"F-35 Test Flight Deemed a Success"

On Mon, 01 Jan 2007 21:07:03 GMT, "Ski"
wrote:

Hit it right on the head Ed - the situation is unique and it got that way
because we went in blind on the wishes of the politicals and not with a good
plan - hence we are backed into a wall and bleeding for it. You caught on
also that there is no doctrine for this, hardly any proper terms and as CAS
was evolving to use the UAV's and the links the real situation on the ground
just up and ran over the thinking and then again the split between the USAF
and Army has not helped.

How would you tackle this - seriously with all respect - how would you put
this fire out or in the least what role would you see air power

First, recognize that asking a fighter pilot for an opinion is always
dangerous. Second, if the fighter pilot also teaches political science
and international relations, you're going to get nuance (i.e.
gobbledegook) and bias (i.e. bias.)

I'm a long distance outside of the area of operations and my picture
is provided by the left-stream media. I get some very positive
feedback through back-channel links to folks still in the business to
gain a bit of balance.

Let's start by stating my impression that the current hostilities are
predominantly sectarian between Shia and Sunni, with the US getting
nailed in the cross-fire and offering a convenient scapegoat for each
side to point at as the cause. Not a good situation.

Essential to the discussion is recognition of the need to acknowledge
majority rule--that means mostly Shia, unfortunately. Balance and
stability don't come without some compromise that guarantees input
from the Kurds and Sunni, but they want sovereignty in their
regions,not just a voice. Won't come easy, if at all.

Our role is to get security forces trained (to whatever minimum
standard is achievable) and then get out of the way. The underlying
principle is that eventually the population will tire of the fighting
and determine that their self-interest is better served by stability.
Don't know if that is possible given the Arab mentality.

For US operations model, I'd look to the Israeli. Build a strong intel
system, both national tech (i.e. hardware) and HUMINT (i.e. wetware).
Then stand off and apply the intel when required at points of
decision. That allows selective application of firepower without
getting your troops into indefensible and high vulnerability
situations like house-to-house urban fighting.

I'd get out of the patrolling business as much as possible and get
into the conflict response mode. Wait for a 911 call from the local
authorities before intervening. When major scale operations are
required, do it with precision and supported by a well-managed PR
campaign that clearly spells out that folks who allow insurgents to
live next door, hide in the basement or shoot from their roofs will be
subject to instant response. "We will not lie, cheat or steal--or
support jihadists, or TOLERATE AMONG US those who do..."

The important distinction is to mark that the military didn't lose any
war here--they went in, cleaned house and kicked ass. The current
"mission" is untraditional to say the least. If it fails, it isn't
because of DOD, but because of using the wrong tools for a
nation-building job. Yet, it is very much in our national interest to
try to establish stability and if possible a republican form of
government in the region.

See what you get when you ask?

Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
www.thunderchief.org
www.thundertales.blogspot.com

Ed , very well said - straight shooting and from the heart - thanks
I am working these issues and will carry these words with me - thanks again

Ski




"Ed Rasimus" wrote in message
...
On Mon, 01 Jan 2007 21:07:03 GMT, "Ski"
wrote:

Hit it right on the head Ed - the situation is unique and it got that way
because we went in blind on the wishes of the politicals and not with a
good
plan - hence we are backed into a wall and bleeding for it. You caught on
also that there is no doctrine for this, hardly any proper terms and as
CAS
was evolving to use the UAV's and the links the real situation on the
ground
just up and ran over the thinking and then again the split between the
USAF
and Army has not helped.

How would you tackle this - seriously with all respect - how would you put
this fire out or in the least what role would you see air power

First, recognize that asking a fighter pilot for an opinion is always
dangerous. Second, if the fighter pilot also teaches political science
and international relations, you're going to get nuance (i.e.
gobbledegook) and bias (i.e. bias.)

I'm a long distance outside of the area of operations and my picture
is provided by the left-stream media. I get some very positive
feedback through back-channel links to folks still in the business to
gain a bit of balance.

Let's start by stating my impression that the current hostilities are
predominantly sectarian between Shia and Sunni, with the US getting
nailed in the cross-fire and offering a convenient scapegoat for each
side to point at as the cause. Not a good situation.

