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JohnSmith wrote in news:eaeRg.21555$eW5.17847
@bignews5.bellsouth.net: Incorrect. It is an issue. Fatigued controller working a double shift without proper rest combined with the FAA violating their own staffing orders at KLEX. Irrelevant. Taking off and landing safely is the pilot's responsibility. The presence or absence of a tower, a controller, or even a runway is irrelevant. It is a HUGE issue. The word is Liability. Look it up. In the US, anyone can sue anyone for anything with pretty much no risk. For example, if it bothers you so much that there are black homosexuals in the FAA, you are certainly able to sue. Just please stop ranting about it here. |
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"Judah" wrote in message
. .. JohnSmith wrote in news:eaeRg.21555$eW5.17847 @bignews5.bellsouth.net: Incorrect. It is an issue. Fatigued controller working a double shift without proper rest combined with the FAA violating their own staffing orders at KLEX. Irrelevant. Taking off and landing safely is the pilot's responsibility. The presence or absence of a tower, a controller, or even a runway is irrelevant. Really? Then why bother having them? Of course the crew had primary responsibility, although the anomalies in airport markings and notices and layout will play a role, too. The point about the ATC role goes to redundancy, not the crew's actions. If the controller had been able to stick to just one of his two jobs, he might have noticed the errant takeoff and warned the crew. There was a fairly recent posting in one of the aviation groups of exactly the same incident - same airport, same runways confused by a regional airliner crew - 13 years ago. The crew and the controller caught it at about the same time. This time neither did, but the controller couldn't have caught it because by then he was engaged in other duties - the job that should have been performed by the second (required) controller. This is not to excuse the crew's oversight, but redundancy is an essential pillar of our safety system. It's prevented far, far more accidents than have occurred. Redundancy failures often are part of the chain of events that has to occur before you actually get an accident. The secret to airline safety's excellent record is identifying the links that can make up such a chain, and fixing or preventing them. It is a HUGE issue. The word is Liability. Look it up. In the US, anyone can sue anyone for anything with pretty much no risk. For example, if it bothers you so much that there are black homosexuals in the FAA, you are certainly able to sue. The FAA has been successfully sued as part of post-acciident liabilities, and we're not talking chump change, either. Furthermore, there are other "liabilities" involved - the PR and political price to be paid when an FAA screw-up results in an accident, expecially one with many fatalities. Just please stop ranting about it here. Safety isn't his agenda here. To blame this accident on an FAA "social engineering" program is like saying that the reason that Johnny can't read is because he had to listen to a classroom discussion of African-American history. He's using a legitimate safety issue as an excuse to plaster aviation newsgroups with racist crap. |
#3
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![]() "John Mazor" wrote in message ... Irrelevant. Taking off and landing safely is the pilot's responsibility. The presence or absence of a tower, a controller, or even a runway is irrelevant. Really? Then why bother having them? Controllers? For separation. Of course the crew had primary responsibility, although the anomalies in airport markings and notices and layout will play a role, too. Airport markings and notices and layout share responsibility with the crew? What airport markings, notices, or layout indicated that runway 26 was runway 22? The point about the ATC role goes to redundancy, not the crew's actions. If the controller had been able to stick to just one of his two jobs, he might have noticed the errant takeoff and warned the crew. There was a fairly recent posting in one of the aviation groups of exactly the same incident - same airport, same runways confused by a regional airliner crew - 13 years ago. The crew and the controller caught it at about the same time. This time neither did, but the controller couldn't have caught it because by then he was engaged in other duties - the job that should have been performed by the second (required) controller. The job that should have been performed by the second (required) controller was radar. Had that requirement been adhered to it wouldn't have guaranteed a second controller in the tower cab. This is not to excuse the crew's oversight, but redundancy is an essential pillar of our safety system. It's prevented far, far more accidents than have occurred. Redundancy failures often are part of the chain of events that has to occur before you actually get an accident. The secret to airline safety's excellent record is identifying the links that can make up such a chain, and fixing or preventing them. Two pilots were on duty in the cockpit, that didn't provide sufficient redundacy. |
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"Steven P. McNicoll" wrote in message
