"F-35 Test Flight Deemed a Success"

On Thu, 04 Jan 2007 15:59:23 GMT, The Leslie Cheswick Soul Explosion
wrote:

On Tue, 02 Jan 2007 15:52:29 GMT, Ed Rasimus
wrote:

[snip detailed & responsible analysis from Ed]

Jumping in unbidden to pick on a couple of points just to expose my
poor manners...

The important distinction is to mark that the military didn't lose any
war here--they went in, cleaned house and kicked ass.

True, but only in so far as the first stage of operations. The war
continues. The failure of the US forces (and British) to suppress the
insurgency and sectarian conflict, despite all the cultural and
operational factors outside their control, remains a failure. I think
it's explicable, and understandable, but still a failure to adapt to
changing operational conditions.

If you are only happy by ascribing "failure" to the military
operation, far be it from me to disabuse you of the notion. We aren't
dealing here with changing operational conditions. This isn't fluidity
of a front or unforeseen maneuvering of enemy forces. It isn't
resistance efforts by an occupied nation to an imperialist force--it
is cultural, tribal and ethnic dissonance very similar to the Balkans.
Absent a unifying (and often oppressive) leader like Tito or even
Sadaam, the underlying animosity resurfaces and the national construct
fractures.

If there is a failure involved, it is very similar to the failure of
Vietnam for American foreign policy. That is, it is the failure to
recognize the culture and the historic background of the regional
strife. It is a tendency to ascribe Eurocentric values to Asian or
Middle-eastern people. Fundamentalist Muslims may never accept the
concept of Hobbesian rule by "consent of the governed" just as
Southeast Asians may never subjugate family and relationship to the
land to the dictates of the majority as expressed through an arguably
corrupt government.

The current
"mission" is untraditional to say the least.

On the contrary, I'd say it's similar to several historical examples,
from the Philippines to numerous Latin American interventions, and
that's simply from within the context of US military history. The
supremacy of the US force's operational and technological capacity
doesn't mean that every situation can be resolved by the blind
application of that doctrinal conventional operational supremacy.

Without applying a shotgun historical approach to your "examples" let
me simply suggest that neither the Philippines nor any recallable
Latin American involvements had the overlay of: 1.) three divergent
religious sects; 2.) an imposed national identity from British
colonial rule; 3.) thirty years of minority control under a
totalitarian, brutal dictatorship; 4) a distinct separatist movement
seeking national identity in a third of the nation; 5.) a dozen or
more competing warlords seeking ascendency to fill a perceived power
vacuum and 6.) a recent history of application of weapons of mass
destruction against national enemies and their own people.

I'd also be hard pressed to label the flexibility demonstrated by the
US military in approaches evolving from the collapse of the Soviet
Union into Desert Storm into Afghanistan into Iraqi Freedom into the
current referee for civil war and scapegoat role as "blind application
of that doctrinal conventional operational supremacy"--whatever that
means.

If it fails, it isn't
because of DOD, but because of using the wrong tools for a
nation-building job.

Ah, but the wrong tool (the DoD) was used for the nation-building job.
An ideological aversion to the term "nation-building" doesn't excuse
the DoD and military for failing to engage with the neccessity for
doing just that in order to win the war. At least to start with.

It isn't a case of ideological aversion. It is recognition of the fact
that the essential function of a military is to kill people and break
things--quicker and more efficiently than the opposition. Period.
"Everything else is rubbish"...B. M. vR

Yet, it is very much in our national interest to
try to establish stability and if possible a republican form of
government in the region.

See what you get when you ask?

Please do not resort to such blatant examples of responsible and
rational analysis in future. This is usenet; there are
commonly-accepted standards of random abuse and infantile posturing to
uphold.

Thanks...I needed that! ;-)



Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
www.thunderchief.org
www.thundertales.blogspot.com

On Thu, 04 Jan 2007 16:36:44 GMT, Ed Rasimus
wrote:

True, but only in so far as the first stage of operations. The war
continues. The failure of the US forces (and British) to suppress the
insurgency and sectarian conflict, despite all the cultural and
operational factors outside their control, remains a failure. I think
it's explicable, and understandable, but still a failure to adapt to
changing operational conditions.