Essential to the discussion is recognition of the need to acknowledge
majority rule--that means mostly Shia, unfortunately. Balance and
stability don't come without some compromise that guarantees input
from the Kurds and Sunni, but they want sovereignty in their
regions,not just a voice. Won't come easy, if at all.

Our role is to get security forces trained (to whatever minimum
standard is achievable) and then get out of the way. The underlying
principle is that eventually the population will tire of the fighting
and determine that their self-interest is better served by stability.
Don't know if that is possible given the Arab mentality.

For US operations model, I'd look to the Israeli. Build a strong intel
system, both national tech (i.e. hardware) and HUMINT (i.e. wetware).
Then stand off and apply the intel when required at points of
decision. That allows selective application of firepower without
getting your troops into indefensible and high vulnerability
situations like house-to-house urban fighting.

I'd get out of the patrolling business as much as possible and get
into the conflict response mode. Wait for a 911 call from the local
authorities before intervening. When major scale operations are
required, do it with precision and supported by a well-managed PR
campaign that clearly spells out that folks who allow insurgents to
live next door, hide in the basement or shoot from their roofs will be
subject to instant response. "We will not lie, cheat or steal--or
support jihadists, or TOLERATE AMONG US those who do..."

The important distinction is to mark that the military didn't lose any
war here--they went in, cleaned house and kicked ass. The current
"mission" is untraditional to say the least. If it fails, it isn't
because of DOD, but because of using the wrong tools for a
nation-building job. Yet, it is very much in our national interest to
try to establish stability and if possible a republican form of
government in the region.

See what you get when you ask?

Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
www.thunderchief.org
www.thundertales.blogspot.com

On Tue, 02 Jan 2007 15:52:29 GMT, Ed Rasimus
wrote:

[snip detailed & responsible analysis from Ed]

Jumping in unbidden to pick on a couple of points just to expose my
poor manners...

The important distinction is to mark that the military didn't lose any
war here--they went in, cleaned house and kicked ass.

True, but only in so far as the first stage of operations. The war
continues. The failure of the US forces (and British) to suppress the
insurgency and sectarian conflict, despite all the cultural and
operational factors outside their control, remains a failure. I think
it's explicable, and understandable, but still a failure to adapt to
changing operational conditions.

The current
"mission" is untraditional to say the least.

On the contrary, I'd say it's similar to several historical examples,
from the Philippines to numerous Latin American interventions, and
that's simply from within the context of US military history. The
supremacy of the US force's operational and technological capacity
doesn't mean that every situation can be resolved by the blind
application of that doctrinal conventional operational supremacy.

If it fails, it isn't
because of DOD, but because of using the wrong tools for a
nation-building job.

Ah, but the wrong tool (the DoD) was used for the nation-building job.
An ideological aversion to the term "nation-building" doesn't excuse
the DoD and military for failing to engage with the neccessity for
doing just that in order to win the war. At least to start with.

Yet, it is very much in our national interest to
try to establish stability and if possible a republican form of
government in the region.

See what you get when you ask?

Please do not resort to such blatant examples of responsible and
rational analysis in future. This is usenet; there are
commonly-accepted standards of random abuse and infantile posturing to
uphold.

Gavin Bailey

--
Now see message: "Boot sector corrupt. System halted. All data lost."
Spend thousands of dollar on top grade windows system. Result better
than expected. What your problem? - Bart Kwan En

On Thu, 04 Jan 2007 15:59:23 GMT, The Leslie Cheswick Soul Explosion
wrote:

On Tue, 02 Jan 2007 15:52:29 GMT, Ed Rasimus
wrote:

[snip detailed & responsible analysis from Ed]

Jumping in unbidden to pick on a couple of points just to expose my
poor manners...

The important distinction is to mark that the military didn't lose any
war here--they went in, cleaned house and kicked ass.

True, but only in so far as the first stage of operations. The war
continues. The failure of the US forces (and British) to suppress the
insurgency and sectarian conflict, despite all the cultural and
operational factors outside their control, remains a failure. I think
it's explicable, and understandable, but still a failure to adapt to
changing operational conditions.

