What F-102 units were called up for Viet Nam

Juvat wrote in message . ..
Kevin Brooks blurted out:


I wonder if you'd have the temerity to utter such a thing to, say, the
personnel from the ANG units like those in CO and NM that were
activated and flew in Vietnam,

Jeez...you're reading waaaay too much into Scott's posts IMO.

No, I am not reading anything "into it". His words are quite clear in
their meaning and intent.

The
original question you will recall had to do with ANG F-102 units
called up. He posited none due to the mission. He was correct on that
score. Yes? No?

No, he was incorrect. He said none were deployed (which was wrong)
because there was no need for interceptors (wrong again, as in fact an
interceptor force was maintained in Vietnam, and in Thailand
(including some RAAF folks with F-86's at one point, IIRC) throughout
the period of major US involvement).


or to those "champagne unit" (your
description) members who pulled their voluntary rotations in Vietnam?
Methinks not...

Okay, but that's an entirely different issue from the "entitled"
gentlemen that used their position to get an officer slot in the TX
ANG...in an airplane that had next to ZERO chance of getting activated
and sent into harm's way.

Zero chance? That's probably what the F-100 jockeys from CO thought,
too, right up until they deployed to the RVN. An airplane that had
ZERO percent chanc??? Odd, since that very same aircraft served in SEA
throughout most of the war, with ANG pilots forming part of the
manning that supported them.


So I'd be willing to bet Scott would have no
problem acknowledging the excellent service of the SEA volunteers.

Well, since he is so willing to brush the entire 111th FIS, a unit
that did contribute pilots to fly F-102's in Vietnam, with his "I hate
GWB" brush, I would disagree that he demonstrates such willingness.


Was no longer a "first line aircraft"? Uhmmm...care to guess when the
last F-102's left active duty?

When?

The last F-102's left active duty service (as interceptors, that
is--they would later return in the guise of the QF-102) in 73, after
the US had concluded the treaty with Hanoi (source:
http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/pao/Hi...468/ch11-4.htm). They continued
in ANG service for only a few more years (77 IIRC). So, throughout
this period of the Vietnam conflict, the Dagger remained in "front
line" service. It was the *first* US combat aircraft deployed to the
RVN after the Tonking Gulf incident, and remained in theater throught
the time of US major involvement. Not bad for Scott's "second echelon"
fighter, as he would call it, no?


Since you did not even have a ghostly
idea that they had served in Vietnam, how the heck are we supposed to
believe your assessment of their operational status?

Again...simply from a comprehension stand point the question was ANG
F-102 sqdns recalled for SEA...NOT, I repeat NOT if any AD squadrons
served.

No, that was NOT the question. The question was about F-102 service in
Vietnam, period. Which Scott managed to fumble--but hey, that's
excusable, we all make mistakes, and he admitted as much (which is
better than a lot of folks hereabouts...). But he left the ballpark
when he tried to go political and engaged in wholesale libel with his
"the Guard was a haven for draftdodgers" crap. My brother served in
the Guard at the very end of the Vietnam conflict--AFTER serving on
active duty and pulling a year flying DUSTOFF missions out of Danang
and Phu Bai...but hey, that tarbrush Scott was wielding casts a broad
stroke, does it not? ANG and ARNG units were serving in Vietnam as
well, along with a few thousand former ARNG "individual replacements"
(see what happened to the HIARNG infantry brigade that was
activated....). Then we get the attempt to tar the entire 111th FIS
because Scott does not like GWB; again, uncalled for.

Scott was correct on this score even if he simply guessed.

Not really. The F-102's went in when the curtain went up, and returned
only when it went down. ANG F-102 folks played in the same sandbox as
their AC counterparts.


As to even the
definition of 'first line", have you ever looked at what the breakdown
in the old ADC force was during that period? Take a gander at how many
of those forces you call "second echelon", I presume, were standing
alert on a routine basis.

