The Latest Military Airspace Grab: 700 Square Miles!

On Mon, 14 Feb 2005 18:58:00 GMT, "Allen"
wrote in ::


"Larry Dighera" wrote in message
.. .


Does the military _ever_ return its airspace to public use?


-------------------------------------------------------------------
AVflash Volume 11, Number 7a -- February 14, 2005
-------------------------------------------------------------------

GA PILOTS TAKE ON MILITARY IN N.M.
New Mexico has some wide-open skies, but apparently there is not
enough room there for all the military and civilian pilots who want to
fly. The U.S. Air Force wants to add 700 square miles to the 2,600
square miles now used by the F-16 Falcons based at Cannon Air Force
Base. The airspace expansion would mean rerouting about 40 civilian
flights per day, and intrude onto GA routes between Albuquerque and
Roswell. "They've grabbed up so much airspace, it's going to be
dangerous for small, civilian aircraft," U.S. Pilots Association
President Steve Uslan told The Albuquerque Journal. "And that's a long
way around, and that means a lot of fuel and a lot of time wasted."
http://www.avweb.com/eletter/archive...ll.html#189168

Go to www.cannon.af.mil . There is a 421 page .pdf of the proposed areas.
The proposal creates a new MOA on the flight path.

Many thanks for that link. Here are some excerpts from the USAF EIS
with my comments interspersed:

DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR
NEW MEXICO TRAINING RANGE INITIATIVE
a. Responsible Agency: United States Air Force
b. Cooperating Agency: Federal Aviation Administration
c. Proposals and Actions: This Draft Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS) analyzes the potential environmental consequences
of a proposal to modify the training airspace near Cannon Air
Force Base (AFB), New Mexico. The proposal would improve airspace
for training primarily New Mexico-based pilots. The existing
airspace no longer suffices to train aircrews in all of the
tactics they will be expected to use in combat. The Proposed
Action and two action alternatives are comprised of four elements:
modifying the configuration of existing airspace (including
expanding the size, operational altitudes, and usefulness of the
Pecos Military Operations Area [MOA] and associated Air Traffic
Control Assigned Airspace [ATCAA], and moving Jet Route J-74
[J-74] and deconflicting commercial traffic five to seven nautical
miles (nm) north of the modified training airspace); creating new
airspace (the Capitan MOA/ATCAA to connect the existing Beak MOA
and the expanded Pecos MOA); flying at supersonic speeds above
10,000 feet above mean sea level (MSL) or approximately 5,000 to
6,000 feet above ground level (AGL) in the airspace; and extending
the use of defensive countermeasures (chaff and flares) to the
new and modified airspace. Alternative A modifies the airspace
configuration, establishes the Capitan MOA/ATCAA, includes
supersonic flight above 10,000 feet MSL, and expands defensive
chaff and flares use. Alternative A does not move J-74. Under
Alternative A, other deconfliction methods could be instituted to
route commercial traffic around active Pecos North ATCAA airspace.
Alternative B modifies the Pecos MOA/ATCAA airspace, reroutes J-74
traffic, includes supersonic flight above 10,000 feet MSL, and
extends use of defensive chaff and flares. The Capitan MOA/ATCAA
would not be created under Alternative B. Under the No-Action
Alternative, aircrews would continue to train in the existing
airspace, fly at supersonic speeds above 30,000 feet MSL, and use
defensive chaff and flares.


If proposed alternative A or B were implemented, would the military
airspace above 10,000' be returned to civil use?


d. Comments and Inquiries: Written comments on this document
should be directed to Ms. Brenda Cook, New Mexico Training Range
Initiative EIS Project Manager, HQ ACC/CEVP, 129 Andrews Street,
Suite 102, Langley AFB, VA 23665-2769. Telephone inquiries may be
made to Cannon AFB Public Affairs at (505) 784-4131.

...

Under No-Action, aircrews would be required to travel to bases or
locations with adequately sized airspace for training with current
weapons and tactics. This would both reduce training opportunities
and increase costs.

...

Under the Proposed Action and Alternative B, rerouting commercial
traffic from the current J-74 and other directly routed civilian
aircraft would add one to two minutes of additional flight time
for a re-routed aircraft.

...

The increase in sonic booms from one per five days under No-Action
to two per three days under the Proposed Action or Alternatives A
or B would not be expected to affect wildlife or livestock
behavior.

...

Predicted peak overpressure noise from sonic booms would not be
strong enough to cause damage to structures in good condition.

...

Sonic booms are not expected to occur at pressure levels that
could damage structures, although older windows or objects on
shelves could be vibrated or damaged. Change in sonic booms from
one per five days to two per three days or any chaff or flare
residual materials would not be in amounts that would affect
property values or land use. The added risk of flare-induced fire
in the affected area, compared to other potential sources of fire,
would be very low. Therefore, no effects on socioeconomic resource
are expected from the Proposed Action or Alternative A or B. In
the unlikely event of property damage due to an Air Force
activity, the Air Force has established procedures for damage
claims.


I'm sure that is a great comfort to Ms. Jacques Olivier and her
daughter:
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?e...12X22313&key=1


An annual total of 60,770 chaff bundles and 40,286 flares would
continue to be authorized throughout the new, modified, and
existing airspace. ... About 5 million chaff strands are dispensed
in each bundle of chaff.

...

These mishap rates do not consider combat losses due to enemy
action. F-16C aircraft have flown more than 3,336,700 hours since
the aircraft entered the Air Force inventory during Fiscal Year
1985. Over that period, 120 Class A mishaps have occurred and 113
aircraft have been destroyed.


That would be an average of one F-16C non-combat Class A mishap every
two months!


...

Under the airspace, 14 percent is lands managed by the Bureau of
Land Management (BLM), 16 percent is state land, and 69 percent is
private.

...

There are seven counties underlying or partially underlying the
training airspace.

...

Record searches of both the New Mexico State Register of Cultural
Properties and the NRHP indicate that there are NRHP-listed
properties in one county underlying project MOAs and proposed
expansion areas. As Table 3.6-1 indicates, listed properties in De
Baca county include the De Baca County Courthouse, which was
constructed in 1917; the Fort Sumner Railroad Bridge, which was
constructed in 1906; the Rodrick Drug Store; the Fort Sumner
Women’s Club; and the Fort Sumner Ruins.

...

Towns within the study area range in population from less than 200
to about 1,900 (University of New Mexico [UNM] 2000).

The majority (78 percent) of the land under the airspace is
privately held. The majority of the public land that would be
affected by the Proposed Action is administered by the BLM.

...

Approximately 71 percent of all land under the restricted airspace
is held in private ownership, 21 percent are state lands, and 8
percent is administered by the Air Force (Air Force 2001e).

...

One high-altitude Jet Route, J-74 (J-74), provides direct
east-to-west routing between the Texico VORTAC and the Corona
VORTAC. Jet routes are established under Federal Aviation
Regulation (FAR) Part 71 in Class A airspace to designate
frequently used routings. Jet routes extend from FL 180 to FL 450,
inclusive. They have no specified width; width varies depending
on many aeronautical factors (FAA Order 7400.2 2000). J-74 passes
over the Pecos North High MOA, through the northern portion of the
Pecos ATCAA, and over the restricted airspace associated with
Melrose AFR. Currently, the Pecos ATCAA is capped at FL 300, and
does not conflict with civil traffic generally at FL 310 or
higher. Commercial traffic routed via direct or using J-74
fluctuates from light to heavy, depending on the time of day. Most
traffic involves operations to and from Dallas-Fort Worth, Texas.
Peaks normally occur during mid-morning and mid to late afternoon
(personal communication, Semanek 2004). The 27 FW seldom requests
authorization to use this airspace because it is unavailable for
military use even though it is greatly needed for training. The
lack of access has “conditioned” the 27 FW to constantly work
around this capped airspace, which diminishes the area for
realistic training.

...

IFR traffic would require ATC clearance to transit the active MOA.
However, VFR traffic could transit the active MOA using the
“see-and-avoid” concept.


The USAF's suggestion that VFR traffic employ see-and-avoid techniques
to avoid mid-air collisions with supersonic military fighter aircraft
reveals a their desire to mislead.


...

Currently, J-74 provides routing between the Texico Very High
Frequency Omni-directional Radio Range and Tactical Air Navigation
Aid (VORTAC) (east of the New Mexico Training Range Initiative
[NMTRI] airspace) and the Corona VORTAC (west of the NMTRI
airspace). This route passes through the northern portion of the
Pecos ATCAA. Conflicting use of this airspace is resolved by Air
Traffic Control (ATC). J-74 would be moved under the Proposed
Action. This could be accomplished by establishing a way-point
north of the ATCAA, and the route would be divided into two
segments.

...

Rerouting J-74 and direct traffic to the north encroaches on the
utilization of another jet route further to the north. This is the
area of J-72 ...

...

The average time between aircraft ranges from 2.7 minutes to 20.9
minutes. The peak hour demand, which occurs on Thursday from 11:00
a.m. to noon, would increase peak traffic from 19 flights per hour
to 30 flights per hour (see Table 4.1-1). The Air Force believes
that scheduling and coordination are required to prevent
over-extension of the National Airspace system.

...

The Air Force believes the likely number of aircraft requiring air
traffic control service from FAA controllers falls within their
ability and expertise to deconflict in the area north of the Pecos
MOA/ATCAA complex. To fully unencumber active available airspace
for military training, IFR traffic transiting this active airspace
must file their flight plans to avoid the Pecos airspace complex
through the Aeronautical Information System Replacement system.

The existing Pecos MOA complex would be expanded laterally and
vertically under the Proposed Action. The MOAs would be expanded
laterally to conform with the lateral boundaries of the ATCAA
overlying the complex. This expansion would include a southerly
expansion of the Pecos South Low MOA, thus adding additional low
altitude military airspace in that region (down to 500 feet AGL).


Is that an additional airspace grab?


The proposed westward expansion of the Pecos complex would result
in the MOA overlying portions of one Federal Airway, V-291. This
airway provides routing between the Corona VORTAC and Roswell. The
proposed MOA expansion would not totally prohibit use of this
airway.

...