If you are only happy by ascribing "failure" to the military
operation, far be it from me to disabuse you of the notion. We aren't
dealing here with changing operational conditions. This isn't fluidity
of a front or unforeseen maneuvering of enemy forces. It isn't
resistance efforts by an occupied nation to an imperialist force--it
is cultural, tribal and ethnic dissonance very similar to the Balkans.
Absent a unifying (and often oppressive) leader like Tito or even
Sadaam, the underlying animosity resurfaces and the national construct
fractures.

If there is a failure involved, it is very similar to the failure of
Vietnam for American foreign policy. That is, it is the failure to
recognize the culture and the historic background of the regional
strife. It is a tendency to ascribe Eurocentric values to Asian or
Middle-eastern people. Fundamentalist Muslims may never accept the
concept of Hobbesian rule by "consent of the governed" just as
Southeast Asians may never subjugate family and relationship to the
land to the dictates of the majority as expressed through an arguably
corrupt government.

The current
"mission" is untraditional to say the least.

On the contrary, I'd say it's similar to several historical examples,
from the Philippines to numerous Latin American interventions, and
that's simply from within the context of US military history. The
supremacy of the US force's operational and technological capacity
doesn't mean that every situation can be resolved by the blind
application of that doctrinal conventional operational supremacy.

Without applying a shotgun historical approach to your "examples" let
me simply suggest that neither the Philippines nor any recallable
Latin American involvements had the overlay of: 1.) three divergent
religious sects; 2.) an imposed national identity from British
colonial rule; 3.) thirty years of minority control under a
totalitarian, brutal dictatorship; 4) a distinct separatist movement
seeking national identity in a third of the nation; 5.) a dozen or
more competing warlords seeking ascendency to fill a perceived power
vacuum and 6.) a recent history of application of weapons of mass
destruction against national enemies and their own people.

I'd also be hard pressed to label the flexibility demonstrated by the
US military in approaches evolving from the collapse of the Soviet
Union into Desert Storm into Afghanistan into Iraqi Freedom into the
current referee for civil war and scapegoat role as "blind application
of that doctrinal conventional operational supremacy"--whatever that
means.

If it fails, it isn't
because of DOD, but because of using the wrong tools for a
nation-building job.

Ah, but the wrong tool (the DoD) was used for the nation-building job.
An ideological aversion to the term "nation-building" doesn't excuse
the DoD and military for failing to engage with the neccessity for
doing just that in order to win the war. At least to start with.

It isn't a case of ideological aversion. It is recognition of the fact
that the essential function of a military is to kill people and break
things--quicker and more efficiently than the opposition. Period.
"Everything else is rubbish"...B. M. vR

Yet, it is very much in our national interest to
try to establish stability and if possible a republican form of
government in the region.

See what you get when you ask?

Please do not resort to such blatant examples of responsible and
rational analysis in future. This is usenet; there are
commonly-accepted standards of random abuse and infantile posturing to
uphold.

Thanks...I needed that! ;-)



Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
www.thunderchief.org
www.thundertales.blogspot.com

On Thu, 04 Jan 2007 16:36:44 GMT, Ed Rasimus
wrote:

True, but only in so far as the first stage of operations. The war
continues. The failure of the US forces (and British) to suppress the
insurgency and sectarian conflict, despite all the cultural and
operational factors outside their control, remains a failure. I think
it's explicable, and understandable, but still a failure to adapt to
changing operational conditions.

If you are only happy by ascribing "failure" to the military
operation, far be it from me to disabuse you of the notion. We aren't
dealing here with changing operational conditions.

I'm afraid we are. The major watershed was the change from
conventional resistance to the US invasion to an insurgency against
"occupation". Subsequent changes have included the evolution of a
multi-agency insurgency (al Queda, Sunni nationalists, then Shia
militias), and then the speculation about training/supporting the
local forces to take the lead.

This isn't fluidity
of a front or unforeseen maneuvering of enemy forces.

If the maneuvering of insurgent forces could be foreseen at a minute
tactical level, the US would be able to defeat them. Until the next
crop of recruits continued the conflict days, weeks or months later.