Fair point...then read Charles J Gross book published by the Office of
Air Force History "Prelude to Total Force" The Air National Guard
1943-1969." Apparently the USAF AD Corona (generals) held the notion
the ANG was second echelon for quite awhile, highlighted by the
deployment of ANG forces to Korea for the Pueblo Crisis. The highly
successful F-100 deployment to SEA was quite the eye-opener for AD
commanders.

I believe you, or the author maybe, forgot another earlier
example--the activation and deployment to Europe of various ANG
fighter units as a result of the Berlin crisis earlier that same
decade.


Not really. The degree of state control has always been exaggerated by
those who have never served in a Guard unit, which number I am
guessing from your sneering tone you would be a part of.

OK your AD and ANG service and my AD and ANG service differed greatly.

My AD and ARNG service, you mean.

I agree with Scott's POV on state control in the past (only from
asking the question of career ANG guys). YMMV

OK. Just how did the states leverage this control? Appointing
officers? Not really--they had to be vetted by a federal rec board
before the appointments were effective. Training plans? Nope--that was
controlled by the federal side. IET? Nope, because this was after it
was decided that all NG personnel would attend AC IET. Money,
organization, and/or equipment? Heck no--that was firmly the purview
of the feds. So, where was all of this state control really
manifested?


Too little, too late (in terms of backpeddling, that is). Go up and
read your first paragraph in *this* post and then come back and tell
me you were not "attacking".

OK...I don't think he was attacking.

Then you apparently share his view of the Guard as a whole during that
period. Too bad.

And I think it is fairly accurate
to postulate that the USAF didn't think the F-102 was essential in
SEA, short legs and an adversary with a token number of IL-28s.

Gee, then why did they keep them in service over there throughout the
war? Do you think if your opponent has a weak, but existant, air
strike capability, then it is OK to ignore air defense? Good way to
get a bloody nose (see what happened when we had B-29's caught on
Saipan during WWII by that "remote" threat).

Brooks


Juvat

I posted:
Jeez...you're reading waaaay too much into Scott's posts IMO.

Kevin Brooks posted:
No, I am not reading anything "into it". His words are quite clear in
their meaning and intent.

Kevin cool your jets pardner...the title of this thread is what?

"What F-102 units were called up for Viet Nam"

What does "called up" mean to you? To me it means what non-active duty
units, Guard or Reserve were activated for duty. How do you "call up"
an active duty unit?

It does NOT mean which Acitve Duty squadrons deployed. But I'd bet
that's how you're reading this thread.

No, he was incorrect. He said none were deployed (which was wrong)

Actually he said "I don't think any were. This plane was strictly an
interceptor for shooting down bombers. No guns, no ground attack
capability."

I'm pretty sure history will confirm that F-102s were indeed
interceptors lacking a surface attack mission. I acknowledge the
kludged attempts to use it's IRST in a surface attack role, but that
was NOT it's mission (Air Defense as you acknowledge). And history
will confirm that no ANG unit was called up for active duty in SEA.

because there was no need for interceptors (wrong again, as in fact an
interceptor force was maintained in Vietnam, and in Thailand
throughout the period of major US involvement).

Okay...you're absolutely right. He was incorrect WRT to the presence
of ANY F-102s.

Zero chance? That's probably what the F-100 jockeys from CO thought,
too, right up until they deployed to the RVN. An airplane that had
ZERO percent chanc??? Odd, since that very same aircraft served in SEA
throughout most of the war, with ANG pilots forming part of the
manning that supported them.

Come on Kevin...I'm sincerely trying to keep this on topic about ANG
F-102 sqdns and Scott's post.

ZERO chance of an ANG F-102 pilot flying combat unless he volunteered.
The issue regarding the four ANG F-100 units that deployed, it's a
great display of what the citizen airman has been willing to do for
our country from the gitgo. The USAF was very pleased with that
deployment. (Not back pedaling...before you suggest that I am)

The last F-102's left active duty service (as interceptors, that
is--they would later return in the guise of the QF-102) in 73, ... They continued
in ANG service for only a few more years (77 IIRC).

