Practice IMC in real IMC

On Sat, 25 Mar 2006 22:36:59 GMT, Jose
wrote:

Let's see: I'm uncomfortable doing unusual attitude recovery in IMC. The

For practice I think it's an unnecessary added risk and really adds
nothing that you can't do under the hood.

accident record shows this to be probably the top killer of IR pilots.

I'm not so sure about that, but I don't know.


I think this is a simpleminded use of statistics, and suggest (avec
caveat) that an examination of -why- it is the top killer (if in fact it
is; I don't know this) would be called for. I speculate:

1: the unusual attitude came as a surprise,

Many things can come as surprises, but the only way an unusual
attitude should come as a surprise is either extreme turbulence, or
lack of attention.

On one of my early flights as a student in IMC, I ended up in an
unusual attitude. ( I let the bank in a descending turn get too steep
and away we went) The instructor never said a word. He just sat there
and waited for me to recover which I did. Certainly he would have
taken over had things (or I) appeared to be coming unglued, but it was
little different than a VFR recovery. You do have to learn that both
the DG and AI are quite likely to be unreliable during and for a
little while after an unusual attitude recovery.

2: it came as a result of an instrument failure (such as vacuum) and

Vacuum failures can catch even experienced pilots as the AI very
slooooly rolls over and plays dead. Slow enough that the pilot has a
tendency to follow it unless his/her instrument scan catches it right
away. You'd think it'd be easy to catch, but if you are bouncing
around with the resultant erratic instruments bounces as well, the
failure may be pronounced before the differences in the scan become
pronounced enough to spot. Still, although it may result in the
necessity of an unusual attitude recovery, with altitude it should be
relatively easy.

subsequent lack of partial panel chops,

That is important.

3: it came about single pilot

It should not be much of a problem for a *proficient* pilot. Notice I
didn't say current.

4: the pilot was not sharp at recovery (or even IMC skills)
and/or

Which was my case.

5: it came about with a low ceiling, allowing no room for VFR recovery.

We had lots of altitude.


Practicing unusual attitude recovery, deliberately, in IMC, with a high
ceiling, and with a CFII, would address all of these conditions except
instrument failure. That last condition could be addressed by checking
the gauges prior to each entry.

Actually... that is probably a no. It is quite easy to cause the gyros
to tumble in an unusual attitude, or recovery. You don't have to roll
much beyond 60 degrees for that to happen. I've been 90 degreed by
the weather quite a few times and it usually takes the AI and DG a bit
to recover. I always figure an unusual attitude recovery IMC or under
the hood is going to be partial panel as those are the only
instruments at that time I really trust even if my scan does tell me
they all agree.


Actually =doing= the maneuvers, even a this way, does entail some risk,
but the benefit is increased IFR sharpness and skills, which translates
into overall safer IFR flying.

Most of this can be done under the hood with an instructor, or safety
pilot who is intimately familiar with the airplane and its
requirements and is probably a lot safer. I'd not want to be doing
unusual attitude recovery in IMC unless I was very proficient and I
tend to be pretty laid back and am very familiar with my plane and
just how far it can go before complaining or trying to bite back..

I really don't see much of an advantage to actually doing stalls and
unusual attitude recovery in IMC compared to under the hood. Besides
if the worst does happen and your screw up under the hood there should
be someone in the right seat who can help.

Roger Halstead (K8RI & ARRL life member)
(N833R, S# CD-2 Worlds oldest Debonair)
www.rogerhalstead.com

Jose

Most of this can be done under the hood with an instructor, or safety
pilot who is intimately familiar with the airplane and its
requirements and is probably a lot safer.

It's different in the clag. Hoodwork is helpful, but actual can be an
eye-opener.

Jose
--
Nothing takes longer than a shortcut.
for Email, make the obvious change in the address.

On Sun, 26 Mar 2006 05:28:32 GMT, Jose
wrote:

Most of this can be done under the hood with an instructor, or safety
pilot who is intimately familiar with the airplane and its
requirements and is probably a lot safer.

It's different in the clag. Hoodwork is helpful, but actual can be an
eye-opener.

Yah, it's *usually* a lot easier in the soup than under the hood.
You don't get as many distractions and false clues at to attitude with
maybe the exception of flicker vertigo.

My instructor had me flying in actual right down to minimums to the
point my first solo trip after getting the rating was right down to
minimums. I was expecting I'd have to go over and shoot the ILS at
MBS as most of the area was down to about 200 feet, but about 3 mile
sout it opened up like flying down a inverted canyon about 2 miles
wide, about 4 long, and about 600 high. (MDA is about 500 AGL)

I was far more proficient then than I am now. I need to go spend some
time under the hood and take an IPC refresher.

