Israeli Air Force to lose Middle East Air Superiority Capability to the Saudis in the near future

"Matt A.00 01 is Matthew Ackerman" wrote in message ...
Arie Kazachin wrote:
In message - "Matt A.00 01 is
Matthew Ackerman" writes:

Arie Kazachin wrote:

[self snip. I know what I wrote]


The IDF intelegence deny that happened as the CIA asked them not to
disclose it. The world was afraid that Nixon had gone off the deep
end and would use SAC Bombers already airborn 24 hours a day and
fire the misiles in the Silos at the Russians as he warned them he
would if they did what you say. There is no declasified information
on Russian Pilots flying missions for the Arab side to this day.
There are of course the rhumors that it happened but no IAF pilot,
no Arab Pilot, and no Soviet Pilot has come forward about such to
this day. Stop inventing stories and reporting unprovable things.
Bottom

[snip. Lost patience to correct what's below after the line above. ]

Despite your baseless claims, it had LONG SINCE beed declassified and
appeared in books and papers. The book "The sky is not the limit" had
been printed in 1990 and it includes this battle description, so the
declassification came before 1990. Out of the 5 downed MiG-21s 3 were
downed by Mirage-IIICJ and two by F-4E. The pilots of Mirages we
Asher Snir, "Avik", Yiftah Spector and the pilots of F-4Es we
Aviem Sela and Avihu Ben-Nun. Find the pilots and ask them :-)
or do some "googling". You'll also probably get it at
"http://www.iaf.org.il/" somewhere under "history". Unfortunately I
can't access it at home - the site designers so heavily "optimized
for MS IE" that my Netscape can't show it correctly.



************************************************** **************************
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* Arie Kazachin, Israel, e-mail:
*

************************************************** **************************
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NOTE: before replying, leave only letters in my domain-name.
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| * / \ o ++ O ++ o
| | |
| |
\ \_)
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Where did it say the downed Mig Pilots were Soviets.


I found it for you.

This is what was written in the old IAF site:


http://www.iaf.org.il/iaf/doa_iis.dl...3.3.6.3.3.html

One of the best known dogfights of the Israeli-Egyptian War of
Attrition was the encounter with MiG-21's flown by Soviet pilots. On
the afternoon hours of June 30th 1970, Israeli Phantoms attacked an
Egyptian radar installation at Suhuna, near the Gulf of Suez, with
other Phantoms and Mirages providing air cover. Soon enough, 6
quartets of Egyptian MiG-21's, flown by Soviet pilots, were scrambled
against the Israelis. In a matter of seconds, the scene was that of a
massive air brawl, which resulted in 5 MiG's being shot down - 3 by
Mirages and 2 by Phantoms

-

Last week the IAF launched a new site and at least for now there isn't
an English section in it.

Here you can find confirmation for the downed soveit pilots story (in
Hebrew):

http://www.iaf.org.il/Templates/Airc...ntPageNumber=2

http://www.iaf.org.il/Templates/Airc...ntPageNumber=2



That was the issue
that you posed and not what planes were involved. Is that why you simply
snipped out your previous words and said you knew what you posted. Should I
put back those quotes I retain the posts I download for the highest number
of days one can enter in that option on OE, I think that is 9,999 days. My
sent copies of all posts is automaticaly kept and I could find it there as
well till I decide it is too old to bother keeping usually about 2 years for
most posts and 3 for business emails sent out from here. I Also if I deem
it important enough flag the sent message and my cleanup is done by a 2
rules in OE.

Rule Sent CLean 1: In SENT folder if Message is flagged Stop executing
message rules.

Rule Sent CLean 2: In SENT folder if message older than 742 days Delete
Message stop executing rules.

Real easy to keep long enough and self clean every time I run OE. So I
unlike you do know what I responded to and you seem to forgotten.

As to 1990 My MS is is Comp Sci, but I hold an associates in Visual arts (NY
School of Vissual Arts) and a BA in History. Every professor would have
called 1990 still recently. The book was written and published (I do have a
copy of it) in 1990, the source is documented and if you check the
documentation out, the second step of researching a topic. That is one
reads it in a footnoted or endnoted source and then goes to the source that
the author used. You would find it was infact declasified only the prior
year 1989. A source is in Historical Terms considered new or recent till it
has had 20 years of reviewing for any mistakes by other historians. Now
that would take that off the "recently" list in 2009 not before as I was
taught.

There are books out on the Battle of Britain written 10 years after the war
using documents that were declasified rigfht after the War. Later many
mistakes as to pertant facts still came out that proved the conculusions of
those Historians wrong. I.E. the exact fighter capacity of the RAF at the
time of the Munich Conference. The first set of documents indicated 20
times the number of fighters then were really there and usefull. That
document came out just after the end of the war. 15 years later a military
historian after talking with mechanics at various air fields at that time,
found a flaw in how the numbers were generated. The document counted old WW
I Biplanes and unarmed trainers as if they were viable fighters. Planes
being scrapped at that time were also counted by the orders of the Air
Marshal of the time. He believed their were Nazi Agents that had access to
the documents and wanted them to think Britain was a lot better armed and
ready than it was.

That is why any good historian will 'think of anything available for less
than 20 years as recent. Real good researching Historians usually leave
anything of the last 20 years as "current events" as it is too knew to
uncover the historical parts of it other then at the most trivial levels.' -
Dr. Buchsbaumb U. Of Prague and Pace University after 1969.


I used to have some of his books and attended 3 of his classes. He escaped
from Hiltler and worked in British Intellegence during WWII and returned to
his home in 1945 taught at Prague and during that famous spring of freedom
published 2 books he had hidden from the Communists then as they fell to the
Warsaw Pack was away on a lecture in London. He and his wife stayed out of
that country and came to the USA. Apon my return and finishing Physical
Rehab for the wounds in action in '67 I attended that school (Pace U) at
their Pleasantville Campus (Westchester County NY) where he was teaching.
He was one of my proffessors and my advisor. He gave "F" on papers that had
too many sources under 20 years old. No topic that came into being during
that 20 year window was ever accepted.

I will abide by his definition of recent not yours, thank you.


