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On Thu, 03 Aug 2006 16:42:07 GMT, Larry Dighera
wrote: On Thu, 03 Aug 2006 16:02:22 GMT, Jose wrote in : then the pilot would do what he always does to enter R airspace: Contact ATC. I've attempted that, and also contacting the FSS as printed on the charts themselves, and often the putative controlling agency doesn't know whether it's hot or not. That is true. Why do you suppose that occurs? Do you think ATC is so disorganized, that they can't find the military activity information, or do you think the military has provided ambiguous information, what? It would seem, that given the system in place for activating and deactivating Restricted airspace, there should be a concrete answer available at all times. Could it be a level of operational intensity that makes minute-by-minute update impractical? Example: Holloman AFB operating four squadrons (32 airplanes each) conducting Fighter Lead-In Training for recent graduates of Undergraduate Pilot Training enroute to fighter assignments. Average of 120 sorties per day ranging from single ship to two, three and four ship flights. Also second fighter wing with three more squadrons of 18 aircraft each conducting complex operations coordinated with ground radar environments and often requiring supersonic airspace. Schedule published twelve hours before operations commence. Airspace activated as scheduled, but morning fog precludes launches. Delays of thirty minutes--should airspace be turned back? Launch when weather allows and airspace is hot. Schedule is both slipped and compressed to keep training flow and meet required completions dates. Flight aborts because of maintenance problems. Beak B is now empty but A and C remain "hot". Should GA aircraft be cleared through B or should airspace remain blocked for fifteen minute late launch of flight? Scheduled A/G mission cancelled because of unavailability of properly configured aircraft. Add-on to schedule with available aircraft to fly A/A sortie. Schedule flexes again. Afternoon weather builds up in Talon N, so unscheduled Beak C takes additional sorties from Talon N. And on and on. Conversely, Saturday and Sunday no scheduled training, so airspace is released. Maintenance requires a block for a functional check flight on a repaired airplane. Flexibility to allow delay waiting for ATC to clear GA aircraft out of the block is no problem. Life goes on. Isn't that different than your innuendo laden language above? "ATC is so disorganized..." "military information is so ambiguous..." Ed Rasimus Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret) "When Thunder Rolled" www.thunderchief.org www.thundertales.blogspot.com |
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On Thu, 03 Aug 2006 17:51:37 GMT, Ed Rasimus
wrote in : On Thu, 03 Aug 2006 16:42:07 GMT, Larry Dighera wrote: On Thu, 03 Aug 2006 16:02:22 GMT, Jose wrote in : then the pilot would do what he always does to enter R airspace: Contact ATC. I've attempted that, and also contacting the FSS as printed on the charts themselves, and often the putative controlling agency doesn't know whether it's hot or not. That is true. Why do you suppose that occurs? Do you think ATC is so disorganized, that they can't find the military activity information, or do you think the military has provided ambiguous information, what? It would seem, that given the system in place for activating and deactivating Restricted airspace, there should be a concrete answer available at all times. Could it be a level of operational intensity that makes minute-by-minute update impractical? Example: Holloman AFB operating four squadrons (32 airplanes each) conducting Fighter Lead-In Training for recent graduates of Undergraduate Pilot Training enroute to fighter assignments. Average of 120 sorties per day ranging from single ship to two, three and four ship flights. Also second fighter wing with three more squadrons of 18 aircraft each conducting complex operations coordinated with ground radar environments and often requiring supersonic airspace. Schedule published twelve hours before operations commence. Airspace activated as scheduled, but morning fog precludes launches. Delays of thirty minutes--should airspace be turned back? Launch when weather allows and airspace is hot. Schedule is both slipped and compressed to keep training flow and meet required completions dates. Flight aborts because of maintenance problems. Beak B is now empty but A and C remain "hot". Should GA aircraft be cleared through B or should airspace remain blocked for fifteen minute late launch of flight? Scheduled A/G mission cancelled because of unavailability of properly configured aircraft. Add-on to schedule with available aircraft to fly A/A sortie. Schedule flexes again. Afternoon weather builds up in Talon N, so unscheduled Beak C takes additional sorties from Talon N. And on and on. Conversely, Saturday and Sunday no scheduled training, so airspace is released. Maintenance requires a block for a functional check flight on a repaired airplane. Flexibility to allow delay waiting for ATC to clear GA aircraft out of the block is no problem. Life goes on. Isn't that different than your innuendo laden language above? "ATC is so disorganized..." "military information is so ambiguous..." Sir, the information you provided does not explain how ATC would not be aware if the R airspace were hot or not. If the military scheduled the airspace, ATC should assume it is hot, right? |