The proposed southerly expansion of the Pecos South Low MOA, into
the area of the previously defined “Roswell Shelf,” would result
in lowering MOA airspace in that region from 11,000 feet MSL to
500 feet AGL.

...

Expansion of the Pecos MOA complex could interact with traffic on
the “Worth-3” SID.

...

Depending on which airspace were active for training, rerouting
could require flying around the entire Pecos MOA/ATCAA complex.
The more likely effect to private pilots would be to schedule a
flight at a time other than the hours during the typical two days
per month when the Capitan MOA/ATCAA was in use. As is always the
case, if an emergency, such as a life-flight were required, the
Air Force would immediately shift or end training to accommodate
the emergency.

...

The increase in sonic booms from supersonic activity would be
noticeable and can be intrusive. They will occur on average two
times in three days ... Public concerns expressed during scoping
include annoyance of people who are startled by booms, possible
damage to structures (particularly brittle objects like older
windows) and potential adverse effects on domestic and wild
animals. ... Sonic booms under the Proposed Action are not
expected to damage viable structures, such as foundations,
buildings, windmills, radio towers, or water tanks. ... Not all
structures are in good condition. Brittle elements such as windows
and plaster can weaken with age, and become susceptible to
breakage at low boom levels. ... Nonetheless, the presence of
susceptible structures, for whatever reason, means that some
damage attributable to sonic booms is to be expected.

...

Short-term reactions to new noises may include temporary shifts in
habitat use or activities. For example, prairie dogs and swift
foxes might spend more time in their burrows, where they would be
somewhat insulated from noises (Francine et al. 1995). Lesser
prairie-chickens are known to cease lekking activities for several
minutes to several hours in response to noise disturbances (Giesen
and Connelly 1993); therefore, a sudden onset low-level noise
event from an aircraft overflight could disturb lekking
prairie-chickens. ... Under the Proposed Action, a greater number
of sorties would include supersonic flight and supersonic flight
would occur at lower altitudes than under existing conditions.
Consequently, animals would be exposed to louder noise levels from
sonic booms than they are at present.

...

Several special-status species are rare in New Mexico, but could
be present during spring and fall migration, particularly along
the Pecos River (NMDGF 2002a, 2002b). These are brown pelican,
piping plover, mountain plover, black tern (Chlidonias niger),
interior least tern, peregrine falcon, bald eagle, and Baird’s
sparrow. These temporary visitors may not be habituated to
aircraft noise. Migrating birds require quality stopover habitat
to rest and eat. Noise disturbance, therefore, could cause
individual special-status birds and other migratory birds (e.g.,
ducks and geese) to leave their stopover area prematurely.
However, negative impacts to special-status populations would not
be expected. ... Wintering bald eagles are sensitive to noise
disturbance (Grubb and King 1991) and may be disturbed by aircraft
noise However, because of the short duration of a noise event
occurring at a particular location on the ground, any resulting
physiological or behavioral disturbance would be short-lived.

...

Noise from supersonic flight would increase in all parts of the
airspace, but at levels that would not be expected to
significantly impact biological resources. Resident wild animals
and livestock experiencing new noise levels may initially
experience negative effects and may temporarily shift habitat use
or activities as a result (Harrington and Veitch 1991).

...

Under the Proposed Action, the number of supersonic events
throughout the airspace would increase relative to current
conditions. Supersonic flights at 10,000 feet MSL could increase
the frequency and intensity of sonic booms.

...

The proposed MOA expansions and new airspace would not prohibit
general aviation use. MOAs are joint use airspace and both
military and civil pilots are required to operate under
see-and-avoid rules of flight.


Clearly, see-and-avoid failed to separate military and civil aircraft
at _subsonic_ speeds in these military-civil mishaps:

http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?e...13X33340&key=1
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/GenPDF.asp?...1FA028A&rpt=fi
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?e...26X00109&key=2

That the USAF can muster the audacity to suggest that see-and-avoid
would be a successful technique for separating _supersonic_ aircraft
is hubris beyond comprehension.


Other socioeconomic factors, such as business activity,
employment, interest rates, and land scarcity (or availability)
are much more likely to affect property values than an altitude
redistribution of flight pattern changes in existing training
aircraft overflights.


What of the reduction of property values do supersonic military
aircraft operations above 30,000' feet over the affected area?


The New Mexico Air National Guard (NMANG) is proposing to create
the Smitty MOA underneath the current CATO MOA, which is 60 miles
southwest of Albuquerque. An EA analyzing this action is underway.
Creation of this new MOA would not affect Cannon AFB or its
airspace


Is this yet another attempted military airspace grab?

On Wed, 16 Feb 2005 17:50:56 GMT, Larry Dighera
wrote:



I'm sure that is a great comfort to Ms. Jacques Olivier and her
daughter:
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?e...12X22313&key=1

How does expansion of a MOA for operations above 10,000 feet in New
Mexico relate to a mid-air collision in Florida on a low-level
training route?


These mishap rates do not consider combat losses due to enemy
action. F-16C aircraft have flown more than 3,336,700 hours since
the aircraft entered the Air Force inventory during Fiscal Year
1985. Over that period, 120 Class A mishaps have occurred and 113
aircraft have been destroyed.


That would be an average of one F-16C non-combat Class A mishap every
two months!

Dunno about your math skills here, but I just read about 120 class A
mishaps during the period from FY 1985 to the present--that's a bit
more than 20 years of experience and doesn't begin to address rates
per 100,000 flying hours which for the F-16 (all models) are
significantly lower than previous single-seat, single-engine tactical
aircraft.

The numbers might confirm the contention that flying high performance
tactical aircraft is somewhat dangerous and therefore some airspace
reservation is a good idea.

IFR traffic would require ATC clearance to transit the active MOA.
However, VFR traffic could transit the active MOA using the
“see-and-avoid” concept.


The USAF's suggestion that VFR traffic employ see-and-avoid techniques
to avoid mid-air collisions with supersonic military fighter aircraft
reveals a their desire to mislead.

It isn't "the USAF's suggestion", it is the basic concept of Visual
Flight Rules. Nothing misleading about it--the idea of VFR is to
provide simple rules for flight in VISUAL conditions and without need
for a flight plan or clearance or external third-party deconfliction.
Look out the window and don't bump into things in front of you.

You might also note that aircraft below 10,000 MSL (except in some
special use airspace) is already restricted to airspeeds below 250
KIAS.

The existing Pecos MOA complex would be expanded laterally and
vertically under the Proposed Action. The MOAs would be expanded
laterally to conform with the lateral boundaries of the ATCAA
overlying the complex. This expansion would include a southerly
expansion of the Pecos South Low MOA, thus adding additional low
altitude military airspace in that region (down to 500 feet AGL).


Is that an additional airspace grab?

"Additional"? If there were not similar airspace adjustments going on
all the time with both increases and reductions in airspace.

The proposed MOA expansions and new airspace would not prohibit
general aviation use. MOAs are joint use airspace and both
military and civil pilots are required to operate under
see-and-avoid rules of flight.


Clearly, see-and-avoid failed to separate military and civil aircraft
at _subsonic_ speeds in these military-civil mishaps:

http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?e...13X33340&key=1
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/GenPDF.asp?...1FA028A&rpt=fi
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?e...26X00109&key=2

That the USAF can muster the audacity to suggest that see-and-avoid
would be a successful technique for separating _supersonic_ aircraft
is hubris beyond comprehension.

Guess what? Civilian aircraft operating under "see-and-avoid" run into
each other at subsonic speeds with much greater frequency. And, when
the military is involved in any mishap an investigation is conducted,
reported in the public domain and blame is assigned. Corrective action
to eliminate those accidents in the future is part of the process.

The "hubris beyond comprehension" here is your flogging of the issue
with little apparent background and a total unwillingness to
acknowledge any of the alternatives to your pronouncements.

Other socioeconomic factors, such as business activity,
employment, interest rates, and land scarcity (or availability)
are much more likely to affect property values than an altitude
redistribution of flight pattern changes in existing training
aircraft overflights.


What of the reduction of property values do supersonic military
aircraft operations above 30,000' feet over the affected area?

For aircraft the size of F-16s, sonic booms above 30,000 feet are
usually not heard on the surface. That's why most supersonic airspace
in the US is at high altitudes.


The New Mexico Air National Guard (NMANG) is proposing to create
the Smitty MOA underneath the current CATO MOA, which is 60 miles
southwest of Albuquerque. An EA analyzing this action is underway.
Creation of this new MOA would not affect Cannon AFB or its
airspace


Is this yet another attempted military airspace grab?

Oh, and lest I forget....screw you, Larry. You're clueless.


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
www.thunderchief.org
www.thundertales.blogspot.com

Oh, and lest I forget....screw you, Larry. You're clueless.

Much as it pains me to agree with a fighter dood, I have to go along
with that remark.

Dick
Former MATS/MAC AC

On 16 Feb 2005 12:39:23 -0800, "Dick L." wrote
in . com::

Oh, and lest I forget....screw you, Larry. You're clueless.

Much as it pains me to agree with a fighter dood, I have to go along
with that remark.

Dick
Former MATS/MAC AC

I'll take your agreement with Ed's remark as an admission, that you
have no valid argument to present on the subject proposed MOA
expansion.

On Wed, 16 Feb 2005 12:43:05 -0700, Ed Rasimus
wrote in
::

On Wed, 16 Feb 2005 17:50:56 GMT, Larry Dighera
wrote:


In the unlikely event of property damage due to an Air Force
activity, the Air Force has established procedures for damage
claims.

I'm sure that is a great comfort to Ms. Jacques Olivier and her
daughter:
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?e...12X22313&key=1

How does expansion of a MOA for operations above 10,000 feet in New
Mexico relate to a mid-air collision in Florida on a low-level
training route?

The USAF's statement regarding claims procedures for "damage due to
Air Force activity" is probably inadequate to replace Ms. Oliveier's
late husband.

The November 16, 2000 fatal F-16/Cessna 172 MAC occurred at 3,000' at
subsonic speed.

I believe the expansion of the MOA relates to low-level supersonic
military operations within "5,000 to 6,000 feet above ground level
(AGL)".



