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Ed Rasimus posted:
Juvat wrote: Jeez...you're reading waaaay too much into Scott's posts IMO. The original question you will recall had to do with ANG F-102 units called up. He posited none due to the mission. He was correct on that score. Yes? No? Well, I think you're word-smithing a bit here. No sir...simply reading the question as posted (looking up at the thread topic). If the topic were "F-102s units deployed to SEA" you might have a leg to stand on. Honest, I've got the whole thread saved because the topic is interesting and was going to post some details that others beat me to the punch. If we are searching for full unit deployments of F-102, specifically from ANG units, for SEA, then I'm not sure that there were any. Respectfully, you do know the answer. None. I will direct you to the book by Gross...published by the USAF Office of History. Well, again. Here the question revolves around the somewhat belabored point of the two political parties in America. The fact is, that the President probably could have avoide military service entirely. We have a lot of documentation that his predecessor was successful and arguably when he was avoiding, a lot less "privileged" than Bush. No argument...but we're getting off on a tangent I suspect. Now, as you well understand, Bush went through a full year of UPT, then the various required USAF survival schools, then full operational qualification and a couple of years of ANG service flying a Century Series jet. That seems to me (based on what I know of single-engine/single-seat aviation) a somewhat hazardous occupation. You and I have differing POV on what constitutes GWB becoming MR and maintaining that status. I'll agree he did achieve MR status, but that as far as I will go... However, I'm somewhat surprised that you consider he met all his obligations. Or have I inferred something you are not implying? Belay that last...it is not my desire to let this thread turn into a groveling, low speed, knife fight at the bottom of the TRA on ths subject of GWB...but I can. This was in a period in which the aircraft which he was qualified in was continously deployed to SEA. I'd say there was a little bit more than "ZERO chance" of winding up in harm's way. Again, arguably a bit more chance than being a body-guarded PIO clerk who spent 151 days of a year tour in SEA. And I suspect if the names were reversed you would find it EQUALLY plausible that the swinging dick that served in SEA had a better chance of going into harm's way than a guy that was suspended from flying status in Aug 1972 for failing to take a physical. The continual deployment (despite the fairly dismal combat effectiveness) of the F-102 during SEA seems to disagree with your last statement here. Fair enough, and fairly close in the details, I believe that F-102s were gone from SEA by Jul 1970. Yes? No? I should have posited that had the NVAF threat been deem greater...there would have been a greater force than four Dets of roughly 6 jets each. Mea Culpa. No one thought the Beagles were coming, but there was a lot of apprehension about a singleton MiG-17 or 21 making a penetration over Laos into the Thai bases or across the DMZ to Danang. An alert interceptor force was always deployed. I'd be willing to speculate that "somebody" in 13th/7th AF thought IL-28s were a threat. The reason for my statement is simply that I've read about the Beagle threat perception in CHECO reports, inferred on my part becasue the reports mention the Beagle being able to reach Saigon. Juvat |
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Juvat wrote:
Ed Rasimus posted: Fair enough, and fairly close in the details, I believe that F-102s were gone from SEA by Jul 1970. Yes? No? I should have posited that had the NVAF threat been deem greater...there would have been a greater force than four Dets of roughly 6 jets each. Mea Culpa. No one thought the Beagles were coming, but there was a lot of apprehension about a singleton MiG-17 or 21 making a penetration over Laos into the Thai bases or across the DMZ to Danang. An alert interceptor force was always deployed. I'd be willing to speculate that "somebody" in 13th/7th AF thought IL-28s were a threat. The reason for my statement is simply that I've read about the Beagle threat perception in CHECO reports, inferred on my part becasue the reports mention the Beagle being able to reach Saigon. Juvat Ed Rasimus Fighter Pilot (ret) ***"When Thunder Rolled: *** An F-105 Pilot Over N. Vietnam" *** from Smithsonian Books ISBN: 1588341038 |
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Juvat wrote:
Ed Rasimus posted: The continual deployment (despite the fairly dismal combat effectiveness) of the F-102 during SEA seems to disagree with your last statement here. Fair enough, and fairly close in the details, I believe that F-102s were gone from SEA by Jul 1970. Yes? No? No. At least as I recall, and posted. There were still F-102s deployed in '72 when I was back at Korat in the F-4. Danang and Udorn I believe. But, I've been wrong in the past....there was, after all, the fateful decision to marry my first wife. I should have posited that had the NVAF threat been deem greater...there would have been a greater force than four Dets of roughly 6 jets each. Mea Culpa. Realistically, the NVAF threat was small, yet, the need for an air defense response existed and it made more sense to deploy those specialized aircraft and retain the mission flexibility of other tactical jets that could also carry iron up N. No one thought the Beagles were coming, but there was a lot of apprehension about a singleton MiG-17 or 21 making a penetration over Laos into the Thai bases or across the DMZ to Danang. An alert interceptor force was always deployed. I'd be willing to speculate that "somebody" in 13th/7th AF thought IL-28s were a threat. The reason for my statement is simply that I've read about the Beagle threat perception in CHECO reports, inferred on my part becasue the reports mention the Beagle being able to reach Saigon. I'm always bothered by the "historians" and "statisticians" who quote from CHECO and Red Baron reports. In a few years this crap will go unrefuted, but while a few crusty *******s are still alive, we'll throw a bull-**** flag occasionally. If the IL-28s, parked at Gia Lam were a threat, we should have taken them off the ramp. We could have done it on any given day. We all knew where they were and had the wherewithal to do it. The ROE prevented it until '72 when we were finally allowed to jettison on the airfields. The air attack threat was more realistically from a MiG 17 or 21 with a pair of bombs making a quick dash in-country. During several years of the bombing pause, the MiGs operated further south than the main bases in Pack VI, including Vinh and Dong Hoi. It would have been well within the capabiltiy of the little jets to make a run at NKP, Udorn, Ubon or Danang. Ed Rasimus Fighter Pilot (ret) ***"When Thunder Rolled: *** An F-105 Pilot Over N. Vietnam" *** from Smithsonian Books ISBN: 1588341038 |
#4
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Ed Rasimus posted:
No. At least as I recall, and posted. There were still F-102s deployed in '72 when I was back at Korat in the F-4. Danang and Udorn I believe. But, I've been wrong in the past.... I think you are mistaken, from reading Michel referencing the F-4s sitting alert at Udorn and flying CAPs on Laos/NVN border. Perhaps he missed this detail. According to Pete Stickney's post... The 64th FIS was inactivated in November '69, with the 509th FIS once again picking up the Don Muang det. Operations at Da Nang ended in ealy '70, and the Don Muang det was closed in late May. On 24 July, 1970, the 509th FIS was inactivated. The 82nd FIS, which had been at Naha AB, and had been supplying alert dets in Korea, inactivated in May, 71. So my question would be...what unit in 1972 since all the PACAF F-102s were history (so to speak). I suspect that you honestly don't know, but that may not alter your recollection (right or wrong). Realistically, the NVAF threat was small, yet, the need for an air defense response existed and it made more sense to deploy those specialized aircraft and retain the mission flexibility of other tactical jets that could also carry iron up N. Apparently only until Jul 70 for the 509th, and May of 71 for the 82d. Regarding my reference to CHECO reports... I'm always bothered by the "historians" and "statisticians" who quote from CHECO and Red Baron reports. Hmmm, imagine folks like myself actually believing the contemporaneous reporting of tactics, trends, and analysis by the likes of Robert Futrell and Warren Thompson. I am certainly a skeptical asshole, looking for mutiple sources. In a few years this crap will go unrefuted, but while a few crusty *******s are still alive, we'll throw a bull-**** flag occasionally. Fair enough...you tossed out the F-102s still in SEA in 1972. That may well proved to be a bull-**** flag *or* simply bull-****. Does that mean we ignore you if you prove to be incorrect on this matter of fact? Not at all. The problem I found with oral history is the lack of contemporaneous documentation. If the IL-28s, parked at Gia Lam were a threat,... Which would support the reason for having F-102s at TSN and Don Muang.. The air attack threat was more realistically from a MiG 17 or 21 with a pair of bombs making a quick dash in-country... Which explains the Det at Da Nang however long that lasted (1970 according to Stickney's research), and certainly not past Jul 72 when the 366th TFW moved to Thailand...and Udorn Det whenever it closed. Juvat |
