Another SR22

On Thu, 26 Oct 2006 16:56:50 -0500, "Gig 601XL Builder"
wrDOTgiaconaATcox.net wrote in :


Does the POH mention when it may be appropriate to deploy the 'chute?
I thought it was for use in spin recovery.


From the manual

[excerpt deleted]

Thank you.

What does the POH say about CAPS deployment for spin recovery?

"Larry Dighera" wrote in message
...
On Thu, 26 Oct 2006 16:56:50 -0500, "Gig 601XL Builder"
wrDOTgiaconaATcox.net wrote in :


Does the POH mention when it may be appropriate to deploy the 'chute?
I thought it was for use in spin recovery.


From the manual

[excerpt deleted]

Thank you.

What does the POH say about CAPS deployment for spin recovery?


You know Larry the URL for the manual was in the upstream post but since I
downloaded the whole book.

Spins

The SR22 is not approved for spins, and has not been tested or

certified for spin recovery characteristics. The only approved and

demonstrated method of spin recovery is activation of the Cirrus

Airframe Parachute System (See CAPS Deployment, this section).

Because of this, if the aircraft "departs controlled flight," the CAPS

must be deployed.

While the stall characteristics of the SR22 make accidental entry into a

spin extremely unlikely, it is possible. Spin entry can be avoided by

using good airmanship: coordinated use of controls in turns, proper

airspeed control following the recommendations of this Handbook, and

never abusing the flight controls with accelerated inputs when close to

the stall (see Stalls, Section 4).

If, at the stall, the controls are misapplied and abused accelerated

inputs are made to the elevator, rudder and/or ailerons, an abrupt wing

drop may be felt and a spiral or spin may be entered. In some cases it

may be difficult to determine if the aircraft has entered a spiral or the

beginning of a spin.

.. WARNING .

In all cases, if the aircraft enters an unusual attitude from

which recovery is not expected before ground impact,

immediate deployment of the CAPS is required.

The minimum demonstrated altitude loss for a CAPS

deployment from a one-turn spin is 920 feet. Activation at

higher altitudes provides enhanced safety margins for

parachute recoveries. Do not waste time and altitude trying to

recover from a spiral/spin before activating CAPS.

Inadvertent Spin Entry

1.
CAPS.............................................. ...................................
Activate

On Fri, 27 Oct 2006 08:36:26 -0500, "Gig 601XL Builder"
wrDOTgiaconaATcox.net wrote in :


"Larry Dighera" wrote in message
.. .
On Thu, 26 Oct 2006 16:56:50 -0500, "Gig 601XL Builder"
wrDOTgiaconaATcox.net wrote in :


Does the POH mention when it may be appropriate to deploy the 'chute?
I thought it was for use in spin recovery.


From the manual

[excerpt deleted]

Thank you.

What does the POH say about CAPS deployment for spin recovery?


You know Larry the URL for the manual was in the upstream post but since I
downloaded the whole book.

Thank you for the information.

Spins

The SR22 is not approved for spins, and has not been tested or

certified for spin recovery characteristics. The only approved and

demonstrated method of spin recovery is activation of the Cirrus

Airframe Parachute System (See CAPS Deployment, this section).

Because of this, if the aircraft "departs controlled flight," the CAPS

must be deployed.

While the stall characteristics of the SR22 make accidental entry into a

spin extremely unlikely, it is possible. Spin entry can be avoided by

using good airmanship: coordinated use of controls in turns, proper

airspeed control following the recommendations of this Handbook, and

never abusing the flight controls with accelerated inputs when close to

the stall (see Stalls, Section 4).

If, at the stall, the controls are misapplied and abused accelerated

inputs are made to the elevator, rudder and/or ailerons, an abrupt wing

drop may be felt and a spiral or spin may be entered. In some cases it

may be difficult to determine if the aircraft has entered a spiral or the

beginning of a spin.

. WARNING .

In all cases, if the aircraft enters an unusual attitude from

which recovery is not expected before ground impact,

immediate deployment of the CAPS is required.

The minimum demonstrated altitude loss for a CAPS

deployment from a one-turn spin is 920 feet. Activation at

higher altitudes provides enhanced safety margins for

parachute recoveries. Do not waste time and altitude trying to

recover from a spiral/spin before activating CAPS.

