Scared of mid-airs

On Sun, 30 Jul 2006 20:41:50 GMT, Ed Rasimus
wrote in
::

On Sun, 30 Jul 2006 19:14:53 GMT, Larry Dighera
wrote:

On Sun, 30 Jul 2006 17:01:33 GMT, Ed Rasimus
wrote in
::

Unfortunately, military pilots often have their on-board radar set to
reject slow moving targets like light GA aircraft, so it isn't being
used for collision avoidance with civil aircraft. That should change.

And what military aircraft radars are using MTI with thresholds above
GA aircraft speeds?

As I recall, it was during the discussion of the November 16, 2000
MAC, that a military pilot mentioned in rec.aviation.military, that
military radars were not appropriate for traffic deconfliction (my
paraphrase).


They've also been trained to provide their
own separation and to operate in areas without the
all-seeing/all-knowing motherliness of Air Traffic Control.

Some have;some haven't:

How much training experience in the military aviation business do you
have? Stick with what you know--apparently Google searches are your
forte:

You can bluster all you like, but failing to acknowledge the
culpability of the military in each of the military/civil MAC NTSB
reports I cited, is tacit agreement that each was the fault of the
military flight.


Civil aircraft to the right of military aircraft:
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?e...26X00109&key=1

F-16s lacked required ATC clearance:
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?e...12X22313&key=1

A6 pilot expected to exit MTR eight minutes after route closu
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?e...11X12242&key=1

A6 hit glider that had right of way:
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?e...13X33340&key=1

Nevertheless as Mr. Dighera incessantly points out, "stuff"
happens--

If I infer your intent correctly, the 'stuff' to which you
euphemistically refer are the deaths of civil pilots due to being
impaled in midair collisions by high-speed, low-level military
aircraft often on MTR runs.

Or, conversely the numbers of deaths of military pilots due to
mid-airs with GA pilots operating cluelessly in restricted, warning,
prohibited airspace, MOAs and oil burner routes.

That is interesting. I hadn't considered that, especially MOAs,
Warning, and Oil Burner Routes.

If civil flights cause a MAC in Restricted or Prohibited airspace due
to lack of a ATC clearance, they are culpable. But the others are
joint use airspace. Each civil and military flight within them is by
regulation responsible for visual see-and-avoid separation in VMC.

The military doesn't own MOAs, Warning, and Oil Burner Routes. The
source of the hazard, in my opinion, is the high speed of the military
aircraft affording insufficient time for successful traffic
deconfliction. That has to be acknowledged, and modifications made to
assure some likelihood of avoiding a MAC.

Perhaps you'd be good enough to invest the requisite time to research
representative NTSB reports that illustrate the types of MACs to which
you refer. That might be productive.

It's a two-edged sword, Larry.

Indeed.

but it ain't murder.

Some are, and some aren't.

Mid-airs aren't murder. Accidents happen. Most accident boards find
causative factors. But it isn't murder.

Florida law defines third-degree murder as the killing of a person
without intent or premeditation, a terminology that in other states
would closely match the interpretation of manslaughter crimes.

That makes it murder in Florida. Out.

But the military's miserable record in reprimanding its airmen who
wrongfully kill innocent pilots, and shortsighted safety initiatives
are pathetic.

You are the pathetic one with innuendo, hyperbole, exaggeration and
disgusting rhetoric.

I am unaware of any deliberate innuendo.

I would have to see examples of hyperbole to be able to find facts
that support those statements.

Perhaps it is your prejudice that obstructs your objective
comprehension of the facts, and makes you so incredulous as to think
you needn't bother with them.

No one goes out to have a mid-air.

I'll agree with you there. Just like no one intends to cause an auto
accident.

But certain flaws in judgment can constitute criminal negligence. And,
the FAA's regulatory exemption to system limitations can easily
precipitate a high-speed, low-level MAC. It's time the whole issue
were reexamined.

You've got to agree, that rocketing through congested
terminal airspace at 500 knots without the required ATC clearance,
lopping 9' of wingtip from a glider with an A6, and failing to see and
avoid a crop duster are manslaughter, which is called Third Degree
Murder in Florida.

Until you can show me some experience in flying a military tactical
aircraft in a leadership position of a flight of four in congested
airspace with weather factors involved, I'll simply discount your
commentary as someone with a fixation.


The flight to which that statement referred was a flight of two,
visibility 10 miles.

