Scared of mid-airs

Larry Dighera wrote:
I would have to see examples of hyperbole to be able to find facts
that support those statements.

also Larry Dighera:
You've got to agree, that rocketing through congested
terminal airspace at 500 knots without the required ATC clearance,

If you speak here of the Florida mishap, there's your example--
the CLOSURE rate was near 500 knots, but not the speed of
the USAF aircraft.

And since he was not aware that he was in terminal airspace
(per a cite you named), there's a deliberate misstatement
to boot.


I am unable to find any reasonable excuse for what Parker did. It was
a clear day. He was descending into Class B airspace, canceled IFR,
and dove his flight of two into the terminal airspace at twice the
speed limit imposed on all other aircraft in that airspace without ATC
clearance. He may have lost situational awareness, but I find it
impossible to believe he didn't know that continuing his descent would
put him within Class B airspace without a clearance and without
communications with ATC. That's against regulations.

His nav system position error was sufficient that he was not
aware he was entering terminal airspace. What about that
do you not understand? Or do you simply refuse to believe
it because it isn't convenient?

Per the F-16 Dash 1 he was allowed to be at 350 knots at
that altitude, and was traveling only slightly faster at the time
of the collision. What about that statement (from the
accident investigation) do you not understand?



Jeff

On Mon, 31 Jul 2006 07:59:18 -0600, "Jeff Crowell"
wrote in ::

Larry Dighera wrote:
I would have to see examples of hyperbole to be able to find facts
that support those statements.

also Larry Dighera:
You've got to agree, that rocketing through congested
terminal airspace at 500 knots without the required ATC clearance,

If you speak here of the Florida mishap, there's your example--
the CLOSURE rate was near 500 knots, but not the speed of
the USAF aircraft.

Just to assure that we are all both aware, the definition of
'hyperbole' is: extravagant exaggeration.


The USAF Accident Investigation Board's report:

1. "Based on their closure rate of approximately 480 knots," ...

2. "Speeds of up to 450 knots were noted during the
descent."

Based on 1 above, you are the one who has exaggerated the closing
speed by 20 knots, but we are both human after all.

Based on 2 above, I am guilty of exaggerating the top speed the Ninja
flight reached by 50 knots. I don't classify ~11% as _extravagant_
exaggeration; rather it is my poor recollection of an event that
occurred nearly six years ago. In any event, I apologize for my
error, but I do not see how it may have affected the conclusions I
reached.

And since he was not aware that he was in terminal airspace
(per a cite you named), there's a deliberate misstatement
to boot.

The USAF Accident Investigation Board's report:

"Ninja flight’s mistake was in transitioning to the tactical
portion of their flight too early, unaware that they were in
controlled airspace."

That was President, Accident Investigation Board Robin E. Scott's
opinion. It is not fact.

Despite the fact that Parker failed to brief terminal airspace prior
to the flight as regulations require, I personally find it difficult,
if not impossible, to believe Parker was unaware, that the 60 mile
diameter Tampa Class B terminal airspace lay below him at the time he
chose to descend below 10,000' into it.

Immediately prior to that descent, he was attempting to contact ATC
for clearance to enter Tampa Class B airspace, but failed to make
contact, so he continued his descent into Tampa Class B airspace. If
he were unaware he was over the 60 mile diameter terminal airspace,
what reason would he have had to contact Tampa Approach? Surely
Parker could see the busy international airport below him. So, while
my statement is at odds with the AIB report, I believe it is more
accurate.

If you disagree, I welcome your explanation of how a competent pilot
can possibly be unaware of a 60 mile wide swath of congested terminal
airspace (and that doesn't even include the Class C to the south of
the Class B) that is located immediately north of the MTR start point.


I am unable to find any reasonable excuse for what Parker did. It was
a clear day. He was descending into Class B airspace, canceled IFR,
and dove his flight of two into the terminal airspace at twice the
speed limit imposed on all other aircraft in that airspace without ATC
clearance. He may have lost situational awareness, but I find it
impossible to believe he didn't know that continuing his descent would
put him within Class B airspace without a clearance and without
communications with ATC. That's against regulations.

His nav system position error was sufficient that he was not
aware he was entering terminal airspace.

The USAF Accident Investigation Board's report:

"The error was such that following INS steering to a selected
point would place the aircraft 9-11 NM south of the desired
location"

In other words, Parker's INS steering erroneously lead him to believe
he was located 9-11 miles north of his true position, because his
flight was southbound at the time. That means, that Parker could not
have thought he had past terminal airspace, and the AIB report
indicates that he believed he was approaching the MTR start point
prior to his descent below 10,000'. The error works against the
theory that it excuses Parker's decisions.

