Is MDHI going to make it?

Helowriter wrote:
Yep, that's me, Monday morning quarterback, Tuesday afternoon 'told you
so.' And now that ARH and LUH are here, I'm telling you it was a
mistake for Boeing to take itself out of the light helicopter business.
Now they have to buy the airframe from a shaky partner, and may lose
the ARH because of that. They also dealt themselves out of the
light/commerical tilt rotor business - and ancillary
government/military sales. (I know -- it's a fad, and Bell will never
sell more than a handful of 609s and derivatives.)

Salesmen make business -- if Eurocopter and Bell could sustain
commercial product lines in tough times, I suspect Boeing could have
too. Do you blame people for not buying MD600s and Exploriers from a
Dutch holding company when the two major suppliers have stable support
networks? That doesn't mean the product lines were losers. And it
doesn't mean the technology in them is worthless.

The composite blades finally in test for the AH-64 are made like those
already on the 530F (same autoclaves, too). Bell 430s were using that
four-bladed composite rotor head and blade technology way in advance of
the AH-1Z/UH-1Y go-ahead. A lot of that flaw-tolerant S-92 technology
makes good sense for a military operator who has to fly alot, take
battle damage, and stay within a budget. HUMS and lot of this dual-use
stuff evolves in parallel.

Commercial utilization rates are typically higher than military, and
commercial operators get real mad when they can't fly -- that gives you
RAM technologies directly applicable to military helicopters. I'm told
some of the latest FARs are tougher than MILSPEC.

Boeing figured 20-year sole-source military contracts like Chinook and
Apache modernization and V-22 and Comanche were sure bets -- ooops
Comanche wasn't a sure bet. Now, DoD has no problem going offshore for
helicopters. I don't think we should just surrender the market and the
industry to Europe. Monday morning, that might be good for business,
and Tuesday afternoon bad for the country.

HW

The light airframes are still available if Boeing wins the ARH. MDHI is
shaky, but they only have to hold on long enough for AMCOM to make a
decision. If Bell wins the competition, Boeing isn't stuck with a
money-losing commercial operation. The decision to get out of the
commercial tilt-rotor was primarily a Bell decision - no market for the
aircraft. All of the tilt-rotor sales are for military, not an ancillary
government/military sale from a commercial product. Tilt-rotor has been
a military program from the beginning - not a commercial program with
military applicability. V-22 would have never been developed if it had
been a straight civilian product. The torrent of money put into it over
the years would have been turned off long ago if it were a commercial
aircraft - no way to ever make a profit after the development costs.

Salesmen make business - its easy when you already own the lion's share
of the commercial market (Bell) or have governments that protect the
industry (Eurocopter). A good product line that doesn't sell is a loser.
A technology that nobody is interested in has little worth in the
commercial industry.

Composite blades were originally in development for the AH-64A but MD
first used them on the MD-530 because the U.S. Army has always been much
more averse to advanced technologies than say, the USAF or USN. The MD
entry into LHX was viewed with suspicion by the Army because it used the
"unproven" NOTAR concept - the Army wanted something that they were
familiar with. Flaw tolerance isn't the same thing as rugged. A high UTE
rate in a stable commercial environment doesn't equate to a high UTE
rate in a combat environment. A commercial aircraft doesn't routinely
make high-speed descents into the trees, jink around, take fire and
still have to come home with the crew intact. The design, build and
performance criteria are very different between the two.

The FARs are getting tougher because the DoD stopped requiring MILSPEC
many years ago. In an attempt to "streamline" the procurement process,
the Pentagon decided that they would no longer require MILSPECs for new
aircraft acquisitions. Requiring FARs was a different matter. Not to be
outdone, the procurement types in the USG started migrating MILSPEC
standards into the FARs. We're gradually closing the circle on the old
onerous procurement process and will be right back where we started in a
few more years.

Boeing is the prime for Chinook and Apache. Bell is the prime for V-22
and Sikorsky was the prime for Commanche. Of the four aircraft
mentioned, Boeing's strategy is working.