If you are only happy by ascribing "failure" to the military
operation, far be it from me to disabuse you of the notion. We aren't
dealing here with changing operational conditions.

I'm afraid we are. The major watershed was the change from
conventional resistance to the US invasion to an insurgency against
"occupation". Subsequent changes have included the evolution of a
multi-agency insurgency (al Queda, Sunni nationalists, then Shia
militias), and then the speculation about training/supporting the
local forces to take the lead.

This isn't fluidity
of a front or unforeseen maneuvering of enemy forces.

If the maneuvering of insurgent forces could be foreseen at a minute
tactical level, the US would be able to defeat them. Until the next
crop of recruits continued the conflict days, weeks or months later.

The enemy has an operational and tactical advantage attained by
abusing the status of civilians and hiding amongst them both to
protect their heroic skins from US military action and to
hypocritically garner support when that action causes civilian
casualties.

It isn't
resistance efforts by an occupied nation to an imperialist force

Who said it was? Don't make the mistake of assuming that I accept the
axiomatic assumptions of "imperialist intervention" which pass for
understanding of the issue in some quarters.

--it
is cultural, tribal and ethnic dissonance very similar to the Balkans.

There is also a real, albeit fundamentally distorted perception of
fighting foreign occupiers, however. That this is rampantly
overstated by Arab prejudice and indoctrinated anti-Americanism
doesn't alter the fact that many insurgents and their supporters
sincerely believe it.

Absent a unifying (and often oppressive) leader like Tito or even
Sadaam, the underlying animosity resurfaces and the national construct
fractures.

Tito was a lot cleverer about masking Serb supremacy with some
pretensions at multi-ethnic window dressing, though. Saddam's
Tikriti-Sunni ascendency was a lot less subtle.

If there is a failure involved, it is very similar to the failure of
Vietnam for American foreign policy. That is, it is the failure to
recognize the culture and the historic background of the regional
strife.

I'd agree with that. It's not as if there are American commentators,
analysts and even some politicians who understand and understood this,
which is where I think there is some grounds for legitimate criticism
of the neo-con ideological approach to the issue. Dissenting views on
tactics were available, and not just from clueless goons in the media,
or unthinking and reflexive anti-war narcissists.

It is a tendency to ascribe Eurocentric values to Asian or
Middle-eastern people. Fundamentalist Muslims may never accept the
concept of Hobbesian rule by "consent of the governed" just as
Southeast Asians may never subjugate family and relationship to the
land to the dictates of the majority as expressed through an arguably
corrupt government.

All true, nonetheless ideological allies (Vietnamese who genuinely
opposed communism/Iraqis who genuinely desire democracy) do exist
amongst the murkier sectarian, ethnic and class divisions. And the
issue isn't about the existance of these other competing loyalties,
but the extent of them and how to 'shape the battlefield' to minimise
the conflicts between 'tribalism' and 'progressive democracy'.

On the contrary, I'd say it's similar to several historical examples,
from the Philippines to numerous Latin American interventions, and
that's simply from within the context of US military history. The
supremacy of the US force's operational and technological capacity
doesn't mean that every situation can be resolved by the blind
application of that doctrinal conventional operational supremacy.

Without applying a shotgun historical approach to your "examples" let
me simply suggest that neither the Philippines nor any recallable
Latin American involvements had the overlay of: 1.) three divergent
religious sects;

Only two of which are fundamentally relevant, and which have numerous
fractures within the sects concerned. SCIRI, for example, are not
identical with Sadr's militia. The larger Sunni/Shia split parallels
the catholic/islamic split in the Philippines.

2.) an imposed national identity from British
colonial rule

Instead they got if from Spanish and American colonial rule. Sorry,
but I don't see this as a critical difference.

; 3.) thirty years of minority control under a
totalitarian, brutal dictatorship;

Yet the divisions in place now reflect the situation in the 1920's
Iraqi revolt, absent maybe the socialist pretensions of the rump
B'aathists. I'd certainly accept that thirty years of B'aathism and
Saddam made things much worse and with more potential for conflict.

