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#1
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Michael wrote:
"Richard Kaplan" wrote I think there is a reasonable subset of pilots who frankly enjoy a bit of danger I think that subset includes 100% of all pilots that fly for fun except for some total idiots. You exclude all those that recognize the risk, and accept the risk as payment for the various benefits, but that would be even happier to gain those benefits w/o the risk. [...] Aviation has inherent risk to it, and those people who are not comfortable with the added risk soon leave aviation. Those who are left are comfortable with it. "Comfort" does not imply "enjoyment". - Andrew |
#2
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Andrew Gideon wrote
You exclude all those that recognize the risk, and accept the risk as payment for the various benefits, but that would be even happier to gain those benefits w/o the risk. I sometimes wonder how many of those there really are. Think about how you feel when you pull off a landing with a lot of gusty crosswind and squeak it on, right on target. Or when you make an approach to minimums with the needle(s) dead centered all the way and the runway is right there. Intellectually, you know that you just completed an increased-risk operation - and what made it an increased-risk operation was the increased degree of difficulty. But you still feel good - you were faced with a challenge and you were up to it. You wouldn't feel nearly as good making that approach/landing in calm winds/CAVU. How many pilots don't feel that way? "Comfort" does not imply "enjoyment". I wonder. In any case - whether they enjoy it or not (and I think most do, at some level) the fact that they are comfortable with a certain amount of risk means that most pilots are not too interested in reducing that risk if it means a reduction in capability. Just say no doesn't cut it. To have acceptance and value, a safety seminar has to show you how to reduce risk without reducing capability. That's much harder, and in my opinion few safety seminars accomplish this. I think that's why most people don't go. Most (if not all) pilots I know have been to at least one. They didn't come back because they were not impressed. I think the real solution is to have safety seminars that actually teach you to increase safety without decreasing capability. Then people will come and pay attention. However, you don't accomplish an increase in safety without a reduction in capability with rules - you accomplish it with skill and knowledge. That means we need a very different method for choosing the people who teach these safety seminars. Michael |
#3
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Michael wrote:
Andrew Gideon wrote You exclude all those that recognize the risk, and accept the risk as payment for the various benefits, but that would be even happier to gain those benefits w/o the risk. I sometimes wonder how many of those there really are. Think about how you feel when you pull off a landing with a lot of gusty crosswind and squeak it on, right on target. Or when you make an approach to minimums with the needle(s) dead centered all the way and the runway is right there. Intellectually, you know that you just completed an increased-risk operation - and what made it an increased-risk operation was the increased degree of difficulty. But you still feel good - you were faced with a challenge and you were up to it. You wouldn't feel nearly as good making that approach/landing in calm winds/CAVU. In fact, I do feel pretty damned good making an excellent approach under the hood too. There's less risk, which I like, and there's also the same satisfaction of having met well the challenge. I enjoy when I nail a simulated power failure landing too...but I don't long for real opportunities to test my skills. How many pilots don't feel that way? "Comfort" does not imply "enjoyment". I wonder. In any case - whether they enjoy it or not (and I think most do, at some level) the fact that they are comfortable with a certain amount of risk means that most pilots are not too interested in reducing that risk if it means a reduction in capability. Ah, now here we're in complete agreement. I see the risk as payment for the capability, and the current trade-off is fine for me. Of course, my risk profile is different from some random other pilot's, but that's each of us making our own individual choices. Just say no doesn't cut it. To have acceptance and value, a safety seminar has to show you how to reduce risk without reducing capability. That's much harder, and in my opinion few safety seminars accomplish this. I think that's why most people don't go. I think that many don't "spoon feed" this, true. For example, I attended one seminar which was a dissection of a midair. There was no conclusion with a set of rules that would reduce risk, but I think that the presentation and discussion provided useful information. Seeing what occurred offers us the chance to catch the same pattern, and "break the