The Latest Military Airspace Grab: 700 Square Miles!

On Wed, 16 Feb 2005 16:28:37 -0700, Ed Rasimus
wrote in
::

On Wed, 16 Feb 2005 22:02:08 GMT, Larry Dighera
wrote:

On Wed, 16 Feb 2005 12:43:05 -0700, Ed Rasimus
wrote in
::

On Wed, 16 Feb 2005 17:50:56 GMT, Larry Dighera
wrote:


In the unlikely event of property damage due to an Air Force
activity, the Air Force has established procedures for damage
claims.

I'm sure that is a great comfort to Ms. Jacques Olivier and her
daughter:
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?e...12X22313&key=1

How does expansion of a MOA for operations above 10,000 feet in New
Mexico relate to a mid-air collision in Florida on a low-level
training route?

The USAF's statement regarding claims procedures for "damage due to
Air Force activity" is probably inadequate to replace Ms. Oliveier's
late husband.

And, your arguments citing a mishap in Florida relating to a MOA
change in New Mexico are inadequate to address the training
requirements of combat forces in high performance tactical jet
aircraft.

My argument was with the USAF's statement _in_ the proposed MOA
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) about claims procedures for
"damage due to Air Force activity." If the USAF hadn't raised the
issue in conjunction with their proposal to increase the size of the
MOA, I wouldn't have referred to their failure to criminally prosecute
Parker for the death of Oliveier.

I'm deeply sympathetic to Ms Olivier or Oliveier,

The USAF wasn't when they heard that she was going to sue them. An
Air Force spokesman was reported to have said, that they'd seek
compensation for the F-16 that killed her husband due to Lead Parker's
deliberate decision to descend into congested terminal airspace
without the required ATC clearance.

but I'm
also sympathetic to the surviving wives and families of quite
literally hundreds of USAF, USN and USMC tactical aviators who died or
were imprisoned when lost in military flight operations in the service
of their country.

How is that relevant to the current discussion of MOA expansion?


The November 16, 2000 fatal F-16/Cessna 172 MAC occurred at 3,000' at
subsonic speed.

I believe the expansion of the MOA relates to low-level supersonic
military operations within "5,000 to 6,000 feet above ground level
(AGL)".

So, creating a MOA which would advise all aircraft operators of the
intended operations would not be as good as operating in non-special
use airspace as was being done in the Florida accident?

From that statement, it seems you might be a bit confused about the
proposed MOA enlargement as well as the Florida mishap.

The USAF proposes not to establish a MOA, but to increase the size of
the one currently in existence, so that they can conduct supersonic
operations within 5,000' to 6,000' of the surface instead of at
30,000' as is currently occurring. Please read the USAF EIS, so that
you'll at least know what we are discussing. Here's a link to it:
www.cannon.af.mil




These mishap rates do not consider combat losses due to enemy
action. F-16C aircraft have flown more than 3,336,700 hours since
the aircraft entered the Air Force inventory during Fiscal Year
1985. Over that period, 120 Class A mishaps have occurred and 113
aircraft have been destroyed.


That would be an average of one F-16C non-combat Class A mishap every
two months!

Dunno about your math skills here,

Perhaps you'll be good enough to assist me in calculating the number
of F-16C non-combat mishaps per month given the USAF's statement, that
120 Class A mishaps have occurred to date (Jan. 2005) since the 1985
Fiscal Year.

My point was that 3.3 MILLION hours per 120 mishaps (which aren't all
mid-airs or even aircraft losses and which didn't all occur in special
sue airspace) is a statistic that is better viewed as mishaps/100k
flight hours rather than mishaps/month.

So, you agree with my math now?


but I just read about 120 class A
mishaps during the period from FY 1985 to the present--that's a bit
more than 20 years of experience and doesn't begin to address rates
per 100,000 flying hours which for the F-16 (all models) are
significantly lower than previous single-seat, single-engine tactical
aircraft.

Be that as it may, I was commenting on the number of F-16C non-combat
mishaps per month.

Which means what relative to training airspace in NM?

Not much. But a non-combat Class A mishap every two months continuing
for a period of 20 years is significant in its own right, in my
opinion.

[...]


IFR traffic would require ATC clearance to transit the active MOA.
However, VFR traffic could transit the active MOA using the
“see-and-avoid” concept.


The USAF's suggestion that VFR traffic employ see-and-avoid techniques
to avoid mid-air collisions with supersonic military fighter aircraft
reveals a their desire to mislead.

It isn't "the USAF's suggestion", it is the basic concept of Visual
Flight Rules.

Yes. It is the 'law' of VFR operations, however in this case it was
suggested as a _viable_ means of transiting the proposed MOA while
low-level supersonic military operations are in progress!

First, note that the tactical applicability of supersonic operations
at high or low altitude is very limited. Second, note that most
PLANNED supersonic operation is done at high altitude, such as
high-speed intercept training. Third, note that UNPLANNED supersonic
operation can occur momentarily during air combat maneuver/BFM
training and that might be at relatively low altitude (although most
tactical training employs a 10k or 5k AGL "floor"). Fourth, note that
most training in which supersonic operations are planned or highly
likely will be conducted in restricted airspace rather than MOA.
Fifth, note that transiting of MOAs by VFR traffic while allowed is
discourage; by IFR traffic is not allowed when the MOA is in use.

Those statements reveal the fact that you haven't read the USAF EIS
statement proposing the increase in size of the MOA. The reason the
USAF is seeking to increase the size of the MOA is so that they can
conduct supersonic operations within 5,000' to 6,000' of the surface
instead of at 30,000' as is currently occurring. Please read the USAF
EIS, so that you'll at least know what we are discussing. Here's a
link to it: www.cannon.af.mil


Nothing misleading about it--the idea of VFR is to
provide simple rules for flight in VISUAL conditions and without need
for a flight plan or clearance or external third-party deconfliction.

The NAS is a system. As such, it is dependent on each aspect of its
implementation to be functional in order for the whole to function
properly.

