Angry

It isn't a simple as just print a receipt. If you print before the
voter presses the final button and the voter changes their mind, the
receipt and the machine do not agree. If you print a second receipt then
you have two receipts for one voter. If the receipt and the machine
disagree and the voter presses the final button anyway, which one is the
true vote?

There is no way to count the receipts by hand so now you need a entire
new set of machines to count receipts which brings you back to many of
the problems with punch cards.

"Neil Gould" wrote in message news_Psf.48165

I agree with you. Further, the percentage of sampled machines should
not
be "small", as in 1 or 2%, but significant, as in at least one machine
from each precinct. The paper proofs should be printed at the same
time,
with the voter inspecting both for accuracy, and then give one copy to
the
registrar (or designated official). That copy would be used to verify
the
electronic tally. The question becomes, what to do if there is a
discrepancy?

It really angers me that such basic and simple methodology is not even
being discussed, much less that Diebold is pawning off an approach
that is
completely unverifiable, and that politicians are buying into it.

Neil

Recently, sfb posted:

It isn't a simple as just print a receipt. If you print before the
voter presses the final button and the voter changes their mind, the
receipt and the machine do not agree. If you print a second receipt
then you have two receipts for one voter. If the receipt and the
machine disagree and the voter presses the final button anyway, which
one is the true vote?

Why would a receipt *ever* be printed before the "final" button is
pressed? At that point, printing them in duplicate is not a problem.

There is no way to count the receipts by hand so now you need a entire
new set of machines to count receipts which brings you back to many of
the problems with punch cards.

Why couldn't receipts be counted by hand? As a method of verification, the
task isn't all that large. Still, if the receipts followed a standard
layout, they could be counted by machine quite easily.

Regards,

Neil

"Neil Gould" wrote in message
...
Recently, sfb posted:

It isn't a simple as just print a receipt. If you print before the
voter presses the final button and the voter changes their mind, the
receipt and the machine do not agree. If you print a second receipt
then you have two receipts for one voter. If the receipt and the
machine disagree and the voter presses the final button anyway, which
one is the true vote?

Why would a receipt *ever* be printed before the "final" button is
pressed? At that point, printing them in duplicate is not a problem.

There is no way to count the receipts by hand so now you need a entire
new set of machines to count receipts which brings you back to many of
the problems with punch cards.

Why couldn't receipts be counted by hand? As a method of verification, the
task isn't all that large. Still, if the receipts followed a standard
layout, they could be counted by machine quite easily.


Additionally, just because a receipt is printed it does not mean that the
vote recorded is the same as printed on the receipt (screen says vote for
"X", receipt says vote for "X", record vote as a vote for "Y"). It appears
there is no way to insure fraud is not a part of the voting process. The
only thing that can be done is try and minimize the fraud.

Receipts can be easily faked also. Even with the bat codes on them, if
let's say 6 million were faked, are we going to try to recertify 6
million receipts by hand?

If you are going to use the paper receipt to recount, then you can't
allow them to leave the polling place. Imagine the law suits when you
have a million electronic votes and people only returned 500, 000
receipts.

"Flyingmonk" wrote in message
ups.com...
Receipts can be easily faked also. Even with the bat codes on them,
if
let's say 6 million were faked, are we going to try to recertify 6
million receipts by hand?

Flyingmonk opined

Receipts can be easily faked also. Even with the bat codes on them, if
let's say 6 million were faked, are we going to try to recertify 6
million receipts by hand?

The big problem with receipts is that they can be used for selling votes.


-ash
Cthulhu in 2005!
Why wait for nature?

"Ash Wyllie" wrote in message
...
The big problem with receipts is that they can be used for selling votes.

That's a "big" problem? I would expect anyone involved in a major
vote-purchasing scheme would simply take advantage of absentee ballots. You
don't buy the behavior of the voter. You just buy their absentee ballot
(signed, of course).

I don't really think receipts are all that necessary (a single printed
ballot should be sufficient), but I don't see that they would present a big
problem either.

Pete

The big problem with receipts is that they can be used for selling votes.

That's a "big" problem?

Uh... I think it would be. Another problem is anonymity. The voter
will either take the paper home (where it appears eventually in his
trash) or he leaves it at the site (along with his fingerprints). A
sufficiently clever and motivated opponent (personal or otherwise) could
make use of this information.

In any case, the issue is whether or not the vote the voter =thinks= is
cast, is =actually= the vote that gets counted. This is independent of
paper receipts to the voter.

Jose
--
You can choose whom to befriend, but you cannot choose whom to love.
for Email, make the obvious change in the address.

("Ash Wyllie" wrote)
Receipts can be easily faked also. Even with the bat codes on them, if
let's say 6 million were faked, are we going to try to recertify 6
million receipts by hand?

The big problem with receipts is that they can be used for selling votes.


Thomas Edison
1868: Came up with his first patented invention, an Electrical Vote
Recorder. Application for this patent was signed 0n October 11, 1968.
Because the invention was way ahead of its time, it was heartily denigrated
by politicians... He now becomes much more oriented towards making certain
there is a strong public demand and associated market for anything he tries
to invent.

Tripped over this while surfing.


Montblack

"Tom Conner" wrote in message
nk.net...
Additionally, just because a receipt is printed it does not mean that the
vote recorded is the same as printed on the receipt

True. That's why a hand-recount is needed of some percentage of the paper
ballots, as an audit of the machine-counted votes.

[...] It appears
there is no way to insure fraud is not a part of the voting process.

As long as human beings are involved at any part of the process, there will
be the potential for fraud. The problem is that currently, the potential
for fraud is VASTLY higher than it should be.

The only thing that can be done is try and minimize the fraud.

Indeed. So, let's do that thing.

Pete