Inadvertent Spin Entry


That seems to confirm, that the CAPS was required to the meet spin
recovery requirements for FAA certification of the SR22.

But if the aircraft is below 1,000', the CAPS system is probably not
an option.

Thank you again for providing the SR22 POH quotes.

Larry,

But if the aircraft is below 1,000', the CAPS system is probably not
an option.


IF you are in a fully developed spin (1 full turn, as certification
requires and the handbook says), traditional spin recovery isn't an
option either at 1000 feet. There is a limit to altitude loss during
recovery to meet certification. The chute obviously qualifies.

--
Thomas Borchert (EDDH)

On Fri, 27 Oct 2006 16:06:45 +0200, Thomas Borchert
wrote in
:

Larry,

But if the aircraft is below 1,000', the CAPS system is probably not
an option.


IF you are in a fully developed spin (1 full turn, as certification
requires and the handbook says), traditional spin recovery isn't an
option either at 1000 feet. There is a limit to altitude loss during
recovery to meet certification. The chute obviously qualifies.

Obviously.

However, if you have, for example, an engine failure at 400' on
departure, the CAPS is not an option.

My point is, that CAPS is not an option at the times it's needed most:
below 920'. So to characterize the SR22 CAPS as a safety enhancement
(for other than spin recovery, and possibly a MAC, structural failure,
loss of control, and landing in inhospitable terrain, *if* they occur
above 920') is inappropriate. (And CAPS use for recovery in the event
of pilot incapacitation is a judgment call specific to the incident.)

Personally, I would characterize the SR22 CAPS solely as a
certification requirement for spin recovery, with limited utility in a
few other emergency situations, and certainly not as a "panic-button"
capable of rescuing the flight from all perils.

Larry,

However, if you have, for example, an engine failure at 400' on
departure, the CAPS is not an option.

How do you arrive at that conclusion?

My point is, that CAPS is not an option at the times it's needed most:
below 920'.

That's not what your own quote says. It says it is not an option if you
arrive at less than 920 feet after one full turn in a spin.

So to characterize the SR22 CAPS as a safety enhancement
(for other than spin recovery, and possibly a MAC, structural failure,
loss of control, and landing in inhospitable terrain, *if* they occur
above 920') is inappropriate.

Well, the people saved by it in different circumstances would probably
beg to differ.

--
Thomas Borchert (EDDH)

On Fri, 27 Oct 2006 17:18:30 +0200, Thomas Borchert
wrote in
:

Larry,

However, if you have, for example, an engine failure at 400' on
departure, the CAPS is not an option.

How do you arrive at that conclusion?

The way I read the quote from the SR22 POH, it requires 920' to fully
deploy the CAPS. Do you have information to the contrary?

My point is, that CAPS is not an option at the times it's needed most:
below 920'.

That's not what your own quote says. It says it is not an option if you
arrive at less than 920 feet after one full turn in a spin.

So you feel that less altitude would be required for full CAPS
deployment if the aircraft hadn't archived "one full turn in a spin?"
You'll have to cite some objective information that supports that
notion before I'll change my opinion from what is written in the SR22
POH.

So to characterize the SR22 CAPS as a safety enhancement
(for other than spin recovery, and possibly a MAC, structural failure,
loss of control, and landing in inhospitable terrain, *if* they occur
above 920') is inappropriate.

Well, the people saved by it in different circumstances would probably
beg to differ.

Are you able to provide any credible information about the
circumstances to which you refer?

Larry Dighera wrote:
However, if you have, for example, an engine failure at 400' on
departure, the CAPS is not an option.

My point is, that CAPS is not an option at the times it's needed most:
below 920'. So to characterize the SR22 CAPS as a safety enhancement
(for other than spin recovery, and possibly a MAC, structural failure,
loss of control, and landing in inhospitable terrain, *if* they occur
above 920') is inappropriate.

