Federal Aviation Administration to cut more air traffic controllers

Ron Lee wrote:
Having just one controller on duty is also

problematic [as noted in the recent wrong-runway episode in
Lexington KY (RISKS-24.41)]. [Source: Matthew L. Wald, *The
New York Times*, 20 Sep

2006; PGN-ed, TNX to Lauren Weinstein]


http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/20/wa...20control.html



Non-issue. The pilots were responsible for verifying that they were
on the correct runway.

Ron Lee

Incorrect. It is an issue. Fatigued controller working a
double shift without proper rest combined with the FAA
violating their own staffing orders at KLEX.

It is a HUGE issue. The word is Liability. Look it up.

How can you justify cutting controller staffing while you
spend millions on Civil Rights empires in the FAA?

You are on an IFR approach. You are bumping minimums low on
fuel. Would you rather have the FAA spend money on..

1. Air Traffic controllers and ILS technicians or...

2. Kissing the Black Ass boondoggles at a resort spa?

I choose number 1.

The FAA chooses number 2.

It is an issue

JohnSmith wrote in news:eaeRg.21555$eW5.17847
@bignews5.bellsouth.net:

Incorrect. It is an issue. Fatigued controller working a
double shift without proper rest combined with the FAA
violating their own staffing orders at KLEX.

Irrelevant. Taking off and landing safely is the pilot's responsibility. The
presence or absence of a tower, a controller, or even a runway is irrelevant.

It is a HUGE issue. The word is Liability. Look it up.

In the US, anyone can sue anyone for anything with pretty much no risk. For
example, if it bothers you so much that there are black homosexuals in the
FAA, you are certainly able to sue.

Just please stop ranting about it here.

"Judah" wrote in message
. ..
JohnSmith wrote in news:eaeRg.21555$eW5.17847
@bignews5.bellsouth.net:

Incorrect. It is an issue. Fatigued controller working a
double shift without proper rest combined with the FAA
violating their own staffing orders at KLEX.

Irrelevant. Taking off and landing safely is the pilot's responsibility.
The
presence or absence of a tower, a controller, or even a runway is
irrelevant.

Really? Then why bother having them?

Of course the crew had primary responsibility, although the anomalies in
airport markings and notices and layout will play a role, too.

The point about the ATC role goes to redundancy, not the crew's actions. If
the controller had been able to stick to just one of his two jobs, he might
have noticed the errant takeoff and warned the crew. There was a fairly
recent posting in one of the aviation groups of exactly the same incident -
same airport, same runways confused by a regional airliner crew - 13 years
ago. The crew and the controller caught it at about the same time. This
time neither did, but the controller couldn't have caught it because by then
he was engaged in other duties - the job that should have been performed by
the second (required) controller.

This is not to excuse the crew's oversight, but redundancy is an essential
pillar of our safety system. It's prevented far, far more accidents than
have occurred. Redundancy failures often are part of the chain of events
that has to occur before you actually get an accident. The secret to
airline safety's excellent record is identifying the links that can make up
such a chain, and fixing or preventing them.

It is a HUGE issue. The word is Liability. Look it up.

In the US, anyone can sue anyone for anything with pretty much no risk.
For
example, if it bothers you so much that there are black homosexuals in the
FAA, you are certainly able to sue.

The FAA has been successfully sued as part of post-acciident liabilities,
and we're not talking chump change, either. Furthermore, there are other
"liabilities" involved - the PR and political price to be paid when an FAA
screw-up results in an accident, expecially one with many fatalities.

Just please stop ranting about it here.

Safety isn't his agenda here.

To blame this accident on an FAA "social engineering" program is like saying
that the reason that Johnny can't read is because he had to listen to a
classroom discussion of African-American history. He's using a legitimate
safety issue as an excuse to plaster aviation newsgroups with racist crap.

"John Mazor" wrote in message
...

Irrelevant. Taking off and landing safely is the pilot's responsibility.
The presence or absence of a tower, a controller, or even a runway is
irrelevant.


Really? Then why bother having them?


Controllers? For separation.