What about that do you not understand?

You need to re-read that portion of the AIB report dealing with the
INS error that miraculously occurred immediately before his descent.
There was no error earlier in his flight. Read the report, and cite
the portion that contradicts my analysis, if you don't concur.

Or do you simply refuse to believe it because it isn't convenient?

I refuse to believe your analysis of the effect Parker's INS error
had, because it isn't logical. You need to take the time to
OBJECTIVELY re-analyze that portion of the AIB report.

Per the F-16 Dash 1 he was allowed to be at 350 knots at
that altitude, and was traveling only slightly faster at the time
of the collision. What about that statement (from the
accident investigation) do you not understand?

Jeff, I understand that 450 knots within congested terminal airspace
is about one third faster than the 350 knot speed limit you state
above. One third is not 'slightly faster'. It is _significantly_
faster. (The 450 knot figure is quoted from the AIB report at the
beginning of this follow up article.) Perhaps you can provide the
reasoning you used in arriving at your conclusion.

Incidentally, what is the 'F-16 Dash 1'? Is it the aircraft operation
manual, that provides information regarding minimum speeds for various
flight regimes?

Just a question for a fighter pilot, what amount of fuel in
minutes is normally on board when you begin a terminal
penetration? If you have good position and radio contact,
how long does it take to get a tanker hook-up?

Since 9/11, how much fighter cover traffic is in civil
airspace that wasn't there before?[general terms, nothing
classified]

If ATC is slow with a clearance, are you expected to punch
out?



"Larry Dighera" wrote in message
...
| On Mon, 31 Jul 2006 07:59:18 -0600, "Jeff Crowell"
| wrote in
::
|
| Larry Dighera wrote:
| I would have to see examples of hyperbole to be able to
find facts
| that support those statements.
|
| also Larry Dighera:
| You've got to agree, that rocketing through congested
| terminal airspace at 500 knots without the required
ATC clearance,
|
| If you speak here of the Florida mishap, there's your
example--
| the CLOSURE rate was near 500 knots, but not the speed of
| the USAF aircraft.
|
| Just to assure that we are all both aware, the definition
of
| 'hyperbole' is: extravagant exaggeration.
|
|
| The USAF Accident Investigation Board's report:
|
| 1. "Based on their closure rate of approximately 480
knots," ...
|
| 2. "Speeds of up to 450 knots were noted during the
| descent."
|
| Based on 1 above, you are the one who has exaggerated the
closing
| speed by 20 knots, but we are both human after all.
|
| Based on 2 above, I am guilty of exaggerating the top
speed the Ninja
| flight reached by 50 knots. I don't classify ~11% as
_extravagant_
| exaggeration; rather it is my poor recollection of an
event that
| occurred nearly six years ago. In any event, I apologize
for my
| error, but I do not see how it may have affected the
conclusions I
| reached.
|
| And since he was not aware that he was in terminal
airspace
| (per a cite you named), there's a deliberate misstatement
| to boot.
|
| The USAF Accident Investigation Board's report:
|
| "Ninja flight's mistake was in transitioning to the
tactical
| portion of their flight too early, unaware that they
were in
| controlled airspace."
|
| That was President, Accident Investigation Board Robin E.
Scott's
| opinion. It is not fact.
|
| Despite the fact that Parker failed to brief terminal
airspace prior
| to the flight as regulations require, I personally find it
difficult,
| if not impossible, to believe Parker was unaware, that the
60 mile
| diameter Tampa Class B terminal airspace lay below him at
the time he
| chose to descend below 10,000' into it.
|
| Immediately prior to that descent, he was attempting to
contact ATC
| for clearance to enter Tampa Class B airspace, but failed
to make
| contact, so he continued his descent into Tampa Class B
airspace. If
| he were unaware he was over the 60 mile diameter terminal
airspace,
| what reason would he have had to contact Tampa Approach?
Surely
| Parker could see the busy international airport below him.
So, while
| my statement is at odds with the AIB report, I believe it
is more
| accurate.
|
| If you disagree, I welcome your explanation of how a
competent pilot
| can possibly be unaware of a 60 mile wide swath of
congested terminal
| airspace (and that doesn't even include the Class C to the
south of
| the Class B) that is located immediately north of the MTR
start point.
|
|
| I am unable to find any reasonable excuse for what
Parker did. It was
| a clear day. He was descending into Class B airspace,
canceled IFR,
| and dove his flight of two into the terminal airspace
at twice the
| speed limit imposed on all other aircraft in that
airspace without ATC
| clearance. He may have lost situational awareness, but
I find it
| impossible to believe he didn't know that continuing
his descent would
| put him within Class B airspace without a clearance and
without
| communications with ATC. That's against regulations.
|
| His nav system position error was sufficient that he was
not
| aware he was entering terminal airspace.
|
| The USAF Accident Investigation Board's report:
|
| "The error was such that following INS steering to a
selected
| point would place the aircraft 9-11 NM south of the
desired
| location"
|
| In other words, Parker's INS steering erroneously lead him
to believe
| he was located 9-11 miles north of his true position,
because his
| flight was southbound at the time. That means, that
Parker could not
| have thought he had past terminal airspace, and the AIB
report
| indicates that he believed he was approaching the MTR
start point
| prior to his descent below 10,000'. The error works
against the
| theory that it excuses Parker's decisions.
|
| What about that do you not understand?
|
| You need to re-read that portion of the AIB report dealing
with the
| INS error that miraculously occurred immediately before
his descent.
| There was no error earlier in his flight. Read the
report, and cite
| the portion that contradicts my analysis, if you don't
concur.
|
| Or do you simply refuse to believe it because it isn't
convenient?
|
| I refuse to believe your analysis of the effect Parker's
INS error
| had, because it isn't logical. You need to take the time
to
| OBJECTIVELY re-analyze that portion of the AIB report.
|
| Per the F-16 Dash 1 he was allowed to be at 350 knots at
| that altitude, and was traveling only slightly faster at
the time
| of the collision. What about that statement (from the
| accident investigation) do you not understand?
|
| Jeff, I understand that 450 knots within congested
terminal airspace
| is about one third faster than the 350 knot speed limit
you state
| above. One third is not 'slightly faster'. It is
_significantly_
| faster. (The 450 knot figure is quoted from the AIB
report at the
| beginning of this follow up article.) Perhaps you can
provide the
| reasoning you used in arriving at your conclusion.
|
| Incidentally, what is the 'F-16 Dash 1'? Is it the
aircraft operation
| manual, that provides information regarding minimum speeds
for various
| flight regimes?
|

