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#1
August 23rd 03, 04:20 AM
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The Revolution Will Not Be Televised wrote:
On Tue, 19 Aug 2003 20:56:37 GMT, Guy Alcala wrote: Not quite that simple, if you want to base them close to the U.S. daytime units. Who's going to use the grass strips 2 Gp. would be giving up? The heavies aren't. Ironically they did have to operate heavies from grass strips in 1940-42 with all that that suggests in terms of all-weather operational effectiveness, I know they did, and they seem to have abandoned the idea at the first opportunity. I know, but I was working with an earlier conversion-to-daylight frame in mind, namely the summer of 1943, ideally before Hamburg gives Harris some unchallengeable success to rentrench his preferred night/area bombing strategy. Okay, I was working on ACM Kramer's timeline, where the decision to switch was definitely fall '43. Note that this wasn't based on the actual situation, more an "if we decided to to make this change, what would such a decision entail? snip I just don't see the point of converting 2 Gp. to heavies with all the disruption that would cause, when you still want a day medium bomber force. Yes, I was talking about 3 Group re-equipping with Liberators there. Some of their ex-Wellington bases (like Feltwell, Methwold, etc) weren't concreted by the summer of 1943, and they need bases with concrete runways for the Libs. Okay, that clears up the confusion. 3 Gp. needs to convert from Stirlings in any case, which are no longer participating in the main offensive, and thus (from Butch's point of view) are almost completely ineffective. Again, I think you're working with a later point of departure from the existing historical timeline than me. Yes. In the summer of 1943 the Stirling force was actually scheduled to expand by another couple of new squadrons. Now that you've brought them to mind, they might be useful in shallow-penetration heavily-escorted daylight raids with their bombload. Only for targets with light flak defenses, similar to those the mediums would go after. At least they have dual controls, but they'd already been taken off day ops over France back in 1941?, and I don't think the defenses had gotten any lighter since. BTW, do you have any idea why they didn't put some extended tips on the Stirlings, as they did for the Halifax? Maybe it just would have taken too much of a change to get them up to reasonable heights. [B-25 ops] Yes, but not a hell of a lot worse than the "Daylight Lanc" fantasy, I mean, operational evaluation platform. I'm certain the B-25 carried more than 3,000lbs, but maybe only over shorter distances. Not internally, it didn't. The B-25 bomb bay was smaller than the B-26's. Allowable loads were 1 x 2,000 lb., or 2 x 1,000/1,600 lb., or 6 x 500 lb. or some larger number (8/10/12? I forget) of 250 lbers. The figures I have are 15,000ft loaded cruise and a 4,000lb bombload which 2 Group were using from 1943 into 1944 from the references I've seen. Obviously, this was for targets in France, so deeper penetration might reduce the bombload, but it seemed to have the best range/bombload/defensive armament characteristics of the available bombers in 2 Group: frankly, intermediate-level penetration raids with Bostons or Venturas (the alternatives) are a non-starter. Absolutely, which is why Embry wanted to go all B-25/Mosquito. At some point around 1944 they realized that the 2,000 lb. station was essentially never used, so it was removed and that made enough room for them to carry 1 extra 1,000 lb. bomb. Bowyer claims the very first Mitchell raid in 2 Group in January 1943 (escorted by Mustang Is, interestingly enough) featured a bombload of 2 x 1,000lb and 4 x 500lb per aircraft. If this is correct, I think you're underestimating the possible bombload, or I'm underestimating the impact of increased fuel loading for more distant targets. I suppose that load just might be possible, depending on the arrangement of the bomb racks. I don't have a diagram of the B-25 bomb rack arrangement, and it's been awhile since I saw one up close. Plays hell with accuracy though, carrying a mixed load like that. Max. load, internal and external, is quoted as 5,200 lb. It's never been clear from the sources available to me whether you could carry 500 lbers externally on the wing racks the heaviest bombs specifically mentioned as carried there are 325 lb. depth charges. And a torpedo on the centerline, but I think we can ignore that. BTW, what was the target of that first attack? Are we talking a "just nip across the channel to Calais and back" sort of thing? The B-26 bomb bay could carry 2 x 2,000 lb. (and occasionally did), or 4 x 1,000 lb., or 8 x 500 lb., etc. Early