4) a distinct separatist movement
seeking national identity in a third of the nation;

There have certainly been seperatists in the Philippines, most notably
the Moros.

5.) a dozen or
more competing warlords seeking ascendency to fill a perceived power
vacuum

This has been de rigeur everywhere historically, but particularly over
much of Asia in the post-colonial era.

and 6.) a recent history of application of weapons of mass
destruction against national enemies and their own people.

That's certainly unique to Iraq, but even then hasn't been of much
relevance to the situation now. The Kurds would still hate Saddam and
distrust Sunni rule without Hallabjah. The Iranians don't need the
victims of chemical attacks to produce casualties suffered by Iraqi
aggresson under Saddam by the same token.

I'd also be hard pressed to label the flexibility demonstrated by the
US military in approaches evolving from the collapse of the Soviet
Union into Desert Storm into Afghanistan into Iraqi Freedom into the
current referee for civil war and scapegoat role as "blind application
of that doctrinal conventional operational supremacy"--whatever that
means.

It means winning against a uniformed enemy without comprehending that
this does not conclude the conflict. The US has plenty of experience
in dealing with insurgencies, and plenty of innovative, thinking
leaders with excellent practical and educational experience. Some
(but not all) of the problems the US forces have faced in Iraq have
been due to the use of counter-productive and innappropriate tactics.
Most of these stem from the early stage of the insurgency, where some
commanders, and certainly the DoD, were reluctant to admit that they
were even facing such a beast, let alone embrace the concept of
modifying tactics and operational strategy to beat it.

Ah, but the wrong tool (the DoD) was used for the nation-building job.
An ideological aversion to the term "nation-building" doesn't excuse
the DoD and military for failing to engage with the neccessity for
doing just that in order to win the war. At least to start with.

It isn't a case of ideological aversion.

It certainly was under Rumsfeld and the "we don't do occupations"-era
Pentagon.

It is recognition of the fact
that the essential function of a military is to kill people and break
things--quicker and more efficiently than the opposition. Period.
"Everything else is rubbish"...B. M. vR

The problem with this is when this approach conflicts with winning the
war. Either you change approach or admit that inflexible operational
doctrine trumps the achievement of strategic aims. Building a
military machine that could destroy the NVA or VC in almost any battle
it chose did not win the Vietnam war.

Please do not resort to such blatant examples of responsible and
rational analysis in future. This is usenet; there are
commonly-accepted standards of random abuse and infantile posturing to
uphold.

Thanks...I needed that! ;-)

I note the lack of personal abuse in this followup. Have you no
shame?

Gavin Bailey

--
Now see message: "Boot sector corrupt. System halted. All data lost."
Spend thousands of dollar on top grade windows system. Result better
than expected. What your problem? - Bart Kwan En

On Thu, 04 Jan 2007 18:19:49 GMT, The Leslie Cheswick Soul Explosion
wrote:

On Thu, 04 Jan 2007 16:36:44 GMT, Ed Rasimus
wrote:



Please do not resort to such blatant examples of responsible and
rational analysis in future. This is usenet; there are
commonly-accepted standards of random abuse and infantile posturing to
uphold.

Thanks...I needed that! ;-)

I note the lack of personal abuse in this followup. Have you no
shame?

Gavin Bailey

I think you're singing bass and I'm singing tenor in the same choir.


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
www.thunderchief.org
www.thundertales.blogspot.com

On Thu, 04 Jan 2007 18:55:08 GMT, Ed Rasimus
wrote:

I think you're singing bass and I'm singing tenor in the same choir.

I think you're missing an opportunity to reduce a constructive thread
to the normal level of usenet discourse.

Be that as it may, I would still differ on the importance of
patrolling. Reducing the visibility of the uniformed army on the
ground serves a valid purpose in reducing the 'occupier' propaganda
dynamic, but some level of patrolling is still required - covert and
overt - to maintain some independent contact with the community.

Without that, there won't be the level of intelligence required for
checking that the Iraqi forces are operating efficiently or even the
level of intelligence required to effectively use precision heavy
weaponry which is sometimes required. I'm strongly in favour of
'minimum force' to reduce the asymmetric propaganda dynamic, but I
have to say bombing Zarqawi accurately from the air is a better
alternative to going though the door (or window, or wall) on foot,
always provided the intelligence is sufficiently accurate.