FARs are part of that system. The prohibiting of flight in excess of
250 knots below 10,000 feet is a FAR. The military has exploited the
"SPEED AUTHORIZATION GRANTED TO DOD May 18, 1978" which states:

The regulation grants an exception to aircraft having flight
characteristics which preclude safe operation at speeds below 250
knots by providing that if the minimum safe airspeed for any
particular operation is greater than the maximum speed prescribed,
the aircraft may be operated at that minimum safe airspeed.

When the speed of aircraft below 10,000 feet exceeds 250 knots as
mandated by FAR § 91.117(a)*, the integrity of the NAS is compromised
as evidenced by at least two of the three military/civil mishaps, and
corroborated by the military's own study which concluded, that out of
each 20 seconds of flight below 250 knots, 17 seconds must be
dedicated to scanning for conflicting traffic and 3 seconds remained
for scanning cockpit gages; this was for "highly trained" military
pilots.

So it is evident that see-and-avoid is completely impracticable for
maintaining aircraft separation when aircraft are traveling in excess
of Mach one.

You confirm my asssertion of cluelessness. Some military aircraft
don't function very well at 250 KIAS unless in landing configuration.
They burn fuel at high rates and are restricted in their agility. For
that reason the FARs have waivered the 250 max exactly for the reason
you quote "minimum SAFE airspseed".

I didn't say there was no reason for the DOD exemption from the 250
knot maximum speed below 10,000' feet. I said it brakes the NAS, and
is unsafe. There is not enough time to see-and-avoid at speeds in
excess of 250 knots.

You're saying military aircraft need to go faster than 250 knots below
10,000'; who am I to dispute that. I'm saying regardless of that
need, it creates a flight hazard to civil aviation when it occurs
outside of Restricted airspace (such as MTRs and MOAs).

Let's take this to an example you are probably more familiar with:
driving your car. How much time when driving do you spend looking out
the window versus staring at your speedometer? Ditto for airplanes.

How much time does a military pilot spend with his head down in the
cockpit studying charts, tuning radios, setting up navigation
equipment and not scanning for conflicting traffic? If it's more than
three seconds out of every 20, he's causing a safety hazard by virtue
of a military research study. If you have the flight experience you
claim, you know I'm correct.


Look out the window and don't bump into things in front of you.

Oh, if it were only so simple.

Don't knock it if you haven't tried it.

I've tried it. Trust me, it's not that easy to spot an aircraft ATC
has pointed out that is only a mile or two distant. Now, at
supersonic speeds of ~11.5 miles a minute, it would only take 5
seconds for a 2 mile distant supersonic aircraft to reach you! You
have to agree, that's not a reasonable amount of time to
see-and-avoid.

[...]

Is that an additional airspace grab?

"Additional"? If there were not similar airspace adjustments going on
all the time with both increases and reductions in airspace.

If there are so many adjustments occurring, it should be easy to
provide several examples of _reductions_ in military airspace, please.

Did you read previous posts? Walker AFB, Roswell NM. Williams AFB,
Chandler AZ. Webb AFB, Big Spring TX. Wendover AFB, Wendover UT.
Wurtsmith AFB....and those are just W's--all closed within the last 30
years, all with airspace which was no longer needed.

No, I did not read the articles that mentioned those closures.

Does it require the closure of an airbase to get the military to
relinquish its SUA? Aren't there situations where they no longer
train in the same way, and can relinquish it without closing the a
base?


That the USAF can muster the audacity to suggest that see-and-avoid
would be a successful technique for separating _supersonic_ aircraft
is hubris beyond comprehension.

Guess what? Civilian aircraft operating under "see-and-avoid" run into
each other at subsonic speeds with much greater frequency.

That may be due to the relative number of aircraft and the number of
operational hours between the military and civil fleets.

And, it may even be due to private pilots being clueless about where
they are. Or maybe they are talking on their cell phones.

There are more civil aircraft flying more hours. That's the reason.

Your attempt to make light of the grim realities of MACs, reveals your
less than sincere and cavalier attitude.


And, when the military is involved in any mishap an investigation
is conducted, reported in the public domain and blame is assigned.

Actually, the same thing occurs for civil mishaps; the NTSB finds and
reports probable cause. The specific action taken by the FAA against
a civil pilot is a matter of public record. Here's what occurred in
the case of the November 16, 2000 fatal MAC in Florida:

Air Force officials said the mistakes [sic] Lt. Col. Parker made
leading up to the crash over Manatee County deserved only
"administrative action" — a written or verbal reprimand. He will
also retain his officer's pension.

The decision regarding Parker was made by Brig. Gen. John Rosa,
commander of Moody Air Force Base in south Georgia, where the F-16
pilots were stationed at the time of the crash.

Citing confidentiality laws, Air Force officials would not
elaborate on what form of administrative action was taken. They
also would not say which of the mistakes he made the day of the
crash led to the reprimand, the Sarasota Herald-Tribune
reported...

-- Associated Press

If you read the accident report you would find a clear detailing of
the "mistakes" and you would learn whether they were primary,
secondary or lesser causes.

I have read both the military AIB and the NTSB reports. (I'd be happy
to provide copies via e-mail to anyone interested.) It's clear that
flight lead Parker deliberately chose to descend into congested
terminal airspace at high speed without the required ATC clearance,
and lead his wingman into the fatal collision.


As for the "administrative action" it could range from corrective
training to removal from flight status to loss of pay to mandatory
retirement.

It was reported to be a verbal reprimand. So while the accident
report was made public, the details of the "punishment" Parker
received were confidential, unlike those in FAA certificate actions.
The military does not disclose as much information as the FAA.

But, the mere fact that he didn't have his sword broken,
his buttons cut off and his epaulets removed before hanging in the
public square MIGHT mean he wasn't guilty of anything significant!