On Mon, 31 Jul 2006 20:33:06 -0500, "Jim Macklin"
wrote:

Just a question for a fighter pilot, what amount of fuel in
minutes is normally on board when you begin a terminal
penetration? If you have good position and radio contact,
how long does it take to get a tanker hook-up?

By regulation you need 20 minutes remaing at the initial approach fix.
If weather conditions require an alternate, you need time to go from
IAF to the alternate IAF plus 20 minutes.

In typical, daily, local airfield operations with a VFR recovery
planned, you will have about 20 minutes left when you begin your
descent along the recovery route.

Tankers are not normally an option. Tankers are not usually co-located
with tactical bases. Schedules for tankers and coordination of
required airspace blocks takes considerable time--days usually.

Unlike carrier operations where tankers often sit deck alert to pass a
few thousand pounds of gas to an emergency aircraft, for USAF tactical
aircraft, tankers are not routinely available.

Since 9/11, how much fighter cover traffic is in civil
airspace that wasn't there before?[general terms, nothing
classified]

"fighter cover traffic"?? Dunno what that means. If you mean CAP
related to homeland security, I would say not more than 50-100 sorties
per day. The majority of US military air traffic is routine training
operations around the country. Pilot training, operational
qualification training, currency training, etc.

It virtually all takes place in joint use airspace and is always done
with an ATC flight plan. It is almost always done under IFR. It is
99.9% in "controlled airspace" since there is very little uncontrolled
airspace in the country.

If ATC is slow with a clearance, are you expected to punch
out?

No, you are expected to operate as you indicated on your flight plan
using common sense and whatever is available to you. There are
detailed procedures, for example, regarding how to deal with radio
failure in flight both VFR and IFR in both VMC and IMC.

Let's get over Larry's fixation that military pilots simply gad about
the country ejecting when it suits them or their day is turning
unpleasant.


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
www.thunderchief.org
www.thundertales.blogspot.com

On Tue, 01 Aug 2006 13:04:10 GMT, Ed Rasimus
wrote in
::

there is very little uncontrolled airspace in the country.