The enemy has an operational and tactical advantage attained by
abusing the status of civilians and hiding amongst them both to
protect their heroic skins from US military action and to
hypocritically garner support when that action causes civilian
casualties.

It isn't
resistance efforts by an occupied nation to an imperialist force

Who said it was? Don't make the mistake of assuming that I accept the
axiomatic assumptions of "imperialist intervention" which pass for
understanding of the issue in some quarters.

--it
is cultural, tribal and ethnic dissonance very similar to the Balkans.

There is also a real, albeit fundamentally distorted perception of
fighting foreign occupiers, however. That this is rampantly
overstated by Arab prejudice and indoctrinated anti-Americanism
doesn't alter the fact that many insurgents and their supporters
sincerely believe it.

Absent a unifying (and often oppressive) leader like Tito or even
Sadaam, the underlying animosity resurfaces and the national construct
fractures.

Tito was a lot cleverer about masking Serb supremacy with some
pretensions at multi-ethnic window dressing, though. Saddam's
Tikriti-Sunni ascendency was a lot less subtle.

If there is a failure involved, it is very similar to the failure of
Vietnam for American foreign policy. That is, it is the failure to
recognize the culture and the historic background of the regional
strife.

I'd agree with that. It's not as if there are American commentators,
analysts and even some politicians who understand and understood this,
which is where I think there is some grounds for legitimate criticism
of the neo-con ideological approach to the issue. Dissenting views on
tactics were available, and not just from clueless goons in the media,
or unthinking and reflexive anti-war narcissists.

It is a tendency to ascribe Eurocentric values to Asian or
Middle-eastern people. Fundamentalist Muslims may never accept the
concept of Hobbesian rule by "consent of the governed" just as
Southeast Asians may never subjugate family and relationship to the
land to the dictates of the majority as expressed through an arguably
corrupt government.

All true, nonetheless ideological allies (Vietnamese who genuinely
opposed communism/Iraqis who genuinely desire democracy) do exist
amongst the murkier sectarian, ethnic and class divisions. And the
issue isn't about the existance of these other competing loyalties,
but the extent of them and how to 'shape the battlefield' to minimise
the conflicts between 'tribalism' and 'progressive democracy'.

On the contrary, I'd say it's similar to several historical examples,
from the Philippines to numerous Latin American interventions, and
that's simply from within the context of US military history. The
supremacy of the US force's operational and technological capacity
doesn't mean that every situation can be resolved by the blind
application of that doctrinal conventional operational supremacy.

Without applying a shotgun historical approach to your "examples" let
me simply suggest that neither the Philippines nor any recallable
Latin American involvements had the overlay of: 1.) three divergent
religious sects;

Only two of which are fundamentally relevant, and which have numerous
fractures within the sects concerned. SCIRI, for example, are not
identical with Sadr's militia. The larger Sunni/Shia split parallels
the catholic/islamic split in the Philippines.

2.) an imposed national identity from British
colonial rule

Instead they got if from Spanish and American colonial rule. Sorry,
but I don't see this as a critical difference.

; 3.) thirty years of minority control under a
totalitarian, brutal dictatorship;

Yet the divisions in place now reflect the situation in the 1920's
Iraqi revolt, absent maybe the socialist pretensions of the rump
B'aathists. I'd certainly accept that thirty years of B'aathism and
Saddam made things much worse and with more potential for conflict.

4) a distinct separatist movement
seeking national identity in a third of the nation;

There have certainly been seperatists in the Philippines, most notably
the Moros.

5.) a dozen or
more competing warlords seeking ascendency to fill a perceived power
vacuum

This has been de rigeur everywhere historically, but particularly over
much of Asia in the post-colonial era.

and 6.) a recent history of application of weapons of mass
destruction against national enemies and their own people.

That's certainly unique to Iraq, but even then hasn't been of much
relevance to the situation now. The Kurds would still hate Saddam and
distrust Sunni rule without Hallabjah. The Iranians don't need the
victims of chemical attacks to produce casualties suffered by Iraqi
aggresson under Saddam by the same token.

