Best dogfight gun?

In message , Hog Driver
writes
----- Original Message -----
From: "Paul J. Adam"
That's an extremely large "if", given the extensive air-to-air sensor
suite fitted to the A-10...

Well, using AWACS and mutual support tactics, the A-10 pilots are going to
have an idea where to pick up the tally.

Again, AWACS is situation-dependent, and there's that oft-quoted
statistic about 80% of surviving pilots wondering who shot them down
(tracking that statistic to a source is probably good for a PhD thesis -
anyone up for funding it? )

Once that happens, it isn't the
best 'suite' that is going to win the fight, it's the best BFM to get to the
WEZ.

Depends what weapons the assorted combatants brought to the fight: for
many engagements, the A-10 is totally defensive and manoevering against
RWR indications. (Does it have any IRWR gear? It's a natural platform to
get some sort of missile-warning gear over RWR)

Again, for real life this isn't much of a problem because the A-10
operates in total air supremacy and has never had an enemy aircraft ever
get a chance to shoot at it (rendering the preparations of the A-10
crews to fight back untested).

Are you keeping your ordnance for this turn? How long does it take to
get the nose pointed at the target while still having time to get that
shot off? (driving your required detection range). How much airspeed do
you have left at the end of it, which has a serious effect on your
ability to escape the wingman? And what happens when you discover the
attacking aircraft was firing a missile, rather than making a gun pass?

It all depends upon the situation. Hopefully the A-10 pilot(s) pick up the
tally at least 3 or 4 miles out near 3 or 9 o'clock, coming out of a good
RMD. Then they only have slightly more than 90 degrees to get the nose to
bear. Even with all the ordnance still on the jet, at the most a six to
seven second turn in the A-10 not including reaction lag time. Again,
depending on lots of factors, they may get nose-on in time to hose off a
sidewinder and open up with the gun around or slightly inside 9,000' (no
peacetime TRs to worry about). Most likely it will be a beak-to-beak pass
with the A-10s not getting a shot off, which they will try to drive to a
one-circle if the idiot(s) hang around. If bad guy decides to go vertical,
the engaged A-10 may go with him energy dependant and hose off a sidewinder
to give him sometime to think about, even with an opening Vc. Smart A-10
driver won't continue uphill, instead try to keep tally and get a circle of
hogs going.

Good to hear some of my WAGs confirmed

I guess you could describe my position thusly... A-10s engaged by modern
fighters are in bad trouble, but have a few cards to play (low altitude,
high turn rate and large countermeasure magazines come to mind) while
they can give over-aggressive enemy fighters some very nasty problems to
solve.

If the A-10s get any ordnance off prior to the merge, it might coax the bad
guy into thinking twice about keeping his fangs out. Since the primary A-10
role is to kill them by the bushels instead of one at a time, most A-10
pilots won't hit the emer jett until they get wrapped up with the guy for
180 degrees of turn.

Do you have options short of "full jettison"? I freely confess that my
flying experience is limited to civil propjobs and computer games, but
does the A-10 have (for instance) any option to jettison A/G ordnance
while keeping outboard pylons (Sidewinders and jammer pods)?

Again, situation dependent, lots of 'what ifs' that
you can't know about until you are there.

This is too true, sadly, and imposes all sorts of limits on open debate.

In answer to your airspeed question, the A-10 will be headed downhill the
entire time to maintain corner velocity, and if he's coming out of RMD, he
should know what's coming so he'll probably be carrying extra knots for the
initial turn at the merge.

Trouble with that is, how do you get that energy back, especially if you
started out low? Bear in mind that if there are enemy fighters up and
flying, their IADS is probably still operational complete with
radar-guided SAMs.

(And, given recent experience, what if the Bad Guys have orders that
"anything you can shoot at is hostile" while their fighters have stern
orders to stay high and fast no matter how tempting the diving target?)

But then, this keeps coming back to Bad Guys who can mount a credible
air threat. Not sure where to find a likely enemy that can seriously
sustain any sort of counter-air operations against the US...

The smart A-10 pilot will be flaring and chaffing early and often in
anticipation of that missile shot you are talking about...and keeping the
jet moving.

Again, that's keeping the A-10 defensive rather than having it turn and
fight an attacking Su-27 or similar... just because

If this analysis was accurate, the F-15 and F-22 would be screaming for
27mm or 30mm guns...

I think we both know that the possibility of air-to-air gun fighting today
is highly unlikely. Lessons learned from the past would behoove us to have
them on our jets, or in the case of the A-10, use them to really screw up
the bad guys on the ground.

I hate to be contrarian... all right, I don't. I _like_ being
contrarian. Lessons from the past suggest that getting missiles working
and crews trained is a better path to dead enemies for air-to-air work.
Air-to-ground, guns pull you into IR-SAM range and even for A-10s that
isn't healthy.

The initial question asked was how multi-barrel and single barrel cannons
stack up, and the subject is best dogfight guns. Just because the A-10 is
built around the GAU-8 doesn't mean it is any less of an effective dogfight
gun, especially with the high rates of turn the A-10 is capable of, small
bullet dispersion over the tac effective range, and relatively high rate of
fire.

Sure, just as a modern bayonet is a miserable weapon compared to a Light
Infantry sword (a proper sword that just happened to have fittings to
mount onto a Baker rifle... beat _that_ for close quarters combat! Other
than by eschewing melee and throwing in a grenade, or shooting the
enemy, or otherwise cheating...)

One 2Lt Patton wrote the US Army's last swordsmanship manual... doesn't
make swords a useful weapon, whatever the advantages his technique had
over the enemy's _code duello_, if you find yourself trying to use a
sabre against an enemy with a pistol (or, worse, an enemy luring you
into the beaten zone of a machinegun)

I'd hazard that where a credible air-to-air threat might exist then the
A-10's Sidewinder and countermeasure fit becomes of more importance than
its gun loadout, however reassuring the gun is as a weapon of last
extremity.

--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBoxatjrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

"Paul J. Adam" wrote in message
...
In message , Hog Driver
writes
----- Original Message -----
From: "Paul J. Adam"

snip


I think we both know that the possibility of air-to-air gun fighting
today
is highly unlikely. Lessons learned from the past would behoove us to
have
them on our jets, or in the case of the A-10, use them to really screw up
the bad guys on the ground.

