Scared of mid-airs

On Thu, 03 Aug 2006 15:28:47 GMT, Larry Dighera
wrote:

On Tue, 01 Aug 2006 15:25:29 GMT, Ed Rasimus
wrote in
::

OK, your homework for this week is to pick a major USAF tactical base.
You seem familiar with MacDill, but you could use Langley, Luke,
Nellis, Seymour-Johnson or similar. Now, draw up a minimum of four low
level MTRs, each a minimum of 300 miles in length. Be sure that entry
and exit points are close enough to base of origin for local
operations during a typical 90 minute flight. Have at least two of the
routes terminate on a weapons range. Consider the routes restricted
airspace. Now, how does your GA traffic go anywhere? You have
effectively created boxes that don't allow anyone else to use the
airspace.

With regard to low-level MTRs, isn't the ceiling 500' AGL to 1,500'
AGL? Why not just fly over top of the proposed MTR restricted
airspace? If that approach should happen to interfere with
navigation, then the pilot would do what he always does to enter R
airspace: Contact ATC. I don't see the problem you apparently do.
What am I overlooking?

You've added a factor not previously in evidence. If you draw the MTR
with those altitude specs, then you MAY be able to create routes that
would be meet training requirements and allow for reasonably
unhindered GA traffic.

You're overlooking the fact that ATC doesn't usually have coverage at
those altitudes in areas typically employed for MTRs. They won't be
able to offer you the desired "no responsibility on the part of the GA
pilot" guarantee of no threat because they can't see traffic at those
altitudes.

Additionally, training maneuvers on an MTR may require formation
repositioning, simulated evasive maneuvers, simulated armed
reconnaisance maneuvering and even simulated weapons delivery
maneuvers and re-attacks. Those requirements could seriously mitigate
your ability to create 500-1500' AGL corridors.

Isn't joint-use under VFR more practical?

Joint use of MTR airspace causes a hazard to air navigation because of
the high speeds involved. Practicality is trumped by air safety in my
mind. Is it not in yours?

If you ask that last sentence question, you must not have been paying
attention throught the last 120 messages here. The (relatively) high
speeds involved are not the problem you continually try to make them.

How much time do you have driving an airplane at 300 knots or more?
I've got about 4000 hours of tactical jet operation and never seemed
to find it too difficult to see-and-avoid other aircraft.

Would you characterize yourself as typical of the skill level attained
by the majority of military fighter pilots?

You demonstrate here that you actually don't know many military
fighter pilots (BTW, there is no other kind--all fighter pilots are
military). Show me a fighter pilot who does not contend that his
personal skill level is above the average and I'll show you a pilot
who will lose tomorrow.

My skill level was generally above the majority. But the training
level I required of those who were my students, those in my squadron
and those in my flights was more than adequate to do the job safely.

Let's also note something regarding your favorite 250 knot restriction
below 10M'. For a period of time (long ago, galaxy far, far away), I
operated an aircraft that flew final approach at typical landing
weight at 205 KIAS. That was landing configuration with gear and flaps
down. In clean configuration, 350 knots was generally the minimum
maneuverable speed. At 250 knots clean, my agile fighter suddenly
became a shuddering block of non-aerodynamic technology with little
more G available than your Cessna 172. Not practical.

Today, aircraft operate comfortably at lower speeds, but still need
operational flexibility and therefore the exemption of the 250 knot
restriction remains necessary.

I don't recall having said the exemption isn't necessary.

My objection is to the _hazard_ operating in excess of the speed limit
the National Airspace System designers chose while creating the
system. If you think the 250 knot limit below 10,000' is unwarranted,
perhaps your credentials are superior to those who designed the
system. Doubtful.

My credentials may be different than theirs. But, they recognized the
operational and aerodyamic necessity of the exception as well as I do.
You are apparently the only one who does not recognize that some high
performance tactical aircraft require that exemption to operate
safely. 'Tis you Moriarty, not I.