I guess you won't be surprised when I was hoping for a little more
detail, like last AD sqdn date and last ANG date. Guess I'll do the
reasearch [sigh].

It was the *first* US combat aircraft deployed to the
RVN after the Tonking Gulf incident,

You'd be hard pressed to make a case of "first" deployed after the
Gulf of Tonkin. Afterall, the 1st Air Commando (Farm Gate) guys were
already flying combat sorties from Bien Hoa before GoT, as were RF-101
guys (Able Mable) from Misawa (45th TRS) and Kadena (15th TRS). You
get the picture.

No, that was NOT the question. The question was about F-102 service in
Vietnam, period.

Kevin, re-read the title of this thread. "What F-102 units were called
up for Viet Nam," not what F-102 units served in SEA. Sir you are in
error...but I bet you disagree with me.

Scott was correct on this score even if he simply guessed.

Not really.

OK...I say tomato...you say cantalope.

I believe you, or the author maybe, forgot another earlier
example--the activation and deployment to Europe of various ANG
fighter units as a result of the Berlin crisis earlier that same
decade.

Phew...uhhh my bad, I was trying to keep the discussion close to
topic, sorta, hoping to keep it on SEA deployments of ANG F-102s. I
mentioned the only activations during SEA.

If you wish I can cite every ANG squadron activated for Berlin and the
deployment location, but I don't think it is germaine to F-102s in
SEA.

Gee, then why did they keep them in service over there throughout the
war? Do you think if your opponent has a weak, but existant, air
strike capability, then it is OK to ignore air defense?

Fair question, one I cannot answer. If the threat were that great,
then why not bring the superior interceptor (the F-106) in to replace
the F-102, I cannot answer that one either. I guess the F-102 was so
good at it's mission the AF only needed 24 or so in SEA (four 6 plane
Dets) and that might be proof of its effectiveness as an Interceptor.

Truly sorry for the bad blood. You have misconstrued my intent. That
being Scott was correct that no ANG F-102 unit was called up for Viet
Nam, and he was mistaken that no F-102 units served in SEA.

Juvat

Kevin cool your jets pardner...the title of this thread is what?

Now you're being ridiculous. The title of the thread has nothing to do
with the discussion, and it was Scott's post that moved it into its
present territory. If he didn't mean to do that, he can always
apologize and set the record straight.

all the best -- Dan Ford
email: www.danford.net/letters.htm#9

see the Warbird's Forum at www.warbirdforum.com
and the Piper Cub Forum at www.pipercubforum.com

Cub Driver posted:

Now you're being ridiculous.

Geez Dan, thanks for the breath of fresh air. I'm honestly not trying
to escalate the signal to noise ratio here...honestly trying to post
details

The title of the thread has nothing to do
with the discussion,

And here I was trying to keep it within near earth orbit of the title
of the thread. Mea Culpa, mea culpa.

and it was Scott's post that moved it into its
present territory. If he didn't mean to do that, he can always
apologize and set the record straight.

Your concerns are noted.

Juvat

Juvat wrote:


Fair question, one I cannot answer. If the threat were that great,
then why not bring the superior interceptor (the F-106) in to replace
the F-102, I cannot answer that one either. I guess the F-102 was so
good at it's mission the AF only needed 24 or so in SEA (four 6 plane
Dets) and that might be proof of its effectiveness as an Interceptor.

Juvat

Simple answer to your question regarding why 106's weren't deployed
instead of 102's. During '66 to '69, there was a chronic shortage of
J-75s. Since the Deuce used the much more common J-57, it was more
readily deployable.


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (ret)
***"When Thunder Rolled:
*** An F-105 Pilot Over N. Vietnam"
*** from Smithsonian Books
ISBN: 1588341038

Juvat wrote in message . ..
I posted:
Jeez...you're reading waaaay too much into Scott's posts IMO.

Kevin Brooks posted:
No, I am not reading anything "into it". His words are quite clear in
their meaning and intent.

Kevin cool your jets pardner...the title of this thread is what?