--�
MattA
?subject=HepatitusC-Objectives

Matt's Hep-C Story web pages are back at a home. No more drop down ads
to get in your way. http://mywebpages.comcast.net/matta00

Truth about Howard Aubrey AKA madyan67:
http://www.geocities.com/lord_haha_libeler/

Quant wrote:
"Matt A.00 01 is Matthew Ackerman" wrote in
message ...
Arie Kazachin wrote:
In message - "Matt A.00 01 is
Matthew Ackerman" writes:

Arie Kazachin wrote:

[self snip. I know what I wrote]


The IDF intelegence deny that happened as the CIA asked them not to
disclose it. The world was afraid that Nixon had gone off the deep
end and would use SAC Bombers already airborn 24 hours a day and
fire the misiles in the Silos at the Russians as he warned them he
would if they did what you say. There is no declasified
information on Russian Pilots flying missions for the Arab side to
this day. There are of course the rhumors that it happened but no
IAF pilot, no Arab Pilot, and no Soviet Pilot has come forward
about such to this day. Stop inventing stories and reporting
unprovable things. Bottom

[snip. Lost patience to correct what's below after the line above. ]

Despite your baseless claims, it had LONG SINCE beed declassified
and appeared in books and papers. The book "The sky is not the
limit" had been printed in 1990 and it includes this battle
description, so the declassification came before 1990. Out of the 5
downed MiG-21s 3 were downed by Mirage-IIICJ and two by F-4E. The
pilots of Mirages we Asher Snir, "Avik", Yiftah Spector and the
pilots of F-4Es we Aviem Sela and Avihu Ben-Nun. Find the pilots
and ask them :-) or do some "googling". You'll also probably get
it at "http://www.iaf.org.il/" somewhere under "history".
Unfortunately I can't access it at home - the site designers so
heavily "optimized for MS IE" that my Netscape can't show it
correctly.




************************************************** **************************
**
* Arie Kazachin, Israel, e-mail:
*


************************************************** **************************
**
NOTE: before replying, leave only letters in my
domain-name. Sorry, SPAM trap. ___ .__/ |
| O /
_/ /
| | I HAVE NOWHERE ELSE TO GO !!!
| |
| | |
| | /O\
| _ \_______[|(.)|]_______/
| * / \ o ++ O ++ o
| | |
| |
\ \_)
\ |
\ |
\ |
\ |
\ |
\ |
\ |
\_|

Where did it say the downed Mig Pilots were Soviets.


I found it for you.

This is what was written in the old IAF site:


http://www.iaf.org.il/iaf/doa_iis.dl...3.3.6.3.3.html

One of the best known dogfights of the Israeli-Egyptian War of
Attrition was the encounter with MiG-21's flown by Soviet pilots. On
the afternoon hours of June 30th 1970, Israeli Phantoms attacked an
Egyptian radar installation at Suhuna, near the Gulf of Suez, with
other Phantoms and Mirages providing air cover. Soon enough, 6
quartets of Egyptian MiG-21's, flown by Soviet pilots, were scrambled
against the Israelis. In a matter of seconds, the scene was that of a
massive air brawl, which resulted in 5 MiG's being shot down - 3 by
Mirages and 2 by Phantoms

-

Last week the IAF launched a new site and at least for now there isn't
an English section in it.

Here you can find confirmation for the downed soveit pilots story (in
Hebrew):



http://www.iaf.org.il/Templates/Airc...=HE&lobbyID=69
&folderID=78&docfolderID=184&docID=18175&currentPa geNumber=2



http://www.iaf.org.il/Templates/Airc...=HE&lobbyID=69
&folderID=78&docfolderID=184&docID=18173&currentPa geNumber=2



That was the issue
that you posed and not what planes were involved. Is that why you
simply snipped out your previous words and said you knew what you
posted. Should I put back those quotes I retain the posts I download
for the highest number of days one can enter in that option on OE, I
think that is 9,999 days. My sent copies of all posts is
automaticaly kept and I could find it there as well till I decide it
is too old to bother keeping usually about 2 years for most posts
and 3 for business emails sent out from here. I Also if I deem it
important enough flag the sent message and my cleanup is done by a 2
rules in OE.

Rule Sent CLean 1: In SENT folder if Message is flagged Stop
executing message rules.

Rule Sent CLean 2: In SENT folder if message older than 742 days
Delete Message stop executing rules.

Real easy to keep long enough and self clean every time I run OE.
So I unlike you do know what I responded to and you seem to
forgotten.

As to 1990 My MS is is Comp Sci, but I hold an associates in Visual
arts (NY School of Vissual Arts) and a BA in History. Every
professor would have called 1990 still recently. The book was
written and published (I do have a copy of it) in 1990, the source
is documented and if you check the documentation out, the second
step of researching a topic. That is one reads it in a footnoted or
endnoted source and then goes to the source that the author used.
You would find it was infact declasified only the prior year 1989.
A source is in Historical Terms considered new or recent till it has
had 20 years of reviewing for any mistakes by other historians. Now
that would take that off the "recently" list in 2009 not before as I
was taught.

There are books out on the Battle of Britain written 10 years after
the war using documents that were declasified rigfht after the War.
Later many mistakes as to pertant facts still came out that proved
the conculusions of those Historians wrong. I.E. the exact fighter
capacity of the RAF at the time of the Munich Conference. The first
set of documents indicated 20 times the number of fighters then were
really there and usefull. That document came out just after the
end of the war. 15 years later a military historian after talking
with mechanics at various air fields at that time, found a flaw in
how the numbers were generated. The document counted old WW I
Biplanes and unarmed trainers as if they were viable fighters.
Planes being scrapped at that time were also counted by the orders
of the Air Marshal of the time. He believed their were Nazi Agents
that had access to the documents and wanted them to think Britain
was a lot better armed and ready than it was.

That is why any good historian will 'think of anything available for
less than 20 years as recent. Real good researching Historians
usually leave anything of the last 20 years as "current events" as
it is too knew to uncover the historical parts of it other then at
the most trivial levels.' - Dr. Buchsbaumb U. Of Prague and Pace
University after 1969.


I used to have some of his books and attended 3 of his classes. He
escaped from Hiltler and worked in British Intellegence during WWII
and returned to his home in 1945 taught at Prague and during that
famous spring of freedom published 2 books he had hidden from the
Communists then as they fell to the Warsaw Pack was away on a
lecture in London. He and his wife stayed out of that country and
came to the USA. Apon my return and finishing Physical Rehab for
the wounds in action in '67 I attended that school (Pace U) at their
Pleasantville Campus (Westchester County NY) where he was teaching.
He was one of my proffessors and my advisor. He gave "F" on papers
that had too many sources under 20 years old. No topic that came
into being during that 20 year window was ever accepted.

I will abide by his definition of recent not yours, thank you.


--�
MattA
?subject=HepatitusC-Objectives

Matt's Hep-C Story web pages are back at a home. No more drop down
ads to get in your way. http://mywebpages.comcast.net/matta00

Truth about Howard Aubrey AKA madyan67:
http://www.geocities.com/lord_haha_libeler/

So then by your own statement the IAF was supperior to the Soviets?

