Boeing Niner Zero Niner AwwwYEAH!

wrote:

What also was a failure was the fanciful idea that bombers could
protect themselves against intercepters.

While not denying your point about the heavy losses suffered by bombers,
I have heard it asserted on various History Channel and Discovery Wings
documentaries that B-17 gunners actually shot down more Luftwaffe
fighters than escort fighters did.

"TTA Cherokee Driver" wrote in message

I have heard it asserted on various History Channel and Discovery Wings
documentaries that B-17 gunners actually shot down more Luftwaffe
fighters than escort fighters did.

This has been debated since the war. My grandfather said that the biggest
problem was, whenever an interceptor came through a formation and went down
in flames, there were might have been ten guys shooting at it and all of
them claimed it as their kill when they debriefed after a mission. By
contrast, when a fighter pilot won a dogfight it was obvious who had scored
the victory.

My grandfather's tailgunner told me "your pappy got two," and I had never
heard him claim a single plane. When I was old enough, I guess, he told me
that everybody had been shooting at the first, but that he was the only one
shooting at the second so he "guessed" it must have been his, but it was one
thing he didn't talk much about other than describing his tracers bouncing
off the armor of the enemy airplane right below the pilot, who had pulled
his fighter alongside the bomber as if in formation.

-c

If it was effective, why did Germany manage to produce the greatest
amount of war related materials late in the war when the Allied
bombing was at it's greatest effectiveness? Shouldn't things have
been the other way around?

Corky Scott

What is your source for German production in the above statement?

On Wed, 23 Jun 2004 17:37:23 GMT, "Casey Wilson"
wrote:


If it was effective, why did Germany manage to produce the greatest
amount of war related materials late in the war when the Allied
bombing was at it's greatest effectiveness? Shouldn't things have
been the other way around?

Corky Scott

What is your source for German production in the above statement?

The postwar strategic bombing assesement survey. It basically
shredded the hallowed tenents that founded the US strategic bombing
campaign.

Here is the main conclusion:

Aviation: "In 1944 the German air force is reported to have accepted a
total of 39,807 aircraft of all types -- compared with 8,295 in 1939,
or 15,596 in 1942 before the plants suffered any attack." According to
the report, almost none of the aircraft produced in 1944 were used in
combat and some may have been imaginary.
Armor production "reached its wartime peak in December 1944, when
1,854 tanks and armored vehicles were produced. This industry
continued to have relatively high production through February 1945."
Ball bearings: "There is no evidence that the attacks on the
ball-bearing industry had any measurable effect on essential war
production."
Steel: The bombing greatly reduced production, but the resulting
shortage had no contribution to the defeat.
Consumer goods: "In the early years of the war -- the soft war period
for Germany -- civilian consumption remained high. Germans continued
to try for both guns and butter. The German people entered the period
of the air war well stocked with clothing and other consumer goods.
Although most consumer goods became increasingly difficult to obtain,
Survey studies show that fairly adequate supplies of clothing were
available for those who had been bombed out until the last stages of
disorganization. Food, though strictly rationed, was in nutritionally
adequate supply throughout the war. The Germans' diet had about the
same calories as the British."
The survey concluded that one reason German production rose in so many
areas was in part that the German economy did not go on a complete war
footing until late 1942 and 1943. Up until then, factories had been on
a single shift in many industries and the German economy was generally
inefficient and not operating at full capacity.

Please note, some aspects of the bombing were very effective. The Oil
production bombing, more so than any other aspect, hugely curtailed
the ability of the German military forces to fight or train to fight.
Oil was not originally the top priority of the bomber forces.

Primarily the problem with Strategic Bombing, as visualized by the
leaders of the Army Air Forces, was that it was an untried concept.
Hundreds of thousands of airmen, in both British forces and US forces
died trying to accomplish something that turned out to be
unattainable, at least in terms of 1940 to 45 technology.

Of course, the bombing campaign affected the outcome of the war. It's
just that the manner of the affect wasn't how the leaders designed it.
They thought that if they could destroy the war making industries,
Germany would loose it's ability to wage war. That part did not
happen. But Germany spent so much time and effort attempting to stop
the bombing campaign, that their ground forces suffered. The skies
over Germany became a charnel house for the German aviators and
without an effective air force, the German army lost a lot of
effectiveness. Germany withdrew enormous numbers of flack guns from
the Russian front to ring their cities for protection. This proved
dire for the bombers, but also reduced the effectiveness of the German
army to counter the hundreds of thousands of tanks the Russians now
sent against their forces.

In the end, hard as this is to swallow, the huge Russian armies likely
would have ground out a victory which would have been even more costly
for them than it was, were it not for the air war against Germany.