I agree about surrendering the commercial rotary wing industry to Europe
being a bad thing for the country. But, you need to be talking to the
folks in D.C. about that, not the folks in Chicago. Boeing was skinned,
dressed and slow-roasted over an open fire for the 767T deal. They were
roundly criticized in public for trying to protect their commercial
B-767 product line by getting the USG to lease 100 aircraft. The company
will make the decision within the next couple of months whether or not
to terminate the product line as result of not having any future for it.
The European governments would have no problem with subsidizing their
commercial aircraft (or helicopter) industry in order to stay in the
game. That's a government decision, not a corporate decision.

Vygg

Vygg wrote

"The decision to get out of the
commercial tilt-rotor was primarily a Bell decision - no market for the

aircraft. All of the tilt-rotor sales are for military, not an
ancillary
government/military sale from a commercial product. Tilt-rotor has been

a military program from the beginning - not a commercial program with
military applicability."

Did you mean to write a Boeing or McDonnell decision? Bell in the end
was better off without Boeing as a partner on the 609, but at the time
BOEINGS decision to drop out almost killed the program. The engineers
at Boeing Vertol are some of the best, but their managers had no
concept on how to run a commericial aircraft program.

A Boeing Vertol management mentality of spending aircraft development
money on "engineering processes" instead of engineering design resulted
in Boeing claiming that they had completed 90% of all the 609
engineering. When Bell started opening files of what were supposed to
be stress analysis, what they found were one sentence notes stating
that the formal analysis would be completed at a later date. When all
Boeing enginnering was reviewed, it turned out they had only completed
about 40% of what they claimed. They had spent however over 100% of
what they were budgeted.

This is why Boeing Vertol managers were elated when presented the
opportunity to drop out of the 609 program. The grunt engineers
however were devastated. Many key engineers ended up leaving Philly
for Texas as a result

Take care,

CTR

CTR wrote:
Vygg wrote

"The decision to get out of the
commercial tilt-rotor was primarily a Bell decision - no market for the

aircraft. All of the tilt-rotor sales are for military, not an
ancillary
government/military sale from a commercial product. Tilt-rotor has been

a military program from the beginning - not a commercial program with
military applicability."

Did you mean to write a Boeing or McDonnell decision? Bell in the end
was better off without Boeing as a partner on the 609, but at the time
BOEINGS decision to drop out almost killed the program. The engineers
at Boeing Vertol are some of the best, but their managers had no
concept on how to run a commericial aircraft program.

A Boeing Vertol management mentality of spending aircraft development
money on "engineering processes" instead of engineering design resulted
in Boeing claiming that they had completed 90% of all the 609
engineering. When Bell started opening files of what were supposed to
be stress analysis, what they found were one sentence notes stating
that the formal analysis would be completed at a later date. When all
Boeing enginnering was reviewed, it turned out they had only completed
about 40% of what they claimed. They had spent however over 100% of
what they were budgeted.

This is why Boeing Vertol managers were elated when presented the
opportunity to drop out of the 609 program. The grunt engineers
however were devastated. Many key engineers ended up leaving Philly
for Texas as a result

Take care,

CTR

V-22 has always been a Bell-Boeing enterprise. MDHS didn't become a part
of Boeing until the buy-out. Boeing Rotorcraft was, and still is,
headquartered out of Philly. MD didn't have a say in the 609. I can't
speak for the management or operation there as I'm only familiar with
the Mesa site. The two operations just . . . well, to be diplomatic
about it . . . tolerate each other.

In any case, Bell is the prime for V-22/609 and it was their call to
terminate the commercial product. Boeing probably had an input, but Bell
made the final decision.

Vygg

Vygg,

The decision to drop out of the 609 was Boeing Vertols. No doubt with
some influence by Harry Stonecipher. Per the provisions of the
partnership contract, by dropping out Boeing was obligated to turn over
at zero cost to Bell all hardware and enginering they had created.

Originaly this appeared to be a windfall to Bell. But over the past
five years Bell and their new partner Agusta have been forced to
redesign almost every part originally designed or specified by Boeing.
In their rush to justfiy all the money they had spent, Boeing Vertol
managers (not the engineers) demanded the release of engineering that
had more in common with fantasy than fact.