I hate to be contrarian... all right, I don't. I _like_ being
contrarian. Lessons from the past suggest that getting missiles working
and crews trained is a better path to dead enemies for air-to-air work.
Air-to-ground, guns pull you into IR-SAM range and even for A-10s that
isn't healthy.

Paul, doing away with a tool from your kit without a compelling reason to do
so, along with having a danged foolproof method of handling the situations
that said tool could handle, is unwise. As to air-to-ground use, I believe
the resident Strike Eagle driver has already provided a reason for retaining
a strafe capability, i.e., recent operations in Afghanistan. During Anaconda
the need for up-close-and-personal support (read that as well within the
danger-close margin) was reported. You can't *always* use your LGB's or
JDAM's, which is why the grunts liked the cannon armed aircraft during that
fight. Yes, it brings the air in within MANPADS range--but that is a risk
those guys are willing to accept when the fight on the ground gets hairy
(and thank goodness for that). Arguing that they can't (or never should)
face such a risk is a bit illogical--if all services followed that thought
process, we'd stop issuing rifles to infantrymen because in order to use one
you have to close to within the effective range of the other guy's weapons.


The initial question asked was how multi-barrel and single barrel cannons
stack up, and the subject is best dogfight guns. Just because the A-10
is
built around the GAU-8 doesn't mean it is any less of an effective
dogfight
gun, especially with the high rates of turn the A-10 is capable of, small
bullet dispersion over the tac effective range, and relatively high rate
of
fire.

Sure, just as a modern bayonet is a miserable weapon compared to a Light
Infantry sword (a proper sword that just happened to have fittings to
mount onto a Baker rifle... beat _that_ for close quarters combat! Other
than by eschewing melee and throwing in a grenade, or shooting the
enemy, or otherwise cheating...)

One 2Lt Patton wrote the US Army's last swordsmanship manual... doesn't
make swords a useful weapon, whatever the advantages his technique had
over the enemy's _code duello_, if you find yourself trying to use a
sabre against an enemy with a pistol (or, worse, an enemy luring you
into the beaten zone of a machinegun)

But there are tasks for which that bayonet is oh-so-much better than say, an
M16A2 with state-of-the-art night optics. I saw a fair amount of peanut
butter spread with bayonets; had we had to use our M16's for that it would
have been rather messy. Now that is I admit a rather extreme example, but
again it points out the wisdom of retaining those tools we have even in the
face of longer ranged/more lethal options.

Brooks

snip

In message , Kevin Brooks
writes
"Paul J. Adam" wrote in message
...
I hate to be contrarian... all right, I don't. I _like_ being
contrarian. Lessons from the past suggest that getting missiles working
and crews trained is a better path to dead enemies for air-to-air work.
Air-to-ground, guns pull you into IR-SAM range and even for A-10s that
isn't healthy.

Paul, doing away with a tool from your kit without a compelling reason to do
so, along with having a danged foolproof method of handling the situations
that said tool could handle, is unwise.

Sure, but insisting on keeping kit because it used to be essential and
still might be useful is equally risky: especially when it can't be
jettisoned.

As to air-to-ground use, I believe
the resident Strike Eagle driver has already provided a reason for retaining
a strafe capability, i.e., recent operations in Afghanistan. During Anaconda
the need for up-close-and-personal support (read that as well within the
danger-close margin) was reported. You can't *always* use your LGB's or
JDAM's, which is why the grunts liked the cannon armed aircraft during that
fight.

Are there no gun pods? This has always been a capability that can be
bolted onto aircraft as necessary.

Yes, it brings the air in within MANPADS range--but that is a risk
those guys are willing to accept when the fight on the ground gets hairy
(and thank goodness for that). Arguing that they can't (or never should)
face such a risk is a bit illogical--if all services followed that thought
process, we'd stop issuing rifles to infantrymen because in order to use one
you have to close to within the effective range of the other guy's weapons.

More like issuing lances to tankers so they can run down enemy
soldiers...

Sure, just as a modern bayonet is a miserable weapon compared to a Light
Infantry sword (a proper sword that just happened to have fittings to
mount onto a Baker rifle... beat _that_ for close quarters combat! Other
than by eschewing melee and throwing in a grenade, or shooting the
enemy, or otherwise cheating...)

One 2Lt Patton wrote the US Army's last swordsmanship manual... doesn't
make swords a useful weapon, whatever the advantages his technique had
over the enemy's _code duello_, if you find yourself trying to use a
sabre against an enemy with a pistol (or, worse, an enemy luring you
into the beaten zone of a machinegun)

But there are tasks for which that bayonet is oh-so-much better than say, an
M16A2 with state-of-the-art night optics.

True, but how much does a bayonet weigh and what else can you use it
for? I notice that while the bayonet I was issued for use with L1A1 was
strictly and firmly only for fixing to the muzzle and jabbing enemy
with... probing for mines was a grudgingly acceptable alternative. But
Nothing Else! Hence even when I was issued a bayonet I at least had a
good lock knife for utility task.

The other allowable uses of a good stout sharp knife have grown
steadily: I was always amused that the cheap copy of a K-Bar I carried
on my webbing was much mocked at the start of an exercise and much
demanded by the end. Now, bayonets are having their utility as tools
rated as important as their ability to become improvised spears.


But the knife bayonet is a small, light, handy item that can replace
what a soldier would carry anyway (not many of us carried knives to
fight with, certainly not in peacetime, and I'd certainly not have
bothered with both bayonet and K-bar-clone). The analogy for air combat
is nearer to a full-size sword, lance or pike: a large, hefty item that
weighs as much as several magazines for your rifle or a day or two's
rations, even if it's more lethal in hand-to-hand combat.

And can you _guarantee_ that soldiers will never find themselves in
close-quarter battle? Would you have them carry puny knives, or would
you give them mighty swords, spears and/or axes to smite their foes with
as a permanent addition to their CEFO? Okay, they don't fight like that
too often... and it's more weight for them to carry... but there will
always be cases where soldiers find themselves fighting at arm's length,
so wouldn't issuing everyone a sword or axe be useful then?

I saw a fair amount of peanut
butter spread with bayonets; had we had to use our M16's for that it would
have been rather messy. Now that is I admit a rather extreme example, but
again it points out the wisdom of retaining those tools we have even in the
face of longer ranged/more lethal options.

