbox to accompany the squadrons and lend it's massive
firepower to their protection. Didn't work. The bomber was as heavy
as the normally loaded B-17F's with their bombloads. When the normal
bombers dropped their loads over the target, they suddenly became 4 to
5 thousand pounds lighter, but the YB-40's didn't. The normal bombers
turned off the target and opened up their throttles to get the hell
out of there, and the YB-40's couldn't keep up. They were quietly
retired after a few months of evaluation. The chin turret, however,
was deemed a success and was installed in the next model of B-17, the
G.

A little talked about problem with the massive formations of bombers
was the apparently frequent collateral damage from friendly fire as
the gunners hosed bullets all over the sky in a desperate effort to
protect themselves from the German fighters which often passed by
missing by mere feet occasionally. With so many airplanes occupying
airspace in so narrow an area and the speed with which the fighters
approached and flashed by, it's not surprising that the counter fire
would hit neighboring bombers accidentally. I know of no statistics
covering this situation, but it was apparently so serious a problem
that by the middle of 1944, the waist gunners were reduced from two to
one, and eventually to none. The bombardier, unless he was the lead
or deputy bombardier, really did not need to be trained to aim bombs
because only the lead bomber in each group actually did the aiming,
all the rest of the bombers dropped on his signal, or when they
sighted the bombs dropping from the lead bomber. So he became a
gunner/toggler. By that time as we all know, the bombers were being
protected all the way to the target by P-51's so high command may have
decided to kill two birds with one stone: eliminate the now
unnecessary gunners/ammo and save weight while adding to the bomb
load.

In the end, it was Allied soldiers capturing German territory that
forced the German surrender. Bombing them from afar was literally all
the Allies could do to claim they were taking the war to the Germans
during the first part of the war because they did not have the
infantry assets to confront them after their initial defeats.

Corky Scott

A book by Mierjewski (Air University) that asserts WW II was won because of
the strategic bombing of the railroads. This cut off the coal supply that
powered the underground munitions factories, crippling the war effort. This
illustrates "Effects Based Operations" and "cascading effects" which are hot
topics these days.

wrote in message

Please, no one called the bombing a complete failure.

Not on this group. Sorry if I made it sound like you suggested that. In
other forums, the air campaign has been likened to genocide against the
Germans/Japanese and called a complete failure.

The air campaign did not, as you say, cause the Germans to give up, but it
surely seemed like a good idea at the time (even though the British survived
the Battle of Britain.)

What also was a failure was the fanciful idea that bombers could
protect themselves against intercepters.

Well, they did a pretty good job. The ability to knock an interceptor out
of its pursuit curve saved countless airmen. For an interceptor to strike
it had to fly a predictable path and if a gunner made the guy flinch, or
pull out, or the gunner's bullets occupied the same space in the curve as
the intercepter, the plane was effectively defended. It forced the Luftwaffe
to use head-on attacks which made them equally vulnerable and reduced the
time with which they could fire. 'Course, that created a whole host of
problems such as incoming bullets tearing the the length of the fuselage,
etc.

Anecdote: My grandfather's crew came in over Sampigny, France struggling to
hold altitude with three engines knocked out by flak over Schweinfurt. At
about 250' AGL they flew over a Luftwaffe airfield that wasn't on their map,
and, as the pilot wrote, Jerry was sending up every odd plane and hanger
queen that had for an easy kill. Fortunately, the Germans were apparently
so eager to get them that the fighters didn't get up their combat energy and
attacked low and slow, and the bomber crew knocked down an unusual number of
varied aircraft. The tailgunner was credited with a Ju88, my grandfather a
109 and the pilot wrote that they had about half a dozen 110s circling for
them, and, according to the bombardier, and bullets from a FW-190 on a
head-on with its cowl and a piston head shot away tore through them like a
bull in a china cabinet before he passed underneath inverted. The
tailgunner saw that one exit and none of them could figure out how that
pilot didn't auger, being inverted at maybe 150 feet AGL. (After they
crashed and exited the plane, Bye wrote, the 190 came around and rather than
strafing as they expected, executed a precise eight-point roll over them.)

According to pilot Ray Bye, they pulled up to avoid some power lines and the
bomber stalled out and crashed into a ditch, on fire but with no loss of
life. A cannon round from a 109 exploded in front of my grandfather's
temple, but he was in luck that day because a gunner from the crew of Wabbit
Twacks, having competed their 25th mission, gave him an armored RAF crew
helmet that morning when the crews loaded up for Schweinfurt. He was
banging away at the 109 when a "house, and then a barn, flew between them,
and the airplanes crashed within a couple hundred yards of each other." The
interesting thing about that is that the 109 had finished firing and was
merely flying alongside. My grandfather could see his tracers bouncing off
the fuselage below the cockpit, and the canopy had been shot away because he
could see a stocking tied around the pilot's neck trailing him. I believe
the German thought that the B-17 was surrendering when he was hit. He ended
up in a hospital in France next to another 96th crewman who reported later
that the guy survived a .50 round through his lung! (Ray, the pilot, heard
through a French farmer in 1990 or so that one of the Luftwaffe pilots had
visisted the crash site and wanted to contact the American pilot, but before
they could meet in France, Ray died.)

Hell of a war story, huh? I've heard it from my grandfather, the pilot, the
tailgunner and the bombardier and they all have equally dramatic
perspectives.

In any case, had it not been for the guns in the bomber, they'd have been
dead before they hit the ground.

-c