"What F-102 units were called up for Viet Nam"

What does "called up" mean to you? To me it means what non-active duty
units, Guard or Reserve were activated for duty. How do you "call up"
an active duty unit?

By deploying them into the theater of operations from their current
station would be one manner of "calling up" an AC unit. I note that
the other posters who anwered the initial question also did not take
the "this solely deals with the RC" approach--are all of us wrong?


It does NOT mean which Acitve Duty squadrons deployed. But I'd bet
that's how you're reading this thread.

I took it as a total force question.


No, he was incorrect. He said none were deployed (which was wrong)

Actually he said "I don't think any were. This plane was strictly an
interceptor for shooting down bombers. No guns, no ground attack
capability."

I'm pretty sure history will confirm that F-102s were indeed
interceptors lacking a surface attack mission. I acknowledge the
kludged attempts to use it's IRST in a surface attack role, but that
was NOT it's mission (Air Defense as you acknowledge).

Take away the "strictly"; as it was indeed used in ground attack
missions, albeit not very effectively (I do believe a couple of their
three total losses occurred when performing this mission that they
supposedly could not even undertake). The Fairey Battle was by all
accounts a rather lousy ground attack aircraft, but it was indeed used
in that role; the F-104 was never originally intended to serve in the
CAS/BAI role, but that is the role it later found itself serving with
many NATO nations. Why put blinders on only in regards to the F-102's
history?


And history will confirm that no ANG unit was called up for active duty in SEA.

No ANG unit was called up for active duty in SEA?! I thought you
already acknowledged the fact that ANG units were indeed called up?


because there was no need for interceptors (wrong again, as in fact an
interceptor force was maintained in Vietnam, and in Thailand
throughout the period of major US involvement).

Okay...you're absolutely right. He was incorrect WRT to the presence
of ANY F-102s.

Zero chance? That's probably what the F-100 jockeys from CO thought,
too, right up until they deployed to the RVN. An airplane that had
ZERO percent chanc??? Odd, since that very same aircraft served in SEA
throughout most of the war, with ANG pilots forming part of the
manning that supported them.

Come on Kevin...I'm sincerely trying to keep this on topic about ANG
F-102 sqdns and Scott's post.

Sorry to inform you of this, but this thread began to meander
(something that is rather common in Usenet) after Scott made his post
and tried to link it to an anti-GWB thrust. As others have commented,
the only folks who seem restricted to the ANG-only approach appear to
be you and Scott.


ZERO chance of an ANG F-102 pilot flying combat unless he volunteered.

Uhmmm...like when Bush reportedly volunteered for Palace Alert (but
did not meet the experience requirement, which according to one
responsible individual was a minimum of one thousand hours)?

The issue regarding the four ANG F-100 units that deployed, it's a
great display of what the citizen airman has been willing to do for
our country from the gitgo. The USAF was very pleased with that
deployment. (Not back pedaling...before you suggest that I am)

OK. So your earlier statement that no ANG units were deployed was
apparently misworded--I would assume that you mean no F-102 units were
activated? Which would be true enough--but that leaves one wondering
whether F-102 units would indeed have been activated if sufficient
*volunteers* had not stepped forward?


The last F-102's left active duty service (as interceptors, that
is--they would later return in the guise of the QF-102) in 73, ... They continued
in ANG service for only a few more years (77 IIRC).

I guess you won't be surprised when I was hoping for a little more
detail, like last AD sqdn date and last ANG date. Guess I'll do the
reasearch [sigh].

Gee, I was unaware you were so picky, when the issue had meandered to
whether the F-102 was a viable go-to-war/get-activated asset while GWB
was boring holes in the sky during his training and with the 111th FIS
(which question has already been answered, as they were still serving
with AC units while he was flying). But...the 57th FIS ceased Deuce
operations out of Iceland in July 73, and the HIARNG unit reportedly
flew its last Deuce operational sortie in October 76. Good enough?