I may say I stand corrected on one thing though, I assumed that the
discussion was about the war time '67 and the War on Yom Kippur. If these
IAF pilots shot down Soviet Piloted Migs they were better pilots as the
Israelis fight most of their air to air battles with cannon fire not air to
air heat seeking rockets. That requires geting in close and out flying the
enemy planes and the pilots. Israel due to this found ways to reload the
Gpods of their planes much faster than any other nation had. The US sent
their ground crew instructors to study how Iseal in Yom Kippur war put US
planes refuled and reloaded back in the air in 15 minutes when the US ground
crews needed an hour. Israel during the wars often found themeselves with
more Combat ready pilots than planes. Actually it was always that way as
the planes meant buying planes and a lot of spare parts. Not every pilot
could fly 24 * 7 any way for the entire war. So while they refitted the
planes with more fuel, refilled Gpods, and other weapons used up, they often
changed pilots allowing the pilot that already flew 1 to 5 missions to get
some rest and a fresh rested pilot took his place. At the start of the '67
war it was fairly well known that for every 5 planes they had 7 pilots.
Because they always had fewer planes then the Arabs they had to have better
pilots.

Now you indicate they outclassed the Soviets who would have sent their best
in not their worst.

LOL to the argument that the IDF was not the best.


--�
MattA
?subject=HepatitusC-Objectives

Matt's Hep-C Story web pages are back at a home. No more drop down ads
to get in your way. http://mywebpages.comcast.net/matta00

Truth about Howard Aubrey AKA madyan67:
http://www.geocities.com/lord_haha_libeler/

"Matt A.00 01 is Matthew Ackerman" wrote in message
...
Quant wrote:
"Matt A.00 01 is Matthew Ackerman" wrote in
message ...
Arie Kazachin wrote:
In message - "Matt A.00 01 is
Matthew Ackerman" writes:
snip
I may say I stand corrected on one thing though, I assumed that the
discussion was about the war time '67 and the War on Yom Kippur. If these
IAF pilots shot down Soviet Piloted Migs they were better pilots as the
Israelis fight most of their air to air battles with cannon fire not air
to
air heat seeking rockets.

Actually, the situation in that engagement was so that the Israelis have
purposedly set-up a trap: they have sent Phantoms to hit that Egyptian radar
station and act as a demonstration group, knowing that any attack in _that_
area would cause the Soviets to react - not Egyptians. The purpose was to
deliver a message to the Soviets: don't play with us. When the Soviets
reacted as expected, additional groups of Israeli Mirages and Phantoms - all
flown by hand-picked pilots, every single one of which had far more fresh
combat experience than all the Soviets together - hit them from the side.

So, the Soviets fell to their own ignorance as much as they did to missiles
fired from their fighters: they considered themselves "better" than the
Israelis because of what they were at hom ("best" Soviet pilots), not
because of their true combat experience (which was 0). Also because they
would not listen to the "stupid Arabs", which were warning them that new air
combat methods and weapons were needed in order the counter the Israelis.
The Soviets believed they did not need anything better than MiG-21s and
their nifty weaponry. Israelis, on the other side, concentrated all of their
best pilots to deliver the message: these were excellently trained in
air-to-air gunnery, and also knew the MiG-21 and the weaknesses of its
weapons system so well, they could exploit this in combat to their
advantage.

The Israelis knew, for example, that the R-13 - (AA-2 "Atoll", the main
air-to-air missile used by the MiG-21) - was completely useless in air
combat, so they could maneuver and use afterburners without the fear of
being hit, while their own missiles were functioning. They were, however,
neither "super" nor the "best": they were only better than the Soviets and
the Egyptians at the time and place. Of course, that was what counted and
what was important at the time and place.

As a matter of fact several of "best" Israeli "aces" are known for poor
section discipline: they were fighting alone, leaving their wingmen alone
and without support (which caused quite some losses in air combats in 1973,
when the Arabs got better).

That requires geting in close and out flying the
enemy planes and the pilots. Israel due to this found ways to reload the
Gpods of their planes much faster than any other nation had.

Hm, somehow I have a feeling you're missing here too. Guns were important
mainly during the Six Day War. Subsequently, an increasing number of kills
were scored by missiles.
If I recall it exactly all the Israeli kills against Soviets on 30 July 1970
were scored by missiles, just for example....

The US sent
their ground crew instructors to study how Iseal in Yom Kippur war put US
planes refuled and reloaded back in the air in 15 minutes when the US
ground
crews needed an hour.

The turn-around times were more important on the first day of the Six Day
War, in 1967, than in 1970 or 1973: on the first day of the Six Day War the
Israelis had to fly as much in order to keep the enemy under the constant
pressure. The situation changed already on the next day, when the threat
from Arab air forces was minimized. On specific days during the October War,
1973, the IDF/AF flew not more than 150-200 sorties, while having something
like 400 combat aircraft at the time. Means, obviously less than 50% of the
force was flying at all. So, I doubt there was a need for the US to send
anybody to Israel in 1973 to see these Israeli super-turbo turn-around
times...

In fact, in 1973 the Israelis had nothing like turn-around times of 15
minutes: this was neither really needed, nor advisible, and in the cases
where it was attempted the results were heavy losses. The first reason was
that the pilots could not be properly briefed for such operations as fought
in 1973: as after such fast turn-around times the pilots were sent to hit
targets they did not know where to find they got shot down while looking
around... On the first day of the Six Day War, the situation was simplier,
as they had to strike mainly Arab airfields.

Also, in 1973 the IDF/AF was flying Phantoms: a single Phantom can carry as
many bombs as four or more Mirages - and deliver them with far better
precision, over a longer range, at a higher speed. A "salvo" of 12 Mk.82s
dropped from a single F-4E in 1973 could shut down an Arab airfield for
several hours: in 1973 one needed at least four Mirages, or SMB.2s, or
Vautors to do the same job. Consequently they did not need fly as many
sorties as in 1967.

Israel during the wars often found themeselves with
more Combat ready pilots than planes. Actually it was always that way as
the planes meant buying planes and a lot of spare parts.

According to this logic of yours: buying spare parts = bad.

Hehe, I doubt anybody working in any air force could agree with this....

Not every pilot
could fly 24 * 7 any way for the entire war.

As a matter of fact, nobody can do this. Not "even" the Israelis: please,
permit them to remain human beings. Four sorties a day - and for a single
day - yes, but that's already the limit. Three a day for duration of three,
four, perhaps five days. That can function too. But more would only decrease
the capability of the pilot: it would simply drain him down.

So while they refitted the
planes with more fuel, refilled Gpods, and other weapons used up, they
often
changed pilots allowing the pilot that already flew 1 to 5 missions to get
some rest and a fresh rested pilot took his place.