Of course the crew had primary responsibility, although the anomalies in
airport markings and notices and layout will play a role, too.


Airport markings and notices and layout share responsibility with the crew?
What airport markings, notices, or layout indicated that runway 26 was
runway 22?



The point about the ATC role goes to redundancy, not the crew's actions.
If the controller had been able to stick to just one of his two jobs, he
might have noticed the errant takeoff and warned the crew. There was a
fairly recent posting in one of the aviation groups of exactly the same
incident - same airport, same runways confused by a regional airliner
crew - 13 years ago. The crew and the controller caught it at about the
same time. This time neither did, but the controller couldn't have caught
it because by then he was engaged in other duties - the job that should
have been performed by the second (required) controller.


The job that should have been performed by the second (required) controller
was radar. Had that requirement been adhered to it wouldn't have guaranteed
a second controller in the tower cab.



This is not to excuse the crew's oversight, but redundancy is an essential
pillar of our safety system. It's prevented far, far more accidents than
have occurred. Redundancy failures often are part of the chain of events
that has to occur before you actually get an accident. The secret to
airline safety's excellent record is identifying the links that can make
up such a chain, and fixing or preventing them.


Two pilots were on duty in the cockpit, that didn't provide sufficient
redundacy.

"Steven P. McNicoll" wrote in message
k.net...

"John Mazor" wrote in message
...

Irrelevant. Taking off and landing safely is the pilot's responsibility.
The presence or absence of a tower, a controller, or even a runway is
irrelevant.

Really? Then why bother having them?

Controllers? For separation.

And the tower? Might they be perching controllers so high up, in windowed
cabs, so they can see what's happening on the ground there? Such as
airplanes deviating from their clearances? If not, you don't need a tower,
any darkened room on the ground will do.

Of course the crew had primary responsibility, although the anomalies in
airport markings and notices and layout will play a role, too.

Airport markings and notices and layout share responsibility with the
crew? What airport markings, notices, or layout indicated that runway 26
was runway 22?

Stephen, I'm not going to get out in front of the investigation. If you're
truly interested in safety and not just in beating up on pilots, please
follow it as it unfolds. Yes, confusing airport layout and markings and
notices can play a role in an accident and may very well do so here.

Meanwhile, ponder the significance of this portion of the probable cause
statement in the 1990 runway collision in Detroit. Part of the accident
chain was one of the crews becoming confused in low viz weather by a taxi
intersection known colloquially to pilots as "spaghetti junction."

CONTRIBUING TO CAUSE OF ACDNT WERE (1) DEFICIENCIES IN ATC SVCS PROVIDED BY
DETROIT TWR, INCLUDING FAILURE OF GND CTLR TO TAKE TIMELY ACTN TO ALERT LCL
CTLR TO PSBL RWY INCURSION, INADQT VIS OBS, FAILURE TO USE PROGRESSIVE TAXI
INSTRNS IN LOW-VIS CONDS, & ISSUANCE OF INAPPROPRIATE & CONFUSING TAXI
INSTRNS COMPOUNDED BY INADQ BACKUP SUPERVISION FOR LEVEL OF EXPERIENCE OF
STAFF ON DUTY; (2) DEFICIENCIES IN SURFACE MARKINGS, SIGNAGE & LGTG AT ARPT
& FAILURE OF FAA SURVEILLANCE TO DETECT OR CORRECT ANY OF THESE
DEFICIENCIES;

Not all of that applies here, but yes, airport and ATC issues can play a
role in an accident. The intersection was closed and the taxiways were
revamped after the accident.

The point about the ATC role goes to redundancy, not the crew's actions.
If the controller had been able to stick to just one of his two jobs, he
might have noticed the errant takeoff and warned the crew. There was a
fairly recent posting in one of the aviation groups of exactly the same
incident - same airport, same runways confused by a regional airliner
crew - 13 years ago. The crew and the controller caught it at about the
same time. This time neither did, but the controller couldn't have
caught it because by then he was engaged in other duties - the job that
should have been performed by the second (required) controller.