One 609 supplier to Boeing told me that when when they responded to a
critical RFP technical requirement "What you are requesting defies the
laws of known physics!" Boeing managers responded "You are awarded the
contract to develop this device". Turns out that they were the only
ones to respond at all to the RFP. Bell ended up scrapping all Boeing
engineering for this design and starting from scratch. Kept the same
supplier though. Honesty has its rewards.

Take care,

CTR

Hate to tell you, but the commercial 609 is still quite alive, and Bell
claims an order backlog. Bell market studies a couple of years back
projected 45% of the small tilt rotor market would be US and foreign
governments.

Whatever the origins of the Apache composite blade, going back to the
AH-64B, MSIP, etc. the technology to make the things got a chance in a
commercial development - 530F. That's how these things sometimes work,
and denying yourself a commercial avenue denies you development
opportunities that pay off later. Would Boeing Mesa have been better
just learning how to make the Apache blade from scratch today?

Flaw tolerance does indeed equate to ruggedness - the margins to
tolerate flaws caused by damage and keep flying. That is a good thing
for any helicopter - military or civil.

HW

Helowriter wrote:
Hate to tell you, but the commercial 609 is still quite alive, and Bell
claims an order backlog. Bell market studies a couple of years back
projected 45% of the small tilt rotor market would be US and foreign
governments.

Whatever the origins of the Apache composite blade, going back to the
AH-64B, MSIP, etc. the technology to make the things got a chance in a
commercial development - 530F. That's how these things sometimes work,
and denying yourself a commercial avenue denies you development
opportunities that pay off later. Would Boeing Mesa have been better
just learning how to make the Apache blade from scratch today?

Flaw tolerance does indeed equate to ruggedness - the margins to
tolerate flaws caused by damage and keep flying. That is a good thing
for any helicopter - military or civil.

HW

Flaw tolerance is the ability to recover from something going wrong
(back-up systems, automatic reset, etc.). Ruggedness is the ability to
avoid it altogether (armor, maneuverability, "dropability", etc.). If
you've ever dealt with a military helicopter procurement spec, the two
are separate and defined in detail in the requirements.

Origins of the composite blade were the whole point of your argument.
The composite blades for the Apache have always been in development -
despite not having a commercial operation. The fact that the blades were
first used on a 530 (outgrowth from a military program) certainly
doesn't mean that blade development was dependent upon having a civil
use for it, first. Blade development for Apache was and is developed
from scratch - it didn't stop because of the sale to MDHI nor did it
originate with a commercial program. What development opportunities has
Boeing denied itself by not having a commercial rotary wing venture?

AH-64B?

So, Bell claims to have a backorder for the 609? Who has bought it? Firm
orders or wish list? When does the first one get delivered? Commercial,
now, not V-22. I haven't seen anything in the press on any 609 sales.

Vygg

Vygg wrote:

Helowriter wrote:
Hate to tell you, but the commercial 609 is still quite alive, and Bell
claims an order backlog. Bell market studies a couple of years back
projected 45% of the small tilt rotor market would be US and foreign
governments.

Whatever the origins of the Apache composite blade, going back to the
AH-64B, MSIP, etc. the technology to make the things got a chance in a
commercial development - 530F. That's how these things sometimes work,
and denying yourself a commercial avenue denies you development
opportunities that pay off later. Would Boeing Mesa have been better
just learning how to make the Apache blade from scratch today?

Flaw tolerance does indeed equate to ruggedness - the margins to
tolerate flaws caused by damage and keep flying. That is a good thing
for any helicopter - military or civil.

HW

Flaw tolerance is the ability to recover from something going wrong
(back-up systems, automatic reset, etc.). Ruggedness is the ability to
avoid it altogether (armor, maneuverability, "dropability", etc.). If
you've ever dealt with a military helicopter procurement spec, the two
are separate and defined in detail in the requirements.

Origins of the composite blade were the whole point of your argument.
The composite blades for the Apache have always been in development -
despite not having a commercial operation. The fact that the blades were
first used on a 530 (outgrowth from a military program) certainly
doesn't mean that blade development was dependent upon having a civil
use for it, first. Blade development for Apache was and is developed
from scratch - it didn't stop because of the sale to MDHI nor did it
originate with a commercial program. What development opportunities has
Boeing denied itself by not having a commercial rotary wing venture?