His deliberate decision to descend into congested terminal airspace at
high-speed without the required ATC clearance resulted in the death of
an innocent civilian, a fellow American. I consider that not only
significant, but worthy of criminal action. The USAF allowed Parker
to retire as planned with full pension and rank; that is not just.

The "hubris beyond comprehension" here is your flogging of the issue
with little apparent background and a total unwillingness to
acknowledge any of the alternatives to your pronouncements.

When the government perpetrates injustice, it is the prerogative of a
citizen of a free nation to publicly air his views. I believe I have
provided evidence of reasonable background knowledge, and haven't seen
any alternative "pronouncements" to which you refer.

Injustice? Going through a public hearing process before designating
special use airspace is now "injustice"?

At that point, I was referring to the lack of criminal prosecution in
the fatal November 16, 2000 Florida MAC, not the military airspace
grab.

And, reread my sentence above: "unwillingness to acknowledge any of
the alternatives to your pronouncements"--that's not "alternative
'prounouncement'".

How is it different?

Posters have given you blocks of information regarding special use
airspace refuting your basic position opposing expansion of the MOA.
You continue to throw stuff at the wall hoping that some sticks,
regardless of relevance.

Perhaps, but at least I read the USAF EIS, and am aware that the
airspace they are seeking is to enable them to train at supersonic
speed within 5,000' to 6,000' of the surface, unlike you.

[...]


Oh, and lest I forget....screw you, Larry. You're clueless.

Ed Rasimus

Well, it would appear one of us is. But at least I'm not forced to
profane a fellow airman due to lack of reasonable arguments.

Excuse me? I've got more time in the Beak MOA inverted than you've
apparently got in military jets.

How is that revenant to the USAF's attempted airspace grab?

And, if you've missed my presentation of "reasonable arguments" you can't read.

That's me, illiterate. :-)

Oh, and "screw you" isn't profaning you,

You obviously don't know the meaning of the word:

Main Entry:1 profane
Pronunciationr*-*f*n, pr*-
Function:transitive verb
Inflected Formrofaned ; profaning
Etymology:Middle English prophanen, from Latin profanare, from
profanus
Date:14th century

1 : to treat (something sacred) with abuse, irreverence, or
contempt : DESECRATE
2 : to debase by a wrong, unworthy, or vulgar use
–profaner noun

it's exercising restraint despite the frustration at
your apparent inability to make any sense of all of this.

The record is clear; you haven't read the USAF EIS and weren't aware
they want to enlarge the MOA to permit low-level supersonic operations
north of Roswell, NM. You may not like my lack of objectivity and
overt criticism of the military, but it is you who apparently has no
clue about this airspace grab.

If you want profaning of "a fellow airman", I suggest you scan recent
posts from Dudley--he's proven a master at it. But, I can stoop if
need be.

You not only can stoop, you have publicly. I hope you're indiscretion
isn't typical of most military airmen.

Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
www.thunderchief.org
www.thundertales.blogspot.com

On Thu, 17 Feb 2005 02:02:28 GMT, Larry Dighera
wrote:

On Wed, 16 Feb 2005 16:28:37 -0700, Ed Rasimus
wrote in
::


And, your arguments citing a mishap in Florida relating to a MOA
change in New Mexico are inadequate to address the training
requirements of combat forces in high performance tactical jet
aircraft.

My argument was with the USAF's statement _in_ the proposed MOA
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) about claims procedures for
"damage due to Air Force activity." If the USAF hadn't raised the
issue in conjunction with their proposal to increase the size of the
MOA, I wouldn't have referred to their failure to criminally prosecute
Parker for the death of Oliveier.

What part of "accident" is so difficult to understand. For what crime
would you prosecute the flight lead? Murder? Did he premeditate? What
crime?

I'm deeply sympathetic to Ms Olivier or Oliveier,

The USAF wasn't when they heard that she was going to sue them. An
Air Force spokesman was reported to have said, that they'd seek
compensation for the F-16 that killed her husband due to Lead Parker's
deliberate decision to descend into congested terminal airspace
without the required ATC clearance.

We live in a litigious society. Folks threaten to sue when the spill
hot coffee in their laps and to avoid the costs of the litigation, the
prospective defendant will often reach a settlement. No criminal
charges were brought, because no prosecuter with an ounce of judgement
would be able to define a "crime" and no civil action was brought,
because Ms Olivier really couldn't prove that a flight lead decision
was in any way malicious toward her husband.


So, creating a MOA which would advise all aircraft operators of the
intended operations would not be as good as operating in non-special
use airspace as was being done in the Florida accident?

From that statement, it seems you might be a bit confused about the
proposed MOA enlargement as well as the Florida mishap.

The USAF proposes not to establish a MOA, but to increase the size of
the one currently in existence, so that they can conduct supersonic
operations within 5,000' to 6,000' of the surface instead of at
30,000' as is currently occurring. Please read the USAF EIS, so that
you'll at least know what we are discussing. Here's a link to it:
www.cannon.af.mil

I read it and I know what we are discussing. We are talking about a
proposal to increase available training airspace for Cannon AFB and to
change the limits of permissible operations. That is considerably
different than a descent in non-special use airspace a continent away.


My point was that 3.3 MILLION hours per 120 mishaps (which aren't all
mid-airs or even aircraft losses and which didn't all occur in special
sue airspace) is a statistic that is better viewed as mishaps/100k
flight hours rather than mishaps/month.

So, you agree with my math now?

I'm suggesting that extrapolating 20 years experience into a
"mishap/month" stat is misleading. The rate is not constant over the
period. And, the rate for mishaps is measured traditionally as mishaps
per 100k flying hours, not as a function of calendar months.

Not much. But a non-combat Class A mishap every two months continuing
for a period of 20 years is significant in its own right, in my
opinion.

That's the error--the mishaps don't occur at a constant rate through
the period and the assumption that they do is erroneous. The extension
of mishaps to equate with loss of aircraft, association with special
use airspace, supersonic operation and mid-air collisions are all
further errors related to the statistic.