It will be a while (of ever) before the Iraqi forces can get to the
required level of operational proficiency, and they certainly won't be
delivering PGM attacks any time soon, so I personally see a valid role
for air strikes (in limited numbers) and therefore a USAF presence to
deliver them for some time to come.

Gavin Bailey

--
Now see message: "Boot sector corrupt. System halted. All data lost."
Spend thousands of dollar on top grade windows system. Result better
than expected. What your problem? - Bart Kwan En

In a insurgency where the enemy is running generally inside your ability to
react (OODA Loop) - could be seconds instead of minutes - I think there
should be a general rule or baseline for conduct of operations. That is
that no unit, small or large, that goes outside of their safe-zone, goes
without a suitable "eye-in-the-sky" that can provide both day and night
early warning, persistent surveillance, and near instant ability to either
call in or provide weapons on target. If we simply had that - and after
billions spent needlessly it is not a big order - many lives could be saved
and many IED and ambush type situations would be thwarted and many escaping
bad guys would be dealt with. Only by having a "hammer" to react to being
fired upon first (unfortunate general situation for the friendlies in an
insurgency) can the friendlies retain anything like an offensive advantage



"The Leslie Cheswick Soul Explosion"
wrote in message ...
On Thu, 04 Jan 2007 18:55:08 GMT, Ed Rasimus
wrote:

I think you're singing bass and I'm singing tenor in the same choir.

I think you're missing an opportunity to reduce a constructive thread
to the normal level of usenet discourse.

Be that as it may, I would still differ on the importance of
patrolling. Reducing the visibility of the uniformed army on the
ground serves a valid purpose in reducing the 'occupier' propaganda
dynamic, but some level of patrolling is still required - covert and
overt - to maintain some independent contact with the community.

Without that, there won't be the level of intelligence required for
checking that the Iraqi forces are operating efficiently or even the
level of intelligence required to effectively use precision heavy
weaponry which is sometimes required. I'm strongly in favour of
'minimum force' to reduce the asymmetric propaganda dynamic, but I
have to say bombing Zarqawi accurately from the air is a better
alternative to going though the door (or window, or wall) on foot,
always provided the intelligence is sufficiently accurate.

It will be a while (of ever) before the Iraqi forces can get to the
required level of operational proficiency, and they certainly won't be
delivering PGM attacks any time soon, so I personally see a valid role
for air strikes (in limited numbers) and therefore a USAF presence to
deliver them for some time to come.

Gavin Bailey

--
Now see message: "Boot sector corrupt. System halted. All data lost."
Spend thousands of dollar on top grade windows system. Result better
than expected. What your problem? - Bart Kwan En

On Fri, 05 Jan 2007 04:44:44 GMT, "Ski"
wrote:

In a insurgency where the enemy is running generally inside your ability to
react (OODA Loop) - could be seconds instead of minutes - I think there
should be a general rule or baseline for conduct of operations. That is
that no unit, small or large, that goes outside of their safe-zone, goes
without a suitable "eye-in-the-sky" that can provide both day and night
early warning, persistent surveillance, and near instant ability to either
call in or provide weapons on target. If we simply had that - and after
billions spent needlessly it is not a big order - many lives could be saved
and many IED and ambush type situations would be thwarted and many escaping
bad guys would be dealt with. Only by having a "hammer" to react to being
fired upon first (unfortunate general situation for the friendlies in an
insurgency) can the friendlies retain anything like an offensive advantage

Having aerial recce makes a difference, and having efficient CAS
within reach can be a life-saver. However, the insurgents are
incorporated in the local population, and will be feeding off accounts
of US activity when the helicopters can be heard, and even observing
aircraft movements in some cases.

One of the primary tactics in this sort of situation is to be prepared
to use small infantry patrols, planned, routed and operated with
skill, to provide observation without the insurgents and locals
knowing that they are around. This is exceptionally difficult in some
areas in Iraq, but not all of them. Paradoxically, the more
technological resources you deploy to secure them (AFVs, aircraft,
etc), the harder it is to make that kind of basic operation
successful.