models (B-26, B-26A and I think some early B-26Bs) had an additional aft bomb bay usable for small bombs, but this had first been sealed shut as being of more use for other purposes, and then deleted from production altogether. The British only got one allocation, initially of about 50 Marauders in 1942, which were used in the MTO, so we'd need to come up with come convincing operational justifications to grab those USAAF production allocations. I'm not sure, if my figures are correct, there's any need to replace the B-25 which after all is being operated by 2 Group already with a very low wastage rate. Easier to expand an existing resource than demand a new one entirely. Oh, I wasn't implying that we switch 2 Gp. to B-26s, as the production capacity isn't there in any case (what with Omaha switching over to B-29s). The B-25 is fine. It's odd that the USAAF and RAF wound up using different a/c exclusively in the ETO, when you'd think it would have been far simpler to concentrate on a single type. Both forces uses both of them in the MTO, but the B-26 benefited most from the shorter supply lines and better infrastructure in the ETO, as the B-25 required less maintenance and could be flown from worse airfields. snip 2 Gp. ops areas of agreement I'm not sure that the flak threat in '45 _was_ higher. Even the heavies average bombing altitude decreased considerably in 1945, down to the mid teens. Not over the big targets, though. Hitting smaller towns with rail junctions as part of the transport plan, or smaller factories in semi-rural areas wasn't the same as tackling the Ruhr or Leipzig. Some of that is likely due to a shift to more tactical (and thus less well-defended) targets, but not all of it. I imagine the disruption in production and more especially transport was affecting ammo supply, C2 was failing/being seriously degraded, and morale was undoubtedly collapsing as well. While the percentage of damage to flak compared to fighters was increasing, I haven't seen any evidence that it was due to increased effectiveness of the former; rather, it seems to be due to the ever-decreasing effectiveness of the latter. My impression is that the overall flak threat on major target complexes increased. In number of guns often true, but the C2 was worse. I see them hitting targets in Belgium, Holland and on the fringe of the German Bight and the Ruhr. I think that's credible: the Luftwaffe in 1943 could have given them a hard time, but only at the expense of ignoring the heavies which would be right behind them. Fine by me. The B-26s were hitting targets there (not the Bight or the Ruhr); weren't the Mitchells? Not often enough accordng to me, but then you're the man in charge of Fighter ops administration. I know they were bombing the same targets in France (and presumably coastal Belgium) as the B-26s were. As you can see, my knowledge of 2 Gp. ops is limited. They and the 9th hit the same kind of targets: mostly western Holland, western Belgium and northern France, going deeper as time progressed and the invasion period began. I want them bombing airfields like Jever and Rheine, attempting to hit the fighter force which will come up to dispute the path of the 8th AF. Yes, those, Deelen and Twente etc. would all be useful. snip more noxious agreement I thought we were resorting to ridiculously hyperbolic stereotypes for comic effect. I can't see anybody disputing this*. Which reminds me, time for a large wet. That will give me just enough time to slip out and get an ice cream cone then, and drink a couple of bottles of coke on the way back. This silk underwear certainly does keep the thighs from chafing -- What, you thought we wanted the stuff for some vicarious sexual thrill? ;-) J. Edgar Hoover, eat your heart out. We draw the line at accessorizing with earrings and pearl necklaces; supposedly he didn't. snip story confirming tea as vital to the British war effort Guy 
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#2
August 24th 03, 01:06 PM
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On Sat, 23 Aug 2003 03:20:19 GMT, Guy Alcala