I'd also be hard pressed to label the flexibility demonstrated by the
US military in approaches evolving from the collapse of the Soviet
Union into Desert Storm into Afghanistan into Iraqi Freedom into the
current referee for civil war and scapegoat role as "blind application
of that doctrinal conventional operational supremacy"--whatever that
means.

It means winning against a uniformed enemy without comprehending that
this does not conclude the conflict. The US has plenty of experience
in dealing with insurgencies, and plenty of innovative, thinking
leaders with excellent practical and educational experience. Some
(but not all) of the problems the US forces have faced in Iraq have
been due to the use of counter-productive and innappropriate tactics.
Most of these stem from the early stage of the insurgency, where some
commanders, and certainly the DoD, were reluctant to admit that they
were even facing such a beast, let alone embrace the concept of
modifying tactics and operational strategy to beat it.

Ah, but the wrong tool (the DoD) was used for the nation-building job.
An ideological aversion to the term "nation-building" doesn't excuse
the DoD and military for failing to engage with the neccessity for
doing just that in order to win the war. At least to start with.

It isn't a case of ideological aversion.

It certainly was under Rumsfeld and the "we don't do occupations"-era
Pentagon.

It is recognition of the fact
that the essential function of a military is to kill people and break
things--quicker and more efficiently than the opposition. Period.
"Everything else is rubbish"...B. M. vR

The problem with this is when this approach conflicts with winning the
war. Either you change approach or admit that inflexible operational
doctrine trumps the achievement of strategic aims. Building a
military machine that could destroy the NVA or VC in almost any battle
it chose did not win the Vietnam war.

Please do not resort to such blatant examples of responsible and
rational analysis in future. This is usenet; there are
commonly-accepted standards of random abuse and infantile posturing to
uphold.

Thanks...I needed that! ;-)

I note the lack of personal abuse in this followup. Have you no
shame?

Gavin Bailey

--
Now see message: "Boot sector corrupt. System halted. All data lost."
Spend thousands of dollar on top grade windows system. Result better
than expected. What your problem? - Bart Kwan En

On Thu, 04 Jan 2007 18:19:49 GMT, The Leslie Cheswick Soul Explosion
wrote:

On Thu, 04 Jan 2007 16:36:44 GMT, Ed Rasimus
wrote:



Please do not resort to such blatant examples of responsible and
rational analysis in future. This is usenet; there are
commonly-accepted standards of random abuse and infantile posturing to
uphold.

Thanks...I needed that! ;-)

I note the lack of personal abuse in this followup. Have you no
shame?

Gavin Bailey

I think you're singing bass and I'm singing tenor in the same choir.


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
www.thunderchief.org
www.thundertales.blogspot.com

On Thu, 04 Jan 2007 18:55:08 GMT, Ed Rasimus
wrote:

I think you're singing bass and I'm singing tenor in the same choir.

I think you're missing an opportunity to reduce a constructive thread
to the normal level of usenet discourse.

Be that as it may, I would still differ on the importance of
patrolling. Reducing the visibility of the uniformed army on the
ground serves a valid purpose in reducing the 'occupier' propaganda
dynamic, but some level of patrolling is still required - covert and
overt - to maintain some independent contact with the community.

Without that, there won't be the level of intelligence required for
checking that the Iraqi forces are operating efficiently or even the
level of intelligence required to effectively use precision heavy
weaponry which is sometimes required. I'm strongly in favour of
'minimum force' to reduce the asymmetric propaganda dynamic, but I
have to say bombing Zarqawi accurately from the air is a better
alternative to going though the door (or window, or wall) on foot,
always provided the intelligence is sufficiently accurate.

It will be a while (of ever) before the Iraqi forces can get to the
required level of operational proficiency, and they certainly won't be
delivering PGM attacks any time soon, so I personally see a valid role
for air strikes (in limited numbers) and therefore a USAF presence to
deliver them for some time to come.