AH-64B?

So, Bell claims to have a backorder for the 609?

Yes, see below.

Who has bought it? Firm
orders or wish list?

The former, apparently. This list (from FlugRevue) is a bit old, but
indicative of the kind of firms/individuals who planned to buy it:

In March 2003, Bell said there were "nearly 70 advance orders” from
40 customers in 18 countries.
In July 2001, Bell had claimed 80 orders from 42
different customers in
18 countries, apparently down from the November 2000
figures of 83
aircraft from 44 customers in 23 countries. At the
Farnborough Air
Show in September 1998, Bell had put the total at 68
aircraft from 40
customers in 17 countries. Buyers identified at one
time or another a

Aero-Dienst GmbH (Germany)
Aero Gulf Service (Dubai)
AeroValls (Andorra)
Air Center Helicopters Inc. (USA): 2
Austin Jet (USA)
Bristow (UK): 2
Canadian Helicopter Corp. (Canada): 2
Don Carter
Evergreen Helicopters (USA)
Form Air (Turkey)
Helicopter Services (Norway): 2
Helitech DTY Ltd. (Australia)
Hillwood Development (Ross Perot jr., USA)
Wayne Huizenga
Lider (Brazil): 3
Loyd´s Investments (Poland)
Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance (USA)
Mitsui (Japan): 3, announced at the Asian
Aerospace in February
1998
Greg Norman (USA)
Northern Mountain Helicopters Inc. (Canada)
Petroleum Helicopters (USA).
Petroleum Tiltrotors International (Sheikh Sultan
Mohammed Bin
Al Shaikh Mejeren, Dubai): 2
Textron Inc. (USA)
United Industries (South Korea)

IIRR, a deposit of $100,000 was required at the time the a/c made its first
flight, which was about 2 years ago.


When does the first one get delivered? Commercial,
now, not V-22.

IIRR, Certification is scheduled for the 4th Qtr of 2008 (IIRC it was
originally scheduled for 2003). Bell put the 609's development on hold for a
couple of years while they straightened out the MV-22, not for technical
reasons but because they figured that it was necessary for PR (or if you
like, confidence-building) for commercial sales, and because they needed the
cash to take care of the MV-22 and AH-1/UH-1 upgrade development.

I haven't seen anything in the press on any 609 sales.

AvLeak has covered the a/c a fair amount, as have other sources. Here's a
site which I think is fairly current:

http://www.aerospace-technology.com/projects/ba609/

or you can go to Bell's own website.

Guy

Different kind of flaw tolerance -- this is the structues/dynamics
margin to take damage and keep flying. It could be big stuff like a
real hard landing or ballistic damage, or small screwups like a guy
dropping a toolbox on a composite fairing. The point is cracks don't
propagate, and you keep flying. It's a complicated thing with new
design, test, and qualification tools that weren't available before.
Sikorsky first civil certified that for the S-92 in 2002, and it has
big payoffs for military applications -- Of course the Navy decided to
pass on the Presidential competiton, but that's their insanity.

Yep, 64B was the notional multi-stage improvement program considered
before the C/D evolution that became the D to save money on manuals --
yes, I go back that far. My point was the 530F gave Boeing the
opportunity to design, fabricate, and certify/qualify a composite blade
while the Army thought about it, and thought about it. You don't just
go and do stuff like that, and that's why multiple civil/military
programs give you opportunities to develop dual-use technologies.

The same with the Bell 430 four-bladed composite yoke that started out
as the 630 rotor (I don't know where they got the designation from).
They knew the obvious application was the Marine Cobra, but it took a
decade for the Marines to do it. Meanwhile the 430 put the thing into
production and got it certified.

Bell claimed over 80 orders in 18 countries for the 609 in 2003. How
many they lost during the testing pause while they ran out of money I
don't know. They just did a helo-airplane conversion on a ground rig,
and they're supposed to do an in-flight coversion by the end of the
year. They ran out of bucks, let the thing sit, and recruited Agusta
as a partner -- that's the rotorcraft opportunity Boeing missed.

Good holiday, folks

HW