Let's do a little analysis.

VFR minimum visibility: 3 statute miles = 15,480'

250 knots: 417' per second

Time to impact at 250 knots closing: 37 seconds (3 statute miles)

OK, hold your breath for 37 seconds. It's an incredibly long time.

These times do not take into consideration the speed of BOTH aircraft,
and more importantly, they do not allow for the time it takes to
recognize the threat, decide to maneuver out of the path, and the time
it takes for the aircraft to respond and actually finish clearing the
path.

Three seconds? Maybe five if you can't make a decision quickly.

More likely, the exemption was issued as a necessary expedient at a
time when the sky was much bigger (if you know what I mean), and there
was less oversight. Today that exemption creates a negative impact on
air safety, and the whole issue should be objectively reexamined by
qualified engineers.

Not engineers you twit. Operators!

Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
www.thunderchief.org
www.thundertales.blogspot.com

OK, hold your breath for 37 seconds. It's an incredibly long time.

It's a lot of sky to scan. And if nose to nose, you only have 19 seconds.

Jose
--
The monkey turns the crank and thinks he's making the music.
for Email, make the obvious change in the address.

On Thu, 03 Aug 2006 16:37:43 GMT, Jose
wrote:

OK, hold your breath for 37 seconds. It's an incredibly long time.

It's a lot of sky to scan. And if nose to nose, you only have 19 seconds.

Jose

Great, you've got 19 seconds and I've got 19 seconds. Head-on, unless
we are perfectly aligned with miss each other ("Big Sky theory"), but
if either of us see the other, then we do what? Do you know which way
to turn? It IS spelled out in regs. If both of us see each other, we
both do what is required. Still no problem.

Now, you're driving down the Interstate--look at the car in front of
you, watch it pass a marker and count the interval in seconds that you
are maintaining. There's where the danger lies. Back off to 19 seconds
and think how much safer you'll be.

Look out the window. See and avoid. Don't depend upon someone else to
do it for you. There are no guarantees in life. Buy low, sell high.

Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
www.thunderchief.org
www.thundertales.blogspot.com

Great, you've got 19 seconds and I've got 19 seconds. Head-on, unless
we are perfectly aligned with miss each other ("Big Sky theory"), but
if either of us see the other, then we do what?

That's not the point. We have ninteen seconds to notice each other.
For much of that time we each are just a grey dot in a busy grey
landscape, and aren't where the other pilot happened to be looking.

The F16 is also probably in camouflage colors.

Jose
--
The monkey turns the crank and thinks he's making the music.
for Email, make the obvious change in the address.

Jose wrote:
OK, hold your breath for 37 seconds. It's an incredibly long time.

It's a lot of sky to scan. And if nose to nose, you only have 19 seconds.


Nineteen seconds?

I sure as hell hope nobody who thinks nineteen seconds is too short
a time to find and recognize a threat and then take appropriate
action is driving on my street or flying in my sky (but of course
they are).

There's way too many passengers with pilot certificates sitting in
the front seats these days. How people scan and how they should scan
are often two different things. Flying an aircraft is work, Jose,
when done properly. Enjoyable, also? Yes, but it's the "work" part
that adds to longevity.


Jack

I sure as hell hope nobody who thinks nineteen seconds is too short
a time to find and recognize a threat and then take appropriate action is driving on my street or flying in my sky (but of course they are).

There's way too many passengers with pilot certificates sitting in the front seats these days. How people scan and how they should scan are often two different things. Flying an aircraft is work, Jose, when done properly. Enjoyable, also? Yes, but it's the "work" part that adds to longevity.

If you are looking at the encroaching aircraft, then nineteen seconds is
probably plenty of time. The point is, usually you are not. You just
scanned that part of the sky. You are now scanning other parts of the
sky. You can't scan it all at the same time. It takes time. You may
not return to that part of the sky for nineteen seconds, except in
general. Conflicts can come from any direction, and you can only see
(well) in a field 10 or 15 degrees wide. It only takes a few seconds
per "block" but there are 24 to 36 blocks, and we are not even counting
what is above or below by more than 15 degrees. So, at two seconds per
look, and 24 looks, we have forty-eight seconds before you get another
shot at the same 10-15 degree area.