First, note that the tactical applicability of supersonic operations
at high or low altitude is very limited. Second, note that most
PLANNED supersonic operation is done at high altitude, such as
high-speed intercept training. Third, note that UNPLANNED supersonic
operation can occur momentarily during air combat maneuver/BFM
training and that might be at relatively low altitude (although most
tactical training employs a 10k or 5k AGL "floor"). Fourth, note that
most training in which supersonic operations are planned or highly
likely will be conducted in restricted airspace rather than MOA.
Fifth, note that transiting of MOAs by VFR traffic while allowed is
discourage; by IFR traffic is not allowed when the MOA is in use.

Those statements reveal the fact that you haven't read the USAF EIS
statement proposing the increase in size of the MOA. The reason the
USAF is seeking to increase the size of the MOA is so that they can
conduct supersonic operations within 5,000' to 6,000' of the surface
instead of at 30,000' as is currently occurring. Please read the USAF
EIS, so that you'll at least know what we are discussing. Here's a
link to it: www.cannon.af.mil

You're redundant and beginning to carp. My list of five factors is to
point out that simply because an airspace is AUTHORIZED for supersonic
operation does not mean that is what is going on within. Being
AUTHORIZED simply means that if tactically necessary, you can exceed
the mach without filling out reams of paperwork and having an
investigation or potential violation. Most operations are
subsonic--there is little tactical appliacation for supersonic flight.
It can and does occur, usually inadvertently, during engagement. Get
it? You don't use supersonic AUTHORIZED airspace to go blasting back
and forth with your hair on fire.

You confirm my asssertion of cluelessness. Some military aircraft
don't function very well at 250 KIAS unless in landing configuration.
They burn fuel at high rates and are restricted in their agility. For
that reason the FARs have waivered the 250 max exactly for the reason
you quote "minimum SAFE airspseed".

I didn't say there was no reason for the DOD exemption from the 250
knot maximum speed below 10,000' feet. I said it brakes the NAS, and
is unsafe. There is not enough time to see-and-avoid at speeds in
excess of 250 knots.

You're saying military aircraft need to go faster than 250 knots below
10,000'; who am I to dispute that. I'm saying regardless of that
need, it creates a flight hazard to civil aviation when it occurs
outside of Restricted airspace (such as MTRs and MOAs).

Excuse me? If my airplane is drastically hampered in its ability to
safely maneuver by going slower than 250 KIAS below 10k feet MSL, then
it "creates a flight hazard" to me, my flight members, other aircraft
and folks on the ground.

How much time does a military pilot spend with his head down in the
cockpit studying charts, tuning radios, setting up navigation
equipment and not scanning for conflicting traffic? If it's more than
three seconds out of every 20, he's causing a safety hazard by virtue
of a military research study. If you have the flight experience you
claim, you know I'm correct.

Lessee a channel change every fifteen minutes takes about four second.
Charts? If VFR, I'm navigating by pilotage--i.e. looking at landmarks
out the window. If IFR, I'm head-down (or actually looking at the HUD
which is looking out the window) anyway if in the clouds, or
navigating by pilotage if in VMC. And, "setting up nav equipment" is
once again something that isn't done continually and in many systems
is done pre-flight through cartridge programming which then updates.

And, I have the flight experience I claim.


Look out the window and don't bump into things in front of you.

Oh, if it were only so simple.

Don't knock it if you haven't tried it.

I've tried it. Trust me, it's not that easy to spot an aircraft ATC
has pointed out that is only a mile or two distant. Now, at
supersonic speeds of ~11.5 miles a minute, it would only take 5
seconds for a 2 mile distant supersonic aircraft to reach you! You
have to agree, that's not a reasonable amount of time to
see-and-avoid.

Then you need to get your eyes checked. As stated repeatedly, there is
little utility to supersonic operation and very little reason to have
other than very momentary excursions into the supersonic regime at low
altitude. Even so, the shift in visual acquistion range between what
you see at 500 kts and what you see at 660 kts is insignificant.

As for your acquistion ranges, I've regularly seen F-5 sized targets
at 10-15 miles, tanker sized targets at 20 miles and light civil
airplanes at 10 miles--particularly if cued by a radar return, ATC
advisory or other input.

If there are so many adjustments occurring, it should be easy to
provide several examples of _reductions_ in military airspace, please.

Did you read previous posts? Walker AFB, Roswell NM. Williams AFB,
Chandler AZ. Webb AFB, Big Spring TX. Wendover AFB, Wendover UT.
Wurtsmith AFB....and those are just W's--all closed within the last 30
years, all with airspace which was no longer needed.

No, I did not read the articles that mentioned those closures.

Google BRAC. Are you unaware that in the last thirty years the
military has been significantly reduced?

Does it require the closure of an airbase to get the military to
relinquish its SUA? Aren't there situations where they no longer
train in the same way, and can relinquish it without closing the a
base?

Yes there are. There are also changes of mission. If you go back in
history to the '50s and '60s you will find a special use airspace
category called MCC (Military Climb Corridor) at the end of virtually
every runway of every major airport in the US. This was used for
departure of Cold War jet interceptors on scramble departure. They are
no longer used and you won't find them anywhere.

There are more civil aircraft flying more hours. That's the reason.

So, for civil aircraft mishaps, the rate per 100k flying hours might
be a good statistic? Not mishaps per month?

I have read both the military AIB and the NTSB reports. (I'd be happy
to provide copies via e-mail to anyone interested.) It's clear that
flight lead Parker deliberately chose to descend into congested
terminal airspace at high speed without the required ATC clearance,
and lead his wingman into the fatal collision.

That's called "flight lead discretion". It's one of literally hundreds
of decisions a flight lead is required to make in each and every
flight.


It was reported to be a verbal reprimand. So while the accident
report was made public, the details of the "punishment" Parker
received were confidential, unlike those in FAA certificate actions.
The military does not disclose as much information as the FAA.

What part of "verbal reprimand" is so difficult to understand. For
"details" do you require a transcript of the counseling session?