I am unable to find any reasonable excuse for what Parker did. It was
a clear day. He was descending into Class B airspace, canceled IFR,
and dove his flight of two into the terminal airspace at twice the
speed limit imposed on all other aircraft in that airspace without ATC
clearance. He may have lost situational awareness, but I find it
impossible to believe he didn't know that continuing his descent would
put him within Class B airspace without a clearance and without
communications with ATC. That's against regulations.

He broke other regulations in preparation for the flight. His failure
to comply with regulations resulted in the death of an ATP rated
airman, and the destruction of a $30-million aircraft, not to mention
the hazard he caused to those on the ground, his wingman, and other
flights. For this, he did not lose any pay, rank, nor have to pay a
fine nor restitution, nor was he incarcerated, as a civilian might be.
That is a public example of injustice. It does not endear the
military to the public, nor does it strike fear in the hearts of other
military airmen who would commit similar acts of hubris or
incompetence. Face it.

To turn a blind eye to the facts on the grounds that you have military
fighter experience, and I don't, is patently ridiculous, and telling.
Take the time to cool down a bit. Read the NTSB reports; they're
short and interesting. Invest the requisite time to mentally put
yourself in the position of the command pilot of each flight. Try to
envision what could be done to prevent that type of MAC from occurring
in the future.

Offer some constructive insight and information. You won't look so
shaken. And with your experience and additional point of view, we'll
ALL learn something.

Perhaps safety can be enhanced. What do you think?

Larry Dighera wrote:


...failing to acknowledge the
culpability of the military in each of the military/civil MAC NTSB
reports I cited, is tacit agreement that each was the fault of the
military flight.


Failing to acknowledge culpability is the same as admitting fault,
in your world?

This explains a lot.


Jack

On Mon, 31 Jul 2006 05:39:05 GMT, 588 wrote in
::

Larry Dighera wrote:


...failing to acknowledge the
culpability of the military in each of the military/civil MAC NTSB
reports I cited, is tacit agreement that each was the fault of the
military flight.


Failing to acknowledge culpability is the same as admitting fault,
in your world?


Deliberately failing to even read the NTSB reports of military/civil
MACs shows a fear of facing the facts. If one fears facing facts, he
has tacitly implied he is uncomfortable acknowledging the truth, and
thus implied he believes the military culpable.

The truth is, that the military pilots in those MACs:

1. Collided with a glider that had the right of way.

2. Violated regulations resulting in the death of a civil pilot.

3. Failed to see-and-avoid a crop duster while operating on a MTR
beyond the active time period submitted to the FAA.

4. Collided with a civil aircraft approaching from the right, and
thus had the right-of-way.

Given those facts, as contained in the NTSB reports, it's easy to see
why Mr. Rasimus shied away from informing himself about them.

You can attempt to discredit me personally by deliberately
misinterpreting my words, but you will not be successful if you fail
to discuss the issues I have raised. So far you haven't even
attempted to do that in good faith. I think that says a lot more
about your honesty and integrity than I could ever manage.

Larry Dighera wrote:

On Mon, 31 Jul 2006 05:39:05 GMT, 588 wrote in
::

Larry Dighera wrote:


...failing to acknowledge the
culpability of the military in each of the military/civil MAC NTSB
reports I cited, is tacit agreement that each was the fault of the
military flight.

Failing to acknowledge culpability is the same as admitting fault,
in your world?

You can attempt to discredit me personally by deliberately
misinterpreting my words....


I left it to you to interpret your own words, in order to help you
avoid misinterpretation on the part of your readers -- as your words
clearly required some interpretation. Could you really have asked
for more?


Jack

Larry Dighera wrote:
I would have to see examples of hyperbole to be able to find facts
that support those statements.

also Larry Dighera:
You've got to agree, that rocketing through congested
terminal airspace at 500 knots without the required ATC clearance,

If you speak here of the Florida mishap, there's your example--
the CLOSURE rate was near 500 knots, but not the speed of
the USAF aircraft.

And since he was not aware that he was in terminal airspace
(per a cite you named), there's a deliberate misstatement
to boot.


I am unable to find any reasonable excuse for what Parker did. It was
a clear day. He was descending into Class B airspace, canceled IFR,
and dove his flight of two into the terminal airspace at twice the
speed limit imposed on all other aircraft in that airspace without ATC
clearance. He may have lost situational awareness, but I find it
impossible to believe he didn't know that continuing his descent would
put him within Class B airspace without a clearance and without
communications with ATC. That's against regulations.