Actually, there is quite a bit of Class G airspace in the US. It's
ceiling is just 700' or 1,200' AGL.

"Larry Dighera" wrote in message
news

Actually, there is quite a bit of Class G airspace in the US. It's
ceiling is just 700' or 1,200' AGL.


Or higher. Over parts of lakes Michigan and Superior and the upper
peninsula of Michigan there is an area of Class G airspace up to 2600 MSL
and several areas up to 14,500 MSL.

On Tue, 01 Aug 2006 14:41:11 GMT, Larry Dighera
wrote:

On Tue, 01 Aug 2006 13:04:10 GMT, Ed Rasimus
wrote in
::

there is very little uncontrolled airspace in the country.

Actually, there is quite a bit of Class G airspace in the US. It's
ceiling is just 700' or 1,200' AGL.

That's very true, but try to go from one town to another without
transiting controlled airspace. Uncontrolled airspace allows farmer
Brown to fly around the property and count his cows, but not much
more.

Consider also that in most areas flying below 1500' is prohibited.
500' in "other than congested areas" is allowable, but you'd be
surprised how few buildings it takes for the FAA to consider it
congested.

Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
www.thunderchief.org
www.thundertales.blogspot.com

Larry Dighera wrote:


Actually, there is quite a bit of Class G airspace in the US. It's
ceiling is just 700' or 1,200' AGL.


Excellent! Just right for low level nav training routes. ;


Jack

Larry Dighera wrote:


Actually, there is quite a bit of Class G airspace in the US. It's
ceiling is just 700' or 1,200' AGL.

Come on out West, we have lots of class G and you are not limited to a
measly 1200 AGL.

Larry Dighera wrote:
I would have to see examples of hyperbole to be able to find facts
that support those statements.

also Larry Dighera:
You've got to agree, that rocketing through congested
terminal airspace at 500 knots without the required ATC clearance,

Jeff Crowell wrote:
If you speak here of the Florida mishap, there's your example--
the CLOSURE rate was near 500 knots, but not the speed of
the USAF aircraft.

Larry Dighera wrote:
Just to assure that we are all both aware, the definition of
'hyperbole' is: extravagant exaggeration.


The USAF Accident Investigation Board's report:

1. "Based on their closure rate of approximately 480 knots," ...

2. "Speeds of up to 450 knots were noted during the
descent."

Based on 1 above, you are the one who has exaggerated the closing
speed by 20 knots, but we are both human after all.

You have been claiming that the speed of the USAF flight
was "480 knots (550 mph) at impact" (your post, 7/14),
when actual recorded speed at impact was 356 KCAS
per the accident report. That's an exaggeration of 25%.
Whether that qualifies as "extravagant" I leave to you.
Further, what's the purpose of including the miles per
hour conversion except exaggeration, making the
difference look bigger yet?

As I said above, their CLOSURE rate was near 500
knots. Speed during descent was assuredly much
too high.


The USAF Accident Investigation Board's report:

"Ninja flight's mistake was in transitioning to the tactical
portion of their flight too early, unaware that they were in
controlled airspace."

That was President, Accident Investigation Board Robin E. Scott's
opinion. It is not fact.

Despite the fact that Parker failed to brief terminal airspace prior
to the flight as regulations require, I personally find it difficult,
if not impossible, to believe Parker was unaware, that the 60 mile
diameter Tampa Class B terminal airspace lay below him at the time he
chose to descend below 10,000' into it.

That's opinion, too, annit?


Per the F-16 Dash 1 he was allowed to be at 350 knots at
that altitude, and was traveling only slightly faster at the time
of the collision. What about that statement (from the
accident investigation) do you not understand?

Jeff, I understand that 450 knots within congested terminal airspace
is about one third faster than the 350 knot speed limit you state
above. One third is not 'slightly faster'. It is _significantly_
faster. (The 450 knot figure is quoted from the AIB report at the
beginning of this follow up article.) Perhaps you can provide the
reasoning you used in arriving at your conclusion.

Speed of the F-16 at impact was 356 KCAS.


Incidentally, what is the 'F-16 Dash 1'? Is it the aircraft operation
manual, that provides information regarding minimum speeds for various
flight regimes?

The Dash-1 is the flight manual for that particular aircraft. It
defines, among other things, minimum safe airspeeds. The
equivalent publication for naval aircraft is the NATOPS manual.
The FAA recognizes the Dash-1 and NATOPS pubs as legal
documents for the purpose of setting minimum allowable speeds
below 10,000 MSL.


Jeff