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#2
October 29th 03, 12:22 PM
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#3
October 29th 03, 06:39 PM
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(Drazen Kramaric) wrote in message ...
On 28 Oct 2003 10:15:27 -0800, (Stuart Wilkes) wrote: France surrendered because it had no more manpower nor space to continue the war so all their remaining soldiers went to POW camps. And the Soviet government did not surrender Correct. Unlike French government, it still had the territory, manpower and industrial resources to continue the fight with. However, just like French government, Soviet government tried to negotiate a cease fire. The Soviets discussed it, with the Bulgarian Ambassador in Moscow. When and to whom was the offer actually made? The difference is that Hitler rebuffed Soviet approach, but accepted the French (contrary to the wishes of some senior German generals). Had Hitler refused Petain's request for the cease fire, French government would probably left metropolitan France and settled in Algeria. It would still leave Germans as masters of France. nor did it fail to employ its air force You will be well advised to check the number of aircraft (+1500) Germans lost in the Battle for France. "The French fighter force had available to it during the battle more than 2900 modern aircraft. At no time did it have more than one-fifth of these deployed against the Germans. The operational rate of the fighter force was 0.9 sorties per aircraft per day at the height of the battle. (German fighter units flew up to four sorties per aircraft per day.) Yet in spite of committing only a minor portion of its resources at a low usage rate, the fighter force accounted for between 600 and 1000 of the 1439 German aircraft destroyed during the battle." http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/a.../kirkland.html One wonders at the possible result if they had fought with more committment. nor did it fly a suprisingly intact air force to North Africa. It wasn't intact and was definitely defeated. Really. "By 15 June, the French and German air forces were at approximate parity with about 2400 aircraft each, but the French were operating from their own turf, and they had the support of the RAF. Mastery of the air was there for the seizing, but on 17 June the French air staff began to order its units to fly to North Africa. The justification put forth by the air staff was that the army was destroyed and could not protect the airfields. An examination of which units were ordered to North Africa and which were left behind reveals much about the motivation behind the evacuation. The units flown to North Africa were those regular air force squadrons with the most modern and effective aircraft--all of the squadrons equipped with the Curtiss 75A (10), Dewoitine 520 (10), Amiot 354 (8), Bloch 174 (18), Farman 222 (4), Douglas DB-7 (8), and Martin 167 (10), plus most of those with the Lioré et Olivier 451 (12 of 18). Those left behind included all of the air force reserve units--47 observation squadrons and 12 fighter squadrons--and all of the units closely connected with the army (the observation squadrons, the 10 assault bomber squadrons, and 7 night fighter squadrons converted to the ground assault role)." Same link as above Luftwaffe also had hundreds if not thousands of aircraft scattered on the airfields in Germany on May 8th, 1945. So what? They still lost the war. A difference being that the French could import AvGas? Why? If the French government left assets unemployed and surrendered them, why should that count against the Soviets? It refutes the story you are trying to sell. Nonsense. Did the French leave large assets unemployed, only to surreneder them? but would represent argument against your thesis, that Red Army represented the most efficient enemy realistically possible. Did I say efficient? Nope. More determined and more effective at killing German troops? Sure. First, there were much more Germans and their allies deployed on the front line in 1941 than in 1940. I don't doubt it. Check the figures. Second, the ratio of losses was appaling as well as the territory lost. I never said that the Soviets didn't take appalling losses in 1941. I said that they fought back better than the West did in the Battle of France. The only reason Soviet Union did not surrender is that it was big enough and by that I don't mean on this tiny strip of Polish and Rumanian territory stolen in 1939 and 1940. And I never said that that 150km was decisive. I've said that Soviet margins were thin in 1941, and that extra territory did impact the 1941 campaign in a way that reduced German success. I see this as a Good Thing. You are representing this as 3,000,000 German soldiers appeared out of nowehere next to the Soviet border. Was it a sneak attack, or not Drax? Hey, few message ago you were writing about the defensive measures