Can F-15s making 9G turns with payload?

"Ed Rasimus" wrote

Don't know where you were in the food chain of aircrew training, but
if it was installed in the planes every single day, you can bet we
knew how to use it. If it were mission essential or mission critical
we got trained in it, refreshed in it, tested in it, and briefed on
every single mission with regard to employment of it.

Well... OK...

One thing that fighter/bomber crews never seemed to understand was
Mode-4 IFF, and wide-band secure voice. In Iceland the mission was
to intercept and escort any unidentified aircraft through the defense zone.
What that meant in real life was that if the IFF gave you problems, you
shut it off. If you couldn't talk to AWACS, or the Shack on secure, then
you switched to clear. Billions in hardware in the off position.

Finally in 1986 the Air Force started getting serious, and they made the
bean count on those two items as painful as possible.

What we found, was that the crews just didn't understand the poorly
designed fault indicators, and since there was no incentive to operate the
equipment, they just shut it off. 1) The Soviets know we're there, 2) The
Soviets understand how NATO intercepts are conducted, and 3) By
doing the intercepts in the clear, the Soviets weren't surprised when
fighters and tankers, and P-3's, etc, all pounced on them for escort.

All of which HQ decided was too damned non-mil to continue.

The Army finally came along in the early 90's after the highly trained
USAF pilots and AWACS controllers splashed their non-participants
in Iraq.

Today, I think the radio is a completely different tool than it was before
1986. The use of wide and narrow secure when it's even necessary, is
the favored position (especially satcom). I listened to some of the
Air/Air recordings from a strike near Hanoi by a flight of 105's when I
went to a technical seminar, and it pretty much defined the word Clint
Eastwood had about Clusters...

I can see where crews might have training/operational problems with
gadgets even more complex than the IFF and Wide-Band panels.

On Sun, 21 Sep 2003 17:38:44 GMT, "Gene Storey"
wrote:

"Ed Rasimus" wrote

Don't know where you were in the food chain of aircrew training, but
if it was installed in the planes every single day, you can bet we
knew how to use it. If it were mission essential or mission critical
we got trained in it, refreshed in it, tested in it, and briefed on
every single mission with regard to employment of it.

Well... OK...

One thing that fighter/bomber crews never seemed to understand was
Mode-4 IFF, and wide-band secure voice. In Iceland the mission was
to intercept and escort any unidentified aircraft through the defense zone.
What that meant in real life was that if the IFF gave you problems, you
shut it off. If you couldn't talk to AWACS, or the Shack on secure, then
you switched to clear. Billions in hardware in the off position.

Foggy memory trying to recall things. Best I recollect (although I
might be wrong) was that the IFF/SIF had cockpit control of modes 1,
2, 3 and C. Don't recall that Mode-4 was cockpit controllable. In the
F-4 the coding was done in the nosegear well on the ground with a
plunger-like device. If you're talking peace-time air defense
intercept, and you've got 1,2,3 and C so that AWACS/GCI can control
you, then I'd have to agree with the decision to go. In combat,
interdiction, across the fence, then I'd say the prudent choice would
be no-go.

As for secure, again, if you are an interceptor and (as you stated the
situation), you can't talk to AWACS, etc. secure, you still go and
acknowledge that you're degraded. The option is to not go and be
penetrated.

As for your final statement, "billions in hardware in the off
position"--I'd say maybe millions if all the force wasn't using those
two sub-systems, and I'd say that you didn't indicate that all the
force wasn't using the systems--you simply provided a couple of
examples of "if the IFF gave you problems" and "if you couldn't talk
secure". Seems like you're describing a choice of mission
accomplishment or not, in limited situations.


Today, I think the radio is a completely different tool than it was before
1986. The use of wide and narrow secure when it's even necessary, is
the favored position (especially satcom). I listened to some of the
Air/Air recordings from a strike near Hanoi by a flight of 105's when I
went to a technical seminar, and it pretty much defined the word Clint
Eastwood had about Clusters...

Well, it depends on when during the conflict the radio recording you
heard was made. There was no Have Quick or later version of secure
voice. Depending upon the training of the crews (see my comments in
this forum in the past or in WTR for re-qual of various types in
fighters), the mission de jour, the weather, the defenses, etc. etc.
it could indeed be an example of remarkable incompetence.

But, that certainly can't be an example to support your argument
regarding what the crews "understand". Understanding the purpose,
operation, etc of equipment is a whole lot different depending upon
the mission circumstances, and quite obviously, the equipment
availability or existence.

"Ed Rasimus" wrote

Foggy memory trying to recall things. Best I recollect (although I
might be wrong) was that the IFF/SIF had cockpit control of modes 1,
2, 3 and C. Don't recall that Mode-4 was cockpit controllable. In the
F-4 the coding was done in the nosegear well on the ground with a
plunger-like device.

Trivia alert

Probably had a "zero, a/b, hold switch", and a caution lite. there was two
codes a-today b-tomorrow, and the hold kept your plunger data on a hot turn, while the
caution lite blinked when someone interrogated you, but your box
couldn't decode it, and it stayed on solid if you lost your crypto (plunger data) or
the computer went TU.

Usually the blinking lite is the worst, because it means the Patriot battery is now
trying to figure out a second way to ID you