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"Todd Pattist" wrote:
Tim Newport-Peace ] wrote: It was suggested: A: All Purposes including World Records. B: Badges and Diplomas D: Badges up to Diamond What is the rationale for distinguishing between levels B and D? If I understand correctly, D was initially separated from everything else because of concerns about cheating, then B was shown to be hackable (Wedekind). If that's correct, why wasn't B moved into group D? Or, more preferably, why isn't D given the same privileges as B? The Diamond-level approval exists to allow for equipment with minimal physical security. The only flight recorders in that category, at present, are the EW models which connect to external GPS units. Instead of ratcheting up costs, why can't we just use our Official Observers to control cheating? We relied on them for decades before RSA/DSA and public/private key encryption. Costs are ratcheting up only in the sense that some flight recorders that could formerly be used for world records no longer can be. If the private keys in the flight recorder are compromised, we can't depend upon Official Observers to prevent cheating. There are a number of ways to cheat which will not be visible to even the most diligent observer using present procedures. The observer procedures could be altered to require more intrusive inspection and monitoring of the flight (much like the camera/barograph/chronometer days), but I think it a better compromise to accept the fact that some older flight recorder designs just don't provide the level of security assurance desirable for world records. If I hack an A level recorder (with a GPS transmitter simulator and a pressure chamber or by opening the case and inserting GPS code between the off-the-shelf GPS receiver and the custom circuitry), can we just agree that no security is perfect and group them all as imperfect, but usable for all levels with appropriate monitoring by an OO? Of course the security of even "A" level flight recorders is imperfect. There are no perfect security systems. We are just trying to find an appropriate balance between the security requirements, and convenience for pilots and observers. It's not quite as simple to find that balance as you might think... Marc |
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