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#1
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![]() "Stefan" wrote in message ... Thomas Borchert wrote: Hmm. I don't quite get it either. What DO you mean? Sigh, ok. Replace "mistake" by "is to blame" and then you might understand what I've meant. If somebody is given a task which is impossible to accomplish, then who is to blame? The one who failed or the one who gave him the task? The one who ACCEPTED the impossible task. No one forced the controller to work under those conditions. He could have closed his station and walked out, forcing all traffic to be either delayed or rerouted. You know that as well as I do. |
#2
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Juan Jimenez wrote:
The one who ACCEPTED the impossible task. No one forced the controller to work under those conditions. He could have closed his station and walked out, forcing all traffic to be either delayed or rerouted. You know that as well as I do. I don't know this. in fact, I know quite the opposite. I know that the whole idea of the hierarchic structure involved was that the controller should trust that the established and approved workflow was reasonable. I also know that the controller was unaware of what systems didn't work and so was't aware that the safety mechanisms he relied on were inop. And last I know that if he refused the work he would have risked to be fired that very evening. Not really an option with a family. But then, why am I replying since you've plonked me anyway. Stefan |
#3
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![]() "Stefan" wrote in message ... I also know that the controller was unaware of what systems didn't work and so was't aware that the safety mechanisms he relied on were inop. What inoperable safety mechamisms led to this collision? |
#4
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Steven P. McNicoll wrote:
What inoperable safety mechamisms led to this collision? If you had read and understood the report as you claim, you wouldn't ask this. Stefan |
#5
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![]() "Stefan" wrote in message ... If you had read and understood the report as you claim, you wouldn't ask this. If you were aware of any inoperable safety mechanisms that led to this collision you would have answered it. |
#6
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On Sun, 30 Oct 2005 22:53:06 GMT, "Steven P. McNicoll"
wrote: "Stefan" wrote in message ... If you had read and understood the report as you claim, you wouldn't ask this. If you were aware of any inoperable safety mechanisms that led to this collision you would have answered it. "****ing in the wind" is what this kind of debate is sometimes called. By the uncouth. Like me. Brian Whatcott |
#7
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![]() "Stefan" wrote in message ... Juan Jimenez wrote: The one who ACCEPTED the impossible task. No one forced the controller to work under those conditions. He could have closed his station and walked out, forcing all traffic to be either delayed or rerouted. You know that as well as I do. I don't know this. in fact, I know quite the opposite. I know that the whole idea of the hierarchic structure involved was that the controller should trust that the established and approved workflow was reasonable. I also know that the controller was unaware of what systems didn't work and so was't aware that the safety mechanisms he relied on were inop. And last I know that if he refused the work he would have risked to be fired that very evening. Not really an option with a family. But then, why am I replying since you've plonked me anyway. Oh, so if the pilot doesn't preflight, and therefore doesn't know his aircraft has broken systems, doesn't perform checks and just does the flight so he won't lose his job and winds up killing everyone, it's the company's fault. Hmm. That sure is an interesting bit of logic. You wouldn't be related to this controller, a friend of his or perhaps a member of his labor union? Nah, couldn't be. I'll plonk you anyway. I can see where this is coming from... |
#8
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Juan Jimenez wrote:
Oh, so if the pilot doesn't preflight, and therefore doesn't know his aircraft has broken systems, doesn't perform checks and just does the flight so he won't lose his job and winds up killing everyone, it's the company's fault. Hmm. That sure is an interesting bit of logic. You wouldn't be I can see the 747 captain not believing his mechanics but instead creeping in every hole of his aircraft, checking every nut, measuring tolerances, measuruing hydraulic pressures, X-ray the wings for cracks, etc.etc. before every flight... related to this controller, a friend of his or perhaps a member of his labor union? Nah, couldn't be. I'll plonk you anyway. I can see where this is coming from... You've already claimed once to plonk me and haven't done so, so why would you do it now? Do you even know how to plonk somebody? Stefan |
#9
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"Stefan" wrote in message
... I know that the whole idea of the hierarchic structure involved was that the controller should trust that the established and approved workflow was reasonable. The person doing the job who must have the final say as to whether they feel they can do the job satisfactorily. In this situation, some of the equipment in the ATC facility was out of action. Not enough, by all accounts, necessarily to make it dangerous to work the facility, but some. It would be perfectly reasonable for someone who was comfortable working a fully staffed facility with normal levels of functioning equipment to say, in the event of staffing/equipment shortages: "Sorry, I just don't feel I can provide a safe service in this set of circumstances". The hierarchic structure is not there to allow the guy on the ground to trust that everything will be OK. In this case it's there to solve the problem of someone saying: "Sorry guys, I can't operate this as I don't think I can do so safely". D. |
#10
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David Cartwright wrote:
The hierarchic structure is not there to allow the guy on the ground to trust that everything will be OK. In this case it's there to solve the problem of someone saying: "Sorry guys, I can't operate this as I don't think I can do so safely". You're absolutely correct. But then, there's such a thing which we call in German "corporate culture" (translated, I don't know if this is the correct term in English). You grow up and live in a certain corporate culture and it's very difficult if not impossible to resist. It's the responsibility of the managers to create a safe corporate culture. In this case, one man operations at two workstations at night were SOP. It's asking very much to second guess the SOP. Stefan |
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