Depending on conditions, it may take as much as TEN SECONDS to actually
see the traffic that you are looking right at. The implication of this
is that if you allow two seconds per look, and it takes you ten seconds
to see traffic in the configuration in question, you'll miss it four
times out of five.

But enough theory. How many times have you not seen traffic that was
pointed out to you (2 o'clock and four miles) by ATC? How long did it
take you to find the traffic you =did= see?

http://www.alaska.faa.gov/ata/MACA.htm

Jose
--
The monkey turns the crank and thinks he's making the music.
for Email, make the obvious change in the address.

On Fri, 04 Aug 2006 04:55:32 GMT, Jose
wrote in :

http://www.alaska.faa.gov/ata/MACA.htm

PROPER CLEARING/SCANNING TECHNIQUES

An efficient scan pattern is paramount to visual collision
avoidance procedures. In developing a proper scan technique,
remember that when your head is in motion, vision is blurred and
the brain will not be able to identify conflicting traffic.
Therefore a constant motion scan across the windscreen is
practically useless.

A proper scan technique is to divide your field of vision into
blocks approximately 10 to 15 degrees wide. Examine each block
individually using a system that you find comfortable (e g. from
left to right or starting from the left and moving to the right,
then back to the left again). This method enables you to detect
any movement in a single block. It takes only a few seconds to
focus on a single block and detect conflicting traffic.

A moving target attracts attention and is relatively easy to see.
A stationary target or one that is not moving in your windscreen
is very difficult to detect and is the one that can result in a
MIDAIR COLLISION.

The time to perceive and recognize an aircraft, become aware of a
collision potential and decide on appropriate action, may vary
from as little as 2 seconds to as much as 10 seconds or more
depending on the pilot, type of aircraft and geometry of the
closing situation. Aircraft reaction time must also be added. By
the way, any evasive maneuver contemplated should include
maintaining visual contact with the other aircraft if practical.

There you have it. The FAA telling pilots, that for a 90 degree wide
scan field (45 degrees each side of center), it takes more than two
seconds per 15 degree scan block (at 3 seconds per block, that's 18
seconds per full scan), for a pilot to see a stationary traffic
conflict aircraft growing larger, and it can take up to ten seconds
see-and-avoid (for a total of 28 seconds per full scan).

On Thu, 03 Aug 2006 16:08:14 GMT, Ed Rasimus
wrote in
:

On Thu, 03 Aug 2006 15:28:47 GMT, Larry Dighera
wrote:

On Tue, 01 Aug 2006 15:25:29 GMT, Ed Rasimus
wrote in
:

With regard to low-level MTRs, isn't the ceiling 500' AGL to 1,500'
AGL? Why not just fly over top of the proposed MTR restricted
airspace? If that approach should happen to interfere with
navigation, then the pilot would do what he always does to enter R
airspace: Contact ATC. I don't see the problem you apparently do.
What am I overlooking?

You've added a factor not previously in evidence.

Which factor is that?

If you draw the MTR with those altitude specs, then you MAY be able to
create routes that would be meet training requirements and allow for
reasonably unhindered GA traffic.

That seemed obvious to me.

You're overlooking the fact that ATC doesn't usually have coverage at
those altitudes in areas typically employed for MTRs.

Agreed. Are you saying there is a requirement for ATC to have radar
coverage of all R airspace? Or are you saying, that if the military
is going to shoulder responsibility for the hazard to air safety their
high-speed, low-level operations create, it would require ATC radar
coverage?

ATC had perfectly good radar coverage in Florida, but it didn't
prevent the MAC. And the Cessna pilot was found to have been
partially responsible as a result of being incapable of avoiding at
the speeds involved.