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On Thu, 03 Aug 2006 18:37:24 GMT, Larry Dighera
wrote: Sir, the information you provided does not explain how ATC would not be aware if the R airspace were hot or not. If the military scheduled the airspace, ATC should assume it is hot, right? Yes, if the military scheduled the airspace, ATC should assume it is hot. If they wish to make sure, they should check their controllers and see if anybody was coming or going. IOW, if scheduled it is "Hot" and even if not active at this minute, one should assume that it will be active momentarily. You won't get clearance through the airspace under those conditions. Ed Rasimus Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret) "When Thunder Rolled" www.thunderchief.org www.thundertales.blogspot.com |
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![]() Ed Rasimus wrote: [stuff snipped] Schedule published twelve hours before operations commence. Airspace activated as scheduled, but morning fog precludes launches. Delays of thirty minutes--should airspace be turned back? Launch when weather allows and airspace is hot. Schedule is both slipped and compressed to keep training flow and meet required completions dates. Flight aborts because of maintenance problems. Beak B is now empty but A and C remain "hot". Should GA aircraft be cleared through B or should airspace remain blocked for fifteen minute late launch of flight? Scheduled A/G mission cancelled because of unavailability of properly configured aircraft. Add-on to schedule with available aircraft to fly A/A sortie. Schedule flexes again. In your experience in the USAF who did the actual coordination with the FAA? In my experience it was a group at a numbered AF HQ, and the time it took for unit-level schedule changes to make it up to the HQ and hit the FAA caused a long delay, with the flying unit assuming that the airspace coordination had been done when it may or may not have actually occurred, which resulted in aircraft on MTRs that supposedly were cold, unanticipated arrivals on ranges, multiple units using the same MTR, etc. We kept track of specific flight schedules via the frag orders, which sometimes matched reality and sometimes not. We had a continual problem with weekend use of MTRs when schedules changed but the USAF had nobody on duty on Saturday/Sunday coordinating with the FAA in the region where I worked. John Hairell ) |
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On 3 Aug 2006 12:40:33 -0700, "
wrote: In your experience in the USAF who did the actual coordination with the FAA? In my experience it was a group at a numbered AF HQ, and the time it took for unit-level schedule changes to make it up to the HQ and hit the FAA caused a long delay, with the flying unit assuming that the airspace coordination had been done when it may or may not have actually occurred, which resulted in aircraft on MTRs that supposedly were cold, unanticipated arrivals on ranges, multiple units using the same MTR, etc. It would vary with the unit and the mission. Typically the airspace for training was local to the base--i.e. Holloman airspace was theirs and not shared for example with Cannon. Nellis airspace belonged to Nellis and George airspace belonged to George. Very little went through numbered AF. Coordination of daily schedules and airspace requirements would flow from the Wing to the ARTCC. Ranges were controlled by the military. MTRs could be used by multiple units although a majority of the routes that I saw were base dedicated. Some could be used by other bases and that was coordinated between the bases and ARTCC. There was no such thing as an "unanticipated arrival on ranges"--you had a scheduled range time before takeoff. If you didn't have scheduled range time you didn't go. We kept track of specific flight schedules via the frag orders, which sometimes matched reality and sometimes not. Frag orders are "frag"ments of the total operations order. This is a real operations term, not a training document. You get a frag at a unit in combat. It is part of the total operations plan for the day generated at the component command Hq level. It, by defnition, IS reality. We had a continual problem with weekend use of MTRs when schedules changed but the USAF had nobody on duty on Saturday/Sunday coordinating with the FAA in the region where I worked. From the time I entered active duty (which was 1964) I was never at an installation that did not have a command post which operated 24/7. Even units which did not conduct operations on weekends had such a function. In those days the point-of-contact was the "airdrome officer" who typically was located in base operations. There was always someone on duty. Ed Rasimus Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret) "When Thunder Rolled" www.thunderchief.org www.thundertales.blogspot.com |
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