These mishap rates do not consider combat losses due to enemy
action. F-16C aircraft have flown more than 3,336,700 hours since
the aircraft entered the Air Force inventory during Fiscal Year
1985. Over that period, 120 Class A mishaps have occurred and 113
aircraft have been destroyed.


That would be an average of one F-16C non-combat Class A mishap every
two months!

Dunno about your math skills here,

Perhaps you'll be good enough to assist me in calculating the number
of F-16C non-combat mishaps per month given the USAF's statement, that
120 Class A mishaps have occurred to date (Jan. 2005) since the 1985
Fiscal Year.

but I just read about 120 class A
mishaps during the period from FY 1985 to the present--that's a bit
more than 20 years of experience and doesn't begin to address rates
per 100,000 flying hours which for the F-16 (all models) are
significantly lower than previous single-seat, single-engine tactical
aircraft.

Be that as it may, I was commenting on the number of F-16C non-combat
mishaps per month.

The numbers might confirm the contention that flying high performance
tactical aircraft is somewhat dangerous and therefore some airspace
reservation is a good idea.

I agree, that it tends to confirm the danger involved in flying USAF
F-16C's in a non-combat environment.

Whether or not additional reserved airspace for low-level supersonic
military operations will improved the F-16C's non-combat Class A
bimonthly mishap rate is a speculative matter at best.


IFR traffic would require ATC clearance to transit the active MOA.
However, VFR traffic could transit the active MOA using the
“see-and-avoid” concept.


The USAF's suggestion that VFR traffic employ see-and-avoid techniques
to avoid mid-air collisions with supersonic military fighter aircraft
reveals a their desire to mislead.

It isn't "the USAF's suggestion", it is the basic concept of Visual
Flight Rules.

Yes. It is the 'law' of VFR operations, however in this case it was
suggested as a _viable_ means of transiting the proposed MOA while
low-level supersonic military operations are in progress!

Nothing misleading about it--the idea of VFR is to
provide simple rules for flight in VISUAL conditions and without need
for a flight plan or clearance or external third-party deconfliction.

The NAS is a system. As such, it is dependent on each aspect of its
implementation to be functional in order for the whole to function
properly.

FARs are part of that system. The prohibiting of flight in excess of
250 knots below 10,000 feet is a FAR. The military has exploited the
"SPEED AUTHORIZATION GRANTED TO DOD May 18, 1978" which states:

The regulation grants an exception to aircraft having flight
characteristics which preclude safe operation at speeds below 250
knots by providing that if the minimum safe airspeed for any
particular operation is greater than the maximum speed prescribed,
the aircraft may be operated at that minimum safe airspeed.

When the speed of aircraft below 10,000 feet exceeds 250 knots as
mandated by FAR § 91.117(a)*, the integrity of the NAS is compromised
as evidenced by at least two of the three military/civil mishaps, and
corroborated by the military's own study which concluded, that out of
each 20 seconds of flight below 250 knots, 17 seconds must be
dedicated to scanning for conflicting traffic and 3 seconds remained
for scanning cockpit gages; this was for "highly trained" military
pilots.

So it is evident that see-and-avoid is completely impracticable for
maintaining aircraft separation when aircraft are traveling in excess
of Mach one.

*

http://ecfr.gpoaccess.gov/cgi/t/text....2.4.9&idno=14


Look out the window and don't bump into things in front of you.

Oh, if it were only so simple.


You might also note that aircraft below 10,000 MSL (except in some
special use airspace) is already restricted to airspeeds below 250
KIAS.

Of course, the military has found a way around that speed restriction.
(see above)


The existing Pecos MOA complex would be expanded laterally and
vertically under the Proposed Action. The MOAs would be expanded
laterally to conform with the lateral boundaries of the ATCAA
overlying the complex. This expansion would include a southerly
expansion of the Pecos South Low MOA, thus adding additional low
altitude military airspace in that region (down to 500 feet AGL).


Is that an additional airspace grab?

"Additional"? If there were not similar airspace adjustments going on
all the time with both increases and reductions in airspace.

If there are so many adjustments occurring, it should be easy to
provide several examples of _reductions_ in military airspace, please.


The proposed MOA expansions and new airspace would not prohibit
general aviation use. MOAs are joint use airspace and both
military and civil pilots are required to operate under
see-and-avoid rules of flight.


Clearly, see-and-avoid failed to separate military and civil aircraft
at _subsonic_ speeds in these military-civil mishaps:

http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?e...13X33340&key=1
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/GenPDF.asp?...1FA028A&rpt=fi
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?e...26X00109&key=2

That the USAF can muster the audacity to suggest that see-and-avoid
would be a successful technique for separating _supersonic_ aircraft
is hubris beyond comprehension.

Guess what? Civilian aircraft operating under "see-and-avoid" run into
each other at subsonic speeds with much greater frequency.

That may be due to the relative number of aircraft and the number of
operational hours between the military and civil fleets.

And, when the military is involved in any mishap an investigation
is conducted, reported in the public domain and blame is assigned.

Actually, the same thing occurs for civil mishaps; the NTSB finds and
reports probable cause. The specific action taken by the FAA against
a civil pilot is a matter of public record. Here's what occurred in
the case of the November 16, 2000 fatal MAC in Florida:

Air Force officials said the mistakes [sic] Lt. Col. Parker made
leading up to the crash over Manatee County deserved only
"administrative action" — a written or verbal reprimand. He will
also retain his officer's pension.

The decision regarding Parker was made by Brig. Gen. John Rosa,
commander of Moody Air Force Base in south Georgia, where the F-16
pilots were stationed at the time of the crash.

Citing confidentiality laws, Air Force officials would not
elaborate on what form of administrative action was taken. They
also would not say which of the mistakes he made the day of the
crash led to the reprimand, the Sarasota Herald-Tribune
reported...

-- Associated Press

Corrective action to eliminate those accidents in the future is part
of the process.

Well, at least the USAF tries to give the impression that that occurs:

Thursday, June 21, 2001

Associated Press

BRADENTON — Military aircraft on low-level training missions in
civilian air space should fly at the slowest possible speed, the
Air Force says following an F-16 crash that killed a civilian
pilot.

The Air Force has updated flight manuals and safety procedures on
high-speed, low-altitude flights after reviewing the collision of
the F-16 Fighting Falcon and a Cessna 172 over Manatee County on
Nov. 16, military officials said Tuesday.

Pilots on training maneuvers in civilian air space now are
required to fly at the slowest possible speed although not less
than 250 knots, or 287.5 miles per hour.

In an official review of the crash, released in March, the Air
Force downplayed the F-16's 480 mph speed as a factor. The pilot
was flying 180 mph faster than federal and Air Force guidelines
then allowed for military jets in air space near
Sarasota-Bradenton International Airport.

The updates are written in general terms and refer to slowing the
aircraft and reviewing training routes near congested flying
areas.

The report, overseen and released by Air Force Chief of Staff Gen.
Michael Ryan, comes more than seven months after the F-16, flown
by Capt. Greg Kreuder, collided with the Cessna, killing its
pilot, Jacques Olivier, 57, a [ATP rated] flight instructor from
Hernando County.

"We can't speculate on whether these recommendations would have
affected the outcome of the crash had they already been in place,"
said Air Force spokeswoman Maj. Cheryl Law. "We always consider
safety as our highest priority." ...


The "hubris beyond comprehension" here is your flogging of the issue
with little apparent background and a total unwillingness to
acknowledge any of the alternatives to your pronouncements.

When the government perpetrates injustice, it is the prerogative of a
citizen of a free nation to publicly air his views. I believe I have
provided evidence of reasonable background knowledge, and haven't seen
any alternative "pronouncements" to which you refer.


Other socioeconomic factors, such as business activity,
employment, interest rates, and land scarcity (or availability)
are much more likely to affect property values than an altitude
redistribution of flight pattern changes in existing training
aircraft overflights.


What of the reduction of property values do supersonic military
aircraft operations above 30,000' feet over the affected area?

For aircraft the size of F-16s, sonic booms above 30,000 feet are
usually not heard on the surface. That's why most supersonic airspace
in the US is at high altitudes.

The proposed MOA enlargement is to permit supersonic operations at
between 5,000' and 6,000' as stated in the USAF EIS. Why are you
referring to 30,000' feet? That is the current, not proposed,
altitude floor in the MOA for supersonic operations.


The New Mexico Air National Guard (NMANG) is proposing to create
the Smitty MOA underneath the current CATO MOA, which is 60 miles
southwest of Albuquerque. An EA analyzing this action is underway.
Creation of this new MOA would not affect Cannon AFB or its
airspace


Is this yet another attempted military airspace grab?

Oh, and lest I forget....screw you, Larry. You're clueless.

Ed Rasimus

Well, it would appear one of us is. But at least I'm not forced to
profane a fellow airman due to lack of reasonable arguments.

Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
www.thunderchief.org
www.thundertales.blogspot.com

On Wed, 16 Feb 2005 22:02:08 GMT, Larry Dighera
wrote:

On Wed, 16 Feb 2005 12:43:05 -0700, Ed Rasimus
wrote in
::

On Wed, 16 Feb 2005 17:50:56 GMT, Larry Dighera
wrote:


In the unlikely event of property damage due to an Air Force
activity, the Air Force has established procedures for damage
claims.

I'm sure that is a great comfort to Ms. Jacques Olivier and her
daughter:
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?e...12X22313&key=1

How does expansion of a MOA for operations above 10,000 feet in New
Mexico relate to a mid-air collision in Florida on a low-level
training route?

The USAF's statement regarding claims procedures for "damage due to
Air Force activity" is probably inadequate to replace Ms. Oliveier's
late husband.

And, your arguments citing a mishap in Florida relating to a MOA
change in New Mexico are inadequate to address the training
requirements of combat forces in high performance tactical jet
aircraft. I'm deeply sympathetic to Ms Olivier or Oliveier, but I'm
also sympathetic to the surviving wives and families of quite
literally hundreds of USAF, USN and USMC tactical aviators who died or
were imprisoned when lost in military flight operations in the service
of their country.

The November 16, 2000 fatal F-16/Cessna 172 MAC occurred at 3,000' at
subsonic speed.