The job that should have been performed by the second (required)
controller was radar. Had that requirement been adhered to it wouldn't
have guaranteed a second controller in the tower cab.

And what else, pray tell, would the controller who cleared the accident
aircraft from the gate have been doing? Controlling and monitoring ground
movement was his responsibiity - until he turned away to do another task
that related to movement of aircraft in the air, not ground movement.
There's no guarantee that he would have noticed the erroneous movement if he
hadn't been required to turn to other tasks because of the lack of the
second controller, but it's a pretty sure bet that once he turned from that
area of responsibility (control and monitoring of ground movement), he
wasn't going to notice anything happening on the runway. Thus, his
potential role to provide redundancy and prevent an accident was negated by
FAA's violation of its own staffing rules.

This is not to excuse the crew's oversight, but redundancy is an
essential pillar of our safety system. It's prevented far, far more
accidents than have occurred. Redundancy failures often are part of the
chain of events that has to occur before you actually get an accident.
The secret to airline safety's excellent record is identifying the links
that can make up such a chain, and fixing or preventing them.

Two pilots were on duty in the cockpit, that didn't provide sufficient
redundacy.

That's exactly my point. What's yours?

Care to guess how many times a day that two pilots (never mind just one)
miss something and a warning system or a controller (that's all part of
redundancy, you now) prevents a mishap? Get out your calculator, your
fingers and toes aren't sufficient to the task. The system depends in part
on redundancy to keep us all safe. When it fails, we're all less safe.

You can't deny that the crew missed it, but is that as far as your
understanding of aviation safety goes? "The crew screwed up, end of
discussion"?

John Mazor writes:

And the tower? Might they be perching controllers so high up, in windowed
cabs, so they can see what's happening on the ground there? Such as
airplanes deviating from their clearances? If not, you don't need a tower,
any darkened room on the ground will do.

The pilot-in-command is the final authority. The crash was the
pilot's fault. There was nobody else around, except the copilot, and
the PIC's decision is still final.

The air regulations are a double-edged sword: if a competent pilot
feels he needs to do something for the sake of safety, he can do it,
no matter what anyone else says, and the regulations will protect him.
However, if he's incompetent and screws up, he takes the full blame;
it's not anyone else's responsibility to check up on him.

Controllers function in an advisory capacity. The PIC can always
deviate from a controller's instructions, if he deems it necessary.

Meanwhile, ponder the significance of this portion of the probable cause
statement in the 1990 runway collision in Detroit. Part of the accident
chain was one of the crews becoming confused in low viz weather by a taxi
intersection known colloquially to pilots as "spaghetti junction."

CONTRIBUING TO CAUSE OF ACDNT WERE (1) DEFICIENCIES IN ATC SVCS PROVIDED BY
DETROIT TWR, INCLUDING FAILURE OF GND CTLR TO TAKE TIMELY ACTN TO ALERT LCL
CTLR TO PSBL RWY INCURSION, INADQT VIS OBS, FAILURE TO USE PROGRESSIVE TAXI
INSTRNS IN LOW-VIS CONDS, & ISSUANCE OF INAPPROPRIATE & CONFUSING TAXI
INSTRNS COMPOUNDED BY INADQ BACKUP SUPERVISION FOR LEVEL OF EXPERIENCE OF
STAFF ON DUTY; (2) DEFICIENCIES IN SURFACE MARKINGS, SIGNAGE & LGTG AT ARPT
& FAILURE OF FAA SURVEILLANCE TO DETECT OR CORRECT ANY OF THESE
DEFICIENCIES;

Not all of that applies here ...

None of it applies here. ATC services were not deficient. No
conflicting instructions were given. There were no other aircraft
involved. And even on an unmarked grass strip, a competent pilot will
still check his heading before he rolls.

And what else, pray tell, would the controller who cleared the accident
aircraft from the gate have been doing?

He could be playing pool, and it would still be the sole
responsibility of the pilot-in-command. That's the say the FARs work,
and I think that's how they should work (it's inherited from maritime
law).