Gavin Bailey

--
Now see message: "Boot sector corrupt. System halted. All data lost."
Spend thousands of dollar on top grade windows system. Result better
than expected. What your problem? - Bart Kwan En

In a insurgency where the enemy is running generally inside your ability to
react (OODA Loop) - could be seconds instead of minutes - I think there
should be a general rule or baseline for conduct of operations. That is
that no unit, small or large, that goes outside of their safe-zone, goes
without a suitable "eye-in-the-sky" that can provide both day and night
early warning, persistent surveillance, and near instant ability to either
call in or provide weapons on target. If we simply had that - and after
billions spent needlessly it is not a big order - many lives could be saved
and many IED and ambush type situations would be thwarted and many escaping
bad guys would be dealt with. Only by having a "hammer" to react to being
fired upon first (unfortunate general situation for the friendlies in an
insurgency) can the friendlies retain anything like an offensive advantage



"The Leslie Cheswick Soul Explosion"
wrote in message ...
On Thu, 04 Jan 2007 18:55:08 GMT, Ed Rasimus
wrote:

I think you're singing bass and I'm singing tenor in the same choir.

I think you're missing an opportunity to reduce a constructive thread
to the normal level of usenet discourse.

Be that as it may, I would still differ on the importance of
patrolling. Reducing the visibility of the uniformed army on the
ground serves a valid purpose in reducing the 'occupier' propaganda
dynamic, but some level of patrolling is still required - covert and
overt - to maintain some independent contact with the community.

Without that, there won't be the level of intelligence required for
checking that the Iraqi forces are operating efficiently or even the
level of intelligence required to effectively use precision heavy
weaponry which is sometimes required. I'm strongly in favour of
'minimum force' to reduce the asymmetric propaganda dynamic, but I
have to say bombing Zarqawi accurately from the air is a better
alternative to going though the door (or window, or wall) on foot,
always provided the intelligence is sufficiently accurate.

It will be a while (of ever) before the Iraqi forces can get to the
required level of operational proficiency, and they certainly won't be
delivering PGM attacks any time soon, so I personally see a valid role
for air strikes (in limited numbers) and therefore a USAF presence to
deliver them for some time to come.

Gavin Bailey

--
Now see message: "Boot sector corrupt. System halted. All data lost."
Spend thousands of dollar on top grade windows system. Result better
than expected. What your problem? - Bart Kwan En

On Thu, 04 Jan 2007 23:09:40 GMT, The Leslie Cheswick Soul Explosion
wrote:

On Thu, 04 Jan 2007 18:55:08 GMT, Ed Rasimus
wrote:

I think you're singing bass and I'm singing tenor in the same choir.

I think you're missing an opportunity to reduce a constructive thread
to the normal level of usenet discourse.

It's a curse, I know.

Be that as it may, I would still differ on the importance of
patrolling. Reducing the visibility of the uniformed army on the
ground serves a valid purpose in reducing the 'occupier' propaganda
dynamic, but some level of patrolling is still required - covert and
overt - to maintain some independent contact with the community.

Without that, there won't be the level of intelligence required for
checking that the Iraqi forces are operating efficiently or even the
level of intelligence required to effectively use precision heavy
weaponry which is sometimes required.

I agree with your premise, but the model I'd go with would eliminate
US unit patrolling. As I suggested, the unit-level involvement
scenario would be on-call response to Iraqi security forces or intel.

The idea would be the classic Special Forces model. "Advisors"
embedded in national units. They keep the local force honest
(hopefully), correct errors in training, gain insight into community
relations/intel, and provide feedback to HHQ on progress. It reduces
external force visibility and hence the opportunity to use the
"occupier" propaganda against us.

I'm strongly in favour of
'minimum force' to reduce the asymmetric propaganda dynamic, but I
have to say bombing Zarqawi accurately from the air is a better
alternative to going though the door (or window, or wall) on foot,
always provided the intelligence is sufficiently accurate.

No doubt about it.

It will be a while (of ever) before the Iraqi forces can get to the
required level of operational proficiency, and they certainly won't be
delivering PGM attacks any time soon, so I personally see a valid role
for air strikes (in limited numbers) and therefore a USAF presence to
deliver them for some time to come.

Good point. But the essence of the tactic is that the front end,
visible security force is national not foreign. Where the indirect
fire support comes from is not readily apparent. (You could even mount
a disinformation campaign to deflect responsibility to newly
reconstituted Iraqi units....)

Gavin Bailey

Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
www.thunderchief.org
www.thundertales.blogspot.com