Could you name a single Israeli pilot that flew five sorties in one day,
either in 1967 or 1973? I couldn't. Feel free to correct me, but I can only
remember several that flew four sorties on the first day of the Six Day War,
not a single one that flew as much in 1973.

Now you indicate they outclassed the Soviets who would have sent their
best
in not their worst.

This is nothing special: the fact that the Soviets considered their "best"
pilots "best" means not these were indeed the "best" around. They've got
shot down in air combats fought on a number of other places too... You can
bet your annual income that the same can be said for the Israelis too: some
of their "best" were shot down several times. So also the "best" Arab pilot
ever, Syrian Bassam Hamshu, who shot down nine Israelis in air combats
between 1970 and 1973 - and then got himself shot down and killed in 1982:
there is always somebody who's _better_.....

Tom Cooper
Co-Author:
Iran-Iraq War in the Air, 1980-1988:
http://www.acig.org/pg1/content.php
and,
Iranian F-4 Phantom II Units in Combat:
http://www.osprey-publishing.co.uk/t...hp/title=S6585

Tom Cooper wrote:
"Matt A.00 01 is Matthew Ackerman" wrote in
message ...
Quant wrote:
"Matt A.00 01 is Matthew Ackerman" wrote in
message ...
Arie Kazachin wrote:
In message - "Matt A.00 01 is
Matthew Ackerman" writes:
snip
I may say I stand corrected on one thing though, I assumed that the
discussion was about the war time '67 and the War on Yom Kippur. If
these IAF pilots shot down Soviet Piloted Migs they were better
pilots as the Israelis fight most of their air to air battles with
cannon fire not air
to
air heat seeking rockets.

Actually, the situation in that engagement was so that the Israelis
have purposedly set-up a trap: they have sent Phantoms to hit that
Egyptian radar station and act as a demonstration group, knowing that
any attack in _that_ area would cause the Soviets to react - not
Egyptians. The purpose was to deliver a message to the Soviets: don't
play with us. When the Soviets reacted as expected, additional groups
of Israeli Mirages and Phantoms - all flown by hand-picked pilots,
every single one of which had far more fresh combat experience than
all the Soviets together - hit them from the side.

So, the Soviets fell to their own ignorance as much as they did to
missiles fired from their fighters: they considered themselves
"better" than the Israelis because of what they were at hom ("best"
Soviet pilots), not because of their true combat experience (which
was 0). Also because they would not listen to the "stupid Arabs",
which were warning them that new air combat methods and weapons were
needed in order the counter the Israelis. The Soviets believed they
did not need anything better than MiG-21s and their nifty weaponry.
Israelis, on the other side, concentrated all of their best pilots to
deliver the message: these were excellently trained in air-to-air
gunnery, and also knew the MiG-21 and the weaknesses of its weapons
system so well, they could exploit this in combat to their advantage.

The Israelis knew, for example, that the R-13 - (AA-2 "Atoll", the
main air-to-air missile used by the MiG-21) - was completely useless
in air combat, so they could maneuver and use afterburners without
the fear of being hit, while their own missiles were functioning.
They were, however, neither "super" nor the "best": they were only
better than the Soviets and the Egyptians at the time and place. Of
course, that was what counted and what was important at the time and
place.

As a matter of fact several of "best" Israeli "aces" are known for
poor section discipline: they were fighting alone, leaving their
wingmen alone and without support (which caused quite some losses in
air combats in 1973, when the Arabs got better).

That requires geting in close and out flying the
enemy planes and the pilots. Israel due to this found ways to
reload the Gpods of their planes much faster than any other nation
had.

Hm, somehow I have a feeling you're missing here too. Guns were
important mainly during the Six Day War. Subsequently, an increasing
number of kills were scored by missiles.
If I recall it exactly all the Israeli kills against Soviets on 30
July 1970 were scored by missiles, just for example....

The US sent
their ground crew instructors to study how Iseal in Yom Kippur war
put US planes refuled and reloaded back in the air in 15 minutes
when the US
ground
crews needed an hour.

The turn-around times were more important on the first day of the Six
Day War, in 1967, than in 1970 or 1973: on the first day of the Six
Day War the Israelis had to fly as much in order to keep the enemy
under the constant pressure. The situation changed already on the
next day, when the threat from Arab air forces was minimized. On
specific days during the October War, 1973, the IDF/AF flew not more
than 150-200 sorties, while having something like 400 combat aircraft
at the time. Means, obviously less than 50% of the force was flying
at all. So, I doubt there was a need for the US to send anybody to
Israel in 1973 to see these Israeli super-turbo turn-around times...

In fact, in 1973 the Israelis had nothing like turn-around times of 15
minutes: this was neither really needed, nor advisible, and in the
cases where it was attempted the results were heavy losses. The first
reason was that the pilots could not be properly briefed for such
operations as fought in 1973: as after such fast turn-around times
the pilots were sent to hit targets they did not know where to find
they got shot down while looking around... On the first day of the
Six Day War, the situation was simplier, as they had to strike mainly
Arab airfields.

Also, in 1973 the IDF/AF was flying Phantoms: a single Phantom can
carry as many bombs as four or more Mirages - and deliver them with
far better precision, over a longer range, at a higher speed. A
"salvo" of 12 Mk.82s dropped from a single F-4E in 1973 could shut
down an Arab airfield for several hours: in 1973 one needed at least
four Mirages, or SMB.2s, or Vautors to do the same job. Consequently
they did not need fly as many sorties as in 1967.

Israel during the wars often found themeselves with
more Combat ready pilots than planes. Actually it was always that
way as the planes meant buying planes and a lot of spare parts.

According to this logic of yours: buying spare parts = bad.

No not bad just added expense that the Israeli budget even with the US aid
could not afford. Also having more piltots then planes allowed for more
long time missions when the same pilot would not be taking that plane out
again that day but another pilot would who was rested and well briefed on
the next mission well prior to the plane landing and being refitted for that
mission. In the Six day war after the first day against Egypt, many of the
sorties were flown against the Syrian and Israeli Air Forces to stop the
danger of the air raids that the Jordanians did pull off in the early hours
of the war. Shooting down most of their best pilots supressed them to
defense only. The Syrians lost too many planes also in one day engagement.
By the third day no arab air force threatened Israel or its forces. They
were a nullified threat. In the six day war also a Russian Frieter and 2
ships of their line were attacked in Port Alexandria. They had no air cover
to speak of and were heavily enough damaged to flee the waters entirely to
Lybian Waters and harbor to perform some repairs and set off again to sea
ASAP. After those first three days the majority of IAF activities was close
ground support missions to take out bunkers, Tanks, other Armored Viechles
as well as troops. This is how the Egyptian and Syrian Ground forces kept
finding any defendable position unatenable. Israel did continue to use the
fast refiting time during that time. They were handed known fixed locations
to hit, and then any target of opurtunity as well as those strikes that the
ground troops called in.