I suppose it all comes down to using the appropriate tactic in the
appropriate context; doctrinaire responses to the situation - of all
kinds, including "no CAS" or "no artillery", as well as "maximal
forece protection" - will tend to prove inefficient. My view is that
anything beyond a specific and discriminate use of air power risks
counter-productive results, while aerial recce complements
ground-based observation and visa versa.

Gavin Bailey


--
Now see message: "Boot sector corrupt. System halted. All data lost."
Spend thousands of dollar on top grade windows system. Result better
than expected. What your problem? - Bart Kwan En

On Thu, 04 Jan 2007 23:09:40 GMT, The Leslie Cheswick Soul Explosion
wrote:

On Thu, 04 Jan 2007 18:55:08 GMT, Ed Rasimus
wrote:

I think you're singing bass and I'm singing tenor in the same choir.

I think you're missing an opportunity to reduce a constructive thread
to the normal level of usenet discourse.

It's a curse, I know.

Be that as it may, I would still differ on the importance of
patrolling. Reducing the visibility of the uniformed army on the
ground serves a valid purpose in reducing the 'occupier' propaganda
dynamic, but some level of patrolling is still required - covert and
overt - to maintain some independent contact with the community.

Without that, there won't be the level of intelligence required for
checking that the Iraqi forces are operating efficiently or even the
level of intelligence required to effectively use precision heavy
weaponry which is sometimes required.

I agree with your premise, but the model I'd go with would eliminate
US unit patrolling. As I suggested, the unit-level involvement
scenario would be on-call response to Iraqi security forces or intel.

The idea would be the classic Special Forces model. "Advisors"
embedded in national units. They keep the local force honest
(hopefully), correct errors in training, gain insight into community
relations/intel, and provide feedback to HHQ on progress. It reduces
external force visibility and hence the opportunity to use the
"occupier" propaganda against us.

I'm strongly in favour of
'minimum force' to reduce the asymmetric propaganda dynamic, but I
have to say bombing Zarqawi accurately from the air is a better
alternative to going though the door (or window, or wall) on foot,
always provided the intelligence is sufficiently accurate.

No doubt about it.

It will be a while (of ever) before the Iraqi forces can get to the
required level of operational proficiency, and they certainly won't be
delivering PGM attacks any time soon, so I personally see a valid role
for air strikes (in limited numbers) and therefore a USAF presence to
deliver them for some time to come.

Good point. But the essence of the tactic is that the front end,
visible security force is national not foreign. Where the indirect
fire support comes from is not readily apparent. (You could even mount
a disinformation campaign to deflect responsibility to newly
reconstituted Iraqi units....)

Gavin Bailey

Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
www.thunderchief.org
www.thundertales.blogspot.com

On Fri, 05 Jan 2007 15:38:12 GMT, Ed Rasimus
wrote:

The idea would be the classic Special Forces model. "Advisors"
embedded in national units. They keep the local force honest
(hopefully), correct errors in training, gain insight into community
relations/intel, and provide feedback to HHQ on progress. It reduces
external force visibility and hence the opportunity to use the
"occupier" propaganda against us.

I'd argue for both - the major effort being special forces intermixed
with Iraqi units as advisors (and even leaders, given the customary
standard of Arab military leadership) with those Iraqi units as the
most visible end of the force. However, I still think there's a
powerful case for US units to be partnered up with the best Iraqi ones
to provide a localised presence in certain areas and under certain
conditions, mostly because I don't think there's enough Special Forces
available to do the job required, and the Iraqis aren't at the point
where they can handle substantial stand-up combat outside their base
areas yet.

I'm strongly in favour of
'minimum force' to reduce the asymmetric propaganda dynamic, but I
have to say bombing Zarqawi accurately from the air is a better
alternative to going though the door (or window, or wall) on foot,
always provided the intelligence is sufficiently accurate.

No doubt about it.

The only proviso as far as I can see - and it's a big one - is having
the level of intelligence required, which should be really
substantive. Short of that, risking people on the ground means risking
people on the ground, but if handled properly it can pay off with
better interactions with the locals leading to incrementally better
intelligence.