k.net... "John Mazor" wrote in message ... Irrelevant. Taking off and landing safely is the pilot's responsibility. The presence or absence of a tower, a controller, or even a runway is irrelevant. Really? Then why bother having them? Controllers? For separation. And the tower? Might they be perching controllers so high up, in windowed cabs, so they can see what's happening on the ground there? Such as airplanes deviating from their clearances? If not, you don't need a tower, any darkened room on the ground will do. Of course the crew had primary responsibility, although the anomalies in airport markings and notices and layout will play a role, too. Airport markings and notices and layout share responsibility with the crew? What airport markings, notices, or layout indicated that runway 26 was runway 22? Stephen, I'm not going to get out in front of the investigation. If you're truly interested in safety and not just in beating up on pilots, please follow it as it unfolds. Yes, confusing airport layout and markings and notices can play a role in an accident and may very well do so here. Meanwhile, ponder the significance of this portion of the probable cause statement in the 1990 runway collision in Detroit. Part of the accident chain was one of the crews becoming confused in low viz weather by a taxi intersection known colloquially to pilots as "spaghetti junction." CONTRIBUING TO CAUSE OF ACDNT WERE (1) DEFICIENCIES IN ATC SVCS PROVIDED BY DETROIT TWR, INCLUDING FAILURE OF GND CTLR TO TAKE TIMELY ACTN TO ALERT LCL CTLR TO PSBL RWY INCURSION, INADQT VIS OBS, FAILURE TO USE PROGRESSIVE TAXI INSTRNS IN LOW-VIS CONDS, & ISSUANCE OF INAPPROPRIATE & CONFUSING TAXI INSTRNS COMPOUNDED BY INADQ BACKUP SUPERVISION FOR LEVEL OF EXPERIENCE OF STAFF ON DUTY; (2) DEFICIENCIES IN SURFACE MARKINGS, SIGNAGE & LGTG AT ARPT & FAILURE OF FAA SURVEILLANCE TO DETECT OR CORRECT ANY OF THESE DEFICIENCIES; Not all of that applies here, but yes, airport and ATC issues can play a role in an accident. The intersection was closed and the taxiways were revamped after the accident. The point about the ATC role goes to redundancy, not the crew's actions. If the controller had been able to stick to just one of his two jobs, he might have noticed the errant takeoff and warned the crew. There was a fairly recent posting in one of the aviation groups of exactly the same incident - same airport, same runways confused by a regional airliner crew - 13 years ago. The crew and the controller caught it at about the same time. This time neither did, but the controller couldn't have caught it because by then he was engaged in other duties - the job that should have been performed by the second (required) controller. The job that should have been performed by the second (required) controller was radar. Had that requirement been adhered to it wouldn't have guaranteed a second controller in the tower cab. And what else, pray tell, would the controller who cleared the accident aircraft from the gate have been doing? Controlling and monitoring ground movement was his responsibiity - until he turned away to do another task that related to movement of aircraft in the air, not ground movement. There's no guarantee that he would have noticed the erroneous movement if he hadn't been required to turn to other tasks because of the lack of the second controller, but it's a pretty sure bet that once he turned from that area of responsibility (control and monitoring of ground movement), he wasn't going to notice anything happening on the runway. Thus, his potential role to provide redundancy and prevent an accident was negated by FAA's violation of its own staffing rules. This is not to excuse the crew's oversight, but redundancy is an essential pillar of our safety system. It's prevented far, far more accidents than have occurred. Redundancy failures often are part of the chain of events that has to occur before you actually get an accident. The secret to airline safety's excellent record is identifying the links that can make up such a chain, and fixing or preventing them. Two pilots were on duty in the cockpit, that didn't provide sufficient redundacy. That's exactly my point. What's yours? Care to guess how many times a day that two pilots (never mind just one) miss something and a warning system or a controller (that's all part of redundancy, you now) prevents a mishap? Get out your calculator, your fingers and toes aren't sufficient to the task. The system depends in part on redundancy to keep us all safe. When it fails, we're all less safe. You can't deny that the crew missed it, but is that as far as your understanding of aviation safety goes? "The crew screwed up, end of discussion"? |
#5
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John Mazor writes:
And the tower? Might they be perching controllers so high up, in windowed cabs, so they can see what's happening on the ground there? Such as airplanes deviating from their clearances? If not, you don't need a tower, any darkened room on the ground will do. The pilot-in-command is the final authority. The crash was the pilot's fault. There was nobody else around, except the copilot, and the PIC's decision is still final. The air regulations are a double-edged sword: if a competent pilot feels he needs to do something for the sake of safety, he can do it, no matter what anyone else says, and the regulations will protect him. However, if he's incompetent and screws up, he takes the full blame; it's not anyone else's responsibility to check up on him. Controllers function in an advisory capacity. The PIC can always deviate from a controller's instructions, if he deems it necessary. Meanwhile, ponder the significance of this portion of the probable cause statement in the 1990 runway collision in Detroit. Part of the accident chain was one of the crews becoming confused in low viz weather by a taxi intersection known colloquially to pilots as "spaghetti junction." CONTRIBUING TO CAUSE OF ACDNT WERE (1) DEFICIENCIES IN ATC SVCS PROVIDED BY DETROIT TWR, INCLUDING FAILURE OF GND CTLR TO TAKE TIMELY ACTN TO ALERT LCL CTLR TO PSBL RWY INCURSION, INADQT VIS OBS, FAILURE TO USE PROGRESSIVE TAXI INSTRNS IN LOW-VIS CONDS, & ISSUANCE OF INAPPROPRIATE & CONFUSING TAXI INSTRNS COMPOUNDED BY INADQ BACKUP SUPERVISION FOR LEVEL OF EXPERIENCE OF STAFF ON DUTY; (2) DEFICIENCIES IN SURFACE MARKINGS, SIGNAGE & LGTG AT ARPT & FAILURE OF FAA SURVEILLANCE TO DETECT OR CORRECT ANY OF THESE DEFICIENCIES; Not all of that applies here ... None of it applies here. ATC services were not deficient. No conflicting instructions were given. There were no other aircraft involved. And even on an unmarked grass strip, a competent pilot will still check his heading before he rolls. And what else, pray tell, would the controller who cleared the accident aircraft from the gate have been doing? He could be playing pool, and it would still be the sole responsibility of the pilot-in-command. That's the say the FARs work, and I think that's how they should work (it's inherited from maritime law). There's no guarantee that he would have noticed the erroneous movement if he hadn't been required to turn to other tasks because of the lack of the second controller, but it's a pretty sure bet that once he turned from that area of responsibility (control and monitoring of ground movement), he wasn't going to notice anything happening on the runway. Thus, his potential role to provide redundancy and prevent an accident was negated by FAA's violation of its own staffing rules. The PIC's negligence was so glaring in this case that any question of ATC is moot. It is not ATC's job to hold the hand of pilots. Care to guess how many times a day that two pilots (never mind just one) miss something and a warning system or a controller (that's all part of redundancy, you now) prevents a mishap? How many times? You can't deny that the crew missed it, but is that as far as your understanding of aviation safety goes? "The crew screwed up, end of discussion"? My understanding is that if you cannot trust the crew, nothing else matters. The buck stops in the left-hand seat. -- Transpose mxsmanic and gmail to reach me by e-mail. |
#6
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"Mxsmanic" wrote in message
... The air regulations are a double-edged sword: if a competent pilot feels he needs to do something for the sake of safety, he can do it, no matter what anyone else says, and the regulations will protect him. You're a funny guy! |
#7
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"Steve Foley" wrote in message
news:P%RRg.366$8U2.342@trndny08... "Mxsmanic" wrote in message ... The air regulations are a double-edged sword: if a competent pilot feels he needs to do something for the sake of safety, he can do it, no matter what anyone else says, and the regulations will protect him. You're a funny guy! I'd like to see how far he gets in defending himself against an FAA citation using that argument - "I can do anything I see fit as PIC for the safe operation of my aircraft, and the FARs protect me so you can't touch me." It is a starting point for a defense, but as we see, he is rather weak on where such discussions go after laying down a basic principle or two. Ditto on his simplistic, tunnel-vision view of aviation safety. |
#8
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![]() "Steve Foley" wrote in message news:P%RRg.366$8U2.342@trndny08... "Mxsmanic" wrote in message ... The air regulations are a double-edged sword: if a competent pilot feels he needs to do something for the sake of safety, he can do it, no matter what anyone else says, and the regulations will protect him. You're a funny guy! Stupid, but funny. |
#9
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![]() "Mxsmanic" wrote in message ... John Mazor writes: You can't deny that the crew missed it, but is that as far as your understanding of aviation safety goes? "The crew screwed up, end of discussion"? My understanding is that if you cannot trust the crew, nothing else matters. The buck stops in the left-hand seat. Then your understanding of how the aviation safety system works is woefully deficient. It starts there, but if it stopped there, then aviation still would be an extremely hazardous form of transportation. |
#10
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John Mazor writes:
It starts there, but if it stopped there, then aviation still would be an extremely hazardous form of transportation. It depends on who's sitting in the seat. And with some pilots, aviation still _is_ an extremely hazardous form of transportation. -- Transpose mxsmanic and gmail to reach me by e-mail. |
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