His nav system position error was sufficient that he was not
aware he was entering terminal airspace. What about that
do you not understand? Or do you simply refuse to believe
it because it isn't convenient?

Per the F-16 Dash 1 he was allowed to be at 350 knots at
that altitude, and was traveling only slightly faster at the time
of the collision. What about that statement (from the
accident investigation) do you not understand?



Jeff

On Mon, 31 Jul 2006 07:59:18 -0600, "Jeff Crowell"
wrote in ::

Larry Dighera wrote:
I would have to see examples of hyperbole to be able to find facts
that support those statements.

also Larry Dighera:
You've got to agree, that rocketing through congested
terminal airspace at 500 knots without the required ATC clearance,

If you speak here of the Florida mishap, there's your example--
the CLOSURE rate was near 500 knots, but not the speed of
the USAF aircraft.

Just to assure that we are all both aware, the definition of
'hyperbole' is: extravagant exaggeration.


The USAF Accident Investigation Board's report:

1. "Based on their closure rate of approximately 480 knots," ...

2. "Speeds of up to 450 knots were noted during the
descent."

Based on 1 above, you are the one who has exaggerated the closing
speed by 20 knots, but we are both human after all.

Based on 2 above, I am guilty of exaggerating the top speed the Ninja
flight reached by 50 knots. I don't classify ~11% as _extravagant_
exaggeration; rather it is my poor recollection of an event that
occurred nearly six years ago. In any event, I apologize for my
error, but I do not see how it may have affected the conclusions I
reached.

And since he was not aware that he was in terminal airspace
(per a cite you named), there's a deliberate misstatement
to boot.

The USAF Accident Investigation Board's report:

"Ninja flight’s mistake was in transitioning to the tactical
portion of their flight too early, unaware that they were in
controlled airspace."

That was President, Accident Investigation Board Robin E. Scott's
opinion. It is not fact.

Despite the fact that Parker failed to brief terminal airspace prior
to the flight as regulations require, I personally find it difficult,
if not impossible, to believe Parker was unaware, that the 60 mile
diameter Tampa Class B terminal airspace lay below him at the time he
chose to descend below 10,000' into it.

Immediately prior to that descent, he was attempting to contact ATC
for clearance to enter Tampa Class B airspace, but failed to make
contact, so he continued his descent into Tampa Class B airspace. If
he were unaware he was over the 60 mile diameter terminal airspace,
what reason would he have had to contact Tampa Approach? Surely
Parker could see the busy international airport below him. So, while
my statement is at odds with the AIB report, I believe it is more
accurate.

If you disagree, I welcome your explanation of how a competent pilot
can possibly be unaware of a 60 mile wide swath of congested terminal
airspace (and that doesn't even include the Class C to the south of
the Class B) that is located immediately north of the MTR start point.


I am unable to find any reasonable excuse for what Parker did. It was
a clear day. He was descending into Class B airspace, canceled IFR,
and dove his flight of two into the terminal airspace at twice the
speed limit imposed on all other aircraft in that airspace without ATC
clearance. He may have lost situational awareness, but I find it
impossible to believe he didn't know that continuing his descent would
put him within Class B airspace without a clearance and without
communications with ATC. That's against regulations.

His nav system position error was sufficient that he was not
aware he was entering terminal airspace.

The USAF Accident Investigation Board's report:

"The error was such that following INS steering to a selected
point would place the aircraft 9-11 NM south of the desired
location"

In other words, Parker's INS steering erroneously lead him to believe
he was located 9-11 miles north of his true position, because his
flight was southbound at the time. That means, that Parker could not
have thought he had past terminal airspace, and the AIB report
indicates that he believed he was approaching the MTR start point
prior to his descent below 10,000'. The error works against the
theory that it excuses Parker's decisions.

What about that do you not understand?

You need to re-read that portion of the AIB report dealing with the
INS error that miraculously occurred immediately before his descent.
There was no error earlier in his flight. Read the report, and cite
the portion that contradicts my analysis, if you don't concur.

Or do you simply refuse to believe it because it isn't convenient?

I refuse to believe your analysis of the effect Parker's INS error
had, because it isn't logical. You need to take the time to
OBJECTIVELY re-analyze that portion of the AIB report.

Per the F-16 Dash 1 he was allowed to be at 350 knots at
that altitude, and was traveling only slightly faster at the time
of the collision. What about that statement (from the
accident investigation) do you not understand?

Jeff, I understand that 450 knots within congested terminal airspace
is about one third faster than the 350 knot speed limit you state
above. One third is not 'slightly faster'. It is _significantly_
faster. (The 450 knot figure is quoted from the AIB report at the
beginning of this follow up article.) Perhaps you can provide the
reasoning you used in arriving at your conclusion.

Incidentally, what is the 'F-16 Dash 1'? Is it the aircraft operation
manual, that provides information regarding minimum speeds for various
flight regimes?

Just a question for a fighter pilot, what amount of fuel in
minutes is normally on board when you begin a terminal
penetration? If you have good position and radio contact,
how long does it take to get a tanker hook-up?

Since 9/11, how much fighter cover traffic is in civil
airspace that wasn't there before?[general terms, nothing
classified]

If ATC is slow with a clearance, are you expected to punch
out?



"Larry Dighera" wrote in message
...
| On Mon, 31 Jul 2006 07:59:18 -0600, "Jeff Crowell"
| wrote in
::
|
| Larry Dighera wrote:
| I would have to see examples of hyperbole to be able to
find facts
| that support those statements.
|
| also Larry Dighera:
| You've got to agree, that rocketing through congested
| terminal airspace at 500 knots without the required
ATC clearance,
|
| If you speak here of the Florida mishap, there's your
example--
| the CLOSURE rate was near 500 knots, but not the speed of
| the USAF aircraft.
|
| Just to assure that we are all both aware, the definition
of
| 'hyperbole' is: extravagant exaggeration.
|
|
| The USAF Accident Investigation Board's report:
|
| 1. "Based on their closure rate of approximately 480
knots," ...
|
| 2. "Speeds of up to 450 knots were noted during the
| descent."
|
| Based on 1 above, you are the one who has exaggerated the
closing
| speed by 20 knots, but we are both human after all.
|
| Based on 2 above, I am guilty of exaggerating the top
speed the Ninja
| flight reached by 50 knots. I don't classify ~11% as
_extravagant_
| exaggeration; rather it is my poor recollection of an
event that
| occurred nearly six years ago. In any event, I apologize
for my
| error, but I do not see how it may have affected the
conclusions I
| reached.
|
| And since he was not aware that he was in terminal
airspace
| (per a cite you named), there's a deliberate misstatement
| to boot.
|
| The USAF Accident Investigation Board's report:
|
| "Ninja flight's mistake was in transitioning to the
tactical
| portion of their flight too early, unaware that they
were in
| controlled airspace."
|
| That was President, Accident Investigation Board Robin E.
Scott's
| opinion. It is not fact.
|
| Despite the fact that Parker failed to brief terminal
airspace prior
| to the flight as regulations require, I personally find it
difficult,
| if not impossible, to believe Parker was unaware, that the
60 mile
| diameter Tampa Class B terminal airspace lay below him at
the time he
| chose to descend below 10,000' into it.
|
| Immediately prior to that descent, he was attempting to
contact ATC
| for clearance to enter Tampa Class B airspace, but failed
to make
| contact, so he continued his descent into Tampa Class B
airspace. If
| he were unaware he was over the 60 mile diameter terminal
airspace,
| what reason would he have had to contact Tampa Approach?
Surely
| Parker could see the busy international airport below him.
So, while
| my statement is at odds with the AIB report, I believe it
is more
| accurate.
|
| If you disagree, I welcome your explanation of how a
competent pilot
| can possibly be unaware of a 60 mile wide swath of
congested terminal
| airspace (and that doesn't even include the Class C to the
south of
| the Class B) that is located immediately north of the MTR
start point.
|
|
| I am unable to find any reasonable excuse for what
Parker did. It was
| a clear day. He was descending into Class B airspace,
canceled IFR,
| and dove his flight of two into the terminal airspace
at twice the
| speed limit imposed on all other aircraft in that
airspace without ATC
| clearance. He may have lost situational awareness, but
I find it
| impossible to believe he didn't know that continuing
his descent would
| put him within Class B airspace without a clearance and
without
| communications with ATC. That's against regulations.
|
| His nav system position error was sufficient that he was
not
| aware he was entering terminal airspace.
|
| The USAF Accident Investigation Board's report:
|
| "The error was such that following INS steering to a
selected
| point would place the aircraft 9-11 NM south of the
desired
| location"
|
| In other words, Parker's INS steering erroneously lead him
to believe
| he was located 9-11 miles north of his true position,
because his
| flight was southbound at the time. That means, that
Parker could not
| have thought he had past terminal airspace, and the AIB
report
| indicates that he believed he was approaching the MTR
start point
| prior to his descent below 10,000'. The error works
against the
| theory that it excuses Parker's decisions.
|
| What about that do you not understand?
|
| You need to re-read that portion of the AIB report dealing
with the
| INS error that miraculously occurred immediately before
his descent.
| There was no error earlier in his flight. Read the
report, and cite
| the portion that contradicts my analysis, if you don't
concur.
|
| Or do you simply refuse to believe it because it isn't
convenient?
|
| I refuse to believe your analysis of the effect Parker's
INS error
| had, because it isn't logical. You need to take the time
to
| OBJECTIVELY re-analyze that portion of the AIB report.
|
| Per the F-16 Dash 1 he was allowed to be at 350 knots at
| that altitude, and was traveling only slightly faster at
the time
| of the collision. What about that statement (from the
| accident investigation) do you not understand?
|
| Jeff, I understand that 450 knots within congested
terminal airspace
| is about one third faster than the 350 knot speed limit
you state
| above. One third is not 'slightly faster'. It is
_significantly_
| faster. (The 450 knot figure is quoted from the AIB
report at the
| beginning of this follow up article.) Perhaps you can
provide the
| reasoning you used in arriving at your conclusion.
|
| Incidentally, what is the 'F-16 Dash 1'? Is it the
aircraft operation
| manual, that provides information regarding minimum speeds
for various
| flight regimes?
|