In close ground support flying the pilot must be well rested. When he takes
off he only knows what sector on he is to patrol. He has no designated
targets to be briefed on. His targets are communicated to him from the
ground forces that need an airstrike at a set of co-ordinates. If there is
time he does a flyover at susonic speed and Id's his target(s) and then on
the next pass unloads it. Sometimes he is asked for specific ordinence and
a direction of the attack. That is common when they are against a line of
heavy firing from hidden troops. They ask for Nalpalm from one direction
from a start point. That causes a large line of incinerating fire that
cannot be put out till it all burns off. The pilot only knows that he and
the number of planes that will be in that sector. Nothing is known about
what targets he will hit, when or where in that sector. If on his return to
the field he still has ordinence and can find a target of oportunity he will
use what is left to take that out.

Briefing time is not needed for those missions, just pilots that are rested
and planes loaded with the ordinence and fuel. How long does it take for a
tired pilot to get out of his plane and his rested replacement get in. Not
two hours, not one hour, but perhaps about 15 minutes of them climbing and
talking about the plane's handling. So a 15 minute turn around is a good
and better way to go. The other 50 planes were incase another nation joined
in the fray and they needed to scramble their planes in defense.


Hehe, I doubt anybody working in any air force could agree with
this....

Not every pilot
could fly 24 * 7 any way for the entire war.

As a matter of fact, nobody can do this. Not "even" the Israelis:
please, permit them to remain human beings. Four sorties a day - and
for a single day - yes, but that's already the limit. Three a day for
duration of three, four, perhaps five days. That can function too.
But more would only decrease the capability of the pilot: it would
simply drain him down.


But make the ratio of pilots to planes heavier on the number of pilots to
planes and the IAF could give the pilots a break after short periods and
less sorties. That is how the IAF opperated in both the Six Day and Yom
Kippur Wars as well as against the Palestinians in Lebanon. Any tired pilot
could be given a break when he landed and another pilot would be available
to relieve him for some time to rest.


So while they refitted the
planes with more fuel, refilled Gpods, and other weapons used up,
they
often
changed pilots allowing the pilot that already flew 1 to 5 missions
to get some rest and a fresh rested pilot took his place.

Could you name a single Israeli pilot that flew five sorties in one
day, either in 1967 or 1973? I couldn't. Feel free to correct me, but
I can only remember several that flew four sorties on the first day
of the Six Day War, not a single one that flew as much in 1973.


Over the 1/4 of the first wave against Egypt flew 5 sortees the first day in
'67. Many of these raides went very quickly just take out the air fields
some key roadways and rail line. Also they were the ones that bombed some
Russian Ships in Port Alexandria sending them packing that day. That was
their fifth sortee. The story about this was on the History Channel as well
as in a book by one of the lead pilots, (I do not rememeber his name). The
Show on the History Channel was one of a series called "Air Power".


Now you indicate they outclassed the Soviets who would have sent
their
best
in not their worst.

This is nothing special: the fact that the Soviets considered their
"best" pilots "best" means not these were indeed the "best" around.
They've got shot down in air combats fought on a number of other
places too... You can bet your annual income that the same can be
said for the Israelis too: some of their "best" were shot down
several times. So also the "best" Arab pilot ever, Syrian Bassam
Hamshu, who shot down nine Israelis in air combats between 1970 and
1973 - and then got himself shot down and killed in 1982: there is
always somebody who's _better_.....

Tom Cooper
Co-Author:
Iran-Iraq War in the Air, 1980-1988:
http://www.acig.org/pg1/content.php
and,
Iranian F-4 Phantom II Units in Combat:
http://www.osprey-publishing.co.uk/t...hp/title=S6585



--�
MattA
?subject=HepatitusC-Objectives

Matt's Hep-C Story web pages are back at a home. No more drop down ads
to get in your way. http://mywebpages.comcast.net/matta00

Truth about Howard Aubrey AKA madyan67:
http://www.geocities.com/lord_haha_libeler/

"Matt A.00 01 is Matthew Ackerman" wrote in message
...
Tom Cooper wrote:
"Matt A.00 01 is Matthew Ackerman" wrote in
message ...
Quant wrote:
"Matt A.00 01 is Matthew Ackerman" wrote in
message ...
Arie Kazachin wrote:
In message - "Matt A.00 01 is
Matthew Ackerman" writes:
snip

Israel during the wars often found themeselves with
more Combat ready pilots than planes. Actually it was always that
way as the planes meant buying planes and a lot of spare parts.

According to this logic of yours: buying spare parts = bad.

No not bad just added expense that the Israeli budget even with the US aid
could not afford.

I don't remember to have ever heard about any such problems. As a matter of
fact, the Israeli defence budget doubled between 1972 and 1974, and at the
time the USA - also in the sence of the Nixon's Doctrine - trippled the
worth of their aid projects for Israel. The problems with the Israeli
defence budgets which not even the US aid could support developed only in
1986-1987, at the time of terrible economic problems and a massive inflation
in Israel.

Also having more piltots then planes allowed for more
long time missions when the same pilot would not be taking that plane out
again that day but another pilot would who was rested and well briefed on
the next mission well prior to the plane landing and being refitted for
that
mission.

But how many really "long-range" missions were flown in 1973? The most
distanced targets were Homs in Syria and el-Mansoura in Egypt. That's what -
250-300km, and that because of the over-the-sea leg, in order to avoid the
enemy SAM-belts.

Besides, this argument of yours is contradictive to your explanations about
pilots flying five and more sorties a day: why should they, if there were
enough pilots?

As said: the tempo of operations was nowhere as high as in 1973 as it was on
THE FIRST DAY (only) in 1967. I tried to explain why several times already,
and can't help if you ignored this.

Shooting down most of their best pilots supressed them to
defense only.

Err, actually the Egyptians reorganized and from the third day of the war
hit hard on Israeli troops moving along the roads on Sinai. In that sence,
the EAF lost most of its combat strenght, that's truth, but it never quit
fighting.

The Syrians lost too many planes also in one day engagement.

The Syrians lost most of their planes on the ground. In air battles fought
over the Syrian airfields it was 6:2 for the Israelis, if I recall all the
details correctly. In total, however, the SyAAF was not as heavily damaged
as the EAF, and certainly not as heavily as the RJAF (which lost of all its
combat aircraft) - and none of the top Syrian pilot was killed (well, not in
1967: two or three were KIA in the War of Attrition; one in 1973, and at
least two in 1982).