wrote: [Stirlings doing daylight tactical bombing in support of B-17s] Only for targets with light flak defenses, similar to those the mediums would go after. At least they have dual controls, but they'd already been taken off day ops over France back in 1941?, and I don't think the defenses had gotten any lighter since. They weren't taken off due to heavy losses per se [3-6 Stirlings from 7 and 15 Sqns in 3 Group were used in July 1941 for Circus ops], just that BC wanted them for the main strategic offensive and any bomber lost in daytime or even allocated to FC was seen as a disproportionate waste of resources from painfully small and slowly-expanding four-engined bomber production. We're reversing that perspective here, particularly after October 1943 when the Stirling force is baked by sufficient production output, but by the same token is looking for a mission as they are about to get dropped from deep-penetration missions. BTW, do you have any idea why they didn't put some extended tips on the Stirlings, as they did for the Halifax? Maybe it just would have taken too much of a change to get them up to reasonable heights. The only effort to do this that I can see came with the "super-Stirling" using Centaurus engines mooted by Shorts in 1941. The Centaurus wasn't going to appear in adequate numbers in time to have an impact on Stirling usage in the real world, meanwhile in 1941-42 the MAP and AM were unhappy with Short's chronic failure to meet existing Sitrling production targets. Any new type or equipment change which would further hinder production seems to have been dismissed out of hand, although that's conjecture on my part in the absence of hard evidence. The ceiling of the Stirling I was regarded as a problem, but it was hoped better engines would fix the problem, rather than changing the airframe, i.e. by the Hercules XIs used in the Stirling III. [2 Group B-25s using 4,000lb bombloads in January 1943] BTW, what was the target of that first attack? Are we talking a "just nip across the channel to Calais and back" sort of thing? Yes, the targets were on the Ghent-Terneuzen canal in Belgium; but on the other hand they also carried 4,000lbs on deeper penetrations to Brest and Normandy that I'm aware of. I was hoping you might have some evidence of 12th AF range and bombloads to compare, or even from ops in the SWP. [cowardly and snivelling agreement by the colonialist Yanqui running-dogs snipped] J. Edgar Hoover, eat your heart out. We draw the line at accessorizing with earrings and pearl necklaces; supposedly he didn't. snip story confirming tea as vital to the British war effort Well, it would help if you were aiming to contribute some badly-needed inaccurate, nationally chauvanistic-abuse to this thread, if you could actually manage some substantive inaccuracy. I note that so far I have been the only contributor to succeed in adding unsupported personal abuse to the thread so far. My victory in traditional usenet terms is, frankly, unassailable. Gavin Bailey -- Another user rings. "I need more space" he says. "Well, why not move to Texas?", I ask. - The ******* Operator From Hell
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#3
September 3rd 03, 05:09 AM
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#4
September 3rd 03, 05:16 AM
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ubject: More long-range Spitfires and daylight Bomber Command raids, with
added nationalistic abuse (was: From: (Guy alcala) Date: 9/2/03 9:09 PM Pacific Daylight Time Message-id: ." Here's the sortie count and bomb tonnage for the B-25 and B-26: We never flew "sorties" We flew missions. Fighters flew sorties. Arthur Kramer 344th BG 494th BS England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany Visit my WW II B-26 website at: http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer
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#5
September 3rd 03, 05:51 AM
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ArtKramr wrote:
ubject: More long-range Spitfires and daylight Bomber Command raids, with added nationalistic abuse (was: From: (Guy alcala) Date: 9/2/03 9:09 PM Pacific Daylight Time Message-id: ." Here's the sortie count and bomb tonnage for the B-25 and B-26: We never flew "sorties" We flew missions. Fighters flew sorties. You, fighters and everyone else flew missions that involved a certain number of sorties, effective and ineffective, and records were kept of both. If you want to know what the average effective bombload per a/c was, just counting missions isn't going to do it, because you need to know how many a/c flew on each mission for the number to mean anything; in short, you need to know the number of sorties. The figures I gave above are presumably either effective sorties (those assessed as having dropped bombs), or at least those that were officially counted (i.e. you'd crossed the enemy/occupied coast or whatever the criteria was in the particular theater/timeframe). Guy
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#6
September 3rd 03, 06:19 AM
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Subject: More long-range Spitfires and daylight Bomber Command raids,