It was the *first* US combat aircraft deployed to the
RVN after the Tonking Gulf incident,

You'd be hard pressed to make a case of "first" deployed after the
Gulf of Tonkin. Afterall, the 1st Air Commando (Farm Gate) guys were
already flying combat sorties from Bien Hoa before GoT, as were RF-101
guys (Able Mable) from Misawa (45th TRS) and Kadena (15th TRS). You
get the picture.

Well, the folks in Bien Hoa did not have to deploy into the theater of
operations after the Gulf resolution, now did they (see, this playing
with finite word definitions can work both ways)? Actually, I believe
I read where the first F-102's to enter the area preceeded this by a
few years (1962, when they apparently started running a det out of the
RVN). I did read where the 509th FIS claims to have been the first
unit to deploy into the RVN after the GT incident--is that wrong?


No, that was NOT the question. The question was about F-102 service in
Vietnam, period.

Kevin, re-read the title of this thread. "What F-102 units were called
up for Viet Nam," not what F-102 units served in SEA. Sir you are in
error...but I bet you disagree with me.

As apparently do the other folks who took exception with Scott's post,
not to mention those who answered the original post with the data on
the AC F-102 units that did indeed find themselves flying combat
missions.


Scott was correct on this score even if he simply guessed.

Not really.

OK...I say tomato...you say cantalope.

I believe you, or the author maybe, forgot another earlier
example--the activation and deployment to Europe of various ANG
fighter units as a result of the Berlin crisis earlier that same
decade.

Phew...uhhh my bad, I was trying to keep the discussion close to
topic, sorta, hoping to keep it on SEA deployments of ANG F-102s. I
mentioned the only activations during SEA.

If you wish I can cite every ANG squadron activated for Berlin and the
deployment location, but I don't think it is germaine to F-102s in
SEA.

But it is germane to the fact that the USAF already regarded the ANG
as a real, honest to goodness go-to-war asset well before the entry of
GWB into ANG service.


Gee, then why did they keep them in service over there throughout the
war? Do you think if your opponent has a weak, but existant, air
strike capability, then it is OK to ignore air defense?

Fair question, one I cannot answer. If the threat were that great,
then why not bring the superior interceptor (the F-106) in to replace
the F-102, I cannot answer that one either. I guess the F-102 was so
good at it's mission the AF only needed 24 or so in SEA (four 6 plane
Dets) and that might be proof of its effectiveness as an Interceptor.

I would suspect that, like happened during the Korean conflict, the
USAF was examining the degree of threat (admittedly not great in SEA,
but then again it could not be completely discounted, either) and
decided that the F-106's were better deployed against the more serious
threat and the F-102's could handle the threat posed by the North
Vietnamese.


Truly sorry for the bad blood. You have misconstrued my intent. That
being Scott was correct that no ANG F-102 unit was called up for Viet
Nam, and he was mistaken that no F-102 units served in SEA.

No bad blood. But I get a bit tired when folks like Scott traipse out
the old "the Guard was a bunch of draftdodgers" mantra, not to mention
why he had to even enter into the "bash GWB" mode in the first place.
The first is a gross exaggeration born of enough folks making the
claim in the past, so it must be true, right? The second was just
another attempt at a backhanded swipe at a guy who performed military
service and flew combat aircraft in the defense of this nation-- a
much better alternative to refusing to serve at all, and then
attacking those who did, as many of his then-compatriots did, and none
of which he should be ashamed of, IMO.

Brooks


Juvat

Kevin Brooks posted:


By deploying them into the theater of operations from their current
station would be one manner of "calling up" an AC unit.

OK but that's not how I would interpret it when I was active duty.
Different strokes...

I took it as a total force question.

Again, fair enough...not how I read it.

Take away the "strictly"; as it was indeed used in ground attack
missions, albeit not very effectively...why put blinders on only in regards to the F-102's
history?

Not trying to put blinders on it, I did post that Scott was incorrect
on this score. He made an easy mistake.

Sorry to inform you of this, but this thread began to meander
(something that is rather common in Usenet) after Scott made his post
and tried to link it to an anti-GWB thrust. As others have commented,
the only folks who seem restricted to the ANG-only approach appear to
be you and Scott.