By the third day no arab air force threatened Israel or its forces.

You should ask the Israeli vets about this: there is even pictorial evidence
about "non-threatening" (Algerian-supplied) Egyptian MiG-17s bombing Israeli
column on Sinai, and several trucks going up in flame... Just because the
Israeli media is not talking about such attacks (over 100) it doesn't mean
they never happened.

In the six day war also a Russian Frieter and 2
ships of their line were attacked in Port Alexandria. They had no air
cover
to speak of and were heavily enough damaged to flee the waters entirely to
Lybian Waters and harbor to perform some repairs and set off again to sea
ASAP.

Aha. What was the name of this freighter? This is the first time I heard
about any kind of air strikes against targets in the Alexandria area, in
June 1967. They are not mentioned in any of at least a dozen of books and
three dozens of articles I have to the topic of that air war....

After those first three days the majority of IAF activities was close
ground support missions to take out bunkers, Tanks, other Armored Viechles
as well as troops. This is how the Egyptian and Syrian Ground forces kept
finding any defendable position unatenable.

Not truth either. Egyptian Gen. Amer did a mistake (because of which he was
later relieved of command and commited suicide) by ordering the troops on
Sinai to pull back towards the Canal. In this way he draw his troops out of
their well-dug in positions into the open, where they were hit by the air.
This pull-back resulted in a rout, in which the Egyptians suffered over
30.000 KIA, MIA, and injured for almost nothing in return. If they remained
in their positions along the Israeli border and fought it is 100% sure they
would have not suffered similar losses.

The Syrians, on the contrary, just sat there and wait, and then - when the
Israelis were on the end with their strenght, they started pulling out of
Golan. They were not routed, however: quite on the contrary, they inflicted
heavy losses to the IDF. The 7th AB, for example, had only seven tanks
remaining at the time of the cease-fire.

In close ground support flying the pilot must be well rested. When he
takes
off he only knows what sector on he is to patrol. He has no designated
targets to be briefed on. His targets are communicated to him from the
ground forces that need an airstrike at a set of co-ordinates.

Yeah, this was tried on 7, 8, 9 and 10 October 1973, with the result that
the IDF/AF lost over 80 combat aircraft shot down and over 150 damaged...

If there is
time he does a flyover at susonic speed and Id's his target(s) and then on
the next pass unloads it. Sometimes he is asked for specific ordinence
and
a direction of the attack. That is common when they are against a line of
heavy firing from hidden troops. They ask for Nalpalm from one direction
from a start point. That causes a large line of incinerating fire that
cannot be put out till it all burns off. The pilot only knows that he and
the number of planes that will be in that sector. Nothing is known about
what targets he will hit, when or where in that sector. If on his return
to
the field he still has ordinence and can find a target of oportunity he
will
use what is left to take that out.

Sorry, but I doubt I ever read anything as senseless as this.

Briefing time is not needed for those missions, just pilots that are
rested
and planes loaded with the ordinence and fuel.

Aha. Briefings are not needed now either? You don't really know what are you
talking about, or?

Not every pilot
could fly 24 * 7 any way for the entire war.

As a matter of fact, nobody can do this. Not "even" the Israelis:
please, permit them to remain human beings. Four sorties a day - and
for a single day - yes, but that's already the limit. Three a day for
duration of three, four, perhaps five days. That can function too.
But more would only decrease the capability of the pilot: it would
simply drain him down.


But make the ratio of pilots to planes heavier on the number of pilots to
planes and the IAF could give the pilots a break after short periods and
less sorties. That is how the IAF opperated in both the Six Day and Yom
Kippur Wars as well as against the Palestinians in Lebanon. Any tired
pilot
could be given a break when he landed and another pilot would be available
to relieve him for some time to rest.

In the war, Matt, there are no "tired" or "rested" pilots: there are pilots
that can fly and others that can't. Period.

You have several combat-experienced pilots on this NG: go and ask Ed Rasimus
if he would explain it any other way.

So while they refitted the
planes with more fuel, refilled Gpods, and other weapons used up,
they
often
changed pilots allowing the pilot that already flew 1 to 5 missions
to get some rest and a fresh rested pilot took his place.

Could you name a single Israeli pilot that flew five sorties in one
day, either in 1967 or 1973? I couldn't. Feel free to correct me, but
I can only remember several that flew four sorties on the first day
of the Six Day War, not a single one that flew as much in 1973.


Over the 1/4 of the first wave against Egypt flew 5 sortees the first day
in
'67.

Look: I asked you for names. I can mention names of the one or two IDF/AF
pilots that flew four missions on that day. You say one quarter of them did
so. OK. Can you mention even one name of an IDF/AF pilot that flew five
sorties on that day?

The story about this was on the History Channel as well
as in a book by one of the lead pilots, (I do not rememeber his name).
The
Show on the History Channel was one of a series called "Air Power".

Oh, now I understand everything. Thank's Lord, there is a "History Channel".
You never came to the idea that they could be wrong about this?

Have you ever heard about some stuff called "books" or something similar?
I've heard these are made of paper and ink, and one might be forced to go to
the so-called "book-shops" or "libraries" in order to get them, and then
even have to "read" (spelling?) these too....

But, they say one can learn quite some stuff from reading these strange
things.

Tom Cooper
Co-Author:
Iran-Iraq War in the Air, 1980-1988:
http://www.acig.org/pg1/content.php
and,
Iranian F-4 Phantom II Units in Combat:
http://www.osprey-publishing.co.uk/t...hp/title=S6585

Please Tom, keep your humor in check, just when I relax to take a sip
of tea I get to the end of your posting, and read about
'books'.... please stop before it is fatal to someone!
--
G Hassenpflug * IJN & JMSDF equipment/history fan

Tom Cooper wrote:
"Matt A.00 01 is Matthew Ackerman" wrote in
message ...
Tom Cooper wrote:
"Matt A.00 01 is Matthew Ackerman" wrote in
message ...
Quant wrote:
"Matt A.00 01 is Matthew Ackerman" wrote in
message ...
Arie Kazachin wrote:
In message - "Matt A.00 01
is Matthew Ackerman" writes:
snip

Israel during the wars often found themeselves with
more Combat ready pilots than planes. Actually it was always that
way as the planes meant buying planes and a lot of spare parts.

According to this logic of yours: buying spare parts = bad.

No not bad just added expense that the Israeli budget even with the
US aid could not afford.

I don't remember to have ever heard about any such problems. As a
matter of fact, the Israeli defence budget doubled between 1972 and
1974, and at the time the USA - also in the sence of the Nixon's
Doctrine - trippled the worth of their aid projects for Israel. The
problems with the Israeli defence budgets which not even the US aid
could support developed only in 1986-1987, at the time of terrible
economic problems and a massive inflation in Israel.

