Safety, yet again...

"Jay Honeck" wrote in message

Why would you want to?

Because I'm interesting in *my* probability of dying in a plane crash,
not anyone elses.

Since I:
snip a-n

...I conclude that I may eliminate many of the "stupid pilot tricks"
from my personal risk assessment.

Trouble is, I don't know how to do that...

Your list is comprehensive and no doubt helpful, with the exception of items
D and E, which taken together I consider a net negative. Be that as it may,
you're doing a creditable job of reducing risk, and that in itself serves to
markedly reduce your risk, the theory being that if you personally take
responsibility for every phase of decision making, and you know that you can
greatly control the degree to which you screw up, then you can reduce your
risk to a very low point indeed. And keep it such for a long time.

Where the process breaks down is he when you operate and fly, it is in a
world (GA) that offers you precious little backstop, as you try to reduce
your personal risk assessment to something akin to a commercial airline.
YOU (meaning you and/or Mary) monitor, manage, plan, fly, maintain
(throughsupervision), fuel, monitor, repair, and replace every aspect of
your plane and your flying, with some assistance from a mechanic, a fuel
guy, and perhaps some friends at the airport. When I was flying (or anyone
else in an airline environment) I had two other pilots in the cockpit with
me, or inspecting the plane for me, and we were all flying 12-17 days a
month; a loadmaster and cargo handling crew, or sometimes 5-15 FAs; a
dozen ramp people and mechanics working around the plane on every flight,
all of them - 30-35 people or more - keeping an eye out for anything that
didn't look right, plus ops planners, dispatchers, maintenance schedulers, a
training department, and a bunch of others behind the scenes all managing
this and a hundred other airplanes to make sure that when the plane was at
the gate, it was ready and in good shape to go, and that the pilots flying
it were as ready as they could be. And still there would be minor mistakes,
mechanical failures that delayed things, oversights, etc., usually none of
them serious, but there none the less.

It is this backstopping infrastructure that gives the airline environment
the safety record it enjoys. Its not just great pilots (although we'd all
like to take some credit :-))- its the whole show: if I overlooked
something, there were 2 other people looking over my shoulder in the
cockpit. If anyone anywhere in the process overlooked something, there were
always a number of other folks somewhere whose job included double checking
the first guy.

This is an environment that GA does not, and simply cannot, provide. The
bottom line is that when you fly, you're doing damn near everything
yourself, and in that environment, the probability of mistakes slipping
through will always be higher. You can reduce the risk through exceptional
vigilance, but imo you can never individually duplicate the type of safety
net that an airline provides.

The point is this: what can you do? and what will you do in response?
What is the real world benefit to you if you calculate that you can decrease
your fatality probability from 1 in 73,187 flights (GA) to 1 in 581,395
flights (scheduled 135)? How many total flights have you made up to now?
When will you likely reach 73,187? Even at an average 3 hours per flight
you'd have to log over 24,000 hours of GA flying to get close to that point.
Then what? Will you stop flying because the so-called "law of averages" is
now working against you?

The fact that you think of these things, and take steps to make your flying
as safe as you can means that you probably *are* making your flying as safe
as you can. You don't need to attach a probability number to that, because
it would be meaningless in real world terms. You're doing the best you can,
which is a hell of a lot better than most of your GA compatriots, judging by
the numbers you will undoubtedly beat.

Your list is comprehensive and no doubt helpful, with the exception of items
D and E, which taken together I consider a net negative.

Interesting that you would say that, John. Why is not flying IFR, and
not flying at night "taken together a net negative"?


The point is this: what can you do? and what will you do in response?
What is the real world benefit to you if you calculate that you can decrease
your fatality probability from 1 in 73,187 flights (GA) to 1 in 581,395
flights (scheduled 135)?

There is no real world benefit -- it's an intellectual exercise. I
would continue to fly regardless of the risk -- but one of my family
members has inquired, and I would like to be able to share some real
numbers with her.

Preferably, I would like to share numbers that include: "If you don't
fly drunk, the statisics improve to 'x'..." ,or, "If you don't run out
of gas, the statistics improve to 'Y'..."

Unfortunately, there seems to be no scientific way to arrive at an
answer. (Which, if you think about it, is really quite amazing. What
the hell do we pay all those FAA bureaucrats to DO all day, anyway?)
--
Jay Honeck
Iowa City, IA
Pathfinder N56993
www.AlexisParkInn.com
"Your Aviation Destination"

"Jay Honeck" wrote in message

Your list is comprehensive and no doubt helpful, with the exception of
items
D and E, which taken together I consider a net negative.

Interesting that you would say that, John. Why is not flying IFR, and
not flying at night "taken together a net negative"?

Because by eschewing night and IFR/IMC operations you exempt yourself from
two-thirds of the operational environmental exposure that will, by
contributiing to your overall broad base of experience, help to prevent you
from making one of those "stupid pilot tricks". Nothing to go crazy over --
I just think you'd likely be a better all-around aviator with night and
instrument experience. I will acknowledge, however, that unless you are
likely to fly regularly in the IFR system, your policy may well be best. A
rusty instrument pilot who doesn't realize it is a dangerous thing indeed.
I'm forming opinions from a pov where IFR ops were so normal that somewhat
reduced viz and relatively mild wx systems were really non-events.