#5
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Juvat wrote:
Ed Rasimus posted: No. At least as I recall, and posted. There were still F-102s deployed in '72 when I was back at Korat in the F-4. Danang and Udorn I believe. But, I've been wrong in the past.... I think you are mistaken, from reading Michel referencing the F-4s sitting alert at Udorn and flying CAPs on Laos/NVN border. Perhaps he missed this detail. In "Clashes" Michel is dealing with MiG engagements, not with air defense alerts. Clashes has a lot of good research behind it and Marshall has the experience to back up that of which he writes. But, even he makes mistakes, such as calling all the ECM pods for the war, QRC-160. Certainly there were F-4s on alert at Udorn and absolutely they were flying CAP, but CAP is a different mission than air defense and alert can be for a number of mission options--I sat alert at Korat in 105's, but that was SAR and ground attack alert. And, I sat alert at Korat in F-4Es, but that also was for ground attack. According to Pete Stickney's post... The 64th FIS was inactivated in November '69, with the 509th FIS once again picking up the Don Muang det. Operations at Da Nang ended in ealy '70, and the Don Muang det was closed in late May. On 24 July, 1970, the 509th FIS was inactivated. The 82nd FIS, which had been at Naha AB, and had been supplying alert dets in Korea, inactivated in May, 71. So my question would be...what unit in 1972 since all the PACAF F-102s were history (so to speak). I suspect that you honestly don't know, but that may not alter your recollection (right or wrong). I honestly don't know what unit was deployed, but I'm fairly confident in the recollection that 102s were still in SEA in '72. Realistically, the NVAF threat was small, yet, the need for an air defense response existed and it made more sense to deploy those specialized aircraft and retain the mission flexibility of other tactical jets that could also carry iron up N. Apparently only until Jul 70 for the 509th, and May of 71 for the 82d. Regarding my reference to CHECO reports... I'm always bothered by the "historians" and "statisticians" who quote from CHECO and Red Baron reports. Hmmm, imagine folks like myself actually believing the contemporaneous reporting of tactics, trends, and analysis by the likes of Robert Futrell and Warren Thompson. I certainly like Thompson. His compilation of history in "To Hanoi and Back" is excellent. Still, I like to deal with people who actually flew the missions more than folks who are familiar with the bowels of the AU library and how to run a micro-fiche machine. I am certainly a skeptical asshole, looking for mutiple sources. In a few years this crap will go unrefuted, but while a few crusty *******s are still alive, we'll throw a bull-**** flag occasionally. Fair enough...you tossed out the F-102s still in SEA in 1972. That may well proved to be a bull-**** flag *or* simply bull-****. Does that mean we ignore you if you prove to be incorrect on this matter of fact? Not at all. The problem I found with oral history is the lack of contemporaneous documentation. If the IL-28s, parked at Gia Lam were a threat,... Which would support the reason for having F-102s at TSN and Don Muang.. The air attack threat was more realistically from a MiG 17 or 21 with a pair of bombs making a quick dash in-country... Which explains the Det at Da Nang however long that lasted (1970 according to Stickney's research), and certainly not past Jul 72 when the 366th TFW moved to Thailand...and Udorn Det whenever it closed. If the 366th moved out of Danang in July of '72 at the peak of Linebacker, it's a surprise to me. Of course, I was a member of a squadron that was deactivated at Korat in September of '72, so it's possible. There were movements all over the theater at that time, including the 35th and 67the TFSs coming from Kadena and the entire 354th TFW from CONUS as well as the F-4s from the 4th at S-J. And don't forget the F-111s and even the 561st WW from George. What was at Danang then and where did the 366th go in Thailand? Only the Marine F-4 det? Udorn still had a full house of F-4s and RFs until I left theater in July of '73. Ed Rasimus Fighter Pilot (ret) ***"When Thunder Rolled: *** An F-105 Pilot Over N. Vietnam" *** from Smithsonian Books ISBN: 1588341038 |
#6
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Ed Rasimus posted:
In "Clashes" Michel is dealing with MiG engagements, not with air defense alerts. Clashes has a lot of good research behind it and Marshall has the experience to back up that of which he writes. True...but wouldyou acknowledge that F-102s did fly CAPs and not simply sitting cocked at the end of a runway? And can you agree that the F-102 shot down by the MiG-21 in Feb 1968 was flying CAP? Certainly there were F-4s on alert at Udorn and absolutely they were flying CAP, but CAP is a different mission than air defense and alert can be for a number of mission options--I sat alert at Korat in 105's, but that was SAR and ground attack alert. And, I sat alert at Korat in F-4Es, but that also was for ground attack. So taking this just a little bit farther...if they were still in place at Udorn in 1972 they just might have flown CAPs, they might have even practiced some ACM vs the local air-to-air sqdns (13th, 555th, and TDY 523d, etc). Yet when the F-8s came to town to play, no mention of giving the F-102s a taste. No mention of using F-102s for DACM for the benefit of the air-to-air guys. [FWIW, Ritchie does say that the 432d selected crews for the air-to-air mission into RP-6.] I honestly don't know what unit was deployed, but I'm fairly confident in the recollection that 102s were still in SEA in '72. I certainly like Thompson. His compilation of history in "To Hanoi and Back" is excellent. Fair enough...since I got you to acknowledge that Thompson just might have his **** in one sock, look at page 309 of his book. Fourth entry down...Udorn...number of F-102s there in 1967 = 6, number there in July 1972 = ZERO. Number of F-102s in SEA in July 1972 = ZERO. He could be mistaken, his data is from a HQ document and not an eye witness account. Still, I like to deal with people who actually flew the missions more than folks who are familiar with the bowels of the AU library and how to run a micro-fiche machine. I resemble that remark...Fair enough...Idle --*Chaff* --*Flare* -- I'm just having a problem wondering whose "there i was story" to believe. If the 366th moved out of Danang in July of '72 at the peak of Linebacker, it's a surprise to me. Ummm, respectfully are you being sarcastic with the last part? See Thompson page 223...talks about the movement of the 366th from Da Nang to Takhli in June of 1972. So I ask the question again, sincerely, who do we believe? And why am I doing all the citations/research? Juvat |
#7
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Juvat wrote:
Ed Rasimus posted: In "Clashes" Michel is dealing with MiG engagements, not with air defense alerts. Clashes has a lot of good research behind it and Marshall has the experience to back up that of which he writes. True...but wouldyou acknowledge that F-102s did fly CAPs and not simply sitting cocked at the end of a runway? And can you agree that the F-102 shot down by the MiG-21 in Feb 1968 was flying CAP? I would acknowledge that F-102s flew. I would acknowledge that F-102s even did some ersatz ground attack. I would assert that in 150 North Vietnam missions in Rolling Thunder, Linebacker I & II, I never once was supported by an F-102 CAP. Not once. I never was supported by and F-102 escort, nor in a package with an F-102 sweep either. Never had an F-102 participate in any NVN mission that I was on. Certainly there were F-4s on alert at Udorn and absolutely they were flying CAP, but CAP is a different mission than air defense and alert can be for a number of mission options--I sat alert at Korat in 105's, but that was SAR and ground attack alert. And, I sat alert at Korat in F-4Es, but that also was for ground attack. So taking this just a little bit farther...if they were still in place at Udorn in 1972 they just might have flown CAPs, they might have even practiced some ACM vs the local air-to-air sqdns (13th, 555th, and TDY 523d, etc). Yet when the F-8s came to town to play, no mention of giving the F-102s a taste. No mention of using F-102s for DACM for the benefit of the air-to-air guys. [FWIW, Ritchie does say that the 432d selected crews for the air-to-air mission into RP-6.] I doubt that they would have flown and briefed, scheduled ACM. It was simply against AF policy to fly dissimilar in those days. And, it must be considered that the mission was to fly combat, not to train locally in theater. There was the occasional hassle during RTB, but no scheduled, briefed, training objectives established DACM. Certainly Ritchie is correct. In July of '72, the 7th AF DO toured the Thai bases. He directed that since the Linebacker mission was critical, each base would establish "primary Linebacker crews"--folks who specialized in a particular mission, who would be first scheduled for Pack VI every day and who would carry the load. That meant Udorn established specialized A/A crews. It's the same