Also having more piltots then planes allowed for more
long time missions when the same pilot would not be taking that
plane out again that day but another pilot would who was rested and
well briefed on the next mission well prior to the plane landing and
being refitted for
that
mission.

But how many really "long-range" missions were flown in 1973? The most
distanced targets were Homs in Syria and el-Mansoura in Egypt. That's
what - 250-300km, and that because of the over-the-sea leg, in order
to avoid the enemy SAM-belts.

Besides, this argument of yours is contradictive to your explanations
about pilots flying five and more sorties a day: why should they, if
there were enough pilots?

As said: the tempo of operations was nowhere as high as in 1973 as it
was on THE FIRST DAY (only) in 1967. I tried to explain why several
times already, and can't help if you ignored this.

Shooting down most of their best pilots supressed them to
defense only.

Err, actually the Egyptians reorganized and from the third day of the
war hit hard on Israeli troops moving along the roads on Sinai. In
that sence, the EAF lost most of its combat strenght, that's truth,
but it never quit fighting.

The Syrians lost too many planes also in one day engagement.

The Syrians lost most of their planes on the ground. In air battles
fought over the Syrian airfields it was 6:2 for the Israelis, if I
recall all the details correctly. In total, however, the SyAAF was
not as heavily damaged as the EAF, and certainly not as heavily as
the RJAF (which lost of all its combat aircraft) - and none of the
top Syrian pilot was killed (well, not in 1967: two or three were KIA
in the War of Attrition; one in 1973, and at least two in 1982).

By the third day no arab air force threatened Israel or its forces.

You should ask the Israeli vets about this: there is even pictorial
evidence about "non-threatening" (Algerian-supplied) Egyptian MiG-17s
bombing Israeli column on Sinai, and several trucks going up in
flame... Just because the Israeli media is not talking about such
attacks (over 100) it doesn't mean they never happened.

In the six day war also a Russian Frieter and 2
ships of their line were attacked in Port Alexandria. They had no
air
cover
to speak of and were heavily enough damaged to flee the waters
entirely to Lybian Waters and harbor to perform some repairs and set
off again to sea ASAP.

Aha. What was the name of this freighter? This is the first time I
heard about any kind of air strikes against targets in the Alexandria
area, in June 1967. They are not mentioned in any of at least a dozen
of books and three dozens of articles I have to the topic of that air
war....

After those first three days the majority of IAF activities was close
ground support missions to take out bunkers, Tanks, other Armored
Viechles as well as troops. This is how the Egyptian and Syrian
Ground forces kept finding any defendable position unatenable.

Not truth either. Egyptian Gen. Amer did a mistake (because of which
he was later relieved of command and commited suicide) by ordering
the troops on Sinai to pull back towards the Canal. In this way he
draw his troops out of their well-dug in positions into the open,
where they were hit by the air. This pull-back resulted in a rout, in
which the Egyptians suffered over
30.000 KIA, MIA, and injured for almost nothing in return. If they
remained in their positions along the Israeli border and fought it is
100% sure they would have not suffered similar losses.

The Syrians, on the contrary, just sat there and wait, and then -
when the Israelis were on the end with their strenght, they started
pulling out of Golan. They were not routed, however: quite on the
contrary, they inflicted heavy losses to the IDF. The 7th AB, for
example, had only seven tanks remaining at the time of the cease-fire.

In close ground support flying the pilot must be well rested. When
he
takes
off he only knows what sector on he is to patrol. He has no
designated targets to be briefed on. His targets are communicated
to him from the ground forces that need an airstrike at a set of
co-ordinates.

Yeah, this was tried on 7, 8, 9 and 10 October 1973, with the result
that the IDF/AF lost over 80 combat aircraft shot down and over 150
damaged...

If there is
time he does a flyover at susonic speed and Id's his target(s) and
then on the next pass unloads it. Sometimes he is asked for
specific ordinence
and
a direction of the attack. That is common when they are against a
line of heavy firing from hidden troops. They ask for Nalpalm from
one direction from a start point. That causes a large line of
incinerating fire that cannot be put out till it all burns off. The
pilot only knows that he and the number of planes that will be in
that sector. Nothing is known about what targets he will hit, when
or where in that sector. If on his return
to
the field he still has ordinence and can find a target of oportunity
he
will
use what is left to take that out.

Sorry, but I doubt I ever read anything as senseless as this.

Briefing time is not needed for those missions, just pilots that are
rested
and planes loaded with the ordinence and fuel.

Aha. Briefings are not needed now either? You don't really know what
are you talking about, or?

Not every pilot
could fly 24 * 7 any way for the entire war.

As a matter of fact, nobody can do this. Not "even" the Israelis:
please, permit them to remain human beings. Four sorties a day - and
for a single day - yes, but that's already the limit. Three a day
for duration of three, four, perhaps five days. That can function
too. But more would only decrease the capability of the pilot: it
would simply drain him down.


But make the ratio of pilots to planes heavier on the number of
pilots to planes and the IAF could give the pilots a break after
short periods and less sorties. That is how the IAF opperated in
both the Six Day and Yom Kippur Wars as well as against the
Palestinians in Lebanon. Any tired
pilot
could be given a break when he landed and another pilot would be
available to relieve him for some time to rest.

In the war, Matt, there are no "tired" or "rested" pilots: there are
pilots that can fly and others that can't. Period.

You have several combat-experienced pilots on this NG: go and ask Ed
Rasimus if he would explain it any other way.

So while they refitted the
planes with more fuel, refilled Gpods, and other weapons used up,
they
often
changed pilots allowing the pilot that already flew 1 to 5 missions
to get some rest and a fresh rested pilot took his place.

Could you name a single Israeli pilot that flew five sorties in one
day, either in 1967 or 1973? I couldn't. Feel free to correct me,
but I can only remember several that flew four sorties on the first
day of the Six Day War, not a single one that flew as much in 1973.


Over the 1/4 of the first wave against Egypt flew 5 sortees the
first day
in
'67.

Look: I asked you for names. I can mention names of the one or two
IDF/AF pilots that flew four missions on that day. You say one
quarter of them did so. OK. Can you mention even one name of an
IDF/AF pilot that flew five sorties on that day?

The story about this was on the History Channel as well
as in a book by one of the lead pilots, (I do not rememeber his
name).
The
Show on the History Channel was one of a series called "Air Power".

Oh, now I understand everything. Thank's Lord, there is a "History
Channel". You never came to the idea that they could be wrong about
this?

