F-35's Costs Climb Along With Concerns

"Fred J. McCall" wrote in message
...
(Harry Andreas) wrote:

:In article ,
wrote:
:
: (Harry Andreas) wrote:
:
: :In article , "Keith W"
: wrote:
: :
: : "Harry Andreas" wrote in message
: : ...
: : In article ,
: : wrote:
: :
: : Note that this is sort of the same approach that lost Germany the
war.
: : Everything was hand-finished to very high standards, while us
sloppy
: : folks cranked out ten times as many tanks as they could because
we let
: : the tolerances be looser and eliminated a lot of the skilled
: : 'touch-labor' in the finishing stages.
: :
: : Hmmm. I wouldn't ride that horse too far.
: :
: : Ever see a 1944 built Walther P-38, or Waffenfabrik Mauser?
: : They didn't spend nearly any time finishing them as compared to
: : the early war versions.
: :
: :
: : The German record was very mixed
: :
: :Keith, I hear ya, and the other posters who have said similar things,
: :but I still object to Mr McCall's statement that, in Germany,
: :"Everything was hand-finished to very high standards".
: :That's just not true. As you point out, it was very selective,
:
: Yes. The big ticket items (which was what I meant by "everything",
: since that is what wars are actually fought and won with) got all the
: hand finishing. Small stuff and aircraft designed specifically to be
: cheap and 'throw away' generally weren't.
:
: So object and be damned to you.
:
ude, you can't say "Everything" and then get mad when someone
:disagrees with you. Everything means everything, not some things...

Dude, I don't "get mad". It's only Usenet. Try and rent a clue...

"Everything was hand-finished..." wasn't the issue with German production.
Read Richard Overy's "Why the Allies Won". The Wehrmacht's besetting sin was
not demanding superior (and useless) manufacturing standards. The main
problems were 1. refusal to stop changing designs and 2. not fully
mobilizing for production until 'way too late.

The Wehrmacht couldn't keep their hand off the production designs, making
changes constantly. It made production inefficient and as important, made
logistics a nightmare. Mobilization didn't happen until Speer was given
overall responsiblity for production. The first years of the war
(1939-1942), when Germany had a real chance to win by knocking the USSR out
of the war saw single-shift production and the largest factory units (Adam
Opel and Volkswagen) only peripherally contributing to war production. As a
side note, when the Barbarossa attack went in, the Wehrmacht had litterally
hundreds of types of trucks and motorcycles in use. Try getting the right
carburetor kit for your broke down truck on the outskirts of Kiev.

Paul F Austin wrote:
"Fred J. McCall" wrote in message
...
(Harry Andreas) wrote:

:In article ,
wrote: : : (Harry
Andreas) wrote: : : :In article
, "Keith W" :
wrote: : : : : "Harry
Andreas" wrote in message : :
... : : In article
, : :
wrote: : : : : Note that this is
sort of the same approach that lost Germany the
war.
: : Everything was hand-finished to very high standards, while
us
sloppy
: : folks cranked out ten times as many tanks as they could
because
we let
: : the tolerances be looser and eliminated a lot of the
skilled : : 'touch-labor' in the finishing stages. : : :
: Hmmm. I wouldn't ride that horse too far. : : : :
Ever see a 1944 built Walther P-38, or Waffenfabrik Mauser? : :
They didn't spend nearly any time finishing them as compared to :
: the early war versions. : : : : : : The German record
was very mixed : : : :Keith, I hear ya, and the other posters who
have said similar things, : :but I still object to Mr McCall's
statement that, in Germany, : :"Everything was hand-finished to
very high standards". : :That's just not true. As you point out,
it was very selective, : : Yes. The big ticket items (which was
what I meant by "everything", : since that is what wars are
actually fought and won with) got all the : hand finishing. Small
stuff and aircraft designed specifically to be : cheap and 'throw
away' generally weren't. : : So object and be damned to you. :
ude, you can't say "Everything" and then get mad when someone
:disagrees with you. Everything means everything, not some
things...

Dude, I don't "get mad". It's only Usenet. Try and rent a clue...


"Everything was hand-finished..." wasn't the issue with German
production. Read Richard Overy's "Why the Allies Won". The
Wehrmacht's besetting sin was not demanding superior (and useless)
manufacturing standards. The main problems were 1. refusal to stop
changing designs and 2. not fully mobilizing for production until
'way too late.

