Dear Burt

On 7 Feb 2005 15:10:10 -0800, (Mark James Boyd)
wrote:

29 fatalities.

7 ridge
4 off-airport landings
4 spin on final
3 intentional aerobatics
3 did a PCC but not an assembly check
2 drugs
2 midair
1 rope break
1 on top of rotor clouds
1 fuel exhaustion takeoff eng fail
1 trim failure, killed the towpilot

Those statistics is absolutely worthless, I'm sorry to say.

If you want to find a connection between L/D and danger, it's
necessary to compare identical missions. A 2-33 that is limited to
flying traffic circuits is unlikely to hit a ridge or be damaged in an
off-airport landing during a competitition, don't you agree?

Fuel exhaustion is very unlikely to occur if your glider does not have
an engine - and gliders with engines are usually 45:1 plus. Another
case where a low.-performance glider has no chance to enter the crash
statistics.


Training gliders are per se safer than high performance gliders -
because the latter fly the more risky missions, e.g. cross-country.

One must not compare raw numbers - I bet even in the US there's at
least half a dozen glass gliders on every low-performance glider
("with a Vne less than 120 knots") that are flying cross-country.

Of coure accident numbers will be half a dozen times higher - but
accident rate per glider will be identical.


From some best guessing and the reports, over 80% of the
fatal accidents had PICs with over 100 hours in gliders. About half of the
pilots were CFIs or ATPs with hundreds of hours, often in make/model.

So I used the ASW-20 as my example. If I'd used the ASW-24E or
ASW-27B or Jantar 42-2 or PIK-30 or SZD 55-1, I'm sure
pilots would have come to defend these aircraft as well.

I may use the ASW-20 for an example of my own.
We had one in my club for 17 years.
During this time, we had about 20 aircraft damages (fortunately only
one guy was hurt), and NONE in the ASW-20.

Clear case - the 20 was by far the safest glider in our fleet. Its
replacement, the ASW-27, still hasn't suffererd any damage yet either.
Conclusion: The higher the L/D and the more handles in the cockpit,
the safer the glider.

I guess you see the dangers of reading statistics...


My point is that if I had to guess the next fatality, it would be
an experienced soaring pilot in a 43:1 ship low near a ridge
in a gaggle.

Yup.
Because all the low-performance gliders will bei either on the ground
or staying in the traffic circuit and therefore cannot take part your
scenario.


From a public safety standpoint, I think the FAA has done its
job. And I'll keep training pilots in the 2-33 and L-13 and
1-26 and PW-2. And some of them will move up to fast glass and
practice to try to maintain a level of safety. Hey, man,
that really is their own personal choice, as far as I'm concerned.

"Fast glass"... lmao.

Sorry Mark, but up in the air I like to go as fast as possible with as
much L/D as possible. The approach speed of a "fast glass" glider is
the same 50-55 kts as the one of any other low performance glider, and
its airbrakes are as effective.
It's an urban legend that an LS-4 is harder to fly than a Ka-8. Here
in Europe many clubs are using fast glass gliders as first solo
gliders, with convincing success.




Bye
Andreas

I agree that the quantitative number of fatalities is of little statistical
value.

In order to have statistical value the fatalities have to measured against
flight hour, or against flights, etc. in order to establish an fatality
rate.

It is a fact that fatalities seldom happen in gliders that are in the hangar
or their trailer. How many hours have these high performance gliders flown
compared the fatality count? How many high performance gliders are flying
in the country compared to the low performance group?

Flight time, sortie rate, flight mission type, and pilot's experience are
all items that need to be considered in order to determine risk factors
associated with a sailplane's performance level.

Respectfully,
Wayne
http://www.soaridaho.com/



"Andreas Maurer" wrote in message
news
On 7 Feb 2005 15:10:10 -0800, (Mark James Boyd)
wrote:

29 fatalities.

7 ridge
4 off-airport landings
4 spin on final
3 intentional aerobatics
3 did a PCC but not an assembly check
2 drugs
2 midair
1 rope break
1 on top of rotor clouds
1 fuel exhaustion takeoff eng fail
1 trim failure, killed the towpilot

Those statistics is absolutely worthless, I'm sorry to say.

It's nice to hear others question the validity of useless statistics. How
many privately owned L-13's or 2-33 are there in the US and how many of
those ever embark on an cross country flight??

If all you want to do is train in 2-33's and L-13's and fly around within a
5 to 10 mile area of your local airport...then I'd agree you are at less
risk in some ways and more in others.

That's not what I do however. I take off and leave and come back generally
many hours later. Are there risks?? Damn straight. But I accept them and
understand them and work my butt off to have a logical plan to deal with
them. And hope that I never need to excercise any of those plans, based on
my ability to evaluate my own risk/reward equation and to always remember
that flying is, at the end of the day a very personal reward.

In a way, I believe you have cemented my view that in many cases, students
are not receiving the information that helps them to attain their goals, and
so they have to get it from osmosis, instead of an instructor. The SSA
Master Instructor program is a great idea as well as the mentoring programs
that some areas are fortunate enough to have...we need a ton more of that,
from qualified sources. And again, not to sound like a broken record, but I
believe that the training must become more dynamic and less static. The
pearls of wisdom accrued over the years need to have a better venue to be
shared.


That's about it from me.



Steve.

Steve Hill wrote:
It's nice to hear others question the validity of useless statistics.
How
many privately owned L-13's or 2-33 are there in the US and how many
of
those ever embark on an cross country flight??

If all you want to do is train in 2-33's and L-13's and fly around
within a
5 to 10 mile area of your local airport...then I'd agree you are at
less
risk in some ways and more in others.

That's not what I do however. I take off and leave and come back
generally
many hours later. Are there risks?? Damn straight. But I accept them
and
understand them and work my butt off to have a logical plan to deal
with
them. And hope that I never need to excercise any of those plans,
based on
my ability to evaluate my own risk/reward equation and to always
remember
that flying is, at the end of the day a very personal reward.

In a way, I believe you have cemented my view that in many cases,
students
are not receiving the information that helps them to attain their
goals, and
so they have to get it from osmosis, instead of an instructor. The
SSA
Master Instructor program is a great idea as well as the mentoring
programs
that some areas are fortunate enough to have...we need a ton more of
that,
from qualified sources. And again, not to sound like a broken record,
but I
believe that the training must become more dynamic and less static.
The
pearls of wisdom accrued over the years need to have a better venue
to be
shared.


That's about it from me.



Steve.


SSA M I program is an example of available(in some places) additional
instruction.
The SSA Bronze Badge program was also developed to fill the gap in the
instruction to get the license process.
UH

In article ,
Steve Hill wrote:
Mark,
Thanks for clarifying that you weren't mis-representing the ASW-20
itself as dangerous, or trading safety for performance...or increasing
workload on the pilot in command, SPECIFICALLY on JUST the ASW-20...it
sounds like you really meant...All High performance sailplanes and with
that, I'd agree that as performance is gained, somewhere safety is given up.
But I don't think it's at all safe to say that it's because of a sailplanes
design, it's because of what people do with them.

Absolutely. Flown within the limitations of the pilot and
aircraft and weather, all flying is safe. The interesting part is
that for some aircraft (the 2-33 for example), flying outside of
all of these limitations is still unlikely to result in
death. Not just because it is so hard to even GET into the mountains,
above wave, etc., but also because the 2-33 is a lot like
flying inside a big rubber ball anyway (to use an analogy).

Those of us that choose
high performing sailplanes, do accept increased risk...and almost everyone I
know who pursues it, is aware of those risks and mentally works to mitigate
as much or as many of the variables possible.

That's almost a direct quote from Steve Fosset, right? From what I've
seen of competition pilots and even just "fast glass" pilots,
their preparation and proficiency and experience is quite extensive.
I think this is because it MUST be. They then go out and eeek
performance out of themselves, the weather, and the aircraft.
This reminds me of NASCAR, where the drivers have every concievable
safety device, are very experienced, and know everything about
their craft as well as anyone can. Instead of using this
knowledge to safely drive the minivan with the kids to Chuck-E-Cheeses,
they strap on the fastest, gnarlyest machine imagineable and
drive it as fast and hard as possible without ensuring certain death.