Depends on a lot of factors. For instance, the F-15E both kept a gun
that isn't ideal for its primary mission of ground attack (shell too
light, slant range on the short size, rate of fire derated for strafing)
and halved the ammunition supply. It's not a bad decision because it's
quick and saves money, but it reflects the low priority.

If you were designing the capability from scratch, would you insist on
the M61? Consider a larger-calibre weapon with more A/G punch like a
KCA? Or go for fuel and/or lightness, and hang a podded gun for 'danger
close' missions?


Trouble is, stories of "F-15E bravely makes strafing passes" deservedly
get headlines. "F-15E really regrets having to call skosh fuel and leave
station" don't: but an internal gun is getting on for a thousand pounds
of fuel, which translates to more loiter time or range. And it isn't
negotiable.

--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBoxatjrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

In article ,
"Paul J. Adam" wrote:

Are there no gun pods? This has always been a capability that can be
bolted onto aircraft as necessary.

"Hey, Bob, there's a couple of MiGs between us and the base, I'm a
little low on fuel, no missiles, and we've got no guns."

"Better strap one on, then..."

The "missiles will rule" argument is coming back, I see. But McNamara
is still alive and well...

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

Chad Irby wrote in message ...
In article ,
"Paul J. Adam" wrote:

Are there no gun pods? This has always been a capability that can be
bolted onto aircraft as necessary.

"Hey, Bob, there's a couple of MiGs between us and the base, I'm a
little low on fuel, no missiles, and we've got no guns."

"Better strap one on, then..."

The "missiles will rule" argument is coming back, I see. But McNamara
is still alive and well...

This is from 'Flying Guns: the Modern Era':

"Podded guns have the advantage that they don't need to be lugged
around unless the planes are in circumstances in which a gun is likely
to be needed. Like any other piece of hardware, they can be fitted
according to requirements. The downside of this is that you first have
to make sure that the gunpods are available when required, you have to
be psychic to determine when they might be useful, they use up a
hardpoint which would otherwise be available for fuel or other
weapons, they take some time to harmonise – and keep harmonised – when
fitted, and even then are less accurate than integral guns. Gunpods
generate more drag, usually affect handling and are also much less
"stealthy" than integral guns; a factor likely to be increasingly
important as stealth measures are leading to the internal carriage of
all weapons. This solution is therefore very much second best, but it
is better than nothing. The installation of weapons in
purpose-designed conformal pods fitted directly to the fuselage and
intended to be more or less permanent fixtures does reduce or avoid
some of the above problems."

Tony Williams
Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
Discussion forum at: http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/

"Paul J. Adam" wrote in message
...
In message , Kevin Brooks
writes
"Paul J. Adam" wrote in message
...
I hate to be contrarian... all right, I don't. I _like_ being
contrarian. Lessons from the past suggest that getting missiles working
and crews trained is a better path to dead enemies for air-to-air work.
Air-to-ground, guns pull you into IR-SAM range and even for A-10s that
isn't healthy.

Paul, doing away with a tool from your kit without a compelling reason to
do
so, along with having a danged foolproof method of handling the
situations
that said tool could handle, is unwise.

Sure, but insisting on keeping kit because it used to be essential and
still might be useful is equally risky: especially when it can't be
jettisoned.

And I suppose designing that feature in and then doing away with it because
of its (relatively slight) increase in unit cost, as was done with the RAF
Typhoon, is not risky?


As to air-to-ground use, I believe
the resident Strike Eagle driver has already provided a reason for
retaining
a strafe capability, i.e., recent operations in Afghanistan. During
Anaconda
the need for up-close-and-personal support (read that as well within the
danger-close margin) was reported. You can't *always* use your LGB's or
JDAM's, which is why the grunts liked the cannon armed aircraft during
that
fight.

Are there no gun pods? This has always been a capability that can be
bolted onto aircraft as necessary.

Let's see, which would I rather have orbiting about in the CAS stack,
aircraft that are capable of both without requiring special ordinance
request, or a requirement for the FSE and ALO to put their heads together
and route a request for such specialized ordnance to be fitted...? I believe
the former wins.


Yes, it brings the air in within MANPADS range--but that is a risk
those guys are willing to accept when the fight on the ground gets hairy
(and thank goodness for that). Arguing that they can't (or never should)
face such a risk is a bit illogical--if all services followed that
thought
process, we'd stop issuing rifles to infantrymen because in order to use
one
you have to close to within the effective range of the other guy's
weapons.

More like issuing lances to tankers so they can run down enemy
soldiers...

No, you were arguing that use of the gun is dumb because it brings the CAS
platform down lower into the MANPADS envelope. That is not something we
would prefer to have happen, but when the situation requires it, the risk
may have to be accepted. If you are going to argue the necessity of CAS
*always* staying outside the bad guys response envelope, then the "can't
issue rifles to grunts because they will have to get within the bad guy's
engagement range" is the groundpounder's equivalent solution. Neither of
them makes much sense to me.


Sure, just as a modern bayonet is a miserable weapon compared to a
Light
Infantry sword (a proper sword that just happened to have fittings to
mount onto a Baker rifle... beat _that_ for close quarters combat!
Other
than by eschewing melee and throwing in a grenade, or shooting the
enemy, or otherwise cheating...)

One 2Lt Patton wrote the US Army's last swordsmanship manual... doesn't
make swords a useful weapon, whatever the advantages his technique had
over the enemy's _code duello_, if you find yourself trying to use a
sabre against an enemy with a pistol (or, worse, an enemy luring you
into the beaten zone of a machinegun)

But there are tasks for which that bayonet is oh-so-much better than say,
an
M16A2 with state-of-the-art night optics.

True, but how much does a bayonet weigh and what else can you use it
for? I notice that while the bayonet I was issued for use with L1A1 was
strictly and firmly only for fixing to the muzzle and jabbing enemy
with... probing for mines was a grudgingly acceptable alternative. But
Nothing Else! Hence even when I was issued a bayonet I at least had a
good lock knife for utility task.

The other allowable uses of a good stout sharp knife have grown
steadily: I was always amused that the cheap copy of a K-Bar I carried
on my webbing was much mocked at the start of an exercise and much
demanded by the end. Now, bayonets are having their utility as tools
rated as important as their ability to become improvised spears.