The Nall Report (NR) indicates the phase of flight with the most fatal
pilot-caused accidents (~78% of all fatal accidents) is during what it
calls "maneuvering" (~23%). Since the NR categorizes descent/approach,
landing, go-around, and takeoff/climb distinct from maneuvering, the
maneuvering category would appear to encompass flight regimes presumably at
pattern and cruise altitudes. I would presume then that CAPS would be a
viable option in a large fraction of these cases.

Looking at the way the NR categorizes pilot caused fatal accidents, it
seems to me that about half the categories are such that the fatalities
could in theory have been prevented with CAPS. So CAPS might have been
potentually life-saving in about 0.78*0.5 = ~40% of all fatal GA accidents.

The non-pilot caused accidents allegedly accounted for ~22% of accidents,
but the fraction that happened at altitudes sufficient for effective CAPS
deployment is unknown. Assuming SWAG of ~50% of those 22% happened at
altitudes high enough for CAPS use, then CAPS would be potentially life-
saving in ~11%.

So in theory if all GA craft were equipped with CAPS and pilots were
trained in their effective use, they might cut the number of fatalities in
GA accidents by roughly half.

On Fri, 27 Oct 2006 18:22:34 -0000, Jim Logajan
wrote in :

Larry Dighera wrote:
However, if you have, for example, an engine failure at 400' on
departure, the CAPS is not an option.

My point is, that CAPS is not an option at the times it's needed most:
below 920'. So to characterize the SR22 CAPS as a safety enhancement
(for other than spin recovery, and possibly a MAC, structural failure,
loss of control, and landing in inhospitable terrain, *if* they occur
above 920') is inappropriate.

The Nall Report (NR) indicates the phase of flight with the most fatal
pilot-caused accidents (~78% of all fatal accidents) is during what it
calls "maneuvering" (~23%). Since the NR categorizes descent/approach,
landing, go-around, and takeoff/climb distinct from maneuvering, the
maneuvering category would appear to encompass flight regimes presumably at
pattern and cruise altitudes. I would presume then that CAPS would be a
viable option in a large fraction of these cases.

Pattern altitude for light GA aircraft is typically 800' AGL, so it's
not clear that SR22 CAPS would fully deploy from that altitude. Even
at a 1,000' pattern altitude, the aircraft would likely be below 920'
before the PIC realized the necessity for deploying the SR22 CAPS.

What sort of maneuvering above 920' AGL would cause a fatal mishap,
other than a MAC?

Looking at the way the NR categorizes pilot caused fatal accidents, it
seems to me that about half the categories are such that the fatalities
could in theory have been prevented with CAPS.

So you feel that the PIC in those fatal accidents would have had
sufficient altitude to assess the nature of the emergency and decide
to deploy the CAPS with 920' feet to spare?

I'm having a difficult time thinking of what the cause of such
accidents might be. CFIT doesn't fit. I agree, that a MAC might
permit a pilot to deploy a CAPS, unless it was similar to November 16,
2000 C-172 vs F-16 MAC that disintegrated the pilot and his Skyhawk.

So CAPS might have been
potentually life-saving in about 0.78*0.5 = ~40% of all fatal GA accidents.

I'd have to know more about the nature of the criteria you used in
arriving at that conclusion before I'd accept it.

The non-pilot caused accidents allegedly accounted for ~22% of accidents,
but the fraction that happened at altitudes sufficient for effective CAPS
deployment is unknown. Assuming SWAG of ~50% of those 22% happened at
altitudes high enough for CAPS use, then CAPS would be potentially life-
saving in ~11%.

So in theory if all GA craft were equipped with CAPS and pilots were
trained in their effective use, they might cut the number of fatalities in
GA accidents by roughly half.

Only if one accepts your assumptions.

So in theory if all GA craft were equipped with CAPS and pilots were
trained in their effective use, they might cut the number of fatalities in
GA accidents by roughly half.

Maybe. But it costs weight and money. This means that, for the same
flight, the plane carries less gas, and this is the leading cause of
crashes. One could fly with more fuel stops, this increases the number
of landings and takeoffs (and low altitude flight). Since there's less
money, the airplane might be less well equipped, and the pilot might be
less well trained. This increases the risk too.

Everything comes from somewhere.

Jose
--
"Never trust anything that can think for itself, if you can't see where
it keeps its brain." (chapter 10 of book 3 - Harry Potter).
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