I believe the expansion of the MOA relates to low-level supersonic
military operations within "5,000 to 6,000 feet above ground level
(AGL)".

So, creating a MOA which would advise all aircraft operators of the
intended operations would not be as good as operating in non-special
use airspace as was being done in the Florida accident?



These mishap rates do not consider combat losses due to enemy
action. F-16C aircraft have flown more than 3,336,700 hours since
the aircraft entered the Air Force inventory during Fiscal Year
1985. Over that period, 120 Class A mishaps have occurred and 113
aircraft have been destroyed.


That would be an average of one F-16C non-combat Class A mishap every
two months!

Dunno about your math skills here,

Perhaps you'll be good enough to assist me in calculating the number
of F-16C non-combat mishaps per month given the USAF's statement, that
120 Class A mishaps have occurred to date (Jan. 2005) since the 1985
Fiscal Year.

My point was that 3.3 MILLION hours per 120 mishaps (which aren't all
mid-airs or even aircraft losses and which didn't all occur in special
sue airspace) is a statistic that is better viewed as mishaps/100k
flight hours rather than mishaps/month.

but I just read about 120 class A
mishaps during the period from FY 1985 to the present--that's a bit
more than 20 years of experience and doesn't begin to address rates
per 100,000 flying hours which for the F-16 (all models) are
significantly lower than previous single-seat, single-engine tactical
aircraft.

Be that as it may, I was commenting on the number of F-16C non-combat
mishaps per month.

Which means what relative to training airspace in NM?

The numbers might confirm the contention that flying high performance
tactical aircraft is somewhat dangerous and therefore some airspace
reservation is a good idea.

I agree, that it tends to confirm the danger involved in flying USAF
F-16C's in a non-combat environment.

In ANY environment.

Whether or not additional reserved airspace for low-level supersonic
military operations will improved the F-16C's non-combat Class A
bimonthly mishap rate is a speculative matter at best.

Precisely! The mishap rate and the need for training airspace are not
related to each other!


IFR traffic would require ATC clearance to transit the active MOA.
However, VFR traffic could transit the active MOA using the
“see-and-avoid” concept.


The USAF's suggestion that VFR traffic employ see-and-avoid techniques
to avoid mid-air collisions with supersonic military fighter aircraft
reveals a their desire to mislead.

It isn't "the USAF's suggestion", it is the basic concept of Visual
Flight Rules.

Yes. It is the 'law' of VFR operations, however in this case it was
suggested as a _viable_ means of transiting the proposed MOA while
low-level supersonic military operations are in progress!

First, note that the tactical applicability of supersonic operations
at high or low altitude is very limited. Second, note that most
PLANNED supersonic operation is done at high altitude, such as
high-speed intercept training. Third, note that UNPLANNED supersonic
operation can occur momentarily during air combat maneuver/BFM
training and that might be at relatively low altitude (although most
tactical training employs a 10k or 5k AGL "floor"). Fourth, note that
most training in which supersonic operations are planned or highly
likely will be conducted in restricted airspace rather than MOA.
Fifth, note that transiting of MOAs by VFR traffic while allowed is
discourage; by IFR traffic is not allowed when the MOA is in use.

Nothing misleading about it--the idea of VFR is to
provide simple rules for flight in VISUAL conditions and without need
for a flight plan or clearance or external third-party deconfliction.

The NAS is a system. As such, it is dependent on each aspect of its
implementation to be functional in order for the whole to function
properly.

FARs are part of that system. The prohibiting of flight in excess of
250 knots below 10,000 feet is a FAR. The military has exploited the
"SPEED AUTHORIZATION GRANTED TO DOD May 18, 1978" which states:

The regulation grants an exception to aircraft having flight
characteristics which preclude safe operation at speeds below 250
knots by providing that if the minimum safe airspeed for any
particular operation is greater than the maximum speed prescribed,
the aircraft may be operated at that minimum safe airspeed.

When the speed of aircraft below 10,000 feet exceeds 250 knots as
mandated by FAR § 91.117(a)*, the integrity of the NAS is compromised
as evidenced by at least two of the three military/civil mishaps, and
corroborated by the military's own study which concluded, that out of
each 20 seconds of flight below 250 knots, 17 seconds must be
dedicated to scanning for conflicting traffic and 3 seconds remained
for scanning cockpit gages; this was for "highly trained" military
pilots.

So it is evident that see-and-avoid is completely impracticable for
maintaining aircraft separation when aircraft are traveling in excess
of Mach one.

You confirm my asssertion of cluelessness. Some military aircraft
don't function very well at 250 KIAS unless in landing configuration.
They burn fuel at high rates and are restricted in their agility. For
that reason the FARs have waivered the 250 max exactly for the reason
you quote "minimum SAFE airspseed".

Let's take this to an example you are probably more familiar with:
driving your car. How much time when driving do you spend looking out
the window versus staring at your speedometer? Ditto for airplanes.

Look out the window and don't bump into things in front of you.

Oh, if it were only so simple.

Don't knock it if you haven't tried it.

You might also note that aircraft below 10,000 MSL (except in some
special use airspace) is already restricted to airspeeds below 250
KIAS.

Of course, the military has found a way around that speed restriction.
(see above)

And, you can take it to the bank that they will continue to do so.


Is that an additional airspace grab?

"Additional"? If there were not similar airspace adjustments going on
all the time with both increases and reductions in airspace.

If there are so many adjustments occurring, it should be easy to
provide several examples of _reductions_ in military airspace, please.

Did you read previous posts? Walker AFB, Roswell NM. Williams AFB,
Chandler AZ. Webb AFB, Big Spring TX. Wendover AFB, Wendover UT.
Wurtsmith AFB....and those are just W's--all closed within the last 30
years, all with airspace which was no longer needed.

That the USAF can muster the audacity to suggest that see-and-avoid
would be a successful technique for separating _supersonic_ aircraft
is hubris beyond comprehension.

Guess what? Civilian aircraft operating under "see-and-avoid" run into
each other at subsonic speeds with much greater frequency.

That may be due to the relative number of aircraft and the number of
operational hours between the military and civil fleets.

And, it may even be due to private pilots being clueless about where
they are. Or maybe they are talking on their cell phones.

And, when the military is involved in any mishap an investigation
is conducted, reported in the public domain and blame is assigned.

Actually, the same thing occurs for civil mishaps; the NTSB finds and
reports probable cause. The specific action taken by the FAA against
a civil pilot is a matter of public record. Here's what occurred in
the case of the November 16, 2000 fatal MAC in Florida:

Air Force officials said the mistakes [sic] Lt. Col. Parker made
leading up to the crash over Manatee County deserved only
"administrative action" — a written or verbal reprimand. He will
also retain his officer's pension.

The decision regarding Parker was made by Brig. Gen. John Rosa,
commander of Moody Air Force Base in south Georgia, where the F-16
pilots were stationed at the time of the crash.

Citing confidentiality laws, Air Force officials would not
elaborate on what form of administrative action was taken. They
also would not say which of the mistakes he made the day of the
crash led to the reprimand, the Sarasota Herald-Tribune
reported...

-- Associated Press

If you read the accident report you would find a clear detailing of
the "mistakes" and you would learn whether they were primary,
secondary or lesser causes.

As for the "administrative action" it could range from corrective
training to removal from flight status to loss of pay to mandatory
retirement. But, the mere fact that he didn't have his sword broken,
his buttons cut off and his epaulets removed before hanging in the
public square MIGHT mean he wasn't guilty of anything significant!

The "hubris beyond comprehension" here is your flogging of the issue
with little apparent background and a total unwillingness to
acknowledge any of the alternatives to your pronouncements.

When the government perpetrates injustice, it is the prerogative of a
citizen of a free nation to publicly air his views. I believe I have
provided evidence of reasonable background knowledge, and haven't seen
any alternative "pronouncements" to which you refer.

Injustice? Going through a public hearing process before designating
special use airspace is now "injustice"?

And, reread my sentence above: "unwillingness to acknowledge any of
the alternatives to your pronouncements"--that's not "alternative
'prounouncement'".

Posters have given you blocks of information regarding special use
airspace refuting your basic position opposing expansion of the MOA.
You continue to throw stuff at the wall hoping that some sticks,
regardless of relevance.

What of the reduction of property values do supersonic military
aircraft operations above 30,000' feet over the affected area?

For aircraft the size of F-16s, sonic booms above 30,000 feet are
usually not heard on the surface. That's why most supersonic airspace
in the US is at high altitudes.

The proposed MOA enlargement is to permit supersonic operations at
between 5,000' and 6,000' as stated in the USAF EIS. Why are you
referring to 30,000' feet? That is the current, not proposed,
altitude floor in the MOA for supersonic operations.

I'm referring to 30,000 feet BECAUSE YOU REFERRED TO 30,000 FEET!!!!!
That's YOUR quote above mine.

Oh, and lest I forget....screw you, Larry. You're clueless.

Ed Rasimus

Well, it would appear one of us is. But at least I'm not forced to
profane a fellow airman due to lack of reasonable arguments.

Excuse me? I've got more time in the Beak MOA inverted than you've
apparently got in military jets. And, if you've missed my presentation
of "reasonable arguments" you can't read. Oh, and "screw you" isn't
profaning you, it's exercising restraint despite the frustration at
your apparent inability to make any sense of all of this.

If you want profaning of "a fellow airman", I suggest you scan recent
posts from Dudley--he's proven a master at it. But, I can stoop if
need be.



Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
www.thunderchief.org
www.thundertales.blogspot.com

On Wed, 16 Feb 2005 16:28:37 -0700, Ed Rasimus
wrote in
::

On Wed, 16 Feb 2005 22:02:08 GMT, Larry Dighera
wrote:

On Wed, 16 Feb 2005 12:43:05 -0700, Ed Rasimus
wrote in
::

On Wed, 16 Feb 2005 17:50:56 GMT, Larry Dighera
wrote:


In the unlikely event of property damage due to an Air Force
activity, the Air Force has established procedures for damage
claims.

I'm sure that is a great comfort to Ms. Jacques Olivier and her
daughter:
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?e...12X22313&key=1

How does expansion of a MOA for operations above 10,000 feet in New
Mexico relate to a mid-air collision in Florida on a low-level
training route?