OK, guilty as charged I was honestly trying to keep it on topic.
Respectfully, I'm happy NOT to discuss GWB service record. Nuff said.

OK. So your earlier statement that no ANG units were deployed was
apparently misworded--I would assume that you mean no F-102 units were
activated?

You are correct on that score, I fumble fingered the text when I left
out F-102.

Which would be true enough--but that leaves one wondering
whether F-102 units would indeed have been activated if sufficient
*volunteers* had not stepped forward?

A very small detail regarding F-102 pilots on active duty from Colonel
(PhD) Gross' "Prelude to the Total Force..." page 150

"Pilot shortages due to Southeast Asia operations increasingly
affected the Air Guard. Small numbers of Air Guard F-102 were
encouraged to volunteer for temporary active duty overseas. In July
1968, twenty-four of these pilots were on active duty at bases in
Holland, Germany, Alaska, the Philippines, and Okinawa."


Gee, I was unaware you were so picky... Good enough?

The devil is in the details...

Well, the folks in Bien Hoa did not have to deploy into the theater of
operations after the Gulf resolution, now did they (see, this playing
with finite word definitions can work both ways)?

You win...my sincere apologies for not staying on topic.

I did read where the 509th FIS claims to have been the first
unit to deploy into the RVN after the GT incident--is that wrong?

My humble apologies again, since there were so many deployments to SEA
from back in 1961 up until the GT incident, I honestly don't think a
great deal about which outfit gets the "honor" of being first.

But it is germane to the fact that the USAF already regarded the ANG
as a real, honest to goodness go-to-war asset well before the entry of
GWB into ANG service.

I encourage you to read Gross' book, it might get you to reconsider
that remark.

Regarding the Berlin call-up (there's that expression again) there
were bright spots (no aircraft lost in the deployment) and some less
than stellar deals like three of the four provisional Fighter Wings
BUSTING their ORIs, one actually busted twice. All deployed ANG
tactical fighter (versus interceptor) squadrons were not currently
qualified in conventional surface attack, but had mistaken qualified
in nukes....

Anyway lots of great stuff in the book. Good and bad.

No bad blood. But I get a bit tired when folks like Scott traipse out
the old "the Guard was a bunch of draftdodgers" mantra, ...
The first is a gross exaggeration born of enough folks making the
claim in the past, so it must be true, right?

Again read Gross, he writes..."President Johnson's decision to rely on
draftees rather than reservists raised questions about the expense and
military utility or reserve programs. Many Americans were incensed
that their sons and husbands were being drafted to risk death in
Southeast Asia while men who received drill pay stayed home. The
draft-exempt status of the National Guard, as well as other reserve
programs, became a major incentive to volunteer for those programs."

You can disagree with Gross, but I think he nailed it.

Finally...my apologies, reasonable men can disagree (still scratching
my head over Dan's post) and with that you are welcome to the last
word.

Juvat

Juvat wrote:

Regarding the Berlin call-up (there's that expression again) there
were bright spots (no aircraft lost in the deployment) and some less
than stellar deals like three of the four provisional Fighter Wings
BUSTING their ORIs, one actually busted twice. All deployed ANG
tactical fighter (versus interceptor) squadrons were not currently
qualified in conventional surface attack, but had mistaken qualified
in nukes....

Sometimes stuff just jumps out at me and I've got to comment.

The "omigod, they busted an ORI" business, for example. In January of
'73, the 388th wing at Korat had an ORI. This, commencing just days
after the end of Linebacker II, when the Korat wing exclusively flew
all of the SAM-suppression, both day and night for all the effort.
When we flew all of the EB-66 counter-measures and where we had
successfully absorbed and integrated the three squadron wing of the
354th with A-7s.

The LG, Chief of Maintenance, Chief of supply and Munitions Squadron
CC were all off the base within 24 hours. I became exec to Jack Chain
*(later CINCSAC), as he moved from Wing DO to become LG and "fix"
things as well as respond to the IG report.

Was Korat not "operationally ready"? By whose warped interpretation?

