Widower stabbed Air Traffic Controller?

"Stefan" wrote in message
...

You're absolutely correct. But then, there's such a thing which we call in
German "corporate culture" (translated, I don't know if this is the
correct term in English). You grow up and live in a certain corporate
culture and it's very difficult if not impossible to resist. It's the
responsibility of the managers to create a safe corporate culture. In this
case, one man operations at two workstations at night were SOP. It's
asking very much to second guess the SOP.


What's wrong with one-man operations during light traffic periods at what
would normally be two work stations? In the US you can find half a dozen
sectors combined and worked by one man during the night.

On Sat, 29 Oct 2005 19:46:21 GMT, "Steven P. McNicoll"
wrote:


"Stefan" wrote in message
...

You're absolutely correct. But then, there's such a thing which we call in
German "corporate culture" (translated, I don't know if this is the
correct term in English). You grow up and live in a certain corporate
culture and it's very difficult if not impossible to resist. It's the
responsibility of the managers to create a safe corporate culture. In this
case, one man operations at two workstations at night were SOP. It's
asking very much to second guess the SOP.


What's wrong with one-man operations during light traffic periods at what
would normally be two work stations? In the US you can find half a dozen
sectors combined and worked by one man during the night.

Are they combined on the same scope, or does the controller have to
physically roll the chair up and down the stations to see all the
screens covering their sectors? If memory serves, in this incident
the screens were separate, the controller was looking at another
screen dealing with something there, and by the time he got back to
this station the aircraft were already well within the lateral
distance which would have caused the alerting system to activate, if
it wasn't INOP.

"Peter Clark" wrote in message
...

Are they combined on the same scope, or does the controller have to
physically roll the chair up and down the stations to see all the
screens covering their sectors? If memory serves, in this incident
the screens were separate, the controller was looking at another
screen dealing with something there, and by the time he got back to
this station the aircraft were already well within the lateral
distance which would have caused the alerting system to activate, if
it wasn't INOP.


Could go either way. If the primary system was operational they'd just be
combined at one scope and you used a larger range to see all of the
airspace. If the backup system was in use you couldn't see all of the
airspace at low altitudes because it did not have multiple radar site
capability at that time. You'd have to either switch to different radar
sites at one scope or configure a nearby scope with a different site.

Steven P. McNicoll wrote:

Could go either way. If the primary system was operational they'd just be
combined at one scope and you used a larger range to see all of the
....

If you had read and understood the report as you claim, you wouldn't
write this. It's described in detail that the controller was working two
stations, and there is even a picture of the situation in the report.

Stefan

"Stefan" wrote in message
...
Steven P. McNicoll wrote:

Could go either way. If the primary system was operational they'd just
be combined at one scope and you used a larger range to see all of the
...

If you had read and understood the report as you claim, you wouldn't write
this. It's described in detail that the controller was working two
stations, and there is even a picture of the situation in the report.


What I wrote above has nothing to do with the collision.

On Sun, 30 Oct 2005 23:37:49 +0100, Stefan
wrote:

Steven P. McNicoll wrote:

Could go either way. If the primary system was operational they'd just be
combined at one scope and you used a larger range to see all of the
...

If you had read and understood the report as you claim, you wouldn't
write this. It's described in detail that the controller was working two
stations, and there is even a picture of the situation in the report.

In fairness, he was answering my question regarding whether the
combined US sectors would come up on one scope, not whether the
controller there had the capabilities to do so.