The USAF's statement regarding claims procedures for "damage due to
Air Force activity" is probably inadequate to replace Ms. Oliveier's
late husband.

And, your arguments citing a mishap in Florida relating to a MOA
change in New Mexico are inadequate to address the training
requirements of combat forces in high performance tactical jet
aircraft.

My argument was with the USAF's statement _in_ the proposed MOA
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) about claims procedures for
"damage due to Air Force activity." If the USAF hadn't raised the
issue in conjunction with their proposal to increase the size of the
MOA, I wouldn't have referred to their failure to criminally prosecute
Parker for the death of Oliveier.

I'm deeply sympathetic to Ms Olivier or Oliveier,

The USAF wasn't when they heard that she was going to sue them. An
Air Force spokesman was reported to have said, that they'd seek
compensation for the F-16 that killed her husband due to Lead Parker's
deliberate decision to descend into congested terminal airspace
without the required ATC clearance.

but I'm
also sympathetic to the surviving wives and families of quite
literally hundreds of USAF, USN and USMC tactical aviators who died or
were imprisoned when lost in military flight operations in the service
of their country.

How is that relevant to the current discussion of MOA expansion?


The November 16, 2000 fatal F-16/Cessna 172 MAC occurred at 3,000' at
subsonic speed.

I believe the expansion of the MOA relates to low-level supersonic
military operations within "5,000 to 6,000 feet above ground level
(AGL)".

So, creating a MOA which would advise all aircraft operators of the
intended operations would not be as good as operating in non-special
use airspace as was being done in the Florida accident?

From that statement, it seems you might be a bit confused about the
proposed MOA enlargement as well as the Florida mishap.

The USAF proposes not to establish a MOA, but to increase the size of
the one currently in existence, so that they can conduct supersonic
operations within 5,000' to 6,000' of the surface instead of at
30,000' as is currently occurring. Please read the USAF EIS, so that
you'll at least know what we are discussing. Here's a link to it:
www.cannon.af.mil




These mishap rates do not consider combat losses due to enemy
action. F-16C aircraft have flown more than 3,336,700 hours since
the aircraft entered the Air Force inventory during Fiscal Year
1985. Over that period, 120 Class A mishaps have occurred and 113
aircraft have been destroyed.


That would be an average of one F-16C non-combat Class A mishap every
two months!

Dunno about your math skills here,

Perhaps you'll be good enough to assist me in calculating the number
of F-16C non-combat mishaps per month given the USAF's statement, that
120 Class A mishaps have occurred to date (Jan. 2005) since the 1985
Fiscal Year.

My point was that 3.3 MILLION hours per 120 mishaps (which aren't all
mid-airs or even aircraft losses and which didn't all occur in special
sue airspace) is a statistic that is better viewed as mishaps/100k
flight hours rather than mishaps/month.

So, you agree with my math now?


but I just read about 120 class A
mishaps during the period from FY 1985 to the present--that's a bit
more than 20 years of experience and doesn't begin to address rates
per 100,000 flying hours which for the F-16 (all models) are
significantly lower than previous single-seat, single-engine tactical
aircraft.

Be that as it may, I was commenting on the number of F-16C non-combat
mishaps per month.

Which means what relative to training airspace in NM?

Not much. But a non-combat Class A mishap every two months continuing
for a period of 20 years is significant in its own right, in my
opinion.

[...]


IFR traffic would require ATC clearance to transit the active MOA.
However, VFR traffic could transit the active MOA using the
“see-and-avoid” concept.


The USAF's suggestion that VFR traffic employ see-and-avoid techniques
to avoid mid-air collisions with supersonic military fighter aircraft
reveals a their desire to mislead.

It isn't "the USAF's suggestion", it is the basic concept of Visual
Flight Rules.

Yes. It is the 'law' of VFR operations, however in this case it was
suggested as a _viable_ means of transiting the proposed MOA while
low-level supersonic military operations are in progress!

First, note that the tactical applicability of supersonic operations
at high or low altitude is very limited. Second, note that most
PLANNED supersonic operation is done at high altitude, such as
high-speed intercept training. Third, note that UNPLANNED supersonic
operation can occur momentarily during air combat maneuver/BFM
training and that might be at relatively low altitude (although most
tactical training employs a 10k or 5k AGL "floor"). Fourth, note that
most training in which supersonic operations are planned or highly
likely will be conducted in restricted airspace rather than MOA.
Fifth, note that transiting of MOAs by VFR traffic while allowed is
discourage; by IFR traffic is not allowed when the MOA is in use.

Those statements reveal the fact that you haven't read the USAF EIS
statement proposing the increase in size of the MOA. The reason the
USAF is seeking to increase the size of the MOA is so that they can
conduct supersonic operations within 5,000' to 6,000' of the surface
instead of at 30,000' as is currently occurring. Please read the USAF
EIS, so that you'll at least know what we are discussing. Here's a
link to it: www.cannon.af.mil


Nothing misleading about it--the idea of VFR is to
provide simple rules for flight in VISUAL conditions and without need
for a flight plan or clearance or external third-party deconfliction.

The NAS is a system. As such, it is dependent on each aspect of its
implementation to be functional in order for the whole to function
properly.

FARs are part of that system. The prohibiting of flight in excess of
250 knots below 10,000 feet is a FAR. The military has exploited the
"SPEED AUTHORIZATION GRANTED TO DOD May 18, 1978" which states:

The regulation grants an exception to aircraft having flight
characteristics which preclude safe operation at speeds below 250
knots by providing that if the minimum safe airspeed for any
particular operation is greater than the maximum speed prescribed,
the aircraft may be operated at that minimum safe airspeed.

When the speed of aircraft below 10,000 feet exceeds 250 knots as
mandated by FAR § 91.117(a)*, the integrity of the NAS is compromised
as evidenced by at least two of the three military/civil mishaps, and
corroborated by the military's own study which concluded, that out of
each 20 seconds of flight below 250 knots, 17 seconds must be
dedicated to scanning for conflicting traffic and 3 seconds remained
for scanning cockpit gages; this was for "highly trained" military
pilots.

So it is evident that see-and-avoid is completely impracticable for
maintaining aircraft separation when aircraft are traveling in excess
of Mach one.

You confirm my asssertion of cluelessness. Some military aircraft
don't function very well at 250 KIAS unless in landing configuration.
They burn fuel at high rates and are restricted in their agility. For
that reason the FARs have waivered the 250 max exactly for the reason
you quote "minimum SAFE airspseed".

I didn't say there was no reason for the DOD exemption from the 250
knot maximum speed below 10,000' feet. I said it brakes the NAS, and
is unsafe. There is not enough time to see-and-avoid at speeds in
excess of 250 knots.

You're saying military aircraft need to go faster than 250 knots below
10,000'; who am I to dispute that. I'm saying regardless of that
need, it creates a flight hazard to civil aviation when it occurs
outside of Restricted airspace (such as MTRs and MOAs).

Let's take this to an example you are probably more familiar with:
driving your car. How much time when driving do you spend looking out
the window versus staring at your speedometer? Ditto for airplanes.

How much time does a military pilot spend with his head down in the
cockpit studying charts, tuning radios, setting up navigation
equipment and not scanning for conflicting traffic? If it's more than
three seconds out of every 20, he's causing a safety hazard by virtue
of a military research study. If you have the flight experience you
claim, you know I'm correct.


Look out the window and don't bump into things in front of you.

Oh, if it were only so simple.

Don't knock it if you haven't tried it.

I've tried it. Trust me, it's not that easy to spot an aircraft ATC
has pointed out that is only a mile or two distant. Now, at
supersonic speeds of ~11.5 miles a minute, it would only take 5
seconds for a 2 mile distant supersonic aircraft to reach you! You
have to agree, that's not a reasonable amount of time to
see-and-avoid.

[...]

Is that an additional airspace grab?

"Additional"? If there were not similar airspace adjustments going on
all the time with both increases and reductions in airspace.

If there are so many adjustments occurring, it should be easy to
provide several examples of _reductions_ in military airspace, please.

Did you read previous posts? Walker AFB, Roswell NM. Williams AFB,
Chandler AZ. Webb AFB, Big Spring TX. Wendover AFB, Wendover UT.
Wurtsmith AFB....and those are just W's--all closed within the last 30
years, all with airspace which was no longer needed.

No, I did not read the articles that mentioned those closures.

Does it require the closure of an airbase to get the military to
relinquish its SUA? Aren't there situations where they no longer
train in the same way, and can relinquish it without closing the a
base?


That the USAF can muster the audacity to suggest that see-and-avoid
would be a successful technique for separating _supersonic_ aircraft
is hubris beyond comprehension.

Guess what? Civilian aircraft operating under "see-and-avoid" run into
each other at subsonic speeds with much greater frequency.

That may be due to the relative number of aircraft and the number of
operational hours between the military and civil fleets.

And, it may even be due to private pilots being clueless about where
they are. Or maybe they are talking on their cell phones.

There are more civil aircraft flying more hours. That's the reason.

Your attempt to make light of the grim realities of MACs, reveals your
less than sincere and cavalier attitude.


And, when the military is involved in any mishap an investigation
is conducted, reported in the public domain and blame is assigned.

Actually, the same thing occurs for civil mishaps; the NTSB finds and
reports probable cause. The specific action taken by the FAA against
a civil pilot is a matter of public record. Here's what occurred in
the case of the November 16, 2000 fatal MAC in Florida:

Air Force officials said the mistakes [sic] Lt. Col. Parker made
leading up to the crash over Manatee County deserved only
"administrative action" — a written or verbal reprimand. He will
also retain his officer's pension.

The decision regarding Parker was made by Brig. Gen. John Rosa,
commander of Moody Air Force Base in south Georgia, where the F-16
pilots were stationed at the time of the crash.

Citing confidentiality laws, Air Force officials would not
elaborate on what form of administrative action was taken. They
also would not say which of the mistakes he made the day of the
crash led to the reprimand, the Sarasota Herald-Tribune
reported...