His deliberate decision to descend into congested terminal airspace at
high-speed without the required ATC clearance resulted in the death of
an innocent civilian, a fellow American. I consider that not only
significant, but worthy of criminal action. The USAF allowed Parker
to retire as planned with full pension and rank; that is not just.

Again we come to the terminology of "accident" and "crime". Yes,
someone died. No, there was no criminal intent and while there might
have been an arguably poor decision, it wasn't actionable after a
detailed investigation.

The "hubris beyond comprehension" here is your flogging of the issue
with little apparent background and a total unwillingness to
acknowledge any of the alternatives to your pronouncements.

When the government perpetrates injustice, it is the prerogative of a
citizen of a free nation to publicly air his views. I believe I have
provided evidence of reasonable background knowledge, and haven't seen
any alternative "pronouncements" to which you refer.

And, reread my sentence above: "unwillingness to acknowledge any of
the alternatives to your pronouncements"--that's not "alternative
'prounouncement'".

How is it different?

I didn't say you made an "alternative pronouncement". I said you
haven't acknowledged that numerous posters have provided alternative
information which conflicts with the pronouncements you made.


Perhaps, but at least I read the USAF EIS, and am aware that the
airspace they are seeking is to enable them to train at supersonic
speed within 5,000' to 6,000' of the surface, unlike you.

That's three times redundant. And, see above for the discussion.

Well, it would appear one of us is. But at least I'm not forced to
profane a fellow airman due to lack of reasonable arguments.

Excuse me? I've got more time in the Beak MOA inverted than you've
apparently got in military jets.

How is that revenant to the USAF's attempted airspace grab?

It is relevant to my experience in the airspace in question (have you
read the EIS to see the prominent mentions of Beak MOA and Capitan
MOA?) It is further relevant to your claim to be a "fellow
airman"--can you tell me what you've flown and where that gives you
this status of peer?


1 : to treat (something sacred) with abuse, irreverence, or
contempt : DESECRATE
2 : to debase by a wrong, unworthy, or vulgar use
–profaner noun

If I said you were an asshole, that would be vulgar. If I said ****
you that would be vulgar as well. And, since I don't consider you as
"something sacred", I can't very well be irreverant.

The record is clear; you haven't read the USAF EIS and weren't aware
they want to enlarge the MOA to permit low-level supersonic operations
north of Roswell, NM. You may not like my lack of objectivity and
overt criticism of the military, but it is you who apparently has no
clue about this airspace grab.

That's four and still redundant. But, if you've got little to say,
saying it often will serve equally as well. I've been refuting your
major issue of "airpace grab" with regard to a very small extension of
the MOAs used by both Cannon and Holloman AFBs and the applicability
of the supersonic authorization. (And you might want to get out a map
to check that both Beak and Capitan are W. of Roswell.)

If you want profaning of "a fellow airman", I suggest you scan recent
posts from Dudley--he's proven a master at it. But, I can stoop if
need be.

You not only can stoop, you have publicly. I hope you're indiscretion
isn't typical of most military airmen.

You'll have to familiarize yourself with a lot more military airmen to
make the decision on whether or not I'm typical. But, I'd advise you
to do it online and at a distance.


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
www.thunderchief.org
www.thundertales.blogspot.com

On Thu, 17 Feb 2005 08:50:44 -0700, Ed Rasimus
wrote in
::

On Thu, 17 Feb 2005 02:02:28 GMT, Larry Dighera
wrote:

On Wed, 16 Feb 2005 16:28:37 -0700, Ed Rasimus
wrote in
::


And, your arguments citing a mishap in Florida relating to a MOA
change in New Mexico are inadequate to address the training
requirements of combat forces in high performance tactical jet
aircraft.

My argument was with the USAF's statement _in_ the proposed MOA
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) about claims procedures for
"damage due to Air Force activity." If the USAF hadn't raised the
issue in conjunction with their proposal to increase the size of the
MOA, I wouldn't have referred to their failure to criminally prosecute
Parker for the death of Oliveier.

What part of "accident" is so difficult to understand.

When a pilot deliberately descends into congested terminal airspace
with the required ATC clearance, it's not an accident; it's reckless
endangerment of all the aircraft operating legally within the terminal
airspace. If you disagree, please explain how Parker could have
_accidentally_ descended into the Class B and C airspace, perform a G
Check, and search for the MTR?

For what crime would you prosecute the flight lead? Murder?

Florida law defines third-degree murder as the killing of a person
without intent or premeditation, a terminology that in other states
would closely match the interpretation of manslaughter crimes.

Did he premeditate?

Actually, Parker's preparation for the fatal sortie was flawed.
Here's an excerpt from the USAF Accident Investigation Board report:

(1) Most of the mission planning was accomplished the
evening prior to the mishap. Based on fuel considerations, the
pilots determined that VR-1098 would be the best low-level route
for their mission. Lieutenant Colonel Parker tasked Captain
Kreuder to produce a low-level route map and schedule the route
with the appropriate scheduling agency. Neither pilot had flown
VR-1098 before. As part of his mission planning, Lieutenant
Colonel Parker referred to a FLIP L-19 Instrument Flight Rules
(IFR) Enroute Low Altitude Chart and determined that their planned
route of flight would keep them clear of the Tampa Class B and the
Sarasota-Bradenton Class C airspace (hereafter referred to as
Sarasota Class C airspace). Lieutenant Colonel Parker also
planned the simulated attack for the Avon Park targets and
prepared the briefing room for the next day’s mission. The next
morning, Captain Kreuder reviewed the weather and NOTAMs prior to
the flight briefing and filed a composite IFR/VFR/IFR flight plan
in accordance with unit procedures. He also checked the Bird
Avoidance Model (BAM) for forecast bird activity in the Florida
area.

(2) The mission briefing included a mission overview, scenario of
simulated threats for the mission, routing to the low-level entry
point, and possible divert airfields along the route of flight.
Additionally, the flight lead covered wingman responsibilities and
formation positions. The pilots discussed the specific details of
VR-1098, the planned attacks on Avon Park, and tactical
considerations during the simulated.

I'll set this part below out so you won't miss it:
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Lieutenant Colonel Parker did not specifically brief Class B and
Class C airspace restrictions in the Tampa area during the flight
briefing. Air Force directives require the flight lead to brief
applicable airspace restrictions.
--------------------------------------------------------------------

Although Lieutenant Colonel Parker checked
to make sure their planned route to the low-level would not enter
these areas, they would be flying in close proximity to them.
This information would have enhanced the wingman’s awareness of
the boundaries of these controlled airspaces and their
accompanying altitude restrictions. All other appropriate items
were covered in adequate detail in accordance with Air Force
directives. According to Captain Kreuder, the briefing was
thorough and understood by him.

Parker's failure to brief airspace restrictions as required by Air
Force directives, casts doubt on his ability to adequately premeditate
at all in the mental state he was in at the time.


Here's a question for you experienced AF pilots:

Given the fact, that the top of Tampa Class B is 10,000' in all
sectors, and the entry point for VR1098 is located only one NM south
of the Tampa Class B southern boundary, and Parker's Ninja flight was
southbound above Tampa Class B, how did he plan to enter low level
VR1098 Military Training Route without entering Tampa Class B
airspace? Was he planning on descending nearly 10,000' in less than a
mile?

What crime?

Third-degree murder.

What would the FAA and Florida authorities have called it if Parker
had been a civilian GA pilot and caused the death of another pilot,
because he violated FAA regulations?

I'm deeply sympathetic to Ms Olivier or Oliveier,

The USAF wasn't when they heard that she was going to sue them. An
Air Force spokesman was reported to have said, that they'd seek
compensation for the F-16 that killed her husband due to Lead Parker's
deliberate decision to descend into congested terminal airspace
without the required ATC clearance.

We live in a litigious society. Folks threaten to sue when the spill
hot coffee in their laps and to avoid the costs of the litigation, the
prospective defendant will often reach a settlement.

That doesn't excuse the USAF spokesman's callous comment.

No criminal charges were brought, because no prosecuter with an ounce
of judgement would be able to define a "crime"

We disagree about that.

and no civil action was brought, because Ms Olivier really couldn't
prove that a flight lead decision was in any way malicious toward her
husband.

All she (or the DA) would have had to prove was negligence, which
should have been easy. I'm not sure if she ever filed a suit, but
here's what the newspaper had to say:


http://www.sptimes.com/News/120100/n...t_faults.shtml
Widow of pilot faults Air Force and FAA
By ALEX LEARY and BILL VARIAN
© St. Petersburg Times, published December 1, 2000

CRYSTAL RIVER -- The wife of a Cessna pilot killed in a collision
with an F-16 fighter plane over Manatee County earlier this month
has filed wrongful death claims against the Air Force and the
Federal Aviation Administration.

The claims allege "illegal airspeed and altitude" of the F-16 and
a failure of FAA air traffic controllers to prevent the Nov. 16
crash.

Danielle Olivier, 50, of Citrus County, is seeking up to
$10-million in the death of her husband, 57-year-old Jacques
Olivier.

...

Kreuder said he never saw the Cessna, only a blur, "like a sheet
of white." He ejected and was not injured.

Radar data indicates the military planes were traveling faster
than 480 mph before one of them struck the Cessna 172 piloted by
Jacques Olivier.

Planes below 10,000 feet are limited to flying no faster than 300
mph unless they are in a special military area, which the F-16s
were not.

...

"Air traffic controllers employed by the Federal Aviation
Administration negligently failed to maintain separation between
the two aircraft," Danielle Olivier's claim states.

"These guys were going too fast, they were too low and they
weren't communicating," Coker said in an interview Thursday.

"There is no question it shouldn't have occurred," Coker added.
"It really is an unfortunate tragedy."

...

Submitting the Standard Form 95, as the claim Olivier filed is
known, is a precursor to filing a lawsuit, said Michael Pangia,
former head trial lawyer for the FAA who now works in private
legal practice specializing in aviation matters in Washington.

Two things generally happen after a claim is filed: It can be
denied, or the agency in question can simply sit on it, Pangia
said. If it is denied, the person filing the claim then has six
months to file a lawsuit to seek damages.

If the agency does not respond, the person may take up to six
years from the incident that resulted in the claim to file suit,
as if the claim were denied.

The agency may also decide a claim has merit, in which case it
typically would seek more information to justify damages.

...

First, note that the tactical applicability of supersonic operations
at high or low altitude is very limited. Second, note that most
PLANNED supersonic operation is done at high altitude, such as
high-speed intercept training. Third, note that UNPLANNED supersonic
operation can occur momentarily during air combat maneuver/BFM
training and that might be at relatively low altitude (although most
tactical training employs a 10k or 5k AGL "floor"). Fourth, note that
most training in which supersonic operations are planned or highly
likely will be conducted in restricted airspace rather than MOA.
Fifth, note that transiting of MOAs by VFR traffic while allowed is
discourage; by IFR traffic is not allowed when the MOA is in use.

Those statements reveal the fact that you haven't read the USAF EIS
statement proposing the increase in size of the MOA. The reason the
USAF is seeking to increase the size of the MOA is so that they can
conduct supersonic operations within 5,000' to 6,000' of the surface
instead of at 30,000' as is currently occurring. Please read the USAF
EIS, so that you'll at least know what we are discussing. Here's a
link to it: www.cannon.af.mil

You're redundant and beginning to carp.

Because you repeatedly failed to understand what was stated in the Air
Force EIS, I thought it necessary to get it through your head.