The Wehrmacht couldn't keep their hand off the production designs,
making changes constantly. It made production inefficient and as
important, made logistics a nightmare. Mobilization didn't happen
until Speer was given overall responsiblity for production. The first
years of the war (1939-1942), when Germany had a real chance to win
by knocking the USSR out of the war saw single-shift production and
the largest factory units (Adam Opel and Volkswagen) only
peripherally contributing to war production. As a side note, when the
Barbarossa attack went in, the Wehrmacht had litterally hundreds of
types of trucks and motorcycles in use. Try getting the right
carburetor kit for your broke down truck on the outskirts of Kiev.



They had lots of problems
From the strategic bombing survey

Studies of German manpower utilization show that throughout the war a
great deal of German industry was on a single shift basis, relatively
few German women (less than in the first war) were drawn into industry
and the average work week was below British standards.

Germany's early commitment to the doctrine of the short war was a
continuing handicap; neither plans nor state of mind were adjusted to
the idea of a long war. Nearly all German sources agree that the hope
for a quick victory lasted long after the short war became a long one.
Germany's armament minister Albert Speer, who assumed office in early
1942, rationalized German war production and eliminated the worst
inefficiencies in the previous controls. A threefold increase in
armament production occurred under his direction but the increase cannot
be considered a testament to the efficiency of dictatorship. Rather it
suggests the degree of industrial undermobilization in the earlier
years. An excellent case can be made that throughout the war top
government management in Germany was not efficient."

Vince

Vince wrote:
[snip]


Germany's early commitment to the doctrine of the short war was a
continuing handicap; neither plans nor state of mind were adjusted to
the idea of a long war. Nearly all German sources agree that the hope
for a quick victory lasted long after the short war became a long one.

One short war = short war
Lots of short wars = long time at war.

Weapons and ammunition used need replacing.

Blair and Bush need this explaining.

Andrew Swallow

"Vince" wrote in message
...
Paul F Austin wrote:

The Wehrmacht couldn't keep their hand off the production designs,
making changes constantly. It made production inefficient and as
important, made logistics a nightmare. Mobilization didn't happen
until Speer was given overall responsiblity for production. The first
years of the war (1939-1942), when Germany had a real chance to win
by knocking the USSR out of the war saw single-shift production and
the largest factory units (Adam Opel and Volkswagen) only
peripherally contributing to war production. As a side note, when the
Barbarossa attack went in, the Wehrmacht had litterally hundreds of
types of trucks and motorcycles in use. Try getting the right
carburetor kit for your broke down truck on the outskirts of Kiev.



They had lots of problems
From the strategic bombing survey

Studies of German manpower utilization show that throughout the war a
great deal of German industry was on a single shift basis, relatively
few German women (less than in the first war) were drawn into industry
and the average work week was below British standards.

Germany's early commitment to the doctrine of the short war was a
continuing handicap; neither plans nor state of mind were adjusted to
the idea of a long war. Nearly all German sources agree that the hope
for a quick victory lasted long after the short war became a long one.
Germany's armament minister Albert Speer, who assumed office in early
1942, rationalized German war production and eliminated the worst
inefficiencies in the previous controls. A threefold increase in
armament production occurred under his direction but the increase cannot
be considered a testament to the efficiency of dictatorship. Rather it
suggests the degree of industrial undermobilization in the earlier
years. An excellent case can be made that throughout the war top
government management in Germany was not efficient."

It's remarkable how many "short wars" overstay their welcome: The US Civil
War and WWI come to mind, particularly the effective cease fire on the
Western Front after a few weeks of combat because the artillery dumps
were....empty. Oops.

On Sun, 7 May 2006 17:28:37 -0400, "Paul F Austin"
wrote:


"Vince" wrote in message
...
Paul F Austin wrote:

The Wehrmacht couldn't keep their hand off the production designs,
making changes constantly. It made production inefficient and as
important, made logistics a nightmare. Mobilization didn't happen
until Speer was given overall responsiblity for production. The first
years of the war (1939-1942), when Germany had a real chance to win
by knocking the USSR out of the war saw single-shift production and
the largest factory units (Adam Opel and Volkswagen) only
peripherally contributing to war production. As a side note, when the
Barbarossa attack went in, the Wehrmacht had litterally hundreds of
types of trucks and motorcycles in use. Try getting the right
carburetor kit for your broke down truck on the outskirts of Kiev.