Stalin adopted and were using that as a proof that he wasn't surprised and that he expected German attack in 1941. I wrote nothing so absurd. Make up your mind, either Stalin was wise by making treaty with Hitler and made all the necessary preparations for the inevitable German attack in 1941 or he took Hitler by his word and left the country unprepared for the invasion announced as early as first edition of "Mein Kampf". My mind is perfectly clear on it. Stalin believed there was a risk of German attack in 1941, that risk growing to a near-certainty in 1942. While he believed Germany would not attack while at war with Great Britain, he mobilized reserves in case he was wrong. The primary person responsible for Red Army been caught napping He took a calculated risk on being able to delay a German attack until 1942. By pretending that attack was not going to happen? Again, make up your mind. I'm quite clear on it. You wrote how Stalin had a directive for Barbarossa, For preparations, yes. we all know British were bombarding Stalin with reports about German preparations, Including during a time that British intelligence believed that the German preparations for Barbarossa were really intended to pressure the Soviets into a closer relationship with Germany. the concentration of Wehrmach in Poland was impossible to hide, Indeed. The GRU tracked the German buildup closely. What was unclear was the political intention behind it. is the man you feel was justified in invading Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Finland under the pretext of "security in case of German attack". I do not believe that the attack on Finland was justified. Was annexation of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania justified when Soviet Union already had military bases in the area? Would 70k troops in a few bases have been enough in the event of a German attack? What I don't get is your eternal insistence on either the Germans being given the opportunity to conquer all of Poland and occupy the Baltic States. No, my eternal insistence is on Stalin declaring war on Germany and joining the existing anti-German coalition in field. Where "in the field" were the Western elements of the anti-German coalition fighting the German Army in September 1939? Why should the Soviets shoulder the committment of hostilities on two fronts with no guarantee of the Western Allies hitting Germany with any vigor? Stuart Wilkes
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#4
November 4th 03, 09:12 PM
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#5
November 5th 03, 04:32 PM
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(Drazen Kramaric) wrote in message ...
On 29 Oct 2003 10:39:24 -0800, (Stuart Wilkes) wrote: Correct. Unlike French government, it still had the territory, manpower and industrial resources to continue the fight with. However, just like French government, Soviet government tried to negotiate a cease fire. The Soviets discussed it, with the Bulgarian Ambassador in Moscow. When and to whom was the offer actually made? Since Bulgarian ambassador persuaded Soviet government not to pursue this for a moment, nothing emerged from this initiative. Nevertheless, Soviet government contemplated the similar move Petain's did. Then they really didn't "try to negotiate a cease fire", did they Drax? No they didn't. You will be well advised to check the number of aircraft (+1500) Germans lost in the Battle for France. "The French fighter force had available to it during the battle more than 2900 modern aircraft. Actually, French air force possessed less than 1,000 modern combat aircraft according to "The Oxford Companion to the Second World War". And my source, a paper from the USAF School of Advanced Airpower Studies, disagrees with your source. One wonders at the possible result if they had fought with more committment. They fought with as much commitment as their organisation and equipment allowed. Committing less than a fifth of the available air force at any given time, and that not exceeding one sortie a day. snip Same link as above The link does not serve as any reliable source of information about the Battle for France. I rather read books. It's the USAF School of Advanced Airpower Studies, at Maxwell Air Force Base. I think they know a thing or six about air power. snip I never said that the Soviets didn't take appalling losses in 1941. I said that they fought back better than the West did in the Battle of France. Your only argument is that total number of Germans killed in USSR from June 22nd to August 4th was larger than the number of Germans killed from May 10th to June 22nd. Let's talk the total number of forces engaged, ratio of losses sustained during the fighting and the ammount of territory lost. Go ahead Drax, why don't you? If you've got a point to make, then do it. And I never said that that 150km was decisive. I've said that Soviet margins were thin in 1941, and