My list of five factors is to
point out that simply because an airspace is AUTHORIZED for supersonic
operation does not mean that is what is going on within. Being
AUTHORIZED simply means that if tactically necessary, you can exceed
the mach without filling out reams of paperwork and having an
investigation or potential violation. Most operations are
subsonic--there is little tactical appliacation for supersonic flight.
It can and does occur, usually inadvertently, during engagement. Get
it? You don't use supersonic AUTHORIZED airspace to go blasting back
and forth with your hair on fire.

What you state is not relevant to the planned MOA expansion.

If you had read the Air Force EIS, you'd have noted that one of the
four elements of the proposed MOA expansion is:

... flying at supersonic speeds above 10,000 feet above mean sea
level (MSL) or approximately 5,000 to 6,000 feet above ground
level (AGL) in the airspace ...

And the Air Force EIS further states:

The increase in sonic booms from one per five days under No-Action
to two per three days under the Proposed Action or Alternatives A
or B would not be expected to affect wildlife or livestock
behavior.

So it is apparent that the Air Force deliberately intends (not
inadvertently) to conduct two supersonic operations per every three
days within the proposed expanded MOA despite your contention to the
contrary.

You confirm my asssertion of cluelessness. Some military aircraft
don't function very well at 250 KIAS unless in landing configuration.
They burn fuel at high rates and are restricted in their agility. For
that reason the FARs have waivered the 250 max exactly for the reason
you quote "minimum SAFE airspseed".

I didn't say there was no reason for the DOD exemption from the 250
knot maximum speed below 10,000' feet. I said it brakes the NAS, and
is unsafe. There is not enough time to see-and-avoid at speeds in
excess of 250 knots.

You're saying military aircraft need to go faster than 250 knots below
10,000'; who am I to dispute that. I'm saying regardless of that
need, it creates a flight hazard to civil aviation when it occurs
outside of Restricted airspace (such as MTRs and MOAs).

Excuse me? If my airplane is drastically hampered in its ability to
safely maneuver by going slower than 250 KIAS below 10k feet MSL, then
it "creates a flight hazard" to me, my flight members, other aircraft
and folks on the ground.

I'm sorry you failed to understand my meaning. Let me try again.

If the NAS was designed for a maximum speed of 250 knots below
10,000', and you operate at a speed in excess of that, the NAS will
not function as designed; such excessive speed reduces the time
available for see-and-avoid separation to the point that it is absurd,
and thus causes a safety hazard. Apparently the FAA has chosen to
grant the military exemption based on need rather than safety.

[...]

Then you need to get your eyes checked.

Unlike you, I currently hold a valid Medical Certificate.

As stated repeatedly, there is
little utility to supersonic operation and very little reason to have
other than very momentary excursions into the supersonic regime at low
altitude.

Yes, you have stated that repeatedly, however that "information" is in
direct opposition to the USAF's stated use for the MOA if its
enlargement is granted.

Even so, the shift in visual acquistion range between what
you see at 500 kts and what you see at 660 kts is insignificant.

How significant is the visual acquisition range difference between 250
knots and 660 knots?

As for your acquistion ranges, I've regularly seen F-5 sized targets
at 10-15 miles, tanker sized targets at 20 miles and light civil
airplanes at 10 miles--particularly if cued by a radar return, ATC
advisory or other input.

As a percentage of total attempts, what would be your estimate of the
number of times you have been unable to visually acquire F-5 sized
targets in 3 mile visibility VFR operations?

[...]


I have read both the military AIB and the NTSB reports. (I'd be happy
to provide copies via e-mail to anyone interested.) It's clear that
flight lead Parker deliberately chose to descend into congested
terminal airspace at high speed without the required ATC clearance,
and lead his wingman into the fatal collision.

That's called "flight lead discretion". It's one of literally hundreds
of decisions a flight lead is required to make in each and every
flight.

Are you attempting to imply that the USAF condones the noncompliance
with its directives? Even the chief AIB investigator admitted the
Ninja flight lead had made mistakes:

The chief Air Force investigator said at a news conference Tuesday
that two F-16 pilots from Moody Air Force Base in Valdosta, Ga.,
were not where they were supposed to be, were flying too fast and
were out of radio contact with air-traffic controllers when one of
them collided with a Cessna 172 that had just taken off from
Sarasota bound for Citrus County.

Parker was leading a _training_ mission. He had no compelling _need_
to go rocketing through congested terminal airspace and jeopardize the
safety of all the airline passengers therein as well as those people
on the ground. There is little question, that it was reckless for him
to deliberately chose to descend into congested terminal airspace at
high speed without the required ATC clearance.

[...]

His deliberate decision to descend into congested terminal airspace at
high-speed without the required ATC clearance resulted in the death of
an innocent civilian, a fellow American. I consider that not only
significant, but worthy of criminal action. The USAF allowed Parker
to retire as planned with full pension and rank; that is not just.

Again we come to the terminology of "accident" and "crime". Yes,
someone died. No, there was no criminal intent and while there might
have been an arguably poor decision,

If you have no intent of killing a motorist, but do so as a result of
violating traffic laws while driving, do you think you will not be
criminally prosecuted? Get real.

it wasn't actionable after a detailed investigation.

Perhaps your conclusion is accurate. Or perhaps the military has
influence over the DA in such matters. Or perhaps the DA doesn't have
jurisdiction over military personnel. Neither of us knows why Parker
wasn't criminally prosecuted, but it doesn't seem just to me. If a
civilian pilot had done what Parker did, you can bet he'd be in jail
now.

[...]

"Larry Dighera" wrote in message
...

When a pilot deliberately descends into congested terminal airspace
with the required ATC clearance, it's not an accident; it's reckless
endangerment of all the aircraft operating legally within the terminal
airspace. If you disagree, please explain how Parker could have
_accidentally_ descended into the Class B and C airspace, perform a G
Check, and search for the MTR?


I don't recall anything in the report that indicated the descent into Class
B or Class C airspace was deliberate. As I recall there was a significant
navigational error.

On Sat, 19 Feb 2005 20:58:08 GMT, "Steven P. McNicoll"
wrote in
et::


"Larry Dighera" wrote in message
.. .