Or, there was the "operationally ready" issue when after a bit of time
in the F-4, I asked if I qualified for the Operational Readiness
Medal, which took three or four years of OR status. I learned that my
time in the F-105 didn't count. I was never "operationally ready"!!!
Despite 110 combat missions, I was never OR, because I never had the
requisite checkride.

Something is occasionally rotten in Denmark and in the Inspector's
offices. It ain't always what the reports say that indicates the fact.


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (ret)
***"When Thunder Rolled:
*** An F-105 Pilot Over N. Vietnam"
*** from Smithsonian Books
ISBN: 1588341038

Juvat wrote in message . ..
Kevin Brooks posted:


By deploying them into the theater of operations from their current
station would be one manner of "calling up" an AC unit.

OK but that's not how I would interpret it when I was active duty.
Different strokes...

I took it as a total force question.

Again, fair enough...not how I read it.

Take away the "strictly"; as it was indeed used in ground attack
missions, albeit not very effectively...why put blinders on only in regards to the F-102's
history?

Not trying to put blinders on it, I did post that Scott was incorrect
on this score. He made an easy mistake.

Sorry to inform you of this, but this thread began to meander
(something that is rather common in Usenet) after Scott made his post
and tried to link it to an anti-GWB thrust. As others have commented,
the only folks who seem restricted to the ANG-only approach appear to
be you and Scott.

OK, guilty as charged I was honestly trying to keep it on topic.
Respectfully, I'm happy NOT to discuss GWB service record. Nuff said.

OK. So your earlier statement that no ANG units were deployed was
apparently misworded--I would assume that you mean no F-102 units were
activated?

You are correct on that score, I fumble fingered the text when I left
out F-102.

Which would be true enough--but that leaves one wondering
whether F-102 units would indeed have been activated if sufficient
*volunteers* had not stepped forward?

A very small detail regarding F-102 pilots on active duty from Colonel
(PhD) Gross' "Prelude to the Total Force..." page 150

"Pilot shortages due to Southeast Asia operations increasingly
affected the Air Guard. Small numbers of Air Guard F-102 were
encouraged to volunteer for temporary active duty overseas. In July
1968, twenty-four of these pilots were on active duty at bases in
Holland, Germany, Alaska, the Philippines, and Okinawa."

I believe what he is describing here was the Palace Alert program; I
had thought that was a SEA-only operation, but in reading some info
found on the web during this discussion I noted that the program sent
ANG pilots to various locales. Since it was/is impossible for the USAF
to activate individuals (other than IRR, which likely had few F-102
pilots at the time), the use of volunteers was required. Had those
volunteers not materialized, the only real solution (given that they
were apparently *required*, not just "nice to have along" assets)
would have been to activate an F-102 squadron (and this could easily
have been the case in 68, as you are well aware of the other
activations of both ANG and ARNG units that happened at this time).



Gee, I was unaware you were so picky... Good enough?

The devil is in the details...

Well, the folks in Bien Hoa did not have to deploy into the theater of
operations after the Gulf resolution, now did they (see, this playing
with finite word definitions can work both ways)?

You win...my sincere apologies for not staying on topic.

I did read where the 509th FIS claims to have been the first
unit to deploy into the RVN after the GT incident--is that wrong?

My humble apologies again, since there were so many deployments to SEA
from back in 1961 up until the GT incident, I honestly don't think a
great deal about which outfit gets the "honor" of being first.

But it is germane to the fact that the USAF already regarded the ANG
as a real, honest to goodness go-to-war asset well before the entry of
GWB into ANG service.

I encourage you to read Gross' book, it might get you to reconsider
that remark.

Regarding the Berlin call-up (there's that expression again) there
were bright spots (no aircraft lost in the deployment) and some less
than stellar deals like three of the four provisional Fighter Wings
BUSTING their ORIs, one actually busted twice. All deployed ANG
tactical fighter (versus interceptor) squadrons were not currently
qualified in conventional surface attack, but had mistaken qualified
in nukes....