There's no guarantee that he would have noticed the erroneous movement if he
hadn't been required to turn to other tasks because of the lack of the
second controller, but it's a pretty sure bet that once he turned from that
area of responsibility (control and monitoring of ground movement), he
wasn't going to notice anything happening on the runway. Thus, his
potential role to provide redundancy and prevent an accident was negated by
FAA's violation of its own staffing rules.

The PIC's negligence was so glaring in this case that any question of
ATC is moot. It is not ATC's job to hold the hand of pilots.

Care to guess how many times a day that two pilots (never mind just one)
miss something and a warning system or a controller (that's all part of
redundancy, you now) prevents a mishap?

How many times?

You can't deny that the crew missed it, but is that as far as your
understanding of aviation safety goes? "The crew screwed up, end of
discussion"?

My understanding is that if you cannot trust the crew, nothing else
matters. The buck stops in the left-hand seat.

--
Transpose mxsmanic and gmail to reach me by e-mail.

"Mxsmanic" wrote in message
...
The air regulations are a double-edged sword: if a competent pilot
feels he needs to do something for the sake of safety, he can do it,
no matter what anyone else says, and the regulations will protect him.

You're a funny guy!

"Mxsmanic" wrote in message
...
John Mazor writes:

You can't deny that the crew missed it, but is that as far as your
understanding of aviation safety goes? "The crew screwed up, end of
discussion"?

My understanding is that if you cannot trust the crew, nothing else
matters. The buck stops in the left-hand seat.

Then your understanding of how the aviation safety system works is woefully
deficient.

It starts there, but if it stopped there, then aviation still would be an
extremely hazardous form of transportation.

SNIP
You can't deny that the crew missed it, but is that as far as your
understanding of aviation safety goes? "The crew screwed up, end of
discussion"?

It is for those narrow minded idiots who can't see the
importance of integrity of the entire National Airspace
System. It's the "We don't need **** but the 2 guys in the
Cockpit" fallacy.

In 1994 the FAA started full speed ahead Kissing the Black
Ass and promoting secretaries into key safety positions for
Diversity numbers without proper training or background
knowledge.

Senior Managers in the FAA were even brainwashed by Bull
Dike edicts from inside the Lesbian controlled Beltway in
D.C. FAA Hdq. that you do not need a aviation background to
manage Controllers or Technicians so the need for a
"Background" was eliminated so more Blacks and Women could
be promoted into FAA Management

Now, the FAA has a big bucket of DOG **** that will get
worse as more WHITE MALE HETEROSEXUAL experienced
controllers and technicians retire or quit in disgust.

More people will die across America in aviation disasters
like KLEX unless the FAA returns to the business model of
Air Safety first rather than "Kissing the Black Ass"

See FAA TAX FUNDED BOONDOGGLE

http://www.nbcfae.org/2006AnnualTraining.htm

Or, unless in their(FAA)current sick twisted HR Diversity
Matrix it's OK to kill a few people as long as the Black and
Female FAA Employees remain HAPPY. Sorta like the we don't
need a red light until more people die at the intersection
mentality. That is why they call the FAA the "Tombstone"
agency. People must die before they get off their ass and do
something.

The current FAA Administrator would rather blame the Air
Traffic controllers for funding shortfalls and beat up on
NATCA and abuse their key safety employees with benefit cuts
rather than look at the MILLIONS wasted each year Kissing
the Black Ass in Civil Rights and EEO Empires that have
NOTHING to do with day to day Air Safety or operation of the
FAA.

In other words, it's FUBAR in the FAA with their Air Safety
priorities

But, remember, we are racist and bigots for bringing you
these hard but true facts of the organization entrusted with
American Air Safety. The hard words help the FAA and their
PC Minions deflect and shield themselves from public scrutiny.

It's all sick and wrong

"Political Correctness is Tyranny with Manners"

"AlbertSnore" wrote in message
. ..

SNIP

And further snip the sock puppet's bull**** racist spin that at this point
is, well, making me snore, Albert.

Your amusement value here has just about played out.

Zzzzzzzz...