When a pilot deliberately descends into congested terminal airspace
with the required ATC clearance, it's not an accident; it's reckless
endangerment of all the aircraft operating legally within the terminal
airspace. If you disagree, please explain how Parker could have
_accidentally_ descended into the Class B and C airspace, perform a G
Check, and search for the MTR?


I don't recall anything in the report that indicated the descent into Class
B or Class C airspace was deliberate.

That is correct. The UAAF Accident Investigation Bboard's (AIB)
report found, that Parker's descent into terminal airspace was a
result of his loss of situational awareness, and (erroneously) implied
that it was the result of an INS error that mysteriously originated at
the time Parker chose to descend into Class B airspace without benefit
of the required ATC clearance.

As I recall there was a significant navigational error.

That is correct also. The AIB report found:

Meanwhile, Ninja flight was still in their VFR descent proceeding
to the low-level start route point, located just northeast of the
Class C airspace [or ~1 NM SSE of Class B airspace]. By this
time, Ninja 1’s INS had developed a 9-11 nautical mile (NM)
position error that went unnoticed by the pilot. He had
experienced no problems with the INS on the first sortie of the
day and assumed it was still accurate. He did not crosscheck the
INS accuracy with other systems during the medium-altitude portion
of the mishap sortie. However, a review of ground radar plots
depicting his actual ground track on the first three legs of the
sortie revealed no apparent deviations.

About the specifics of the INS error, the AIB report found:

Ninja 1’s INS was steering him 9-11 NM south of the actual turn
point so Manatee Dam [the MTR entry point] was, in reality,
several miles to his left.

Now, given the flight was on a southerly heading, and the INS error
erroneously caused Ninja 1 (Parker) to believe his position was 9-11
NM south of his true position, Please explain how that error caused
Parker to believe the MTR entry point was located to the side of his
position? He was southbound, and the error erroneously showed his
position 9-11 NM south of his true position, not to the side. That AIB
report conclusion doesn't make any sense.

But it gets worse. The AIB report also mentions Parkers true position
at the time he began his descent into Class B airspace to have been:

When Ninja 1 cancelled IFR, the flight was well inside the lateral
confines of Tampa Class B airspace but still 3,000 ft above its
upper limit.

...

Ninja 1 entered the Sarasota Class C airspace 9 NM northeast of
Sarasota
..

Now, given the flight was on a southerly heading, and the INS error
erroneously caused Ninja 1 (Parker) to believe his position was 9-11
NM south of his true position, it would have caused him to believe he
was north of the northern boundary of Class C airspace. If that is
true, please explain how the INS error could have excused his decision
to descend into Class B airspace.

The NTSB report (MIA01FA028A) found:

They [Ninja flight] continued to descend through 5,000 feet about
6 miles north of the entry point to VR-1098.

[...]

About 1547, the F-16 flight was heading south and descending
through 4,300 feet on a converging course with N73829. Radar data
indicated that the flight had overshot its intended entry point to
VR-1098 and was several miles southwest of the MTR. The flight had
also inadvertently [sic] passed through Tampa class B airspace
without the required ATC clearance and was about to enter the
Sarasota class C airspace without establishing communications with
ATC, which is required by Federal regulations.

[...]

The second jet collided with the civilian airplane and initially
continued southbound, according to witness statements.

Given Ninja flight's southerly course and the AIB report's conclusion,
that the INS error caused Parker to erroneously believe his position
was 9-11 NM south of his true positron, while still descending through
an altitude of 5,000', Parker would have thought his position to be
well past the MTR entry point. But Parker made another error.

The AIB report states:

... about the time Ninja flight was descending through 4,000 ft
MSL and entering the Class C airspace. Ninja 1 ... switched his
navigation system to a ground-attack steering mode. This new mode
shifted the steering indications in the HUD, showing a 180-degree
bearing for 35 NM to the start route point. This shift in the
steering indications was the result of an unintentional cursor
slew bias by the pilot. Ninja 1 failed to note this bias, turned
the flight south to center up the new steering, and continued
looking for the start route ground reference

However, regardless of that, while the INS error could have
contributed to Parker's loss of SA, it in no way accounts for his
decision to descend into Class B airspace without required ATC
clearance.

There is this additional AIB report information, that may shed some
light on the possible cause of Parker's numerous errors:

Lieutenant Colonel Parker sustained no injuries from the mishap
and did not seek medical attention. He had a normal post-mishap
physical examination on 24 November 2000 [8 days subsequent to the
day the mishap occurred].

...

Blood and urine samples from Lieutenant Colonel Parker and Captain
Kreuder were submitted to the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology
for toxicological analysis. Carbon monoxide levels for both
pilots were within normal limits. No ethanol was detected in the
urine or blood samples. Furthermore, no amphetamines,
barbiturates, benzodiazepines, cannabinoids, cocaine, opiates or
phencyclidine were detected in the urine samples of either pilot

Had fluid samples been analyzed immediately following the mishap,
instead of 8 days later, it might not raise such a red flag.

I would very much appreciate your analysis of these apparent facts and
your replies to the two questions I posed above. Perhaps you can
provide a reasonable explanation, that exonerates Parker's decision to
descend when into Class B airspace. I cannot.

"Ed Rasimus" wrote in message
...

What part of "accident" is so difficult to understand. For what crime
would you prosecute the flight lead? Murder? Did he premeditate? What
crime?


The flight lead clearly did not intend for anyone to be killed, but his
unlawful actions did result in the death of another human being. Sounds
like manslaughter to me.



We live in a litigious society. Folks threaten to sue when the spill
hot coffee in their laps and to avoid the costs of the litigation, the
prospective defendant will often reach a settlement. No criminal
charges were brought, because no prosecuter with an ounce of judgement
would be able to define a "crime" and no civil action was brought,
because Ms Olivier really couldn't prove that a flight lead decision
was in any way malicious toward her husband.


Does malice have to be shown? Wouldn't malice make it murder and not
manslaughter?