Anyway lots of great stuff in the book. Good and bad.

Not unusual. That the units had problems with the ORI is not a
surprise; it leaves wanting the more important question of how good
the pilots and their ground crews were (and yes, a unit, be it ground
or air, with superlative crews could still bust a major inspection,
for as you note "the devil is in the details"). As to the question of
nuclear versus conventional delivery training, the fault would have to
lie with the AC on that one--those units training plans had to be
approved ultimately by the AC side of the house, and if they were that
far off-track, then they had to have either (a) been given bad
training guidance, or (b) were given guidance without requisite
resourcing to allow accomplishment of the additional tasks.

I can recall one of my (Regular Army) tac officers in college, who had
entered active duty back in the mid-70's, commenting about the quality
of Guard units--he was amazed at the teamwork they displayed, if not
their (universal) military bearing. He laughed about his active duty
mortar platoon having been rather humiliated in a competition with an
ARNG mortar platoon that was training with them, said they may have
looked like old geezers who called each other by their first names,
but by golly could they hustle in setting up their tubes and putting
rounds downrange and on-target. And this was during one of the Guard's
worst periods (but then again, it was not such a swell time to be in
the "Volar" army, either).


No bad blood. But I get a bit tired when folks like Scott traipse out
the old "the Guard was a bunch of draftdodgers" mantra, ...
The first is a gross exaggeration born of enough folks making the
claim in the past, so it must be true, right?

Again read Gross, he writes..."President Johnson's decision to rely on
draftees rather than reservists raised questions about the expense and
military utility or reserve programs. Many Americans were incensed
that their sons and husbands were being drafted to risk death in
Southeast Asia while men who received drill pay stayed home. The
draft-exempt status of the National Guard, as well as other reserve
programs, became a major incentive to volunteer for those programs."

You can disagree with Gross, but I think he nailed it.

"Many Americans" also served in the Guard, or had friends or relatives
who did. More than a few thousand of them served in Vietnam (and yes,
there were even cases of Guardsmen volunteering for active duty during
the war), and ISTR something like seven to eight thousand ARNG troops
found themselves deploying to Vietnam during the 68-69 timeframe (a
few arty units, a lot of CS/CSS units, and that infantry brigade that
was broken down to provide replacements to the AC divisions already in
country; even, IIRC, Co D/51st Inf Rgt (Ranger), which was an Indiana
ARNG LRRP unit). I believe Mr. Gross is making a generalization that
does not serve the purposes of accuracy, either in the fact that
Guardsmen did indeed serve in Vietnam (and LBJ's mistake was not their
doing), or that there was some kind of universal groundswell of
identifying the Guard as a "draftdodgers haven".


Finally...my apologies, reasonable men can disagree (still scratching
my head over Dan's post) and with that you are welcome to the last
word.

Hey, I have not seen you step beyond the bounds of amicable discussion
here, nor have I seen you really endorse all of Scott's comments, so
no problem.

Brooks


Juvat

(Kevin Brooks) wrote:

No bad blood. But I get a bit tired when folks like Scott traipse out
the old "the Guard was a bunch of draftdodgers" mantra, not to mention
why he had to even enter into the "bash GWB" mode in the first place.
The first is a gross exaggeration born of enough folks making the
claim in the past, so it must be true, right? The second was just
another attempt at a backhanded swipe at a guy who performed military
service and flew combat aircraft in the defense of this nation-- a
much better alternative to refusing to serve at all, and then
attacking those who did, as many of his then-compatriots did, and none
of which he should be ashamed of, IMO.

Interesting. I mentioned George W. in one post. You have in seven
that I've counted so far, using me as the excuse. Of course, it does
make a good excuse to avoid other questions.

Seems like you have the problem here.

As far as what the NG is/was, I guess it was just coincidence that as
draft rates went up in the sixties, so did guard enlistments and
waiting lists. ....and when they went down, so did......

Pure coincidence, I suppose.





Scott Peterson


If genetic scientists crossed a chicken
with a zebra would they get a four-legged
chicken with its own barcode?