Make no mistake, I think the competition pilots are every bit
as comitted to the sport as the Reno air race guys or NASCAR or
fill in your favorite. Just because it isn't as noisy or
"in your face" doesn't make the "fast glass" any less sporty.

If the complexity of the
aircraft were really the issue, wouldn't in then mean that as aircraft
continued to go up in sophistication levels or performance levels, then that
as some point you'd simply die just by getting in or on one...??

Yes that is precisely what I think. Ask Mike Melvill
(the fastest glider pilot in the world)
why he didn't take the third flight. And ask Richard Branson
how many glider rides he expects to give if his fatality rate
for the White Knight ends up matching NASA's 4%.

Methinks
the logic is fundamentally flawed. It's what happens in the cockpit with the
pilot...not the craft.

I disagree. The pilot, craft, and weather are all co-involved.
I didn't see a single fatal accident that would have happened in a 2-33.
I also noted the Hottelier connections causing fatalities. This
doesn't happen with self-connecting controls. And I don't think this
is a "pilot training" issue. This is a design flaw.
Some accidents can be designed away. A very interesting
area of work in soaring is designing away some of these fatalities
with a minimal reduction in performance. Parachutes, BRS, traffic
detectors, turbo, spin characteristics, etc. are all hotly
discussed here and by designers for just this reason.

Your comment about predicting the next bad accident is well taken...sorta
like saying the next catastrophic car crash next Friday, will be due to a 17
year old, his three best buddies and a case of Bud....on a long straight
road, with a nasty curve at the end....

Yes, yes. It wasn't a terribly insightful comment to some people. But
I think your analogy surprises few, while my prediction perhaps DID
surprise some people, who didn't know most fatalities are happening mostly
in 33 to 1 gliders.

We also accept increased risk as a very function of our daily lives Mark,
cars that zip along happily at 75 or 80...when things go bad...they go bad
worse than if you were doing 45. We all know that.

Well, airbags and shoulder harnesses and crash zones made cars
better. This maybe translated into exactly the same fatality rate,
but with greatly increased capability.

Soaring pilots seem to accept a certain level of risk. If
a safety device reduces this risk, it doesn't seem to
provide more safety, it seems to provide more CAPABILITY.
For me it's the same for training. The student was at an
acceptable level of safety when he soloed. Beyond that, my
goal was always to improve his CAPABILITY, while keeping
the safety level at least as good as during solo.

Oh well....not sure where this threads going anymore, but thanks for the
clarification.

And thanks for taking the time to share viewpoints. I don't
know right or wrong, but I certainly know discussing this stuff at all
is VERY helpful for me at least.



Steve.








--

------------+
Mark J. Boyd

I had a recent very positive experience from an SSA
X-C instructor. What a blast of fresh air. Totally
thorough, totally professional, and never nitpickety.

I'm thinking the SSA Master X-C program is great. And
I look forward to some time in the mountains with
the Carl Herold's and Rolf Peterson's of the world.

But I also get a LOT from reading and listening about
X-C flights of non-instructors. ENSURE for 24 hours before the
flight to help with "relief" issues. Cautions about
oxygen use and importance. The continual focus on landouts
throughout X-C flight and the extensive landout preparation.

Really great stuff from a lot of sources. Although I agree
about the SSA Master X-C program, the info from non-instructors
is great too, I think. Just like I think getting two pilots
together for a flight is sometimes more enlightening than
flying repeatedly with the same old instructor.

In article ,
Steve Hill wrote:
It's nice to hear others question the validity of useless statistics. How
many privately owned L-13's or 2-33 are there in the US and how many of
those ever embark on an cross country flight??

If all you want to do is train in 2-33's and L-13's and fly around within a
5 to 10 mile area of your local airport...then I'd agree you are at less
risk in some ways and more in others.

That's not what I do however. I take off and leave and come back generally
many hours later. Are there risks?? Damn straight. But I accept them and
understand them and work my butt off to have a logical plan to deal with
them. And hope that I never need to excercise any of those plans, based on
my ability to evaluate my own risk/reward equation and to always remember
that flying is, at the end of the day a very personal reward.