But the knife bayonet is a small, light, handy item that can replace
what a soldier would carry anyway (not many of us carried knives to
fight with, certainly not in peacetime, and I'd certainly not have
bothered with both bayonet and K-bar-clone). The analogy for air combat
is nearer to a full-size sword, lance or pike: a large, hefty item that
weighs as much as several magazines for your rifle or a day or two's
rations, even if it's more lethal in hand-to-hand combat.

And can you _guarantee_ that soldiers will never find themselves in
close-quarter battle? Would you have them carry puny knives, or would
you give them mighty swords, spears and/or axes to smite their foes with
as a permanent addition to their CEFO? Okay, they don't fight like that
too often... and it's more weight for them to carry... but there will
always be cases where soldiers find themselves fighting at arm's length,
so wouldn't issuing everyone a sword or axe be useful then?

Well, you always have that nifty wire-cutting feature for the latest US
bayonet in combination with its scabbard (though I am not sure how effective
it really is in that role)...


I saw a fair amount of peanut
butter spread with bayonets; had we had to use our M16's for that it
would
have been rather messy. Now that is I admit a rather extreme example, but
again it points out the wisdom of retaining those tools we have even in
the
face of longer ranged/more lethal options.

Depends on a lot of factors. For instance, the F-15E both kept a gun
that isn't ideal for its primary mission of ground attack (shell too
light, slant range on the short size, rate of fire derated for strafing)
and halved the ammunition supply. It's not a bad decision because it's
quick and saves money, but it reflects the low priority.

Low priority and outright elimination are two different things. ISTR reading
that those 10th LID guys in Anaconda were *very* happy to have strafe
support from F-15E's, A-10's, and even AH-64's.


If you were designing the capability from scratch, would you insist on
the M61? Consider a larger-calibre weapon with more A/G punch like a
KCA? Or go for fuel and/or lightness, and hang a podded gun for 'danger
close' missions?

That depends. Since cost is always a factor at some point, the use of the
M61 may be the best solution (you still retain an inherent marginal strafe
capability at minimal cost, and if you want more punch you can still *add*
those pods you keep talking about). Or maybe use a 25mm weapon, or the
Mauser 27mm. Details are rather unimportant to the current question at hand
(courtesy thread drift), which is, "Gun versus no gun". You say no gun, I
say if possible retain the gun and remain more flexible by doing so.



Trouble is, stories of "F-15E bravely makes strafing passes" deservedly
get headlines. "F-15E really regrets having to call skosh fuel and leave
station" don't: but an internal gun is getting on for a thousand pounds
of fuel, which translates to more loiter time or range. And it isn't
negotiable.

We have KC's that refuel TACAIR. If you are talking the CAS mission, which
we are now doing, then it is reasonable to accept that those assets will be
doing their thing relatively close to the EA. And stop acting as if a
thousand pounds of fuel is the end of the world--that works out to what, a
whopping 125 gallons? If your CAS effort is dependent upon a 125 gallon fuel
margine you are likely in deep do-do already.

Brooks

On Wed, 10 Dec 2003 04:51:34 GMT, Kevin Brooks wrote:

And I suppose designing that feature in and then doing away with it because
of its (relatively slight) increase in unit cost, as was done with the RAF
Typhoon, is not risky?

How much does a Mauser BK 27 cost, I wonder? I bet removing it would
save them no more than the cost of one plane, over the entire
programme.


--
"It's easier to find people online who openly support the KKK than
people who openly support the RIAA" -- comment on Wikipedia
(Email: , but first subtract 275 and reverse
the last two letters).

In message , phil hunt
writes
On Wed, 10 Dec 2003 04:51:34 GMT, Kevin Brooks wrote:

And I suppose designing that feature in and then doing away with it because
of its (relatively slight) increase in unit cost, as was done with the RAF
Typhoon, is not risky?

How much does a Mauser BK 27 cost, I wonder? I bet removing it would
save them no more than the cost of one plane, over the entire
programme.

The official explanation follows...

http://www.publications.parliament.u...cmpubacc/136/1
011710.htm#note12
+++++
Select Committee on Public Accounts Minutes of Evidence
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------
APPENDIX 2
Supplementary memorandum submitted by the Defence Procurement Agency
00-01/62)

QUESTIONS 264 AND 306. BACKGROUND TO THE DECISION NOT TO EQUIP
EUROFIGHTER WITH A GUN

7. Since the introduction of air-to-air missiles, a gun has been
used in an air-to-air role for very close range engagements where the
target was inside a short-range air-to-air missile's minimum range.
Notably during the early years of the Vietnam war, the probability of
kill in short-range engagements of the air-to-air missiles then
available proved so low that the very modest capability of gun systems
added significantly to overall effectiveness. The probability of success
with guns has advanced little over the years[12]. By contrast, the
performance of air-to-air missiles has improved dramatically. Indeed, in
short-range engagements, the minimum range capability and agility of the
missiles that Eurofighter will carry, together with its planned
helmet-mounted sight targeting system, offers the pilot a shot with a
very high probability of success in almost every conceivable situation.
A gun could be seen as a defence of last resort when all the aircraft's
missiles had been fired. However, even then the gun's usefulness would
be severely limited because of the possibility of engagement by missile
armed aircraft from well outside the gun's range.

8. Firing "warning shots across the bow" with a gun is not an
effective means of coercion in modern operations. The cockpit
environment of modern aircraft is such that the pilot is extremely
unlikely to hear such warning shots and would only see them if they were
tracer rounds. The value of such a display against a civilian aircraft
is dubious and against a military aircraft it may well be misconstrued.

9. Against some threats, missiles may be susceptible to
counter-measures employed by the opposing aircraft. However, ASRAAM has
already proven itself against typical current countermeasure doctrines
and is designed to overcome extreme levels of countermeasures. Even
should an advanced hostile aircraft have decoyed Eurofighter's
air-to-air missiles successfully, there is again little benefit in
adding a gun to Eurofighter's armament. If the UK pilot were then to
close on that hostile target to within the range of the gun, he would be
placing the aircraft—and himself—at unnecessarily high risk of being
shot down by the hostile aircraft's own missiles. Moreover, gun systems
are not completely invulnerable to countermeasures, not least because
most depend on accurate radar range

10. As for air-to-ground combat, it is worth noting that the original
European Staff Requirement, signed by the Chiefs of Air Staffs from the
partner nations in December 1985, specifies the gun only in an
air-to-air role. So, even then, experienced airmen in the partner
nations did not regard the gun as a valuable weapon for ground attack.
It remains the view of experts that it is difficult to justify using the
gun in Eurofighter's offensive support role, owing to:

— the risk of collateral damage resulting from the relative
inefficiency of gun firing from a fixed-wing aircraft, especially in
this age of precision-guided munitions, with which Eurofighter will be
armed; and

— the increased vulnerability of the aircraft because the gun's short
range would leave the aircraft very exposed to surface-to-air missiles
and anti-aircraft gunfire.