Good point. But the essence of the tactic is that the front end,
visible security force is national not foreign.

As far as possible, yes. But if any action is taken against groups
such as Sadrs militia it will require a substantive and sustained
operation by sizeable US ground forces, even if this is disguised
behind token (or hopefully increasingly less token) Iraqi forces. In
short, I think US forces are still required to operationally influence
the situation to the point where Iraqi forces can cope, even as they
are also required to increase Iraqi capacity via training at the same
time.

Where the indirect
fire support comes from is not readily apparent. (You could even mount
a disinformation campaign to deflect responsibility to newly
reconstituted Iraqi units....)

CAS (as opposed to selective airstrikes beyond the immediate area of
US force presence on the ground) has an advantage in larger operations
as the US/Iraqi/British forces can control the ground after the fact,
and the customary Arab hyperbole about innocent children being
murdered by the Yanqui imperialist warmongers becomes a little more
difficult to sustain when the bodies of the Mehdi army militiamen and
their AK 47s are visibly being pulled out of the rubble besides the
bodies of any collateral casualties.

On the disinformation side, this is where some accurate air strikes
and artillery can pay dividends - hitting a known mortar firing point
with observed air/artillery fire as the latest gang of "fire and flee"
militia men turn up and then attributing their demise to another
agency (no obvious sign of US forces on the spot in the morning when
their cousins and friends tentatively approach the body-strewn scene,
even if anything of intelligence value has already been lifted...)
always appealed to me, probably because I was never allowed to try it.

Gavin Bailey

--
Solution elegant. Yes. Minor problem, use 25000 CPU cycle for 1
instruction, this why all need overclock Pentium. Dumbass.
- Bart Kwan En

Stand with you on all points and the reason we have to continue patrolling is because the Iraqi's just are not up to it yet and when left to themselves the militia police units overwhelm them and they "turn" into sympathizers of the local warlord. So it will take time and more casualties and without each little unit having back up and "high cover" they all go out and are limited to what they can see.

Also many things drive me crazy - there are optical scanners, laser scanners, audio scanners and other things that will pick up rifle fire, spot video camera lenses and sniper scope lenses and in a sense help provide a 2 second to 10 second warning that a sniper is about to shoot at something - none of this has been implemented in the field yet and the billions spent can not account for any serious effort to go after this hard and heavy. We put billions into robots, sensible but not practical for a moving force, so you try to spot an IED and then move around it, that becomes a shell game because there are now multiple plants predicting where you will "go around" the first one. Stuff like that could have simply been dealt with using many small manned aircraft with night systems. Would there be dull moments - absolutely - dull for everyone but the patrols and convoy personnel. The Army says that the local gomers stop moving around after 02:00 am, and most traffic stops but they are still moving and you would think for a minute that those moving around then would constitute folks doing something other then normal. Until only recently in the Baghdad crisis was there a systematic use of road blocks and curfews - I found this unbelievable but no **** the following existed right up until today:

(1) If you plotted where all the US casualties were made what would it look like - it would be clusters of dots collected along the main highway routes south to north through Baghdad branching off to Mosul and Tirkit. Well then the roads and the casualties overlap perhaps in more then 75% of the time.

(2) with that consistent for four years it would seem obvious that they enemy is coming after us since most of the time we are found in long convoys and patrolling along the main routes that connect the population centers - kind of challenges the notion of irregular and asymmetric warfare when things are so determined by bad habits and not corrected - starts to sound like repetitive guerilla warfare, but the enemy has made the war a business in that the skills and wares of the various cells can be scheduled and purchased to set IED's, provide ambush cover, set mortar harassment fires, etc. As long as we keep coming along the roads without controlling the roads and accesses regardless of how much we armor the vehicles or counter the IED triggers with jammers, or have robots to clear known IED finds - well as long as this continues we will be attacked because the enemy has no reason to change his habits

(3) Now knowing that one would aks - well how many units in the US and coalition forces are dedicated to road security an road access - answer NONE, nada, the road security mission is an add-on to those units that are assigned certain AO's that include the highways and the EOD teams (after the fact) are assigned to them but efforts to thwart and clear the highways are taken only with normal patrolling not with dedicated efforts except in special circumstances when helicopters were put up in groups for periods of hours but nothing could be sustained because under every rock and on every roof is an enemy with a rifle or RPG and they have a field day shooting at the helos that are heard for 20 plus miles away and can't turn fast enough to counter shots from a blind side.