-- Associated Press

If you read the accident report you would find a clear detailing of
the "mistakes" and you would learn whether they were primary,
secondary or lesser causes.

I have read both the military AIB and the NTSB reports. (I'd be happy
to provide copies via e-mail to anyone interested.) It's clear that
flight lead Parker deliberately chose to descend into congested
terminal airspace at high speed without the required ATC clearance,
and lead his wingman into the fatal collision.


As for the "administrative action" it could range from corrective
training to removal from flight status to loss of pay to mandatory
retirement.

It was reported to be a verbal reprimand. So while the accident
report was made public, the details of the "punishment" Parker
received were confidential, unlike those in FAA certificate actions.
The military does not disclose as much information as the FAA.

But, the mere fact that he didn't have his sword broken,
his buttons cut off and his epaulets removed before hanging in the
public square MIGHT mean he wasn't guilty of anything significant!

His deliberate decision to descend into congested terminal airspace at
high-speed without the required ATC clearance resulted in the death of
an innocent civilian, a fellow American. I consider that not only
significant, but worthy of criminal action. The USAF allowed Parker
to retire as planned with full pension and rank; that is not just.

The "hubris beyond comprehension" here is your flogging of the issue
with little apparent background and a total unwillingness to
acknowledge any of the alternatives to your pronouncements.

When the government perpetrates injustice, it is the prerogative of a
citizen of a free nation to publicly air his views. I believe I have
provided evidence of reasonable background knowledge, and haven't seen
any alternative "pronouncements" to which you refer.

Injustice? Going through a public hearing process before designating
special use airspace is now "injustice"?

At that point, I was referring to the lack of criminal prosecution in
the fatal November 16, 2000 Florida MAC, not the military airspace
grab.

And, reread my sentence above: "unwillingness to acknowledge any of
the alternatives to your pronouncements"--that's not "alternative
'prounouncement'".

How is it different?

Posters have given you blocks of information regarding special use
airspace refuting your basic position opposing expansion of the MOA.
You continue to throw stuff at the wall hoping that some sticks,
regardless of relevance.

Perhaps, but at least I read the USAF EIS, and am aware that the
airspace they are seeking is to enable them to train at supersonic
speed within 5,000' to 6,000' of the surface, unlike you.

[...]


Oh, and lest I forget....screw you, Larry. You're clueless.

Ed Rasimus

Well, it would appear one of us is. But at least I'm not forced to
profane a fellow airman due to lack of reasonable arguments.

Excuse me? I've got more time in the Beak MOA inverted than you've
apparently got in military jets.

How is that revenant to the USAF's attempted airspace grab?

And, if you've missed my presentation of "reasonable arguments" you can't read.

That's me, illiterate. :-)

Oh, and "screw you" isn't profaning you,

You obviously don't know the meaning of the word:

Main Entry:1 profane
Pronunciationr*-*f*n, pr*-
Function:transitive verb
Inflected Formrofaned ; profaning
Etymology:Middle English prophanen, from Latin profanare, from
profanus
Date:14th century

1 : to treat (something sacred) with abuse, irreverence, or
contempt : DESECRATE
2 : to debase by a wrong, unworthy, or vulgar use
–profaner noun

it's exercising restraint despite the frustration at
your apparent inability to make any sense of all of this.

The record is clear; you haven't read the USAF EIS and weren't aware
they want to enlarge the MOA to permit low-level supersonic operations
north of Roswell, NM. You may not like my lack of objectivity and
overt criticism of the military, but it is you who apparently has no
clue about this airspace grab.

If you want profaning of "a fellow airman", I suggest you scan recent
posts from Dudley--he's proven a master at it. But, I can stoop if
need be.

You not only can stoop, you have publicly. I hope you're indiscretion
isn't typical of most military airmen.

Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
www.thunderchief.org
www.thundertales.blogspot.com

On Thu, 17 Feb 2005 02:02:28 GMT, Larry Dighera
wrote:

On Wed, 16 Feb 2005 16:28:37 -0700, Ed Rasimus
wrote in
::


And, your arguments citing a mishap in Florida relating to a MOA
change in New Mexico are inadequate to address the training
requirements of combat forces in high performance tactical jet
aircraft.

My argument was with the USAF's statement _in_ the proposed MOA
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) about claims procedures for
"damage due to Air Force activity." If the USAF hadn't raised the
issue in conjunction with their proposal to increase the size of the
MOA, I wouldn't have referred to their failure to criminally prosecute
Parker for the death of Oliveier.

What part of "accident" is so difficult to understand. For what crime
would you prosecute the flight lead? Murder? Did he premeditate? What
crime?

I'm deeply sympathetic to Ms Olivier or Oliveier,

The USAF wasn't when they heard that she was going to sue them. An
Air Force spokesman was reported to have said, that they'd seek
compensation for the F-16 that killed her husband due to Lead Parker's
deliberate decision to descend into congested terminal airspace
without the required ATC clearance.

We live in a litigious society. Folks threaten to sue when the spill
hot coffee in their laps and to avoid the costs of the litigation, the
prospective defendant will often reach a settlement. No criminal
charges were brought, because no prosecuter with an ounce of judgement
would be able to define a "crime" and no civil action was brought,
because Ms Olivier really couldn't prove that a flight lead decision
was in any way malicious toward her husband.


So, creating a MOA which would advise all aircraft operators of the
intended operations would not be as good as operating in non-special
use airspace as was being done in the Florida accident?

From that statement, it seems you might be a bit confused about the
proposed MOA enlargement as well as the Florida mishap.

The USAF proposes not to establish a MOA, but to increase the size of
the one currently in existence, so that they can conduct supersonic
operations within 5,000' to 6,000' of the surface instead of at
30,000' as is currently occurring. Please read the USAF EIS, so that
you'll at least know what we are discussing. Here's a link to it:
www.cannon.af.mil

I read it and I know what we are discussing. We are talking about a
proposal to increase available training airspace for Cannon AFB and to
change the limits of permissible operations. That is considerably
different than a descent in non-special use airspace a continent away.


My point was that 3.3 MILLION hours per 120 mishaps (which aren't all
mid-airs or even aircraft losses and which didn't all occur in special
sue airspace) is a statistic that is better viewed as mishaps/100k
flight hours rather than mishaps/month.

So, you agree with my math now?

I'm suggesting that extrapolating 20 years experience into a
"mishap/month" stat is misleading. The rate is not constant over the
period. And, the rate for mishaps is measured traditionally as mishaps
per 100k flying hours, not as a function of calendar months.

Not much. But a non-combat Class A mishap every two months continuing
for a period of 20 years is significant in its own right, in my
opinion.

That's the error--the mishaps don't occur at a constant rate through
the period and the assumption that they do is erroneous. The extension
of mishaps to equate with loss of aircraft, association with special
use airspace, supersonic operation and mid-air collisions are all
further errors related to the statistic.

First, note that the tactical applicability of supersonic operations
at high or low altitude is very limited. Second, note that most
PLANNED supersonic operation is done at high altitude, such as
high-speed intercept training. Third, note that UNPLANNED supersonic
operation can occur momentarily during air combat maneuver/BFM
training and that might be at relatively low altitude (although most
tactical training employs a 10k or 5k AGL "floor"). Fourth, note that
most training in which supersonic operations are planned or highly
likely will be conducted in restricted airspace rather than MOA.
Fifth, note that transiting of MOAs by VFR traffic while allowed is
discourage; by IFR traffic is not allowed when the MOA is in use.

Those statements reveal the fact that you haven't read the USAF EIS
statement proposing the increase in size of the MOA. The reason the
USAF is seeking to increase the size of the MOA is so that they can
conduct supersonic operations within 5,000' to 6,000' of the surface
instead of at 30,000' as is currently occurring. Please read the USAF
EIS, so that you'll at least know what we are discussing. Here's a
link to it: www.cannon.af.mil

You're redundant and beginning to carp. My list of five factors is to
point out that simply because an airspace is AUTHORIZED for supersonic
operation does not mean that is what is going on within. Being
AUTHORIZED simply means that if tactically necessary, you can exceed
the mach without filling out reams of paperwork and having an
investigation or potential violation. Most operations are
subsonic--there is little tactical appliacation for supersonic flight.
It can and does occur, usually inadvertently, during engagement. Get
it? You don't use supersonic AUTHORIZED airspace to go blasting back
and forth with your hair on fire.

You confirm my asssertion of cluelessness. Some military aircraft
don't function very well at 250 KIAS unless in landing configuration.
They burn fuel at high rates and are restricted in their agility. For
that reason the FARs have waivered the 250 max exactly for the reason
you quote "minimum SAFE airspseed".

I didn't say there was no reason for the DOD exemption from the 250
knot maximum speed below 10,000' feet. I said it brakes the NAS, and
is unsafe. There is not enough time to see-and-avoid at speeds in
excess of 250 knots.

You're saying military aircraft need to go faster than 250 knots below
10,000'; who am I to dispute that. I'm saying regardless of that
need, it creates a flight hazard to civil aviation when it occurs
outside of Restricted airspace (such as MTRs and MOAs).

Excuse me? If my airplane is drastically hampered in its ability to
safely maneuver by going slower than 250 KIAS below 10k feet MSL, then
it "creates a flight hazard" to me, my flight members, other aircraft
and folks on the ground.

How much time does a military pilot spend with his head down in the
cockpit studying charts, tuning radios, setting up navigation
equipment and not scanning for conflicting traffic? If it's more than
three seconds out of every 20, he's causing a safety hazard by virtue
of a military research study. If you have the flight experience you
claim, you know I'm correct.

Lessee a channel change every fifteen minutes takes about four second.
Charts? If VFR, I'm navigating by pilotage--i.e. looking at landmarks
out the window. If IFR, I'm head-down (or actually looking at the HUD
which is looking out the window) anyway if in the clouds, or
navigating by pilotage if in VMC. And, "setting up nav equipment" is
once again something that isn't done continually and in many systems
is done pre-flight through cartridge programming which then updates.

And, I have the flight experience I claim.


Look out the window and don't bump into things in front of you.

Oh, if it were only so simple.

Don't knock it if you haven't tried it.