11. Overall, therefore, it is clear that the utility of a gun on an
aircraft such as Eurofighter in modern operations is questionable. To
perform its roles effectively, Eurofighter's armament should emphasise
not the very short-range capability that a gun would offer, but the
long-range capability to be offered initially by the Advanced
Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM). and later by the Meteor beyond
visual range air-to-air missile.

12. The minimal combat value that the gun does provide is more than
outweighed by the support, fatigue and training cost penalties of
retaining it. Specific disadvantages of the gun include:

— the damaging effects of the shock of its recoil on the electronics
(approximately 4 tons recoil shock 30 times a second);
— the corrosive effects of its exhaust gas;
— the strain which it puts on the airframe, reducing the aircraft's
useful life. (Even the weight of 80kg of ammunition can add well over
half a tonne load at the wing roots of the aircraft when it is subject
to high gravitational pull in manoeuvre. Each aircraft has a finite
design fatigue life. Using up this life much more rapidly would require
us to purchase a greater number of aircraft or to undertake a life
extension programme, the cost and operational penalties of which cannot
be justified by the minimal operational benefits of the gun.); and
— a range of training costs, including the provision of new targets,
the increased demands on the Hawk aircraft towing the targets (which
must shortly be replaced by new aircraft), and the cost of removing
training rounds from the environment.

13. We understand that our partner nations currently intend to retain
the gun on Eurofighter. The American F-14, F-15, F/A-18 all have
internal guns, though the F-117 does not; and the F-22 is planned to
have one. The Russian MiG-29 and the Su-27/31 also have guns as do
Gripen and Rafale. Some of these aircraft types entered service many
years ago when missile technology was far less advanced. However, it is
not currently planned to fit an internal gun to the Short Take-Off and
Vertical Landing variant of Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), although it will
be able to carry an externally mounted gun which can be put on and
removed from the aircraft for particular missions.

14. Our assessment remains that, in the future operational roles for
which we require Eurofighter, the minimal value of a gun is more than
outweighed by its considerable associated costs and disadvantages.
+++++



--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBoxatjrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

In message , Kevin
Brooks writes
"Paul J. Adam" wrote in message
...
Sure, but insisting on keeping kit because it used to be essential and
still might be useful is equally risky: especially when it can't be
jettisoned.

And I suppose designing that feature in and then doing away with it because
of its (relatively slight) increase in unit cost, as was done with the RAF
Typhoon, is not risky?

Risky, perhaps. Indicative of serious pressure on the EP budget,
certainly. Personally I'd be a little less inclined to abandon a
capability that was actually built in, but it is more expensive than it
seems to maintain (it's not just guns, or even ammunition, but the
training burden)

Are there no gun pods? This has always been a capability that can be
bolted onto aircraft as necessary.

Let's see, which would I rather have orbiting about in the CAS stack,

How much of a CAS stack existed that far from the nearest airbase?

aircraft that are capable of both without requiring special ordinance
request, or a requirement for the FSE and ALO to put their heads together
and route a request for such specialized ordnance to be fitted...? I believe
the former wins.

How effective were the anecdotal strafing runs? It's a tough problem to
judge. For sure nobody's going to stand up and say "the CAS birds came
in and strafed, but it didn't seem to do much good against the scattered
and dispersed enemy we were fighting" - when someone takes a risk to
help you, you _don't_ go public saying they endangered themsevles for
little result.

More like issuing lances to tankers so they can run down enemy
soldiers...

No, you were arguing that use of the gun is dumb because it brings the CAS
platform down lower into the MANPADS envelope.

As well as getting into ricochet hazard, bringing up problems of target
fixation, all to employ a very limited weapon system. (Actual
effectiveness data is hard to come by for strafing, except that many
aircraft doing it seem to have shot themselves dry... suggests they ran
out of ammunition before their guns killed all the targets)

Where's the evidence of serious effectiveness to compensate? "This was
available, it was used, therefore it must be hugely lethal and vitally
necessary" is a shaky proposition.

That is not something we
would prefer to have happen, but when the situation requires it, the risk
may have to be accepted.

Alternatively, you may want to investigate more capable options for
"really close support", with particular attention to target acquisition
and IFF (it's awkward to accidentally strafe your own side, or to make a
low pass but not be able to find the dust-coloured dust-covered targets
on the dusty mountainside) rather than insist that a given weapon system
is now and forever a fixture.

What is the real requirement, what is the real target, and is a M61
Gatling really the best solution? How about a different gun? How about a
different type of munition? Is air-launched weaponry really the best
option for danger-close or should some other option be pursued?

Remember, we (or at least I) am not talking about ripping guns out of
existing aircraft and plating over the ports; the issue is what to
procure in the future.


If you are going to argue the necessity of CAS
*always* staying outside the bad guys response envelope, then the "can't
issue rifles to grunts because they will have to get within the bad guy's
engagement range" is the groundpounder's equivalent solution. Neither of
them makes much sense to me.

What happens when the Bad Guys have a SA-11 parked out of sight? That's
serious trouble for anything flying within ten miles... bye-bye CAS
unless someone's willing to take some risks.

The idea is to stay out of as much avoidable predictable grief as
possible, and MANPADs and light AAA are known and hugely proliferated.
They're also most effective against an opponent flying a predictable
straight-line path... like a strafing run.

Keeping a capability to strafe is worthwhile, but permanently giving up
a half-ton of useful payload while wearing a "Shoot Me!" sign is perhaps
not the best solution to the problem.

But the knife bayonet is a small, light, handy item that can replace
what a soldier would carry anyway (not many of us carried knives to
fight with, certainly not in peacetime, and I'd certainly not have
bothered with both bayonet and K-bar-clone). The analogy for air combat
is nearer to a full-size sword, lance or pike: a large, hefty item that
weighs as much as several magazines for your rifle or a day or two's
rations, even if it's more lethal in hand-to-hand combat.