They won't be able to offer you the desired "no responsibility on the part
of the GA pilot" guarantee of no threat because they can't see traffic at
those altitudes.

First, I never indicated that GA should have 'no responsibility'; I
said the military should bear sole legal responsibility for the
hazards it poses to air safety as a result of operating under its
exemption to the 250 knot speed limit below 10,000' feet.

Next, There would be no necessity for the military to take sole
responsibility as mentioned above, if they were operating in Class R
airspace (unless they failed to schedule it with ATC/FSS).

Additionally, training maneuvers on an MTR may require formation
repositioning, simulated evasive maneuvers, simulated armed
reconnaisance [sic] maneuvering and even simulated weapons delivery
maneuvers and re-attacks. Those requirements could seriously mitigate
your ability to create 500-1500' AGL corridors.

[Mitigate: to cause to become less harsh or hostile]

Not being familiar with those operations, I ask, would it be feasible
to conduct those operations above 10,000'? If not, why not?

I presume formation repositioning, simulated evasive maneuvers,
simulated armed reconnaissance maneuvering and simulated weapons
delivery maneuvers and re-attacks may require larger lateral, and
perhaps vertical, boundaries than are currently provided by MTRs. Is
that correct?

Isn't joint-use under VFR more practical?

Joint use of MTR airspace causes a hazard to air navigation because of
the high speeds involved. Practicality is trumped by air safety in my
mind. Is it not in yours?

If you ask that last sentence question, you must not have been paying
attention throught the last 120 messages here. The (relatively) high
speeds involved are not the problem you continually try to make them.

We disagree about that. (And you have evaded the question.)


Would you characterize yourself as typical of the skill level attained
by the majority of military fighter pilots?

You demonstrate here that you actually don't know many military
fighter pilots (BTW, there is no other kind--all fighter pilots are
military)

The Flying Tigers were a civilian group. Anyone who thinks the Flying
Tigers were not fighter pilots is uninformed and/or delusional.

My skill level was generally above the majority.

Right. So using your own personal experiences as examples in this
discussion is atypical of most military pilots, by your own admission.

[...] therefore the exemption of the 250 knot restriction remains necessary.

I don't recall having said the exemption isn't necessary.

My objection is to the _hazard_ operating in excess of the speed limit
the National Airspace System designers chose while creating the
system. If you think the 250 knot limit below 10,000' is unwarranted,
perhaps your credentials are superior to those who designed the
system. Doubtful.

My credentials may be different than theirs. But, they recognized the
operational and aerodyamic necessity of the exception as well as I do.
You are apparently the only one who does not recognize that some high
performance tactical aircraft require that exemption to operate
safely. 'Tis you Moriarty, not I.

You'll find it impossible to locate a single instance in which I
advocated operating an aircraft below its safe minimum speed.

My issue is the operation in excess of the 250 knot speed limit in
joint use airspace, and the hazard it causes to civil aviation.


Let's do a little analysis.

VFR minimum visibility: 3 statute miles = 15,480'

250 knots: 417' per second

Time to impact at 250 knots closing: 37 seconds (3 statute miles)

OK, hold your breath for 37 seconds. It's an incredibly long time.

I am able to hold my breath for 1.5 minutes. Other's have done so
recently for nearly 9 minutes.

Of course, fast-movers operate in excess of 250 knots, and the
equation does not consider head-on situations as occurred in Florida.
The closing speed was 480 knots in that instance, which works out to a
little over 19 seconds to visually identify the conflicting traffic at
3 statute miles, decide to take evasive action, and have the aircraft
clear of the path of impact.


These times do not take into consideration the speed of BOTH aircraft,
and more importantly, they do not allow for the time it takes to
recognize the threat, decide to maneuver out of the path, and the time
it takes for the aircraft to respond and actually finish clearing the
path.

Three seconds? Maybe five if you can't make a decision quickly.