I've tried it. Trust me, it's not that easy to spot an aircraft ATC
has pointed out that is only a mile or two distant. Now, at
supersonic speeds of ~11.5 miles a minute, it would only take 5
seconds for a 2 mile distant supersonic aircraft to reach you! You
have to agree, that's not a reasonable amount of time to
see-and-avoid.

Then you need to get your eyes checked. As stated repeatedly, there is
little utility to supersonic operation and very little reason to have
other than very momentary excursions into the supersonic regime at low
altitude. Even so, the shift in visual acquistion range between what
you see at 500 kts and what you see at 660 kts is insignificant.

As for your acquistion ranges, I've regularly seen F-5 sized targets
at 10-15 miles, tanker sized targets at 20 miles and light civil
airplanes at 10 miles--particularly if cued by a radar return, ATC
advisory or other input.

If there are so many adjustments occurring, it should be easy to
provide several examples of _reductions_ in military airspace, please.

Did you read previous posts? Walker AFB, Roswell NM. Williams AFB,
Chandler AZ. Webb AFB, Big Spring TX. Wendover AFB, Wendover UT.
Wurtsmith AFB....and those are just W's--all closed within the last 30
years, all with airspace which was no longer needed.

No, I did not read the articles that mentioned those closures.

Google BRAC. Are you unaware that in the last thirty years the
military has been significantly reduced?

Does it require the closure of an airbase to get the military to
relinquish its SUA? Aren't there situations where they no longer
train in the same way, and can relinquish it without closing the a
base?

Yes there are. There are also changes of mission. If you go back in
history to the '50s and '60s you will find a special use airspace
category called MCC (Military Climb Corridor) at the end of virtually
every runway of every major airport in the US. This was used for
departure of Cold War jet interceptors on scramble departure. They are
no longer used and you won't find them anywhere.

There are more civil aircraft flying more hours. That's the reason.

So, for civil aircraft mishaps, the rate per 100k flying hours might
be a good statistic? Not mishaps per month?

I have read both the military AIB and the NTSB reports. (I'd be happy
to provide copies via e-mail to anyone interested.) It's clear that
flight lead Parker deliberately chose to descend into congested
terminal airspace at high speed without the required ATC clearance,
and lead his wingman into the fatal collision.

That's called "flight lead discretion". It's one of literally hundreds
of decisions a flight lead is required to make in each and every
flight.


It was reported to be a verbal reprimand. So while the accident
report was made public, the details of the "punishment" Parker
received were confidential, unlike those in FAA certificate actions.
The military does not disclose as much information as the FAA.

What part of "verbal reprimand" is so difficult to understand. For
"details" do you require a transcript of the counseling session?


His deliberate decision to descend into congested terminal airspace at
high-speed without the required ATC clearance resulted in the death of
an innocent civilian, a fellow American. I consider that not only
significant, but worthy of criminal action. The USAF allowed Parker
to retire as planned with full pension and rank; that is not just.

Again we come to the terminology of "accident" and "crime". Yes,
someone died. No, there was no criminal intent and while there might
have been an arguably poor decision, it wasn't actionable after a
detailed investigation.

The "hubris beyond comprehension" here is your flogging of the issue
with little apparent background and a total unwillingness to
acknowledge any of the alternatives to your pronouncements.

When the government perpetrates injustice, it is the prerogative of a
citizen of a free nation to publicly air his views. I believe I have
provided evidence of reasonable background knowledge, and haven't seen
any alternative "pronouncements" to which you refer.

And, reread my sentence above: "unwillingness to acknowledge any of
the alternatives to your pronouncements"--that's not "alternative
'prounouncement'".

How is it different?

I didn't say you made an "alternative pronouncement". I said you
haven't acknowledged that numerous posters have provided alternative
information which conflicts with the pronouncements you made.


Perhaps, but at least I read the USAF EIS, and am aware that the
airspace they are seeking is to enable them to train at supersonic
speed within 5,000' to 6,000' of the surface, unlike you.

That's three times redundant. And, see above for the discussion.

Well, it would appear one of us is. But at least I'm not forced to
profane a fellow airman due to lack of reasonable arguments.

Excuse me? I've got more time in the Beak MOA inverted than you've
apparently got in military jets.

How is that revenant to the USAF's attempted airspace grab?

It is relevant to my experience in the airspace in question (have you
read the EIS to see the prominent mentions of Beak MOA and Capitan
MOA?) It is further relevant to your claim to be a "fellow
airman"--can you tell me what you've flown and where that gives you
this status of peer?


1 : to treat (something sacred) with abuse, irreverence, or
contempt : DESECRATE
2 : to debase by a wrong, unworthy, or vulgar use
–profaner noun

If I said you were an asshole, that would be vulgar. If I said ****
you that would be vulgar as well. And, since I don't consider you as
"something sacred", I can't very well be irreverant.

The record is clear; you haven't read the USAF EIS and weren't aware
they want to enlarge the MOA to permit low-level supersonic operations
north of Roswell, NM. You may not like my lack of objectivity and
overt criticism of the military, but it is you who apparently has no
clue about this airspace grab.

That's four and still redundant. But, if you've got little to say,
saying it often will serve equally as well. I've been refuting your
major issue of "airpace grab" with regard to a very small extension of
the MOAs used by both Cannon and Holloman AFBs and the applicability
of the supersonic authorization. (And you might want to get out a map
to check that both Beak and Capitan are W. of Roswell.)

If you want profaning of "a fellow airman", I suggest you scan recent
posts from Dudley--he's proven a master at it. But, I can stoop if
need be.

You not only can stoop, you have publicly. I hope you're indiscretion
isn't typical of most military airmen.

You'll have to familiarize yourself with a lot more military airmen to
make the decision on whether or not I'm typical. But, I'd advise you
to do it online and at a distance.


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
www.thunderchief.org
www.thundertales.blogspot.com

On Thu, 17 Feb 2005 08:50:44 -0700, Ed Rasimus
wrote in
::

On Thu, 17 Feb 2005 02:02:28 GMT, Larry Dighera
wrote:

On Wed, 16 Feb 2005 16:28:37 -0700, Ed Rasimus
wrote in
::


And, your arguments citing a mishap in Florida relating to a MOA
change in New Mexico are inadequate to address the training
requirements of combat forces in high performance tactical jet
aircraft.

My argument was with the USAF's statement _in_ the proposed MOA
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) about claims procedures for
"damage due to Air Force activity." If the USAF hadn't raised the
issue in conjunction with their proposal to increase the size of the
MOA, I wouldn't have referred to their failure to criminally prosecute
Parker for the death of Oliveier.

What part of "accident" is so difficult to understand.

When a pilot deliberately descends into congested terminal airspace
with the required ATC clearance, it's not an accident; it's reckless
endangerment of all the aircraft operating legally within the terminal
airspace. If you disagree, please explain how Parker could have
_accidentally_ descended into the Class B and C airspace, perform a G
Check, and search for the MTR?

For what crime would you prosecute the flight lead? Murder?

Florida law defines third-degree murder as the killing of a person
without intent or premeditation, a terminology that in other states
would closely match the interpretation of manslaughter crimes.

Did he premeditate?

Actually, Parker's preparation for the fatal sortie was flawed.
Here's an excerpt from the USAF Accident Investigation Board report:

(1) Most of the mission planning was accomplished the
evening prior to the mishap. Based on fuel considerations, the
pilots determined that VR-1098 would be the best low-level route
for their mission. Lieutenant Colonel Parker tasked Captain
Kreuder to produce a low-level route map and schedule the route
with the appropriate scheduling agency. Neither pilot had flown
VR-1098 before. As part of his mission planning, Lieutenant
Colonel Parker referred to a FLIP L-19 Instrument Flight Rules
(IFR) Enroute Low Altitude Chart and determined that their planned
route of flight would keep them clear of the Tampa Class B and the
Sarasota-Bradenton Class C airspace (hereafter referred to as
Sarasota Class C airspace). Lieutenant Colonel Parker also
planned the simulated attack for the Avon Park targets and
prepared the briefing room for the next day’s mission. The next
morning, Captain Kreuder reviewed the weather and NOTAMs prior to
the flight briefing and filed a composite IFR/VFR/IFR flight plan
in accordance with unit procedures. He also checked the Bird
Avoidance Model (BAM) for forecast bird activity in the Florida
area.

(2) The mission briefing included a mission overview, scenario of
simulated threats for the mission, routing to the low-level entry
point, and possible divert airfields along the route of flight.
Additionally, the flight lead covered wingman responsibilities and
formation positions. The pilots discussed the specific details of
VR-1098, the planned attacks on Avon Park, and tactical
considerations during the simulated.

I'll set this part below out so you won't miss it:
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Lieutenant Colonel Parker did not specifically brief Class B and
Class C airspace restrictions in the Tampa area during the flight
briefing. Air Force directives require the flight lead to brief
applicable airspace restrictions.
--------------------------------------------------------------------

Although Lieutenant Colonel Parker checked
to make sure their planned route to the low-level would not enter
these areas, they would be flying in close proximity to them.
This information would have enhanced the wingman’s awareness of
the boundaries of these controlled airspaces and their
accompanying altitude restrictions. All other appropriate items
were covered in adequate detail in accordance with Air Force
directives. According to Captain Kreuder, the briefing was
thorough and understood by him.

Parker's failure to brief airspace restrictions as required by Air
Force directives, casts doubt on his ability to adequately premeditate
at all in the mental state he was in at the time.


Here's a question for you experienced AF pilots:

Given the fact, that the top of Tampa Class B is 10,000' in all
sectors, and the entry point for VR1098 is located only one NM south
of the Tampa Class B southern boundary, and Parker's Ninja flight was
southbound above Tampa Class B, how did he plan to enter low level
VR1098 Military Training Route without entering Tampa Class B
airspace? Was he planning on descending nearly 10,000' in less than a
mile?

What crime?

Third-degree murder.

What would the FAA and Florida authorities have called it if Parker
had been a civilian GA pilot and caused the death of another pilot,
because he violated FAA regulations?