that extra territory did impact the 1941 campaign in a way that reduced German success. I'd say that these 150 kilometres were by the order of magnitude less important than Stalin's incompetance in defensive preparations. What has one thing to do with the other? Will not having the 150km magically make everything else better? And who did defended against a German attack better at the time? I see this as a Good Thing. Only if you take Stalin's policy as a given. Nothing about not having the 150km necessarily makes anything else better. Hey, few message ago you were writing about the defensive measures Stalin adopted and were using that as a proof that he wasn't surprised and that he expected German attack in 1941. I wrote nothing so absurd. OK, if you say so. I am not going to dig the Google for you. So, do you maintain that Stalin was surprised by German attack? He was indeed suprised that Germany would attack prior to making peace with Great Britain. Stalin believed there was a risk of German attack in 1941, that risk growing to a near-certainty in 1942. While he believed Germany would not attack while at war with Great Britain, he mobilized reserves in case he was wrong. In the light of what you wrote above, do you think that Stalin believed Britain was going to be defeated by 1942 in order to allow "near certain" attack on Soviet Union? He seemed to have believed what His Majesty's Ambassador, Sir Stafford Cripps, was telling him, that an Anglo-German peace was a possibility not to be excluded. You wrote how Stalin had a directive for Barbarossa, For preparations, yes. So, he "knew" preparations have started. Absolutely. we all know British were bombarding Stalin with reports about German preparations, Including during a time that British intelligence believed that the German preparations for Barbarossa were really intended to pressure the Soviets into a closer relationship with Germany. Even if true, this is irrelevant. Britain was trying to warn Stalin about the impeding German attack. No Britain wasn't. At the time of the warning, what the British feared was closer German-Soviet relations. At the time it was given, the warning was intended to disrupt the German-Soviet discussions the British feared were going on. So we have warnings by Britain and copy of Barbarossa directive in Stalin's hands. the concentration of Wehrmach in Poland was impossible to hide, Indeed. The GRU tracked the German buildup closely. What was unclear was the political intention behind it. Excuse me? "Mein Kampf", Barbarossa directive, British and Soviet agents' warnings and finally the military intelligence data confirming German build up on the Soviet borders? What else did Stalin need? A written declaration of war in triplicate? Information concerning the specifics of Hitler's decisions. The date specified in the Barbarossa Directive had come and gone. A couple other possible start dates the GRU and NKVD had ascertained had also come and gone. Compared to these earlier dates, what reason is there to believe, on say 20 June, that there's something special about 22 June 1941? So, do you think Stalin had more reason to believe Hitler's word You've not shown that he believed Hitler's word. Was annexation of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania justified when Soviet Union already had military bases in the area? Would 70k troops in a few bases have been enough in the event of a German attack? You can always pressure the respective governments to allow more troops into their countries to match the German build-up. And are they going to agree to let you set up a fortified line where you think you need to? Will they let you dig their country up to that degree? The degree of pressure that would be required for that amounts more or less to annexation. No need to annex the countries and murder tens of thousands of citizens because you _might_ be invaded. Where "in the field" were the Western elements of the anti-German coalition fighting the German Army in September 1939? On French border. I can list you the armies involved of you like. If you would please. And tell us how many casualties they inflicted on the German Armed Forces in September 1939. It still betters the Soviet elements fighting the German Army in September 1939. Never said it wasn't. Why should the Soviets shoulder the committment of hostilities on two fronts with no guarantee of the Western Allies hitting Germany with any vigor? Because it is better to fight Germans in Poland alongside Polish army The Polish Army itself didn't think so. The Polish Army itself didn't want anything of the sort. than wait for Germany to deliver concentrated attack and then fight at the gates of Leningrad, Moscow and Rostove. That's why. Except that in September 1939 there's not any reason for anyone to believe that France will go belly-up in six weeks in May-June 1940. Stuart Wilkes
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