Okay. Four seconds to make the decision to take evasive action, and a
couple of seconds to input control commands and for the aircraft to
actually clear the path, that leaves 13 seconds to visually identify
the head-on traffic at 3 statute miles in minimum VMC.

Now, if you consider a fighter at 300 knots approaching a 250 knot
airliner head on, the closure rate would be 550 knots permitting only
17 seconds until impact. Subtracting six seconds for decision and
maneuvering, leaves 11 seconds to visually identify the threat. That's
precious little time to see-and-avoid in single pilot operations.

More likely, the exemption was issued as a necessary expedient at a
time when the sky was much bigger (if you know what I mean), and there
was less oversight. Today that exemption creates a negative impact on
air safety, and the whole issue should be objectively reexamined by
qualified engineers.

Not engineers you twit. Operators!


[Ah. Invective and deprecation: the last refuge of the unarmed. Are
you aware of how such loss of civility diminishes any respect you may
have had? I don't expect you capable of apologizing. Disappointing.]

Operators are not skilled in the disciplines of engineering. Operators
have a vested interest in the decisions. Engineers use objective
calculations to discover system limitations, not necessity nor emotion
to arrive at unrealistic conclusions.

--

DISCLAIMER If you find a posting or message from me
offensive, inappropriate, or disruptive, please ignore it.
If you don't know how to ignore a posting, complain to
me and I will be only too happy to demonstrate... ;-)
--

On Thu, 03 Aug 2006 20:50:20 GMT, Larry Dighera
wrote:

On Thu, 03 Aug 2006 16:08:14 GMT, Ed Rasimus
wrote in
:

On Thu, 03 Aug 2006 15:28:47 GMT, Larry Dighera
wrote:

On Tue, 01 Aug 2006 15:25:29 GMT, Ed Rasimus
wrote in
:

With regard to low-level MTRs, isn't the ceiling 500' AGL to 1,500'
AGL? Why not just fly over top of the proposed MTR restricted
airspace? If that approach should happen to interfere with
navigation, then the pilot would do what he always does to enter R
airspace: Contact ATC. I don't see the problem you apparently do.
What am I overlooking?

You've added a factor not previously in evidence.

Which factor is that?

The factor described in the next sentence--a specific and very limited
altitude block.

If you draw the MTR with those altitude specs, then you MAY be able to
create routes that would be meet training requirements and allow for
reasonably unhindered GA traffic.

That seemed obvious to me.

Note the capitalized qualifier. You most probably will not be able to
create satisfactory training conditions and you will still very likely
impinge on GA traffic's ability to move unhindered.

You're overlooking the fact that ATC doesn't usually have coverage at
those altitudes in areas typically employed for MTRs.

Agreed. Are you saying there is a requirement for ATC to have radar
coverage of all R airspace? Or are you saying, that if the military
is going to shoulder responsibility for the hazard to air safety their
high-speed, low-level operations create, it would require ATC radar
coverage?

You keep seeking foolproof deconfliction. There is NO requirement for
ATC to have radar coverage anywhere. It is desired, but procedural
control is in effect in large areas of the world. And there is NO
requirement for the military to shoulder responsibility for a hazard
that is nothing more than your repeated assertions. And there is NO
requirement for the military to have ATC radar coverage to conduct
flight operations anywhere. It is desireable, but not an absolute
necessity.

ATC had perfectly good radar coverage in Florida, but it didn't
prevent the MAC. And the Cessna pilot was found to have been
partially responsible as a result of being incapable of avoiding at
the speeds involved.

They won't be able to offer you the desired "no responsibility on the part
of the GA pilot" guarantee of no threat because they can't see traffic at
those altitudes.

First, I never indicated that GA should have 'no responsibility'; I
said the military should bear sole legal responsibility for the
hazards it poses to air safety as a result of operating under its
exemption to the 250 knot speed limit below 10,000' feet.