I'm deeply sympathetic to Ms Olivier or Oliveier,

The USAF wasn't when they heard that she was going to sue them. An
Air Force spokesman was reported to have said, that they'd seek
compensation for the F-16 that killed her husband due to Lead Parker's
deliberate decision to descend into congested terminal airspace
without the required ATC clearance.

We live in a litigious society. Folks threaten to sue when the spill
hot coffee in their laps and to avoid the costs of the litigation, the
prospective defendant will often reach a settlement.

That doesn't excuse the USAF spokesman's callous comment.

No criminal charges were brought, because no prosecuter with an ounce
of judgement would be able to define a "crime"

We disagree about that.

and no civil action was brought, because Ms Olivier really couldn't
prove that a flight lead decision was in any way malicious toward her
husband.

All she (or the DA) would have had to prove was negligence, which
should have been easy. I'm not sure if she ever filed a suit, but
here's what the newspaper had to say:


http://www.sptimes.com/News/120100/n...t_faults.shtml
Widow of pilot faults Air Force and FAA
By ALEX LEARY and BILL VARIAN
© St. Petersburg Times, published December 1, 2000

CRYSTAL RIVER -- The wife of a Cessna pilot killed in a collision
with an F-16 fighter plane over Manatee County earlier this month
has filed wrongful death claims against the Air Force and the
Federal Aviation Administration.

The claims allege "illegal airspeed and altitude" of the F-16 and
a failure of FAA air traffic controllers to prevent the Nov. 16
crash.

Danielle Olivier, 50, of Citrus County, is seeking up to
$10-million in the death of her husband, 57-year-old Jacques
Olivier.

...

Kreuder said he never saw the Cessna, only a blur, "like a sheet
of white." He ejected and was not injured.

Radar data indicates the military planes were traveling faster
than 480 mph before one of them struck the Cessna 172 piloted by
Jacques Olivier.

Planes below 10,000 feet are limited to flying no faster than 300
mph unless they are in a special military area, which the F-16s
were not.

...

"Air traffic controllers employed by the Federal Aviation
Administration negligently failed to maintain separation between
the two aircraft," Danielle Olivier's claim states.

"These guys were going too fast, they were too low and they
weren't communicating," Coker said in an interview Thursday.

"There is no question it shouldn't have occurred," Coker added.
"It really is an unfortunate tragedy."

...

Submitting the Standard Form 95, as the claim Olivier filed is
known, is a precursor to filing a lawsuit, said Michael Pangia,
former head trial lawyer for the FAA who now works in private
legal practice specializing in aviation matters in Washington.

Two things generally happen after a claim is filed: It can be
denied, or the agency in question can simply sit on it, Pangia
said. If it is denied, the person filing the claim then has six
months to file a lawsuit to seek damages.

If the agency does not respond, the person may take up to six
years from the incident that resulted in the claim to file suit,
as if the claim were denied.

The agency may also decide a claim has merit, in which case it
typically would seek more information to justify damages.

...

First, note that the tactical applicability of supersonic operations
at high or low altitude is very limited. Second, note that most
PLANNED supersonic operation is done at high altitude, such as
high-speed intercept training. Third, note that UNPLANNED supersonic
operation can occur momentarily during air combat maneuver/BFM
training and that might be at relatively low altitude (although most
tactical training employs a 10k or 5k AGL "floor"). Fourth, note that
most training in which supersonic operations are planned or highly
likely will be conducted in restricted airspace rather than MOA.
Fifth, note that transiting of MOAs by VFR traffic while allowed is
discourage; by IFR traffic is not allowed when the MOA is in use.

Those statements reveal the fact that you haven't read the USAF EIS
statement proposing the increase in size of the MOA. The reason the
USAF is seeking to increase the size of the MOA is so that they can
conduct supersonic operations within 5,000' to 6,000' of the surface
instead of at 30,000' as is currently occurring. Please read the USAF
EIS, so that you'll at least know what we are discussing. Here's a
link to it: www.cannon.af.mil

You're redundant and beginning to carp.

Because you repeatedly failed to understand what was stated in the Air
Force EIS, I thought it necessary to get it through your head.

My list of five factors is to
point out that simply because an airspace is AUTHORIZED for supersonic
operation does not mean that is what is going on within. Being
AUTHORIZED simply means that if tactically necessary, you can exceed
the mach without filling out reams of paperwork and having an
investigation or potential violation. Most operations are
subsonic--there is little tactical appliacation for supersonic flight.
It can and does occur, usually inadvertently, during engagement. Get
it? You don't use supersonic AUTHORIZED airspace to go blasting back
and forth with your hair on fire.

What you state is not relevant to the planned MOA expansion.

If you had read the Air Force EIS, you'd have noted that one of the
four elements of the proposed MOA expansion is:

... flying at supersonic speeds above 10,000 feet above mean sea
level (MSL) or approximately 5,000 to 6,000 feet above ground
level (AGL) in the airspace ...

And the Air Force EIS further states:

The increase in sonic booms from one per five days under No-Action
to two per three days under the Proposed Action or Alternatives A
or B would not be expected to affect wildlife or livestock
behavior.

So it is apparent that the Air Force deliberately intends (not
inadvertently) to conduct two supersonic operations per every three
days within the proposed expanded MOA despite your contention to the
contrary.

You confirm my asssertion of cluelessness. Some military aircraft
don't function very well at 250 KIAS unless in landing configuration.
They burn fuel at high rates and are restricted in their agility. For
that reason the FARs have waivered the 250 max exactly for the reason
you quote "minimum SAFE airspseed".

I didn't say there was no reason for the DOD exemption from the 250
knot maximum speed below 10,000' feet. I said it brakes the NAS, and
is unsafe. There is not enough time to see-and-avoid at speeds in
excess of 250 knots.

You're saying military aircraft need to go faster than 250 knots below
10,000'; who am I to dispute that. I'm saying regardless of that
need, it creates a flight hazard to civil aviation when it occurs
outside of Restricted airspace (such as MTRs and MOAs).

Excuse me? If my airplane is drastically hampered in its ability to
safely maneuver by going slower than 250 KIAS below 10k feet MSL, then
it "creates a flight hazard" to me, my flight members, other aircraft
and folks on the ground.

I'm sorry you failed to understand my meaning. Let me try again.

If the NAS was designed for a maximum speed of 250 knots below
10,000', and you operate at a speed in excess of that, the NAS will
not function as designed; such excessive speed reduces the time
available for see-and-avoid separation to the point that it is absurd,
and thus causes a safety hazard. Apparently the FAA has chosen to
grant the military exemption based on need rather than safety.

[...]

Then you need to get your eyes checked.

Unlike you, I currently hold a valid Medical Certificate.

As stated repeatedly, there is
little utility to supersonic operation and very little reason to have
other than very momentary excursions into the supersonic regime at low
altitude.

Yes, you have stated that repeatedly, however that "information" is in
direct opposition to the USAF's stated use for the MOA if its
enlargement is granted.

Even so, the shift in visual acquistion range between what
you see at 500 kts and what you see at 660 kts is insignificant.

How significant is the visual acquisition range difference between 250
knots and 660 knots?

As for your acquistion ranges, I've regularly seen F-5 sized targets
at 10-15 miles, tanker sized targets at 20 miles and light civil
airplanes at 10 miles--particularly if cued by a radar return, ATC
advisory or other input.

As a percentage of total attempts, what would be your estimate of the
number of times you have been unable to visually acquire F-5 sized
targets in 3 mile visibility VFR operations?

[...]


I have read both the military AIB and the NTSB reports. (I'd be happy
to provide copies via e-mail to anyone interested.) It's clear that
flight lead Parker deliberately chose to descend into congested
terminal airspace at high speed without the required ATC clearance,
and lead his wingman into the fatal collision.

That's called "flight lead discretion". It's one of literally hundreds
of decisions a flight lead is required to make in each and every
flight.

Are you attempting to imply that the USAF condones the noncompliance
with its directives? Even the chief AIB investigator admitted the
Ninja flight lead had made mistakes:

The chief Air Force investigator said at a news conference Tuesday
that two F-16 pilots from Moody Air Force Base in Valdosta, Ga.,
were not where they were supposed to be, were flying too fast and
were out of radio contact with air-traffic controllers when one of
them collided with a Cessna 172 that had just taken off from
Sarasota bound for Citrus County.

Parker was leading a _training_ mission. He had no compelling _need_
to go rocketing through congested terminal airspace and jeopardize the
safety of all the airline passengers therein as well as those people
on the ground. There is little question, that it was reckless for him
to deliberately chose to descend into congested terminal airspace at
high speed without the required ATC clearance.

[...]

His deliberate decision to descend into congested terminal airspace at
high-speed without the required ATC clearance resulted in the death of
an innocent civilian, a fellow American. I consider that not only
significant, but worthy of criminal action. The USAF allowed Parker
to retire as planned with full pension and rank; that is not just.

Again we come to the terminology of "accident" and "crime". Yes,
someone died. No, there was no criminal intent and while there might
have been an arguably poor decision,

If you have no intent of killing a motorist, but do so as a result of
violating traffic laws while driving, do you think you will not be
criminally prosecuted? Get real.

it wasn't actionable after a detailed investigation.

Perhaps your conclusion is accurate. Or perhaps the military has
influence over the DA in such matters. Or perhaps the DA doesn't have
jurisdiction over military personnel. Neither of us knows why Parker
wasn't criminally prosecuted, but it doesn't seem just to me. If a
civilian pilot had done what Parker did, you can bet he'd be in jail
now.

[...]

"Ed Rasimus" wrote in message
...

What part of "accident" is so difficult to understand. For what crime
would you prosecute the flight lead? Murder? Did he premeditate? What
crime?


The flight lead clearly did not intend for anyone to be killed, but his
unlawful actions did result in the death of another human being. Sounds
like manslaughter to me.



We live in a litigious society. Folks threaten to sue when the spill
hot coffee in their laps and to avoid the costs of the litigation, the
prospective defendant will often reach a settlement. No criminal
charges were brought, because no prosecuter with an ounce of judgement
would be able to define a "crime" and no civil action was brought,
because Ms Olivier really couldn't prove that a flight lead decision
was in any way malicious toward her husband.


Does malice have to be shown? Wouldn't malice make it murder and not
manslaughter?