chain". I think a fair number of seminars fall into this category. [...] I think the real solution is to have safety seminars that actually teach you to increase safety without decreasing capability. Then people will come and pay attention. However, you don't accomplish an increase in safety without a reduction in capability with rules - you accomplish it with skill and knowledge. That means we need a very different method for choosing the people who teach these safety seminars. I think I'm seeing what you mean. In your experience, seminars often present rules of the form "thou shall not". I've been to some, but I've also been to some which draw no such simple conclusions, and that simply do provide knowledge (perhaps from the mistakes of others). Still, I'm going to take this perspective to the next few seminars, and see if I note more of what you're describing. - Andrew |
#4
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Andrew Gideon wrote
You wouldn't feel nearly as good making that approach/landing in calm winds/CAVU. In fact, I do feel pretty damned good making an excellent approach under the hood too. There's less risk, which I like, and there's also the same satisfaction of having met well the challenge. Ah - but do you feel AS good? Is it really the same? Sure, it's still a challenge - but I don't think you can compare the feeling you get after you land out of an ILS in 200 and 2000 RVR, where you roll out and still can't see the far end of the runway, and doing it under the hood - even to 100 ft. I enjoy when I nail a simulated power failure landing too...but I don't long for real opportunities to test my skills. I doubt anyone does - but when it happened to me, I did feel really good about having nailed it - much more so than when I do a practice one. Of course I also felt like a real idiot for having put myself in that situation too, since I had no options. The approach to mins didn't bother me at all because I knew I had plenty of fuel to reach much better conditions. Here's the difference - an engine failure is a genuine emergency, and nobody I know wants one of those. A real approach to minimums? We all know it's an increased-risk operation, but I know more than a few people who seek it out, for "training value" and we think nothing of it. In fact, we consider it good training. When I intentionally choose the lowest local ceilings and visibilities for instrument training, is that about enjoying a bit of danger or providing the best, most challenging training available? And how do you separate the two? I think that many don't "spoon feed" this, true. For example, I attended one seminar which was a dissection of a midair. There was no conclusion with a set of rules that would reduce risk, but I think that the presentation and discussion provided useful information. Did it? Did it even provide correct information? I once went to a seminar that dissected a crash. I knew the pilot, and I knew how it happened. The seminar was very interesting, in the sense that a work of fiction can be interesting. It had nothing at all to do with what really happened. That's almost beside the point, though. Assuming the information presented was accurate, there is clearly value in examining past accidents. But is a safety seminar the best venue for this? I would suggest that it is not - that the optimal venue is hangar flying. I think I'm seeing what you mean. In your experience, seminars often present rules of the form "thou shall not". Either that or quite obviously imply them. I've been to some, but I've also been to some which draw no such simple conclusions, and that simply do provide knowledge (perhaps from the mistakes of others). I've been to a couple like that. There was one on flying over the Gulf and the Caribbean by a guy who does it every year. I learned a lot. But flying over the Gulf has inherent risks, and while I suppose if you're going to go anyway you're better off going to the seminar than doing it cold, I can honestly say that all his seminar did was encourage me to cut across the Gulf when the opportunity presented itself. Turned out that there were things he didn't cover and there were a few tense moments there. I suppose he did a good enough job, since I'm still here and would go again (doing it a bit differently this time) but I can't in good conscience call it a safety seminar. Michael |
#5
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Michael wrote:
Andrew Gideon wrote You wouldn't feel nearly as good making that approach/landing in calm winds/CAVU. In fact, I do feel pretty damned good making an excellent approach under the hood too. There's less risk, which I like, and there's also the same satisfaction of having met well the challenge. Ah - but do you feel AS good? Is it really the same? I believe that I feel better after the safer approach, as I don't have to feel the same risk factor leading into the completion. But to be honest, I really cannot say. I've not been able to perform a side-by-side comparison. [...] Here's the difference - an engine failure is a genuine emergency, and nobody I know wants one of those. A real approach to minimums? We all know it's an increased-risk operation, but I know more than a few people who seek it out, for "training value" and we think nothing of it. In fact, we consider it good training. When I intentionally choose the lowest local ceilings and visibilities for instrument training, is that about enjoying a bit of danger or providing the best, most challenging training available? And how do you separate the two? To my mind, easily. [...] I once went to a seminar that dissected a crash. I knew the pilot, and I knew how it happened. The seminar was very interesting, in the sense that a work of fiction can be interesting. It had nothing at all to do with what really happened. Lacking the direct knowledge you had, I cannot say. Since the pilots didn't survive in the example I used, we all knew that some guesswork was involved on that side of things. That's almost beside the point, though. Assuming the information presented was accurate, there is clearly value in examining past accidents. But is a safety seminar the best venue for this? I would suggest that it is not - that the optimal venue is hangar flying. Hanger flying wouldn't have easily afforded the recordings, video and audio, that were presented. That said, of course informal discussions are good too. [...] I've been to a couple like that. There was one on flying over the Gulf and the Caribbean by a guy who does it every year. I learned a lot. But flying over the Gulf has inherent risks, and while I suppose if you're going to go anyway you're better off going to the seminar than doing it cold, I can honestly say that all his seminar did was encourage me to cut across the Gulf when the opportunity presented itself. Turned out that there were things he didn't cover and there were a few tense moments there. I suppose he did a good enough job, since I'm still here and would go again (doing it a bit differently this time) but I can't in good conscience call it a safety seminar. I'm not clear on your point, here. What would you call it? - Andrew |
#6
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Andrew Gideon wrote
When I intentionally choose the lowest local ceilings and visibilities for instrument training, is that about enjoying a bit of danger or providing the best, most challenging training available? And how do you separate the two? To my mind, easily. Then spell it out for me. Which am I doing, and why? Lacking the direct knowledge you had, I cannot say. Since the pilots didn't survive in the example I used, we all knew that some guesswork was involved on that side of things. But there's a difference between guesswork and outright twisting of the facts to support a point. John Galban posted an interesting story about how the latter happened with regard to an accident he was involved with. I've been to a couple like that. There was one on flying over the Gulf and the Caribbean by a guy who does it every year. I can't in good conscience call it a safety seminar. I'm not clear on your point, here. What would you call it? Advanced training? Encouraging dangerous behavior? It all depends on your point of view. Going across the Gulf is really not for the novice pilot, IMO. First off, it's not really something you do in a single engine airplane (since an engine failure leaves you basically no chances at all - the route I flew had me 50-120 miles from land for over 2 hours) so as a minimum you're looking at being a twin pilot. Second, even in a twin, there are issues. You are out of RADAR contact for hours, and have only very limited radio contact (relays via airliners passing overhead). There is effectively no way to update the weather picture, so you have a greatly increased likelihood of encountering adverse weather, while at the same time greatly reduced options for both landing and ATC assistance. It's all doable, but my point is that really the safest solution is not to do it. When you have a seminar that basically tells you how to do it, it's hard to call it a safety seminar. Suppose I put on a seminar about how to scud run. I might include tips like not flying at the bases of the clouds, where the vis is worst. I might cover route planning - instead of the usual VFR-direct, how to choose roads to follow for supplemental nav, being prepared for obstructions, etc. I would likely cover low altitude diversions - how to get to a nearby airport in a hurry. I might cover emergency procedures - off field precautionary landings with power and how to choose a field, an emergency instrument climb and what to expect from ATC, etc. I might discuss various techniques for slowing the plane down - when a notch of flaps might be appropriate, for example. I've been there and done that, and if you're going to scud run, I assure you that you're way better off going to this seminar than just doing it cold and figuring it out as you go along. But would it be a safety seminar? Michael |
#7