(4) How many Iraqi units are dedicated to road security - very few and those involved are tainted by the militias. Note that if we allowed and encouraged the various towns and villages to set up toll sections the earned income would translate to a cash cow and there would be a firm interst in keeping the roads safe for our convoys. Well they would steal us blind - SO WHAT - at $2 billion a week that is nothing and it could provide jobs because we could demand that the roads be repaired and cleaned etc. Also alternative roads could be built for Iraqi normal traffic thus isolating the main roads for the convoys totally and many more jobs. Iraq has railroads, but they do not work - yet railroads have "rightaways"and rightaways mean you could build simple elevated rails on contrete pylons with steel tracks using sleds run by rubber-tires and electric motors (see http://www.megarail.com/CargoRail_Heavy_Cargo/) and low and behold the roads nurished by tolls that have rail rightaways running paralle could produce elevated rails capable of being manufactured in Iraq and on those elevated "T" concrete pylons you could then add pvc water lines, fibre lines, electric power lines, communications in the fibre etc and the same militias and local police collecting tolls and protecting the roads would have to protect the elevated rail segments that would rebuild the infrastructure piece by piece. Remember that over 1200 convoys a day, some miles long are required in Iraq. There are at least six major depot and garrison points - each one has over 8 to 10,000 people, so with 130,000 troops there you have around half in garrison every day - who the hell is fighting the war - a hand full of units going on patrol after patrol after patrol with no air cover and no real support. The generals see everything and in short can do very little because the sytem id set up to feed them not just keep them informed.



"Ed Rasimus" wrote in message ...
On Thu, 04 Jan 2007 23:09:40 GMT, The Leslie Cheswick Soul Explosion
wrote:

On Thu, 04 Jan 2007 18:55:08 GMT, Ed Rasimus
wrote:

I think you're singing bass and I'm singing tenor in the same choir.

I think you're missing an opportunity to reduce a constructive thread
to the normal level of usenet discourse.

It's a curse, I know.

Be that as it may, I would still differ on the importance of
patrolling. Reducing the visibility of the uniformed army on the
ground serves a valid purpose in reducing the 'occupier' propaganda
dynamic, but some level of patrolling is still required - covert and
overt - to maintain some independent contact with the community.

Without that, there won't be the level of intelligence required for
checking that the Iraqi forces are operating efficiently or even the
level of intelligence required to effectively use precision heavy
weaponry which is sometimes required.

I agree with your premise, but the model I'd go with would eliminate
US unit patrolling. As I suggested, the unit-level involvement
scenario would be on-call response to Iraqi security forces or intel.

The idea would be the classic Special Forces model. "Advisors"
embedded in national units. They keep the local force honest
(hopefully), correct errors in training, gain insight into community
relations/intel, and provide feedback to HHQ on progress. It reduces
external force visibility and hence the opportunity to use the
"occupier" propaganda against us.

I'm strongly in favour of
'minimum force' to reduce the asymmetric propaganda dynamic, but I
have to say bombing Zarqawi accurately from the air is a better
alternative to going though the door (or window, or wall) on foot,
always provided the intelligence is sufficiently accurate.

No doubt about it.

It will be a while (of ever) before the Iraqi forces can get to the
required level of operational proficiency, and they certainly won't be
delivering PGM attacks any time soon, so I personally see a valid role
for air strikes (in limited numbers) and therefore a USAF presence to
deliver them for some time to come.

Good point. But the essence of the tactic is that the front end,
visible security force is national not foreign. Where the indirect
fire support comes from is not readily apparent. (You could even mount
a disinformation campaign to deflect responsibility to newly
reconstituted Iraqi units....)

Gavin Bailey

Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
www.thunderchief.org
www.thundertales.blogspot.com