If the military bears "sole responsibility" there is then "no
responsibility" for anyone else. Q.E.D.

Next, There would be no necessity for the military to take sole
responsibility as mentioned above, if they were operating in Class R
airspace (unless they failed to schedule it with ATC/FSS).

Additionally, training maneuvers on an MTR may require formation
repositioning, simulated evasive maneuvers, simulated armed
reconnaisance [sic] maneuvering and even simulated weapons delivery
maneuvers and re-attacks. Those requirements could seriously mitigate
your ability to create 500-1500' AGL corridors.

[Mitigate: to cause to become less harsh or hostile]

Mitigate---to lessen. Add training requirements, not simply a path
from A to B and you lessen your ability to create a MTR within
restricted narrow altitude blocks that doesn't interfere with GA
traffic.

Not being familiar with those operations, I ask, would it be feasible
to conduct those operations above 10,000'? If not, why not?

No. You can't do effective low altitude training at high altitude.

I presume formation repositioning, simulated evasive maneuvers,
simulated armed reconnaissance maneuvering and simulated weapons
delivery maneuvers and re-attacks may require larger lateral, and
perhaps vertical, boundaries than are currently provided by MTRs. Is
that correct?

Yes.

Isn't joint-use under VFR more practical?

Joint use of MTR airspace causes a hazard to air navigation because of
the high speeds involved. Practicality is trumped by air safety in my
mind. Is it not in yours?

If you ask that last sentence question, you must not have been paying
attention throught the last 120 messages here. The (relatively) high
speeds involved are not the problem you continually try to make them.

We disagree about that. (And you have evaded the question.)

Your question is based on an untrue presumption. The speeds involved
do not preclude safe operations. That has been stated repeatedly by a
number of experienced pilots and you continue to ignore it.


Would you characterize yourself as typical of the skill level attained
by the majority of military fighter pilots?

You demonstrate here that you actually don't know many military
fighter pilots (BTW, there is no other kind--all fighter pilots are
military)

The Flying Tigers were a civilian group. Anyone who thinks the Flying
Tigers were not fighter pilots is uninformed and/or delusional.

The Flying Tigers (AVG) were military pilots. They were trained by the
military and operating beyond the umbrella of national authority.
Similarly the Air America/Raven operations of SEA were military pilots
operating out of uniform.

If someone is flying a fighter aircraft, they are not necessarily a
fighter pilot. But, if someone is a fighter pilot you can pretty much
guarantee that they will tell you they are better than the average.

My skill level was generally above the majority.

Right. So using your own personal experiences as examples in this
discussion is atypical of most military pilots, by your own admission.

Fighter pilots are confident to the point of arrogance. If you are
going to enter combat alone in a complex system, you had better think
you are pretty damn good. If you aren't and you know it, you'd better
change jobs. If you are and you don't know it, you won't get the job
done and you'll endanger your leader or your wingmen.

I flew 250 combat missions--over 150 of them over North Vietnam
without ever losing a leader in front of me or a wingman that I was
leading. I'm good and that's not bragging it's fact.

Using my personal experiences in this discussion to this point has
been merely to point out professional facts. If you were talking about
medicine you would listen to a doctor. If you are talking about flying
fighters, please have the grace to listen.

[...] therefore the exemption of the 250 knot restriction remains necessary.

I don't recall having said the exemption isn't necessary.

My objection is to the _hazard_ operating in excess of the speed limit
the National Airspace System designers chose while creating the
system. If you think the 250 knot limit below 10,000' is unwarranted,
perhaps your credentials are superior to those who designed the
system. Doubtful.

My credentials may be different than theirs. But, they recognized the
operational and aerodyamic necessity of the exception as well as I do.
You are apparently the only one who does not recognize that some high
performance tactical aircraft require that exemption to operate
safely. 'Tis you Moriarty, not I.

You'll find it impossible to locate a single instance in which I
advocated operating an aircraft below its safe minimum speed.

