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"Paul Remde" wrote in message news:rQgub.32000$Dw6.156983@attbi_s02...
I just find this absurd. I'm very angry about the sudden change. As Ian mentioned this decision was taken by the IGC Plenum at their meeting in March 2003 and was mentioned in the minutes of this meeting so no question about sudden change. If I remember correctly, Steve Fossett is using a GPS-NAV (and a 302 I believe) and currently setting world records in the southern hemisphere. I think Mr. Fossett is well capable to afford a flight recorder which is suitable for World Records. I'm still waiting for a good answer to the question why. Why is the GPS-NAV suddenly not secure for world records? Your anger must have blinded you, just read the points mentioned in Ians mailing which is in perfect English. This is not acceptable behavior by the IGC. What exactly do you not find acceptable? Progress? Computing power has changed considerably since these initial specifications were introduced. I think pilots going for world records will be happy in the knowledge that their traces come from FR's with the highest security available and nobody will be able to manufacture a record by breaking the security of these older FR's. Regards Bruno IGC-GNSS Committee Paul Remde "Marc Ramsey" wrote in message om... Paul Remde wrote: Yes, but doesn't the CAI system work? It is my impression that it is perfectly secure and has never been compromised. So why suddenly call it "insecure". As of January 1st, the CAI Model 10/20/25 won't be considered "insecure", they just won't be considered "secure enough" for world records. You can still use it for badges, 1000K+ diplomas, contests, etc., just not world records. What is the plan to get the approval back in place? What must CAI do to make it meet your new requirements? Minimally, a firmware upgrade would be required, but it is not clear that the microcontroller is fast enough to support the needed changes. The manufacturer(s?) is the only one that can provide an answer... Marc |
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Paul Repacholi wrote:
If anyone is going to fabricate records, then just feed the whole system from a pseudolite set. No need to get inside the systems at all. You'd need to properly synchonize the GPS and pressure altitude changes to pull it off. Maybe it's easy for you, but not for me 8^) Marc |
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Paul Repacholi wrote:
... If anyone is going to fabricate records, then just feed the whole system from a pseudolite set. No need to get inside the systems at all. ... This is just what the cryptograhic RSA signature makes impossible, not to fake such records, but to put them in an IGC file that the validation program accepts as a genuine file coming from the logger. |
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You miss the point entirely.
There is no signature on the GPS signals, therefore any system capable of generating GPS signals can feed them to a flight recorder via the antenna, exactly like the real satellite system. All the flight recorder can do is take the data, and generate a signature proving that what *it received* has not been tampered with. Pseudolites ( GPS generators for test purposes ) are available, at least 5 manufacturers, by my very cursory search a while ago. They are still relatively expensive, but not much in comparison to the cost of setting up to do a world record. Fooling the pressure transducer and engine noise detection systems on the average flight recorder is a relatively trivial matter, for those who want to cheat. -- Regards, Adrian Jansen J & K MicroSystems Microcomputer solutions for industrial control "Robert Ehrlich" wrote in message ... Paul Repacholi wrote: ... If anyone is going to fabricate records, then just feed the whole system from a pseudolite set. No need to get inside the systems at all. ... This is just what the cryptograhic RSA signature makes impossible, not to fake such records, but to put them in an IGC file that the validation program accepts as a genuine file coming from the logger. |
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