policy that had me assigned as a primary F-4 Hunter/Killer SEAD guy. I honestly don't know what unit was deployed, but I'm fairly confident in the recollection that 102s were still in SEA in '72. I certainly like Thompson. His compilation of history in "To Hanoi and Back" is excellent. Fair enough...since I got you to acknowledge that Thompson just might have his **** in one sock, look at page 309 of his book. Fourth entry down...Udorn...number of F-102s there in 1967 = 6, number there in July 1972 = ZERO. Number of F-102s in SEA in July 1972 = ZERO. I'll concede. Could be. I'm working strictly from memory. A good memory generally, but capable of error. He could be mistaken, his data is from a HQ document and not an eye witness account. Still, I like to deal with people who actually flew the missions more than folks who are familiar with the bowels of the AU library and how to run a micro-fiche machine. I resemble that remark...Fair enough...Idle --*Chaff* --*Flare* -- I'm just having a problem wondering whose "there i was story" to believe. T'was Ronaldus Maximus that said, "trust, but verify." Can't argue with that. If the 366th moved out of Danang in July of '72 at the peak of Linebacker, it's a surprise to me. Ummm, respectfully are you being sarcastic with the last part? See Thompson page 223...talks about the movement of the 366th from Da Nang to Takhli in June of 1972. So I ask the question again, sincerely, who do we believe? And why am I doing all the citations/research? OK, I knew that Tahkli got the 4th deployment for S-J when the base was re-activated. Didn't realize that the Gunfighters moved there as well. And, you're doing the research because you love it! Juvat Ed Rasimus Fighter Pilot (ret) ***"When Thunder Rolled: *** An F-105 Pilot Over N. Vietnam" *** from Smithsonian Books ISBN: 1588341038 |
#8
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Ed Rasimus wrote:
I would acknowledge that F-102s flew. I would acknowledge that F-102s even did some ersatz ground attack. I would assert that in 150 North Vietnam missions in Rolling Thunder, Linebacker I & II, I never once was supported by an F-102 CAP. Not once. I never was supported by and F-102 escort, nor in a package with an F-102 sweep either. Never had an F-102 participate in any NVN mission that I was on. I realize that second-hand accounts shared by "non-participants" is viewed with contempt by many on this NG so if you happen to fall into that category go ahead and stop reading now... Having said that and for those who are interested, my Dad was one of the first group of fighter pilots to operate supersonic fighters (e.g: Dueces) with operational FIS squadrons back in the mid to late '50's. A while back I shared with the NG a local newspaper story about him ejecting from an F-102 over Wisconsin (predictably, the nitpicker contingent here even picked apart THAT!) Anyway, he especially loved the Duece's maneuverability and often spoke fondly of the ol' bird. Seems Walt BJ who also flew the Duece felt exactly the same way about it. However, when the topic of F-102's being sent to Vietnam came up (they were based out of Udorn which is where Dad was based out of while flying the A-1E) he didn't have much to say about it other than it was a waste of resources and -102's didn't belong in SEA, period. Just my 0.02 -Mike Marron |
#9
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Ed Rasimus wrote:
Juvat wrote: Ed Rasimus posted: snip If the 366th moved out of Danang in July of '72 at the peak of Linebacker, it's a surprise to me. Ummm, respectfully are you being sarcastic with the last part? See Thompson page 223...talks about the movement of the 366th from Da Nang to Takhli in June of 1972. So I ask the question again, sincerely, who do we believe? And why am I doing all the citations/research? OK, I knew that Tahkli got the 4th deployment for S-J when the base was re-activated. Didn't realize that the Gunfighters moved there as well. Squadrons of the 366th moved from DaNang, as stated. Offhand I don't remember if they remained part of the 366th at first, or were put under some other wing's control. Walt BJ can say, as he commanded one of the 366th's squadrons (390th IIRR) at the time, and has mentioned the move in the past. And, you're doing the research because you love it! Speaking for myself, it's more often because I hate having to depend on filktered, inaccurate accounts and urban legends, when the truth can be so much more interesting (if less hyperbolic). But sometimes you come across a nugget or vein of real gold in research, and you say "Ah Ha!, why they did what they did now makes sense," and that is very satisfying. Guy |
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