And can you _guarantee_ that soldiers will never find themselves in
close-quarter battle? Would you have them carry puny knives, or would
you give them mighty swords, spears and/or axes to smite their foes with
as a permanent addition to their CEFO? Okay, they don't fight like that
too often... and it's more weight for them to carry... but there will
always be cases where soldiers find themselves fighting at arm's length,
so wouldn't issuing everyone a sword or axe be useful then?

Well, you always have that nifty wire-cutting feature for the latest US
bayonet in combination with its scabbard (though I am not sure how effective
it really is in that role)...

Our SA80 bayonet even has a saw in the scabbard as well as wire-cutting
capability. Like you, I'm dubious about its actual utility. How many
saws does a rifle section need? Why not issue one or two proper saws per
section, if there's a real requirement, rather than give everyone a
folding saw on a bayonet scabbard?

But the air-combat equivalent for a bayonet would be something on the
line of permanently issuing a halberd or bill, or at least a Bloody Big
Sword to every soldier and insisting it be carried everywhere they take
a rifle: it might be useful for those occasions where troops find
themselves at arm's length from the enemy, but it displaces a
significant amount of beans, bullets or batteries from the basic combat
load. A worthwhile tradeoff, or would the troops be better off with more
of their main armament?

Depends on a lot of factors. For instance, the F-15E both kept a gun
that isn't ideal for its primary mission of ground attack (shell too
light, slant range on the short size, rate of fire derated for strafing)
and halved the ammunition supply. It's not a bad decision because it's
quick and saves money, but it reflects the low priority.

Low priority and outright elimination are two different things. ISTR reading
that those 10th LID guys in Anaconda were *very* happy to have strafe
support from F-15E's, A-10's, and even AH-64's.

The AH-64s got badly hammered (seven of eight badly damaged and IIRC
five were so shot up they never flew again...), and again IIRC the A-10
was pulled out early on because it struggled to cope with the
hot-and-high conditions.

The question is not "did they want strafe" but "did they want effective
fire support even at close range"? Not the same thing, not at all.

I doubt you'll find a soldier there who insisted on the support fire
coming from a given asset or weapon now and forever... provided it was
available and turned Bad Guys into Dead Guys (or at least Hiding Guys)
without creating blue-on-blue then it will be considered Good..

If you were designing the capability from scratch, would you insist on
the M61? Consider a larger-calibre weapon with more A/G punch like a
KCA? Or go for fuel and/or lightness, and hang a podded gun for 'danger
close' missions?

That depends. Since cost is always a factor at some point, the use of the
M61 may be the best solution (you still retain an inherent marginal strafe
capability at minimal cost, and if you want more punch you can still *add*
those pods you keep talking about).

Trouble is, when you've got an internal gun you've eaten up weight:
tending to, if you're using guns you're stuck with what you've fitted.
Remember, we're not discussing a major frontline capability here, but an
emergency reversion. Can you justify _more_ guns when you have one built
into the airframe anyway and crews expensively trained in its use?

Or maybe use a 25mm weapon, or the
Mauser 27mm.

Interestingly, the F-35 took this approach for some versions. So did the
AV-8B.

Details are rather unimportant to the current question at hand
(courtesy thread drift), which is, "Gun versus no gun". You say no gun, I
say if possible retain the gun and remain more flexible by doing so.

Then explain the STOVL JSF, which opted for a gun pod rather than an
internal solution despite CAS being high on its priority list.

Trouble is, stories of "F-15E bravely makes strafing passes" deservedly
get headlines. "F-15E really regrets having to call skosh fuel and leave
station" don't: but an internal gun is getting on for a thousand pounds
of fuel, which translates to more loiter time or range. And it isn't
negotiable.

We have KC's that refuel TACAIR.

If the US can claim it's never run short of tanking assets in-theatre,
I'll call them liars, because they're the only force to achieve that.

And unless the tankers are flying low orbits over the firefights,
breaking off to refuel still means "not on station". More fuel means
more time between those absences.

If you are talking the CAS mission, which
we are now doing, then it is reasonable to accept that those assets will be
doing their thing relatively close to the EA. And stop acting as if a
thousand pounds of fuel is the end of the world--that works out to what, a
whopping 125 gallons? If your CAS effort is dependent upon a 125 gallon fuel
margine you are likely in deep do-do already.

How much flying time does that get you, loitering in a notional 'CAS
stack'? When you're a long way from home, time on station gets to be
important, because so much of the sortie and your fuel load gets eaten
up in "getting there" and "getting home". (CAP experience in the
Falklands comes to mind, where that sort of fuel could double on-station
time)

I'd suggest that if your CAS effort is so short of usable ordnance, or
so badly co-ordinated and equipped, that you're depending on guns...
you've also got something badly wrong.

--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBoxatjrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

"Paul J. Adam" wrote in message
...
In message , Kevin
Brooks writes
"Paul J. Adam" wrote in message
...
Sure, but insisting on keeping kit because it used to be essential and
still might be useful is equally risky: especially when it can't be
jettisoned.

And I suppose designing that feature in and then doing away with it
because
of its (relatively slight) increase in unit cost, as was done with the
RAF
Typhoon, is not risky?

Risky, perhaps. Indicative of serious pressure on the EP budget,
certainly. Personally I'd be a little less inclined to abandon a
capability that was actually built in, but it is more expensive than it
seems to maintain (it's not just guns, or even ammunition, but the
training burden)

The training burden? For gosh sakes, you already have to have armorers, and
I doubt that including a periodic requirement for the pilots to do some
range work would be that great a burden--it is after all what they do during
peacetime.


Are there no gun pods? This has always been a capability that can be
bolted onto aircraft as necessary.

Let's see, which would I rather have orbiting about in the CAS stack,

How much of a CAS stack existed that far from the nearest airbase?

Apparently a pretty decent one including F-15E's, F-16's, and A-10's as
well, from what I have read of the reports on Anaconda.


aircraft that are capable of both without requiring special ordinance
request, or a requirement for the FSE and ALO to put their heads together
and route a request for such specialized ordnance to be fitted...? I
believe
the former wins.

How effective were the anecdotal strafing runs? It's a tough problem to
judge. For sure nobody's going to stand up and say "the CAS birds came
in and strafed, but it didn't seem to do much good against the scattered
and dispersed enemy we were fighting" - when someone takes a risk to
help you, you _don't_ go public saying they endangered themsevles for
little result.