My issue is the operation in excess of the 250 knot speed limit in
joint use airspace, and the hazard it causes to civil aviation.

The proximate paragraph above this seems to provide the single
instance requested in the next paragraph further above.


Let's do a little analysis.

VFR minimum visibility: 3 statute miles = 15,480'

250 knots: 417' per second

Time to impact at 250 knots closing: 37 seconds (3 statute miles)

OK, hold your breath for 37 seconds. It's an incredibly long time.

I am able to hold my breath for 1.5 minutes. Other's have done so
recently for nearly 9 minutes.

Of course, fast-movers operate in excess of 250 knots, and the
equation does not consider head-on situations as occurred in Florida.
The closing speed was 480 knots in that instance, which works out to a
little over 19 seconds to visually identify the conflicting traffic at
3 statute miles, decide to take evasive action, and have the aircraft
clear of the path of impact.


These times do not take into consideration the speed of BOTH aircraft,
and more importantly, they do not allow for the time it takes to
recognize the threat, decide to maneuver out of the path, and the time
it takes for the aircraft to respond and actually finish clearing the
path.

Three seconds? Maybe five if you can't make a decision quickly.

Okay. Four seconds to make the decision to take evasive action, and a
couple of seconds to input control commands and for the aircraft to
actually clear the path, that leaves 13 seconds to visually identify
the head-on traffic at 3 statute miles in minimum VMC.

Now, if you consider a fighter at 300 knots approaching a 250 knot
airliner head on, the closure rate would be 550 knots permitting only
17 seconds until impact. Subtracting six seconds for decision and
maneuvering, leaves 11 seconds to visually identify the threat. That's
precious little time to see-and-avoid in single pilot operations.

If you can't make see-and-avoid decisions in less time than that, I
wonder how you drive to work in the morning.

More likely, the exemption was issued as a necessary expedient at a
time when the sky was much bigger (if you know what I mean), and there
was less oversight. Today that exemption creates a negative impact on
air safety, and the whole issue should be objectively reexamined by
qualified engineers.

Not engineers you twit. Operators!


[Ah. Invective and deprecation: the last refuge of the unarmed. Are
you aware of how such loss of civility diminishes any respect you may
have had? I don't expect you capable of apologizing. Disappointing.]

At this point, Scarlett, I don't give a damn.

Operators are not skilled in the disciplines of engineering. Operators
have a vested interest in the decisions. Engineers use objective
calculations to discover system limitations, not necessity nor emotion
to arrive at unrealistic conclusions.

Engineers do a lot of foolish things--one needed only to see the
polyester double-knits they wore to work at Northrop when I was there
working on YF-23. What they don't do is operate the equipment. That's
why establishing OPERATING rules and limitations is a function of
operators. You can get an engineer to tell you how slow an aircraft
can fly and he can tell you what G is available at what bank angle to
create what rate of turn. But, if you want to know if that is
practical or safe as a minimum for operations, you'd better ask the
pilot.



Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
www.thunderchief.org
www.thundertales.blogspot.com

On Thu, 03 Aug 2006 21:54:16 GMT, Ed Rasimus
wrote in
:

On Thu, 03 Aug 2006 20:50:20 GMT, Larry Dighera
wrote:

On Thu, 03 Aug 2006 16:08:14 GMT, Ed Rasimus
wrote in
:

On Thu, 03 Aug 2006 15:28:47 GMT, Larry Dighera
wrote:

On Tue, 01 Aug 2006 15:25:29 GMT, Ed Rasimus
wrote in
:

With regard to low-level MTRs, isn't the ceiling 500' AGL to 1,500'
AGL? Why not just fly over top of the proposed MTR restricted
airspace? If that approach should happen to interfere with
navigation, then the pilot would do what he always does to enter R
airspace: Contact ATC. I don't see the problem you apparently do.
What am I overlooking?

You've added a factor not previously in evidence.

Which factor is that?

The factor described in the next sentence--a specific and very limited
altitude block.