On Mon, 31 Jul 2006 20:33:06 -0500, "Jim Macklin"
wrote:

Just a question for a fighter pilot, what amount of fuel in
minutes is normally on board when you begin a terminal
penetration? If you have good position and radio contact,
how long does it take to get a tanker hook-up?

By regulation you need 20 minutes remaing at the initial approach fix.
If weather conditions require an alternate, you need time to go from
IAF to the alternate IAF plus 20 minutes.

In typical, daily, local airfield operations with a VFR recovery
planned, you will have about 20 minutes left when you begin your
descent along the recovery route.

Tankers are not normally an option. Tankers are not usually co-located
with tactical bases. Schedules for tankers and coordination of
required airspace blocks takes considerable time--days usually.

Unlike carrier operations where tankers often sit deck alert to pass a
few thousand pounds of gas to an emergency aircraft, for USAF tactical
aircraft, tankers are not routinely available.

Since 9/11, how much fighter cover traffic is in civil
airspace that wasn't there before?[general terms, nothing
classified]

"fighter cover traffic"?? Dunno what that means. If you mean CAP
related to homeland security, I would say not more than 50-100 sorties
per day. The majority of US military air traffic is routine training
operations around the country. Pilot training, operational
qualification training, currency training, etc.

It virtually all takes place in joint use airspace and is always done
with an ATC flight plan. It is almost always done under IFR. It is
99.9% in "controlled airspace" since there is very little uncontrolled
airspace in the country.

If ATC is slow with a clearance, are you expected to punch
out?

No, you are expected to operate as you indicated on your flight plan
using common sense and whatever is available to you. There are
detailed procedures, for example, regarding how to deal with radio
failure in flight both VFR and IFR in both VMC and IMC.

Let's get over Larry's fixation that military pilots simply gad about
the country ejecting when it suits them or their day is turning
unpleasant.


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
www.thunderchief.org
www.thundertales.blogspot.com

On Tue, 01 Aug 2006 13:04:10 GMT, Ed Rasimus
wrote in
::

there is very little uncontrolled airspace in the country.

Actually, there is quite a bit of Class G airspace in the US. It's
ceiling is just 700' or 1,200' AGL.

"Larry Dighera" wrote in message
news

Actually, there is quite a bit of Class G airspace in the US. It's
ceiling is just 700' or 1,200' AGL.


Or higher. Over parts of lakes Michigan and Superior and the upper
peninsula of Michigan there is an area of Class G airspace up to 2600 MSL
and several areas up to 14,500 MSL.