Actually, one senior US Army commander *did* sort of hammer the CAS effort
after-the-fact, though not specifically directed at the strafe operations.
Some of his comments were valid, and some were likely as not an attempt to
shovel off blame that he should have borne on his own shoulders. As to
effect, the reports I read varied, with some indicating that in some
instances they ended up having to resort to using PGM's a lot closer than
they originally cared to in order to finally destroy the target (and in at
least one case that almost literally "blew up in their face", so to speak,
yielding a quick, "you almost got us with that last bomb" from the CCT). I
recall two reports indicated that the strafes were on target and at least
suppressed the bad guys (and sometimes suppression is the best you can hope
for).


More like issuing lances to tankers so they can run down enemy
soldiers...

No, you were arguing that use of the gun is dumb because it brings the
CAS
platform down lower into the MANPADS envelope.

As well as getting into ricochet hazard, bringing up problems of target
fixation, all to employ a very limited weapon system. (Actual
effectiveness data is hard to come by for strafing, except that many
aircraft doing it seem to have shot themselves dry... suggests they ran
out of ammunition before their guns killed all the targets)

Well, if you don't even *have* a gun, that is not going to be a problem, is
it? Of course, neither will the CCT (or its supported ground combat element)
get the CAS effort they want either... As to the value of the guns, it is
interesting to note that one of the comments that came out of the Anaconda
participants was, "Every light division needs a supporting *squadron* of
AC-130's." Pie in the sky statement that may be, it points out the value
those ground folks placed upon aerial gunfire support. Imagine a scenario
where the bad guy has a better MANPADS capability and you are stuck in a
similar (daytime) situation--which would you rather commit to making
strafing runs to suppress the bad guys, fast-movers or that AC-130? If you
are as concerned about risk as you claim, you know what the answer to that
one is.


Where's the evidence of serious effectiveness to compensate? "This was
available, it was used, therefore it must be hugely lethal and vitally
necessary" is a shaky proposition.

Better than, "This was not available, so it could not be used, and we lost a
lot of guys", IMO.


That is not something we
would prefer to have happen, but when the situation requires it, the risk
may have to be accepted.

Alternatively, you may want to investigate more capable options for
"really close support", with particular attention to target acquisition
and IFF (it's awkward to accidentally strafe your own side, or to make a
low pass but not be able to find the dust-coloured dust-covered targets
on the dusty mountainside) rather than insist that a given weapon system
is now and forever a fixture.

OFCS, the separation range mentioned in a couple of the reports (one from a
participating Viper pilot and one from a CCT guy on the ground) was
*seventy-five meters*. Do you want any kind of bomb going off that close to
*your* patrol if there is another method entailing less risk of fratricide
available to be tried first? I wouldn't.


What is the real requirement, what is the real target, and is a M61
Gatling really the best solution? How about a different gun? How about a
different type of munition? Is air-launched weaponry really the best
option for danger-close or should some other option be pursued?

For gosh sakes, Paul, we are talking a real world example where the M61 was
their best hope, at least initially. They did not have arty tubes in place
to support them, they had *very* limited mortar support (and too many
simultaneous targets to engage even had they had more available), a very
difficult ammo resupply situation, and lots of bad guys very much
up-close-and-personal to deal with. Now hopefully this was the exception to
the rule, but we all know that plans start going south *before* you cross
the LD and the LC is at best a prediction in many operations, so having that
air-to-ground gunnery asset in the toolbag is a way of ensuring maximum
flexibility.


Remember, we (or at least I) am not talking about ripping guns out of
existing aircraft and plating over the ports; the issue is what to
procure in the future.

So if we have (God forbid) another Anaconda situation (and you know as well
as I do that there *will* be someday another force inserted somewhere that
will find the enemy in an unexpected place, in unexpected strength, and find
itself fighting for survival), and our CAS stack is made up of Typhoons and
STOVL F-35's sans guns, you think that is OK?



If you are going to argue the necessity of CAS
*always* staying outside the bad guys response envelope, then the "can't
issue rifles to grunts because they will have to get within the bad guy's
engagement range" is the groundpounder's equivalent solution. Neither of
them makes much sense to me.

What happens when the Bad Guys have a SA-11 parked out of sight? That's
serious trouble for anything flying within ten miles... bye-bye CAS
unless someone's willing to take some risks.

Taking risks is inherent to military operations. METT-T rules, and the
commanders get paid to weigh those risks versus gains. If you are claiming
otherwise, then thank goodness our fathers who fought in WWII did not take
that view.


The idea is to stay out of as much avoidable predictable grief as
possible, and MANPADs and light AAA are known and hugely proliferated.
They're also most effective against an opponent flying a predictable
straight-line path... like a strafing run.

No, they are even more lethal to that guy flying the AC-130, or to those
guys flying the cargo helos in to haul all those mortar and arty rounds that
you would prefer we use exclusively.


Keeping a capability to strafe is worthwhile, but permanently giving up
a half-ton of useful payload while wearing a "Shoot Me!" sign is perhaps
not the best solution to the problem.

I'd imagine had you been with those guys from the 10th LID who were so happy
to get those strafing runs you'd have a slightly different view of the value
of retaining that capability, as distasteful as having to resort to its use
may be.


But the knife bayonet is a small, light, handy item that can replace
what a soldier would carry anyway (not many of us carried knives to
fight with, certainly not in peacetime, nd I'd certainly not have
bothered with both bayonet and K-bar-clone). The analogy for air combat
is nearer to a full-size sword, lance or pike: a large, hefty item that
weighs as much as several magazines for your rifle or a day or two's
rations, even if it's more lethal in hand-to-hand combat.

And can you _guarantee_ that soldiers will never find themselves in
close-quarter battle? Would you have them carry puny knives, or would
you give them mighty swords, spears and/or axes to smite their foes
with
as a permanent addition to their CEFO? Okay, they don't fight like that
too often... and it's more weight for them to carry... but there will
always be cases where soldiers find themselves fighting at arm's
length,
so wouldn't issuing everyone a sword or axe be useful then?

Well, you always have that nifty wire-cutting feature for the latest US
bayonet in combination with its scabbard (though I am not sure how
effective
it really is in that role)...