In a way, I believe you have cemented my view that in many cases, students
are not receiving the information that helps them to attain their goals, and
so they have to get it from osmosis, instead of an instructor. The SSA
Master Instructor program is a great idea as well as the mentoring programs
that some areas are fortunate enough to have...we need a ton more of that,
from qualified sources. And again, not to sound like a broken record, but I
believe that the training must become more dynamic and less static. The
pearls of wisdom accrued over the years need to have a better venue to be
shared.


That's about it from me.



Steve.






--

------------+
Mark J. Boyd

Where in the PTS does it say land without reference to the altimeter? I
don't see it. I think that's a Bronze requirement, but not in the PTS. I was
asked to do it on my PPG practical... much to my surprise! I had never done
it before but nailed it.

"T o d d P a t t i s t" wrote in message
...
(Mark James Boyd) wrote:

There's a "simulated off field landing" standard too.


The simulated off field landing Task says 1) select a good
field and 2) land without reference to the altimeter.
There's no accuracy requirement in this section where it's
critical.

At 01:30 15 February 2005, Mark James Boyd wrote:
I think you are right. I think that the glider examiners
could come
together to define a better standard for 'simulated
off-field
landings' that perhaps borrows terminolgy from the
airplane 'short-field landing' stuff.

As long as the focus of such short field landings is
on
'near-minimum energy' and 'touchdown spot' this would
be
good. These are good skills. Stopping after that
within any
actual particular distance is of no interest, however,
since anyone can mash the brakes.

I agree with the first part of this but stopping as
quickly as possible is also important. When landing
on an unknown surface, and all field landings are that,
the greater the chance of hitting something hidden
in the grass/crop like deep ruts or rocks. Making the
ground run as short as possible reduces the chances
of that. I know that it does not eliminate it altogether.
Of course the minimum stopping distance is reduced
by ensuring a minimum touchdown speed which goes right
back to managing the speed on the approach.

So the normal landing being a momentum management task,
and having the
off field landing be a different test for minimum landing
speed and
touchdown point task, seems quite reasonable. Putting
them together,
however, doesn't make sense to me. Either you are
landing with
minimum energy, or you are landing with extra energy
and using it
to stop at a certain point. Never both.

And I would not recommend trying to combine them in
real life, either.
One is for one thing, the other is for something else.
A long ground
roll gives a lot more control (using spoiler AND brake)
than
a slightly long 'minimum energy' landing followed by
attempts at maximum
braking that fail and end up rear-ending someone.

In article ,
T o d d P a t t i s t wrote:
Martin Eiler wrote:

As long as we acknowledge what skill we are testing
(managing a rollout), I'm OK with it. It's just a
skill
that I think it is odd to test when IMHO a more important
skill (low energy accurate touchdown) is not directly
tested.
--

------------+
Mark J. Boyd

Still, in an off-airfield landing you need the shortest possible rollout.
And that should be teached and tested.

--
Bert Willing

ASW20 "TW"


"Mark James Boyd" a écrit dans le message de news:
42122c18$1@darkstar...
Agreed, I'd want to see them use SOME braking, and KNOW
where the brakes are and how they are used. And awareness
of the difference in effectiveness of brakes on wet grass vs. cement,
etc. But testing to see "who can stop shorter using brakes"
seems like a bad emphasis.

Agreed, I'd want to see them use SOME braking, and KNOW
where the brakes are and how they are used. And awareness
of the difference in effectiveness of brakes on wet grass vs. cement,
etc. But testing to see "who can stop shorter using brakes"
seems like a bad emphasis.

In airplane teaching, a different instructor used to
teach the "mash the brakes" stuff for the short-field
landing practice. Several of his students flatted tires.
Our local examiner never asked for this kind of braking
action, just a demonstration of the elements, but never the
maximum braking one would actually do in an emergency.

In article ,
T o d d P a t t i s t wrote:
(Mark James Boyd) wrote:

As long as the focus of such short field landings is on
"near-minimum energy" and "touchdown spot" this would be
good. These are good skills. Stopping after that within any
actual particular distance is of no interest, however,
since anyone can mash the brakes.

While it is true that "anyone can mash the brakes," I would
advocate a simulated off field landing task, and in that
test you will want to see that the student actually
remembers to use the brakes. In an off field landing you
want to stop quickly to minimize the chance of rolling into
a rock or hole.


--

------------+
Mark J. Boyd