Against the Japanese, any likeness to precision bombing was abandoned
when the concept broke against the realities of weather and B-29
maladies.

The Strategic Bombing Survey, as you can imagine, became as
politicized a document and process as is humanly possible. The Army
Air Force was already planning to become an independent military force
at that time and made all kinds of interpretations from the survey
that they felt justified their existance and the concept of an
independent air force.

George Ball and John Kenneth Galbreath were members of the bombing
survey. Galbreath in particular adamantly argued that the strategic
bombing of Germany was far less effective than trumpeted by the
leaders of the Army Air Corps. The Air Corps members, of course,
disagreed.

Corky Scott

wrote in message
...

The postwar strategic bombing assesement survey. It basically
shredded the hallowed tenents that founded the US strategic bombing
campaign.

Here is the main conclusion:

Aviation: "In 1944 the German air force is reported to have accepted a
total of 39,807 aircraft of all types -- compared with 8,295 in 1939,
or 15,596 in 1942 before the plants suffered any attack." According to
the report, almost none of the aircraft produced in 1944 were used in
combat and some may have been imaginary.
Armor production "reached its wartime peak in December 1944, when
1,854 tanks and armored vehicles were produced. This industry
continued to have relatively high production through February 1945."

Big Snip


Please note, some aspects of the bombing were very effective. The Oil
production bombing, more so than any other aspect, hugely curtailed
the ability of the German military forces to fight or train to fight.
Oil was not originally the top priority of the bomber forces.

Primarily the problem with Strategic Bombing, as visualized by the
leaders of the Army Air Forces, was that it was an untried concept.
Hundreds of thousands of airmen, in both British forces and US forces
died trying to accomplish something that turned out to be
unattainable, at least in terms of 1940 to 45 technology.

Of course, the bombing campaign affected the outcome of the war. It's
just that the manner of the affect wasn't how the leaders designed it.
They thought that if they could destroy the war making industries,
Germany would loose it's ability to wage war. That part did not
happen. But Germany spent so much time and effort attempting to stop
the bombing campaign, that their ground forces suffered.

More Big Snip

Corky Scott

I did some checking at http://encyclopedia.thefreedictionary.com/ and
found data that conflicts with the armor production figures you put in at
the top. Interestingly, the site I found almost triples the numbers in
favor of your argument for 1944. The disparity may be that the site I found
goes all the way from Panzer I through V and includes the Ferdinand. It also
includes the figures for armor manufactured in Czechoslovakia and other
plants outside Germany. Those latter numbers must be tallied into the
overall picture, I think.
Good argument, Corky. You made me look at a whole new perspective. The
real nut is in the latter paragraphs you included.

wrote:

On Tue, 22 Jun 2004 16:28:07 +0100, "Paul Sengupta"
wrote:

Inhuman? Yes. Ineffective? No.

If it was effective, why did Germany manage to produce the greatest
amount of war related materials late in the war when the Allied
bombing was at it's greatest effectiveness? Shouldn't things have
been the other way around?

Well, for one thing, the bombing didn't reach it's peak until '44 either. Most
British bombing prior to the adoption of the area bombing strategy in early 1942 was
woefully ineffective. In addition, Bomber Command had only a little over 300 bombers
by early '42, most of which were twins. 1942 saw a gradual buildup of squadrons in
Bomber Command, the introduction of navaids such as "Gee", and the gradual shift to
heavies such as the Lancaster and Stirling. The U.S. wasn't even in the picture in
'42 - we were still building bases and running training missions. Early '43 saw
Bomber Command really beginning to work seriously on the area bombing campaign. The
USAAF started bombing targets in France. By second quarter '43, the USAAF was
seriously working on the problem of fighter escort, starting out with Spitfires
borrowed from the RAF, but the worst losses ever suffered were taken in October of
that year going after targets which were outside fighter range. The P-51 was brought
into the theater in November, but it was not until 1944 that enough squadrons were
available to be effective.

One can almost say that German production fell just as soon as we were able to
regularly put several hundred to a thousand plus bombers over their cities, but, of
course, both the buildup of force and the damage increases were gradual.

George Patterson
None of us is as dumb as all of us.

"Paul Sengupta" wrote in message
...
One of the aircraft under development allegedly went to
South America (or the plans did) after the war only to be copied
(allegedly)
by the Soviets. This became the Mig 15.

Replying to myself, I've found a reference for this:
http://www.luft46.com/fw/ta183-i.html

The whole site lists other planes which may have come on-line
had the war gone on for another year.

http://www.luft46.com/


Paul