Our SA80 bayonet even has a saw in the scabbard as well as wire-cutting
capability. Like you, I'm dubious about its actual utility. How many
saws does a rifle section need? Why not issue one or two proper saws per
section, if there's a real requirement, rather than give everyone a
folding saw on a bayonet scabbard?

But the air-combat equivalent for a bayonet would be something on the
line of permanently issuing a halberd or bill, or at least a Bloody Big
Sword to every soldier and insisting it be carried everywhere they take
a rifle: it might be useful for those occasions where troops find
themselves at arm's length from the enemy, but it displaces a
significant amount of beans, bullets or batteries from the basic combat
load. A worthwhile tradeoff, or would the troops be better off with more
of their main armament?

Not if their main armamnet was incapable of handling the situation that
arose. That is the difference, when viewed against the Anaconda model. Had
you taken up that M61 space and crammed a few new radios, or another few
pounds of fuel onboard, it would still not have allowed those CAS aircraft
to do what they were *there* to do, which was support the troops engaged, no
matter how close the separation of the two combatants. With the M61's they
did that.


Depends on a lot of factors. For instance, the F-15E both kept a gun
that isn't ideal for its primary mission of ground attack (shell too
light, slant range on the short size, rate of fire derated for
strafing)
and halved the ammunition supply. It's not a bad decision because it's
quick and saves money, but it reflects the low priority.

Low priority and outright elimination are two different things. ISTR
reading
that those 10th LID guys in Anaconda were *very* happy to have strafe
support from F-15E's, A-10's, and even AH-64's.

The AH-64s got badly hammered (seven of eight badly damaged and IIRC
five were so shot up they never flew again...), and again IIRC the A-10
was pulled out early on because it struggled to cope with the
hot-and-high conditions.

Those AH-64's were indeed getting hammered--but because they hung around and
continued to press home repeated gun runs against the critical targets. How
many AH-64 crews were lost? None. How many lives did they save on the
ground? We'll never know.


The question is not "did they want strafe" but "did they want effective
fire support even at close range"? Not the same thing, not at all.

They wanted fire that would not also kill them in the bargain, which is why
they repeatedly *requested* strafe, again and again. In some cases they
later resorted to using LGB's, with the curious methos of walking them in as
if they were conventional rounds, from what I could decypher. And yet they
still continued to request gun runs...wonder why?


I doubt you'll find a soldier there who insisted on the support fire
coming from a given asset or weapon now and forever... provided it was
available and turned Bad Guys into Dead Guys (or at least Hiding Guys)
without creating blue-on-blue then it will be considered Good..

Yep, and what was available that day (or days, as IIRC this lasted well into
the next day) was CAS, and what those soldiers kept asking for from the CAS
was guns, at least in the early stages. Tells me they liked the guns.


If you were designing the capability from scratch, would you insist on
the M61? Consider a larger-calibre weapon with more A/G punch like a
KCA? Or go for fuel and/or lightness, and hang a podded gun for 'danger
close' missions?

That depends. Since cost is always a factor at some point, the use of the
M61 may be the best solution (you still retain an inherent marginal
strafe
capability at minimal cost, and if you want more punch you can still
*add*
those pods you keep talking about).

Trouble is, when you've got an internal gun you've eaten up weight:
tending to, if you're using guns you're stuck with what you've fitted.
Remember, we're not discussing a major frontline capability here, but an
emergency reversion. Can you justify _more_ guns when you have one built
into the airframe anyway and crews expensively trained in its use?

It is not that important an issue. The fact is that all of the incoming
aircraft we will be fighting with in the foreseeable future, minus the STOVL
version of the F-35, have guns included in their armament suites. I say
great, keep 'em and keep that flexibility they give us.


Or maybe use a 25mm weapon, or the
Mauser 27mm.

Interestingly, the F-35 took this approach for some versions. So did the
AV-8B.

Details are rather unimportant to the current question at hand
(courtesy thread drift), which is, "Gun versus no gun". You say no gun, I
say if possible retain the gun and remain more flexible by doing so.

Then explain the STOVL JSF, which opted for a gun pod rather than an
internal solution despite CAS being high on its priority list.

From what I gather that was dictated by the addition of the STOVL
capability, which necessitates making room for the lift fan, etc.


Trouble is, stories of "F-15E bravely makes strafing passes" deservedly
get headlines. "F-15E really regrets having to call skosh fuel and
leave
station" don't: but an internal gun is getting on for a thousand pounds
of fuel, which translates to more loiter time or range. And it isn't
negotiable.

We have KC's that refuel TACAIR.

If the US can claim it's never run short of tanking assets in-theatre,
I'll call them liars, because they're the only force to achieve that.

And unless the tankers are flying low orbits over the firefights,
breaking off to refuel still means "not on station". More fuel means
more time between those absences.

Those absences are kind of meaningless if the alternative is another couple
of circuits with an arament suite that does not allow you to serve the
customers down below, aren't they? I doubt the groundpounder down below who
is in a situation where his options are such that he wants a strafe/can't
risk even a PGM is going to be very relieved by the knowledge that his CAS
stack can do a few more circles without being able to actually handle his
request.


If you are talking the CAS mission, which
we are now doing, then it is reasonable to accept that those assets will
be
doing their thing relatively close to the EA. And stop acting as if a
thousand pounds of fuel is the end of the world--that works out to what,
a
whopping 125 gallons? If your CAS effort is dependent upon a 125 gallon
fuel
margine you are likely in deep do-do already.

How much flying time does that get you, loitering in a notional 'CAS
stack'?


It does NOT matter if that CAS asset can't conduct the kind of attack you
need!

When you're a long way from home, time on station gets to be
important, because so much of the sortie and your fuel load gets eaten
up in "getting there" and "getting home". (CAP experience in the
Falklands comes to mind, where that sort of fuel could double on-station
time)

I'd suggest that if your CAS effort is so short of usable ordnance, or
so badly co-ordinated and equipped, that you're depending on guns...
you've also got something badly wrong.

You just don't get it, do you? "**** happens" in combat, and flexibility is
what allows you to adjust. having that aerial gun option is a tool for
flexibility. If you don't want that flexibility, fine, but the
powers-that-be here in the US seem to consider it worthwhile, as evidenced
by the recent comments from our resident Strike Eagle pilot in another
similar thread of late. I'll side with the "more tools are better than less
when dealing with uncertainty" side of the house.

Brooks