That 'factor' is just the current height of low-level MTRs; it's not
new.

If you draw the MTR with those altitude specs, then you MAY be able to
create routes that would be meet training requirements and allow for
reasonably unhindered GA traffic.

That seemed obvious to me.

Note the capitalized qualifier. You most probably will not be able to
create satisfactory training conditions and you will still very likely
impinge on GA traffic's ability to move unhindered.

Are you saying that the current dimensions of low-level MTRs do not
meet military training needs?

You're overlooking the fact that ATC doesn't usually have coverage at
those altitudes in areas typically employed for MTRs.

Agreed. Are you saying there is a requirement for ATC to have radar
coverage of all R airspace? Or are you saying, that if the military
is going to shoulder responsibility for the hazard to air safety their
high-speed, low-level operations create, it would require ATC radar
coverage?

You keep seeking foolproof deconfliction.

Actually, I keep saying the those flights that are not exempt from the
250 knot speed limit below 10,000' should be separated from high-speed
military flights enjoying the exemption. I don't for a minute regard
that as foolproof.

There is NO requirement for ATC to have radar coverage anywhere.

Then why did you think I was " overlooking the fact that ATC doesn't
usually have coverage at those altitudes in areas typically employed
for MTRs?"

They won't be able to offer you the desired "no responsibility on the part
of the GA pilot" guarantee of no threat because they can't see traffic at
those altitudes.

First, I never indicated that GA should have 'no responsibility'; I
said the military should bear sole legal responsibility for the
hazards it poses to air safety as a result of operating under its
exemption to the 250 knot speed limit below 10,000' feet.

If the military bears "sole responsibility" there is then "no
responsibility" for anyone else. Q.E.D.

Obviously, if a GA pilot is violating regulations, he is responsible
for the hazard to air safety those violations may pose to other
flights and those over whom he operates, right?


Next, There would be no necessity for the military to take sole
responsibility as mentioned above, if they were operating in Class R
airspace (unless they failed to schedule it with ATC/FSS).

Additionally, training maneuvers on an MTR may require formation
repositioning, simulated evasive maneuvers, simulated armed
reconnaisance [sic] maneuvering and even simulated weapons delivery
maneuvers and re-attacks. Those requirements could seriously mitigate
your ability to create 500-1500' AGL corridors.

[Mitigate: to cause to become less harsh or hostile]

Mitigate---to lessen. Add training requirements, not simply a path
from A to B and you lessen your ability to create a MTR within
restricted narrow altitude blocks that doesn't interfere with GA
traffic.

Are these 'training requirements' you mention currently conducted
outside the confines of the MTR routes as defined in the National
Imaging and Mapping Agency MTR database?
http://164.214.2.62/products/webchum/QryChoice.cfm


Not being familiar with those operations, I ask, would it be feasible
to conduct those operations above 10,000'? If not, why not?

No. You can't do effective low altitude training at high altitude.

I presume formation repositioning, simulated evasive maneuvers,
simulated armed reconnaissance maneuvering and simulated weapons
delivery maneuvers and re-attacks may require larger lateral, and
perhaps vertical, boundaries than are currently provided by MTRs. Is
that correct?

Yes.

Are those maneuvers conducted within MOAs or R airspace?
[...]
Okay. Four seconds to make the decision to take evasive action, and a
couple of seconds to input control commands and for the aircraft to
actually clear the path, that leaves 13 seconds to visually identify
the head-on traffic at 3 statute miles in minimum VMC.

Now, if you consider a fighter at 300 knots approaching a 250 knot
airliner head on, the closure rate would be 550 knots permitting only
17 seconds until impact. Subtracting six seconds for decision and
maneuvering, leaves 11 seconds to visually identify the threat. That's
precious little time to see-and-avoid in single pilot operations.

If you can't make see-and-avoid decisions in less time than that, I
wonder how you drive to work in the morning.

I don't drive to work.