From: Guy Alcala We never flew "sorties" We flew missions. Fighters flew sorties. You, fighters and everyone else flew missions that involved a certain number of sorties, effective and ineffective, Missions that involved sorties???? What does that mean?. I flew all missions. No sorties because you need to know how many a/c flew on each mission for the number to mean an We flew 56 Marauders on every mission. Max effort every time. The figures I gave above are presumably either effective sorties (those assessed as having dropped bombs), or at least those that were officially counted (i.e. you'd crossed the enemy/occupied coast or whatever the criteria was in the particular theater/timeframe). Yeah, that was a bad habbit of ours. We always crossed into enemy territorry and dumped 4,000 pounds of bombs all over them. We called these missions. Not sorties Arthur Kramer 344th BG 494th BS England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany Visit my WW II B-26 website at: http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer
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#7
September 3rd 03, 09:57 AM
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ArtKramr wrote:
Subject: More long-range Spitfires and daylight Bomber Command raids, From: Guy Alcala We never flew "sorties" We flew missions. Fighters flew sorties. You, fighters and everyone else flew missions that involved a certain number of sorties, effective and ineffective, Missions that involved sorties???? What does that mean?. I flew all missions. No sorties. As explained by another poster, a sortie is one flight by one a/c. X number of a/c in a squadron, group or what have you can all fly a single mission, which will count as X number of sorties total. Think of a sortie as the aircraft equivalent of a man/day. If you have a job that is supposed to take 10 man/days to complete, then to do it you can (ignoring any practical difficulties that might preclude some of the combinations) either use 1 man for ten days, 2 men for 5 days, 5 men for two days, or 10 men for one day. Sorties work similarly: 1 a/c flying ten missions, 2 a/c flying 5 missions, 5 a/c flying two missions, or 10 a/c flying one mission, all count as ten sorties. because you need to know how many a/c flew on each mission for the number to mean an We flew 56 Marauders on every mission. Max effort every time. Which is 56 sorties. But medium units didn't always fly 56 a/c. At least in 1943, it was usual to fly 36 a/c group formations (group UE was increased later) in the ETO, and fighter and heavy bomber units had different establishments and flew different formations consisting of different numbers of a/c. the typical heavy bomber group in 1943 would put up between 18-24 a/c for a single mission, i.e. 18-24 sorties. The figures I gave above are presumably either effective sorties (those assessed as having dropped bombs), or at least those that were officially counted (i.e. you'd crossed the enemy/occupied coast or whatever the criteria was in the particular theater/timeframe). Yeah, that was a bad habbit of ours. We always crossed into enemy territorry and dumped 4,000 pounds of bombs all over them. We called these missions. Not sorties. Art, not every a/c that took off crossed into enemy territory. There are inevitably aborts for various reasons. Depending on where the abort occurred, it might or might not count towards completing the tour requirement. The USAAF usually defined an effective sortie as one which dropped bombs on a target. So, for instance, on the Regensburg-Schweinfurt Raid, the 4th Bomb Wing dispatched 146* B-17s on VIIIth BC Mission Number 84, to Regensburg, or 146 sorties (*sources are a bit schizophrenic, as most say 146, but detail 147). Of that number, 11 aborted over England or the North Sea for reasons other than enemy action, but four were replaced by airborne spares, making 139 that crossed the coast. None of the crews of a/c which aborted for these reasons prior to crossing the Dutch coast were allowed to count this mission towards their tour. By the time they got to Regensburg, fourteen more had been shot down, two more had left the formation, dumped their bombs and were hoping to cut the corner and catch up, and one a/c had remained in formation but had had to jettison its bombs. The crews of these a/c were allowed to count the mission towards their tour, but none of these sorties were counted as 'effective', because they didn't/couldn't put bombs on target. The remaining 122 a/c were all able to bomb, so 4th Bomb Wing recorded 146 sorties dispatched (not counting spares), but only 139 combat sorties consisting of 122 effective and 17 ineffective sorties. Being able to bomb a secondary or tertiary target or a target of opportunity, rather than just jettisoning bombs, would usually be counted as an effective sortie (depended on the time and theater); a/c which were unable to bomb an allowed target for any reason would count as an ineffective sortie. Guy
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