Roger Halstead (K8RI & ARRL life member)
(N833R, S# CD-2 Worlds oldest Debonair)
www.rogerhalstead.com


Jose

"Roger" wrote in message
...
On Sat, 25 Mar 2006 22:36:59 GMT, Jose
wrote:

Let's see: I'm uncomfortable doing unusual attitude recovery in IMC. The

For practice I think it's an unnecessary added risk and really adds
nothing that you can't do under the hood.

accident record shows this to be probably the top killer of IR pilots.

I'm not so sure about that, but I don't know.

In combining the latest Nall Report (which does more to report by aircraft
type) and the data from the ASF's Beech Safety Report (which is more a
comparison of Beech models but also of IR vs non-IR pilots), it _appears_
the biggest killer of IR pilots is flight into thunderstorms during IMC and
loss of control while maneauvering in IMC (combined factors???...I'm not a
statistician, nor a "****house lawyer" :~) ).

I'd be intereted in seeing a report that sifts the data out more directly
than trying to extrapolate multiple sources.

snip

--
Matt
---------------------
Matthew W. Barrow
Site-Fill Homes, LLC.
Montrose, CO

Matt Barrow wrote:
"Roger" wrote in message
...

On Sat, 25 Mar 2006 22:36:59 GMT, Jose
wrote:


Let's see: I'm uncomfortable doing unusual attitude recovery in IMC. The

For practice I think it's an unnecessary added risk and really adds
nothing that you can't do under the hood.


accident record shows this to be probably the top killer of IR pilots.

I'm not so sure about that, but I don't know.


In combining the latest Nall Report (which does more to report by aircraft
type) and the data from the ASF's Beech Safety Report (which is more a
comparison of Beech models but also of IR vs non-IR pilots), it _appears_
the biggest killer of IR pilots is flight into thunderstorms during IMC and
loss of control while maneauvering in IMC (combined factors???...I'm not a
statistician, nor a "****house lawyer" :~) ).


Which has nothing to do with the point being discussed which was
PRACTICE maneuvers with an instructor. I'd argue that if we did more
practice in actual we'd have fewer accidents in actual. Although,
flying into a thunderstorm is as much an error in judgement as it is a
measure of flying ability.


I'd be intereted in seeing a report that sifts the data out more directly
than trying to extrapolate multiple sources.

I agree. I've never seen such data, unfortunately.

Matt

On Sun, 26 Mar 2006 07:13:37 -0700, "Matt Barrow"
wrote:


"Roger" wrote in message
.. .
On Sat, 25 Mar 2006 22:36:59 GMT, Jose
wrote:

Let's see: I'm uncomfortable doing unusual attitude recovery in IMC. The

For practice I think it's an unnecessary added risk and really adds
nothing that you can't do under the hood.

accident record shows this to be probably the top killer of IR pilots.

I'm not so sure about that, but I don't know.

In combining the latest Nall Report (which does more to report by aircraft
type) and the data from the ASF's Beech Safety Report (which is more a
comparison of Beech models but also of IR vs non-IR pilots), it _appears_

It should be interesting once there are more SR-22s out there.
The Bo and Debonair (basically same airplane) are deceptively slippery
when you look at the light wing loading, but slippery they are. You
really need to be on your toes all the time and even more so when on
instruments. That's one of the reasons you seldom see a Bo without a
good autopilot that's flown in IMC.

With the nose down that thing will accelerate to Vne in just a few
seconds even though it has a lighter wing loading than some Cherokees.
Now take a SR-22 which is very slippery and I believe has a higher
wing loading and things can go down that slippery slope in a hurry.

the biggest killer of IR pilots is flight into thunderstorms during IMC and

Another reason to upgrade to a nice glass panel with satellite RADAR?

loss of control while maneauvering in IMC (combined factors???...I'm not a

I think if you fly into a thunderstorm the problems with maneuvering
are a given. :-)) OTOH I've been 90 degreed in the clouds and it was
not much more than a big "bump". However any time you pass into
unusually attitudes it's time to keep at least one eye on the TC in
addition to the AI. Keep little airplane in the TC level and the ball
in the center. Low airspeed, get the nose down to the proper attitude.
High airspeed, power off and *ease* the nose up.

OTOH it seems that "inadvertent" flight into IMC is pretty hard on
instrument rated pilots too. Still, we probably never hear about the
ones who survive.

Be it in IMC or under the hood the key is practice and personally I
would prefer to the unusual attitudes with some one in the right seat
who can see.

statistician, nor a "****house lawyer" :~) ).

statistics can mean most anything depending on how a study is
conducted and presented. If you don't know the parameters for the
study then the results don't mean a whole lot.


I'd be intereted in seeing a report that sifts the data out more directly
than trying to extrapolate multiple sources.

And there are so many variables. Time in make and model, total time,
time in the clouds, make and model of aircraft, pilot's attitude
(which is almost impossible to get) Compare high performance retracts
to fixed gear that are not high performance.

Roger Halstead (K8RI & ARRL life member)
(N833R, S# CD-2 Worlds oldest Debonair)
www.rogerhalstead.com

snip