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![]() Suppose I put on a seminar about how to scud run. [...] been there and done that, and if you're going to scud run, I assure you that you're way better off going to this seminar than just doing it cold and figuring it out as you go along. But would it be a safety seminar? Yes. It might save your butt one day. Distinguish between attitude and ability. Seminars that increase ones ability to do something that, under at least some circumstances are dangerous, are still useful. They should perhaps come with a part that indicates when not to do this, since it is certainly the case that the more you hear how to do something, the more acceptable the something becomes. How about the new icing seminar? It gives lots of information about flying in icing conditions, and may well save somebody's butt. And here in the northeast, icing is hard to avoid. Is =that= a safey seminar? Jose -- (for Email, make the obvious changes in my address) |
#8
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Michael wrote:
Andrew Gideon wrote When I intentionally choose the lowest local ceilings and visibilities for instrument training, is that about enjoying a bit of danger or providing the best, most challenging training available? And how do you separate the two? To my mind, easily. Then spell it out for me. Which am I doing, and why? I cannot tell you which you're doing laugh. I do that for the training (it's the model introduced by my CFII). Others may do it precisely for the "thrill". Yet we end up doing the same thing, which makes discerning the motive a little tough. Obviously, you've nothing but my word that I'm not a thrill seeker. And you can even believe that I'm insufficiently self-aware, and that I've merely hidden my thrill-seeking tendencies from myself. How could I argue with that? But I don't think it the case. Lacking the direct knowledge you had, I cannot say. Since the pilots didn't survive in the example I used, we all knew that some guesswork was involved on that side of things. But there's a difference between guesswork and outright twisting of the facts to support a point. John Galban posted an interesting story about how the latter happened with regard to an accident he was involved with. That's true. More, there've been a number of posts on rather...liberal descriptions in NTSB reports. Obviously, accuracy is important. I've been to a couple like that. There was one on flying over the Gulf and the Caribbean by a guy who does it every year. I can't in good conscience call it a safety seminar. I'm not clear on your point, here. What would you call it? Advanced training? Encouraging dangerous behavior? It all depends on your point of view. You'd call the talk given by that guy "encouraging dangerous behavior"? I'd agree that that would not be a "safety seminar". Could you also call it "advanced training"? That would imply that it's providing useful information, but information not applicable to safety. Okay...I can see that, and I can even see that such things are useful. Still...anything which helps one fly is going to aid safety, no? I mean, if you were planning to fly the Gulf anyway, wasn't the information provided - even if incomplete - useful? Or is the problem that he made it seem complete, which tempted you to do something you'd otherwise not? [...] Suppose I put on a seminar about how to scud run. I might include tips like not flying at the bases of the clouds, where the vis is worst. I might cover route planning - instead of the usual VFR-direct, how to choose roads to follow for supplemental nav, being prepared for obstructions, etc. I would likely cover low altitude diversions - how to get to a nearby airport in a hurry. I might cover emergency procedures - off field precautionary landings with power and how to choose a field, an emergency instrument climb and what to expect from ATC, etc. I might discuss various techniques for slowing the plane down - when a notch of flaps might be appropriate, for example. I've been there and done that, and if you're going to scud run, I assure you that you're way better off going to this seminar than just doing it cold and figuring it out as you go along. But would it be a safety seminar? I'd vote "yes". It's another tool in my belt. It's *my* choice whether or not to use it, but your seminar would sharpen that tool. I think of stall practice as similar to this. I've *no* intention of stalling while (for example) making a base-to-final turn. Practicing so that I can recover quickly from a stall isn't going to change that. Or health insurance. I've no plans to get sick, and I do certain things to preserve my health. Having insurance doesn't alter than behavior. - Andrew |
#9
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![]() "Michael" wrote in message om... accomplish it with skill and knowledge. That means we need a very different method for choosing the people who teach these safety seminars. Or choose what seminars you go to. For example the Forums at Oshkosh often serve this purpose. -------------------- Richard Kaplan, CFII www.flyimc.com |
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