Have you ever heard about some stuff called "books" or something
similar? I've heard these are made of paper and ink, and one might be
forced to go to the so-called "book-shops" or "libraries" in order to
get them, and then even have to "read" (spelling?) these too....

But, they say one can learn quite some stuff from reading these
strange things.

Tom Cooper
Co-Author:
Iran-Iraq War in the Air, 1980-1988:
http://www.acig.org/pg1/content.php
and,
Iranian F-4 Phantom II Units in Combat:
http://www.osprey-publishing.co.uk/t...hp/title=S6585

They flew several sorties over Port Alexandria well to the East of Ciaro
where some of the air bases had been moved after the Six Day War. They flew
and bombed the norther Air Bases in Syia nearer to Turkey as well. A lot
further than you incicate. Those are excptions I will admit but they were
long and strenous and tired those pilots out as they could not fly anything
near direct routes due to the SAM Threats. Also A single flight for ground
support was several sortees all rolled into one. They might be called at
times to make 6 or more runs at enemy ground troops, armor, or
installations, as well as field artilery. After these they needed relief,
there is something very taxing coming in at 50 feet and bombing an enemy
position when a miss could kill a lot of IDF troops. So the usual pattern
(History of Air Power) was to relieve them as soon as they landed and ready
the aircraft with a fresh, rested pilot for the next ground suppot mission.
At times IAF Pilots were called in to hit troops less than 100 yards away
from the IDF soldiers that called in the strike. How many time could you do
that type of sortee and keep at it? The quicker they got to rest and try
to relax the quiker they rested enough to do it all over again. Each plane
could fly double the number of such missions and not burn out the pilots.


--�
MattA
?subject=HepatitusC-Objectives

Matt's Hep-C Story web pages are back at a home. No more drop down ads
to get in your way. http://mywebpages.comcast.net/matta00

Truth about Howard Aubrey AKA madyan67:
http://www.geocities.com/lord_haha_libeler/

"Matt A.00 01 is Matthew Ackerman" wrote in message
...
Tom Cooper wrote:
"Matt A.00 01 is Matthew Ackerman" wrote in
message ...
Tom Cooper wrote:
"Matt A.00 01 is Matthew Ackerman" wrote in
message ...
Quant wrote:
"Matt A.00 01 is Matthew Ackerman" wrote in
message ...
Arie Kazachin wrote:
In message - "Matt A.00 01
is Matthew Ackerman" writes:
snip

They flew several sorties over Port Alexandria well to the East of Ciaro
where some of the air bases had been moved after the Six Day War.

Just a second: in your post above you said this happened during the Six Day
War. Now you say it happened afterwards. Would you be so kind to agree with
yourself so we could finally find out when exactly this happened?

They flew
and bombed the norther Air Bases in Syia nearer to Turkey as well.

When?

In 1967, the northernmost Syrian airfields hit by the IDF/AF were near
al-Ladhiqiyah and T.4/Tiyas.

In 1973, no airfields in either area were hit.

A lot
further than you incicate.

Where?

Those are excptions I will admit but they were
long and strenous and tired those pilots out as they could not fly
anything
near direct routes due to the SAM Threats. Also A single flight for ground
support was several sortees all rolled into one. They might be called at
times to make 6 or more runs at enemy ground troops, armor, or
installations, as well as field artilery.

The situation in 1973 was so that by the time they would try to make the
second run on their targets most of the Israeli aircraft were either shot
down or at least damaged. That's what happened to the 201st Sqn IDF/AF,
which lost 6 Phantoms during the Op Dogman 5, on the morning of 7 October
1973. This included the F-4E, flown by unit commander: he was shot down
after he missed the target on the first run, turned around and tried it
again....

One of those strange things of paper and ink I described in my last post,
the book with the strange title "Israel's Best Defence", written (former
IDF/AF pilot) Col. Elizer "Cheetah" Cohen describes this in detail.

Cohen was brazen enough in that book to say that he participated in the wars
1948, 1956, 1967, and 1973. Yet, nowhere in that book is he describing
anything of what you're talking about. Quite on the contrary. What do you
think, could it be he knows it better than you or the History Channel?

After these they needed relief,
there is something very taxing coming in at 50 feet and bombing an enemy
position when a miss could kill a lot of IDF troops.

Really?!?!? You got to be kiddin....

So, how it then came they flew five missions a day?

So the usual pattern
(History of Air Power) was to relieve them as soon as they landed and
ready
the aircraft with a fresh, rested pilot for the next ground suppot
mission.

Are you sure? They really put _fresh_ pilots into their planes? How fresh
were these? Factory-fresh, as fresh as wet paint, or as fresh as the sushi
in the local Jap restaurant?

BTW, what is "History of Air Power"? Another show on the History Channel?

At times IAF Pilots were called in to hit troops less than 100 yards away
from the IDF soldiers that called in the strike. How many time could you
do
that type of sortee and keep at it?

Well, let's see: the USAF, USN and USMC Scooter and Phantom and other pilots
were doing this at such places like Khe Sanh so two or three times a day.
Their usual tour of duty was either a year or so (USAF) or between six and
nine months (USN). Cambodian T-28 and MIG-17-pilots at least once a day at
the Plain de Jars and similar stinking holes. Their tours of duty lasted
until they were killed (either by the enemy or the own regime). The Iranian
F-5 pilots so two or three times at day at the Karaqeh Plain, Shalamcheh,
Majnoon, along the Shatt al-Arab and so many other places. They also had an
endless tour of duty: most of those still alive in 1988 had over 1.500
combat sorties under their belt...

Oh, sorry: your super-human Israeli pilots can't compare to all of these
examples: simply ignore what I said.

The quicker they got to rest and try
to relax the quiker they rested enough to do it all over again. Each
plane
could fly double the number of such missions and not burn out the pilots.

Matt, to be honest: if I hear once again a statement like this I'll probably
crack a rib and then have to pay a visit to my doctor. Please, have mercy
with my insurance.

Tom Cooper
Co-Author:
Iran-Iraq War in the Air, 1980-1988:
http://www.acig.org/pg1/content.php
and,
Iranian F-4 Phantom II Units in Combat:
http://www.osprey-publishing.co.uk/t...hp/title=S6585

"Matt A.00 01 is Matthew Ackerman" wrote in message
...


They flew several sorties over Port Alexandria well to the East of Ciaro

BTW, Matt,
since when is Alexandria east of Cairo?

I tought on the History Channel they try to teach history, not re-draw the
maps....

Tom Cooper
Co-Author:
Iran-Iraq War in the Air, 1980-1988:
http://www.acig.org/pg1/content.php
and,
Iranian F-4 Phantom II Units in Combat:
http://www.osprey-publishing.co.uk/t...hp/title=S6585