Boeing Offers Additional F/A-18 Sale to U.S. Navy

In message , Flashnews
writes
we need a new platform a cross between the
A-10 and the Apache - a Blitz Fighter as some call it -

Ah, yes. The concept that would darken the skies with its wings on the
morning of Day 1 of the war... and blot out the sun with parachutes by
the afternoon of Day 1.

Getting down low into the AAA and IR-SAM envelope in a slow airframe
without _lots_ of expensive electronics is called "Operation Hasty
Suicide", which is why even the A-10 keeps getting more DAS and more
standoff weapons and why AH-64s rapidly amended their tactics.

In short - the whole shipbuilding world is a mess but it may be more
from the fact that we do not know where our Naval forces are going while
they seem to be on Pluto looking for a mission - the war is right in
front of them ready to make toast of the thin-skinned and under
protected ships

I'd advise a quick review of 1940s and 1950s naval weapon testing. The
reason ships lost their armour plate, was because the threat moved from
gun-armed Sverdlov-class cruisers (lobbing ninety-pound shells to a
dozen miles, with maybe one shot in fifty hitting) to Kynda-class
cruisers (lobbing five-ton missiles to three hundred miles, with most of
them hitting). You can't wear enough armour to ignore hits from post-WW2
weapons: to be confident of remaining capable, you have to "not be hit"
for long enough to take out the enemy's ability to fight. WW2-style
armour plate can actually make things _worse_ on weapon impact...


--
The nation that makes a great distinction between its scholars and its
warriors, will have its thinking done by cowards and its fighting done
by fools.
-Thucydides


Paul J. Adam - mainbox{at}jrwlynch[dot]demon(dot)codotuk

In article , "Paul J. Adam"
wrote:

I'd advise a quick review of 1940s and 1950s naval weapon testing. The
reason ships lost their armour plate, was because the threat moved from
gun-armed Sverdlov-class cruisers (lobbing ninety-pound shells to a
dozen miles, with maybe one shot in fifty hitting) to Kynda-class
cruisers (lobbing five-ton missiles to three hundred miles, with most of
them hitting). You can't wear enough armour to ignore hits from post-WW2
weapons: to be confident of remaining capable, you have to "not be hit"
for long enough to take out the enemy's ability to fight. WW2-style
armour plate can actually make things _worse_ on weapon impact...


Paul, armour capabilities is not one of my strong points. Can you elucidate
on why WWII armour might make things worse?
thx

--
Harry Andreas
Engineering raconteur

In message , Harry Andreas
writes
In article , "Paul J. Adam"
wrote:
WW2-style
armour plate can actually make things _worse_ on weapon impact...

Paul, armour capabilities is not one of my strong points. Can you elucidate
on why WWII armour might make things worse?

In an underkeel detonation (influence-fuzed mine or torpedo) armouring
the hull stiffens it. So, instead of fairly vigorous movements, flexing,
and whipping - like the USS PRINCETON in 1991 - you get more transmitted
shock, which tends to do more damage to systems mounted to the hull.
PRINCETON set off two mines, was significantly damaged, but was able to
get key systems back up, resume her duties as AAWC and await relief and
a tug back to Bahrain: two months after that she returned to the US
under her own power (though she did need a fair bit of repair)

HMS Belfast ran over a mine in late 1939, was similarly sized to
PRINCETON, suffered nineteen casualties, mostly broken legs and ankles
from the shock, and had such serious shock effects that her torpedo
tubes were thrown off their mounts. (She also had major problems from
cast-iron pipes and machinery bases shattering, but that was an issue
quickly designed out of ships). It was the end of 1942 before she
returned to service.

--
The nation that makes a great distinction between its scholars and its
warriors, will have its thinking done by cowards and its fighting done
by fools.
-Thucydides


Paul J. Adam - mainbox{at}jrwlynch[dot]demon(dot)codotuk

In article , "Paul J. Adam"
wrote:

In message , Harry Andreas
writes
In article , "Paul J. Adam"
wrote:

In an underkeel detonation (influence-fuzed mine or torpedo) armouring
the hull stiffens it. So, instead of fairly vigorous movements, flexing,
and whipping - like the USS PRINCETON in 1991 - you get more transmitted
shock, which tends to do more damage to systems mounted to the hull.
PRINCETON set off two mines, was significantly damaged, but was able to
get key systems back up, resume her duties as AAWC and await relief and
a tug back to Bahrain: two months after that she returned to the US
under her own power (though she did need a fair bit of repair)

HMS Belfast ran over a mine in late 1939, was similarly sized to
PRINCETON, suffered nineteen casualties, mostly broken legs and ankles
from the shock, and had such serious shock effects that her torpedo
tubes were thrown off their mounts. (She also had major problems from
cast-iron pipes and machinery bases shattering, but that was an issue
quickly designed out of ships). It was the end of 1942 before she
returned to service.

Thanks

--
Harry Andreas
Engineering raconteur

In message , Flashnews
writes

we need a new platform a cross between the
A-10 and the Apache - a Blitz Fighter as some call it -


Aren't UCAV's like Predator/Reaper already evolving to fulfill
that role?

http://www.defense-update.com/products/p/predatorB.htm