They had lots of problems
From the strategic bombing survey

Studies of German manpower utilization show that throughout the war a
great deal of German industry was on a single shift basis, relatively
few German women (less than in the first war) were drawn into industry
and the average work week was below British standards.

Germany's early commitment to the doctrine of the short war was a
continuing handicap; neither plans nor state of mind were adjusted to
the idea of a long war. Nearly all German sources agree that the hope
for a quick victory lasted long after the short war became a long one.
Germany's armament minister Albert Speer, who assumed office in early
1942, rationalized German war production and eliminated the worst
inefficiencies in the previous controls. A threefold increase in
armament production occurred under his direction but the increase cannot
be considered a testament to the efficiency of dictatorship. Rather it
suggests the degree of industrial undermobilization in the earlier
years. An excellent case can be made that throughout the war top
government management in Germany was not efficient."

It's remarkable how many "short wars" overstay their welcome: The US Civil
War and WWI come to mind, particularly the effective cease fire on the
Western Front after a few weeks of combat because the artillery dumps
were....empty. Oops.


And one particular piece of shortsightedness that the Germans seem to
have been guilty of: thinking that 'winning the battle' is equivalent
to winning the war.

Jack Love wrote:

On Sun, 7 May 2006 17:28:37 -0400, "Paul F Austin"
wrote:


"Vince" wrote in message
...
Paul F Austin wrote:

The Wehrmacht couldn't keep their hand off the production designs,
making changes constantly. It made production inefficient and as
important, made logistics a nightmare. Mobilization didn't happen
until Speer was given overall responsiblity for production. The first
years of the war (1939-1942), when Germany had a real chance to win
by knocking the USSR out of the war saw single-shift production and
the largest factory units (Adam Opel and Volkswagen) only
peripherally contributing to war production. As a side note, when the
Barbarossa attack went in, the Wehrmacht had litterally hundreds of
types of trucks and motorcycles in use. Try getting the right
carburetor kit for your broke down truck on the outskirts of Kiev.



They had lots of problems
From the strategic bombing survey

Studies of German manpower utilization show that throughout the war a
great deal of German industry was on a single shift basis, relatively
few German women (less than in the first war) were drawn into industry
and the average work week was below British standards.

Germany's early commitment to the doctrine of the short war was a
continuing handicap; neither plans nor state of mind were adjusted to
the idea of a long war. Nearly all German sources agree that the hope
for a quick victory lasted long after the short war became a long one.
Germany's armament minister Albert Speer, who assumed office in early
1942, rationalized German war production and eliminated the worst
inefficiencies in the previous controls. A threefold increase in
armament production occurred under his direction but the increase cannot
be considered a testament to the efficiency of dictatorship. Rather it
suggests the degree of industrial undermobilization in the earlier
years. An excellent case can be made that throughout the war top
government management in Germany was not efficient."

It's remarkable how many "short wars" overstay their welcome: The US Civil
War and WWI come to mind, particularly the effective cease fire on the
Western Front after a few weeks of combat because the artillery dumps
were....empty. Oops.


And one particular piece of shortsightedness that the Germans seem to
have been guilty of: thinking that 'winning the battle' is equivalent
to winning the war.

They're hardly the only ones to suffer from that misconception (cough).

Guy

In article ,
(Paul F Austin) wrote:

The Wehrmacht couldn't keep their hand off the production
designs, making changes constantly

On the other hand failing to change production had it's
drawbacks. Britain ended up producing 1,771 tanks that were only
ever used for training, the Covenanter. The Sherman was
continuously upgraded by the way.

A lot of the German changes were intended to make production
easier by the way. The MG 42 was introduced because producing it
required less man hours than the MG 34.

Ken Young

wrote:

On the other hand failing to change production had it's
drawbacks. Britain ended up producing 1,771 tanks that were only
ever used for training, the Covenanter.

However, the Covenanter went through four marks during its production
run in (repeated, unsuccessful) efforts to solve its chronic overheating
problem, so "failing to change production" doesn't really apply there.


--
He thinks too much: such men are dangerous.
Julius Caesar I:2

Paul J. Adam MainBoxatjrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk