Best dogfight gun?

In message , Chad Irby
writes
In article ,
Alan Minyard wrote:
Are you familiar with the concept of guided missiles? If you get into
gun range you have already screwed the pooch. The gun is a last
ditch, desperation weapon in ACM, wasting airframe volume and weight
on a honking great, slow, unreliable gun is not a wise trade off.

Comments nearly identical to the one above were very popular in the
early 1960s. And then we got into a real shooting war, and pilots
suddenly needed guns again.

It's an interesting area to actually analyse, particularly when
comparing USAF and USN performance: in Linebacker the USAF shot down
forty-eight MiGs for twenty-four air-to-air losses, while the USN lost
four and scored 24 kills. More interesting yet, the Navy's fighters met
MiGs twenty-six times, for a .92 probability of killing a MiG and a .15
chance of losing one of their own; the USAF had eighty-two engagements,
for .58 kills per engagement but .29 losses.[1]

Sounds abstract? The services were using the same aircraft,
near-identical missiles (Sparrows and different models of Sidewinder),
but the USAF's F-4Ds and F-4Es had guns (pods for the Ds, internal for
the Es) supposedly as a solution to the problems encountered during
Rolling Thunder. Yet they were twice as likely to be shot down and
barely half as likely to kill, as the gunless Navy fighters. (Only seven
of the forty-eight USAF Linebacker kills were achieved with guns,
despite the efforts made to fit them)

Yep, McNamara is still influencing military thought. I was sure we'd
gotten over that, but what goes around, comes around.

"We're not training our crews properly, aren't using our weapons
correctly, and are employing poor tactics that make us very vulnerable"
is much less palatable than "the only problem is the aircraft imposed on
us doesn't have a gun!"

Note that the missiles have improved very significantly since 1972,
while the M61 - though a fine weapon -has had only incremental
modifications.

[1] Stats from "Clashes" by Marshal Michel III
--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBoxatjrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

On Wed, 10 Dec 2003 19:00:14 +0000, "Paul J. Adam"
wrote:

In message , Chad Irby
writes

Comments nearly identical to the one above were very popular in the
early 1960s. And then we got into a real shooting war, and pilots
suddenly needed guns again.

It's an interesting area to actually analyse, particularly when
comparing USAF and USN performance: in Linebacker the USAF shot down
forty-eight MiGs for twenty-four air-to-air losses, while the USN lost
four and scored 24 kills. More interesting yet, the Navy's fighters met
MiGs twenty-six times, for a .92 probability of killing a MiG and a .15
chance of losing one of their own; the USAF had eighty-two engagements,
for .58 kills per engagement but .29 losses.[1]

While numbers tell a story, they can occasionally mislead. USAF to USN
comparisons offer some insight, but strict stats can lead to bad
conclusions. To compare sortie count/MiG engagement percentages you
would need to consider the various missions, the allocation of the
resource, the philosophy of engagement, etc.

With large composite strike packages, the AF tended toward lots of
specialization. Chaff droppers, SEAD, escorts (that often were used to
herd MiGs rather than engage them) and only a few dedicated shooters
on TEABALL frequency meant that the numbers could be skewed.

Sounds abstract? The services were using the same aircraft,
near-identical missiles (Sparrows and different models of Sidewinder),
but the USAF's F-4Ds and F-4Es had guns (pods for the Ds, internal for
the Es) supposedly as a solution to the problems encountered during
Rolling Thunder.

I don't know of any instances in which F-4Ds were carrying gun pods
into RP VI during Linebacker. There were lots of external gun sorties
flown in Rolling Thunder.

Yet they were twice as likely to be shot down and
barely half as likely to kill, as the gunless Navy fighters. (Only seven
of the forty-eight USAF Linebacker kills were achieved with guns,
despite the efforts made to fit them)

It would be helpful to consider the USN fighter-vs-attack philosophy
as well as the level of experience of the multiple tour carrier force.
The USAF "universal pilot" concept and the "no involuntary second
tour" policy impacted the competence level.

The parenthetical conclusion is a poor one. With TEABALL, the 555th
TFW specialists, and the accompanying GCI support, it was possible for
the USAF fighters who DID engage, to use their longer range weapons
and negate the requirement to close to gun range.

Yep, McNamara is still influencing military thought. I was sure we'd
gotten over that, but what goes around, comes around.

"We're not training our crews properly, aren't using our weapons
correctly, and are employing poor tactics that make us very vulnerable"
is much less palatable than "the only problem is the aircraft imposed on
us doesn't have a gun!"

Amen! It's much easier to write off a combat loss than to suffer
accidents in training.

In message , Ed Rasimus
writes
On Wed, 10 Dec 2003 19:00:14 +0000, "Paul J. Adam"
wrote:
It's an interesting area to actually analyse, particularly when
comparing USAF and USN performance: in Linebacker the USAF shot down
forty-eight MiGs for twenty-four air-to-air losses, while the USN lost
four and scored 24 kills. More interesting yet, the Navy's fighters met
MiGs twenty-six times, for a .92 probability of killing a MiG and a .15
chance of losing one of their own; the USAF had eighty-two engagements,
for .58 kills per engagement but .29 losses.[1]

While numbers tell a story, they can occasionally mislead.

Of course - these are broad strokes, and I know enough to know there's a
lot of detail I've missed.

USAF to USN
comparisons offer some insight, but strict stats can lead to bad
conclusions. To compare sortie count/MiG engagement percentages you
would need to consider the various missions, the allocation of the
resource, the philosophy of engagement, etc.

I would argue that the numbers given have some utility, but there are
very clear questions.

With large composite strike packages, the AF tended toward lots of
specialization. Chaff droppers, SEAD, escorts (that often were used to
herd MiGs rather than engage them) and only a few dedicated shooters
on TEABALL frequency meant that the numbers could be skewed.

True, but if the end result was to triple the effectiveness of the
enemy's air defence then there appears to be a problem.

However, I don't have the comparative loss figures for ground fire, or
any data for results; it's quite possible that the USAF's relative
vulnerability to MiGs was balanced by lower losses to SAMs/AAA, and/or
by greater effects achieved to the targets. To date this remains a
personal interest rather than a funded study

Yet they were twice as likely to be shot down and
barely half as likely to kill, as the gunless Navy fighters. (Only seven
of the forty-eight USAF Linebacker kills were achieved with guns,
despite the efforts made to fit them)

It would be helpful to consider the USN fighter-vs-attack philosophy
as well as the level of experience of the multiple tour carrier force.
The USAF "universal pilot" concept and the "no involuntary second
tour" policy impacted the competence level.

Not at all, Ed. The only problem is that the USAF didn't have guns in
its fighters! USAF policy was completely correct in every detail, apart
from the unfortunate imposition of a flawed naval aircraft by McNamara.

(Smiley for the humour impaired)

Seriously... if the USAF had accepted the political cost of maintaining
a similar core cadre of specialist pilots as the USN (the Navy had the
justifiable shibboleth of carrier landing, the USAF lacked that and
chose to spread the pain) then would their results have been better? I'd
certainly guess so. There was much, much more going on than "our
fighters don't have guns".

The parenthetical conclusion is a poor one. With TEABALL, the 555th
TFW specialists, and the accompanying GCI support, it was possible for
the USAF fighters who DID engage, to use their longer range weapons
and negate the requirement to close to gun range.

Actually, I'd continue to claim it was correct. Why bother with Teaball,
Combat Tree, GCI, et al in order to get more performance from those
nasty useless missiles, when gun-armed F-4Es are arriving? If "lack of
guns" is the real problem, surely gun-armed fighters are a complete and
satisfactory answer?

The reality seems to me to be a damn sight more complex, and while
having a gun makes for a nice-to-have for the pilot (I'd want one if I
were flying...) it doesn't seem to be too significant in terms of
results achieved, compared to the other variables..


--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBoxatjrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

On Wed, 10 Dec 2003 22:40:10 +0000, "Paul J. Adam"
wrote:

In message , Ed Rasimus
writes
On Wed, 10 Dec 2003 19:00:14 +0000, "Paul J. Adam"
wrote:

USAF to USN
comparisons offer some insight, but strict stats can lead to bad
conclusions. To compare sortie count/MiG engagement percentages you
would need to consider the various missions, the allocation of the
resource, the philosophy of engagement, etc.

I would argue that the numbers given have some utility, but there are
very clear questions.

With large composite strike packages, the AF tended toward lots of
specialization. Chaff droppers, SEAD, escorts (that often were used to
herd MiGs rather than engage them) and only a few dedicated shooters
on TEABALL frequency meant that the numbers could be skewed.

True, but if the end result was to triple the effectiveness of the
enemy's air defence then there appears to be a problem.

I'd say that the effectiveness of the enemy defenses greatly reduced
by the AF specialization and packages. The losses/sortie difference
between '66/'67 and '72 were significant. Let's not get too tightly
wrapped around the MiG axle. The core of the defense was integrated
AAA and SA-2. MiGs were a factor, but relatively a small one. In
Linebacker, if MiGs got airborne, they generally died. (Or, they never
engaged.)

However, I don't have the comparative loss figures for ground fire, or
any data for results; it's quite possible that the USAF's relative
vulnerability to MiGs was balanced by lower losses to SAMs/AAA, and/or
by greater effects achieved to the targets. To date this remains a
personal interest rather than a funded study

The "relative vulnerability" to MiGs isn't demonstrated by loss
ratios, because the mission wasn't to sweep the skies of enemy
aircraft. Our mission was to deliver iron on targets. The MiGs mission
was to prevent that. While we all wanted to get a MiG, there weren't
enough to go around. And while the MiG pilots had the more agile
aircraft, their mission was to deter the bomb droppers.

Yet they were twice as likely to be shot down and
barely half as likely to kill, as the gunless Navy fighters. (Only seven
of the forty-eight USAF Linebacker kills were achieved with guns,
despite the efforts made to fit them)

It would be helpful to consider the USN fighter-vs-attack philosophy
as well as the level of experience of the multiple tour carrier force.
The USAF "universal pilot" concept and the "no involuntary second
tour" policy impacted the competence level.

Not at all, Ed. The only problem is that the USAF didn't have guns in
its fighters! USAF policy was completely correct in every detail, apart
from the unfortunate imposition of a flawed naval aircraft by McNamara.

Sorry, not true. During the period of Rolling Thunder, the greater
number of sorties were flown into MiG country by gun-equipped F-105s
(and on the Navy side, A-4, A-7 and F-8). By the time of Linebacker,
there were more F-4Es involved in the Pack VI missions than D's. If
anyone was hampered by lack of guns in their fighters, it should have
been the USN, but the initial stats offered in this discussion,
indicate that the USN had better ratios in LB when they had no guns.

Seriously... if the USAF had accepted the political cost of maintaining
a similar core cadre of specialist pilots as the USN (the Navy had the
justifiable shibboleth of carrier landing, the USAF lacked that and
chose to spread the pain) then would their results have been better? I'd
certainly guess so. There was much, much more going on than "our
fighters don't have guns".

Personnel policies and the related errors in applying them, are
background to the tactics issues. Clearly the issue can be traced in
USAF all the way back to the decision in the late '50's to go with
single-track "all jet" pilot training and the assumption of a
universally assignable pilot. The Navy used prop aircraft for primary
training continually and multi-tracking to get dedicated F/A, heavy
and helo pilots. Check USAF today---introducing a prop for primary and
multi-tracking. Sco USN 1/USAF 0!!

The parenthetical conclusion is a poor one. With TEABALL, the 555th
TFW specialists, and the accompanying GCI support, it was possible for
the USAF fighters who DID engage, to use their longer range weapons
and negate the requirement to close to gun range.

Actually, I'd continue to claim it was correct. Why bother with Teaball,
Combat Tree, GCI, et al in order to get more performance from those
nasty useless missiles, when gun-armed F-4Es are arriving? If "lack of
guns" is the real problem, surely gun-armed fighters are a complete and
satisfactory answer?

I argue that "lack of guns" is not the reason for poor kill ratios.
The F-4E "arrived" in 1968--nearly four full years before Linebacker
commenced. In 150 missions into North Vietnam, I only went twice
without a gun (flying a deployed F-4D from the 35th TFS in Korea
during September of '72.) Every other time I had a gun, either in the
F-105D or F-4E. I should note that in all of those sorties, I never
once had an occasion to fire the gun at another aircraft. Never came
close. Never dispatched an A/A missile either. Several times came
close.

The reality seems to me to be a damn sight more complex, and while
having a gun makes for a nice-to-have for the pilot (I'd want one if I
were flying...) it doesn't seem to be too significant in terms of
results achieved, compared to the other variables..

Ahh, total agreement at last. The issue is complex. It extends well
beyond stats and kill rates or calibers and fire rate. I still argue
for guns on fighters.

In article ,
"Paul J. Adam" wrote:

If "lack of guns" is the real problem, surely gun-armed fighters are
a complete and satisfactory answer?

It's not a simple question of "lack of guns."

It's "relying on missiles 100% and not having guns when they're really
bloody useful."

We learned that lesson over 30 years ago, and a whole new generation of
bean counters are trying to resurrect the kind of silliness that the
McNamara school brought us in Vietnam...

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

"Paul J. Adam" wrote in message
...
In message , Chad Irby
writes
In article ,
Alan Minyard wrote:
Are you familiar with the concept of guided missiles? If you get into
gun range you have already screwed the pooch. The gun is a last
ditch, desperation weapon in ACM, wasting airframe volume and weight
on a honking great, slow, unreliable gun is not a wise trade off.

Comments nearly identical to the one above were very popular in the
early 1960s. And then we got into a real shooting war, and pilots
suddenly needed guns again.

It's an interesting area to actually analyse, particularly when
comparing USAF and USN performance: in Linebacker the USAF shot down
forty-eight MiGs for twenty-four air-to-air losses, while the USN lost
four and scored 24 kills. More interesting yet, the Navy's fighters met
MiGs twenty-six times, for a .92 probability of killing a MiG and a .15
chance of losing one of their own; the USAF had eighty-two engagements,
for .58 kills per engagement but .29 losses.[1]

Ugh! That all sounds dangerously like the "operations research", or systems
analysis, kind of numeric mumbo-jumbo so characteristic of the McNamara
era---PLEASSSE don't go there! It took us a generation to rid ourselves of
the most of the "mantle of the number crunchers" (and we were only partially
succesful--witness the continued use of the POM process in budgeting) as it
was...

Brooks

snip

On Wed, 10 Dec 2003 20:39:49 GMT, "Kevin Brooks" wrote:


"Paul J. Adam" wrote in message
...
In message , Chad Irby
writes
In article ,
Alan Minyard wrote:
Are you familiar with the concept of guided missiles? If you get into
gun range you have already screwed the pooch. The gun is a last
ditch, desperation weapon in ACM, wasting airframe volume and weight
on a honking great, slow, unreliable gun is not a wise trade off.

Comments nearly identical to the one above were very popular in the
early 1960s. And then we got into a real shooting war, and pilots
suddenly needed guns again.

It's an interesting area to actually analyse, particularly when
comparing USAF and USN performance: in Linebacker the USAF shot down
forty-eight MiGs for twenty-four air-to-air losses, while the USN lost
four and scored 24 kills. More interesting yet, the Navy's fighters met
MiGs twenty-six times, for a .92 probability of killing a MiG and a .15
chance of losing one of their own; the USAF had eighty-two engagements,
for .58 kills per engagement but .29 losses.[1]

Ugh! That all sounds dangerously like the "operations research", or systems
analysis, kind of numeric mumbo-jumbo so characteristic of the McNamara
era---PLEASSSE don't go there! It took us a generation to rid ourselves of
the most of the "mantle of the number crunchers" (and we were only partially
succesful--witness the continued use of the POM process in budgeting) as it
was...

Brooks

snip

OR has been in use since WWII, when it was used to determine such things
as the parameters of an "ideal" depth charge attack. It was quite effective
at the time, and still is. I certainly have no love of McN, he did an amazing
amount of damage to the US Military (the term "McNamara's Nightmare"
was applied to *numerous* systems).

Al Minyard

"Alan Minyard" wrote in message
...
On Wed, 10 Dec 2003 20:39:49 GMT, "Kevin Brooks"
wrote:


"Paul J. Adam" wrote in message
...
In message , Chad Irby
writes
In article ,
Alan Minyard wrote:
Are you familiar with the concept of guided missiles? If you get
into
gun range you have already screwed the pooch. The gun is a last
ditch, desperation weapon in ACM, wasting airframe volume and weight
on a honking great, slow, unreliable gun is not a wise trade off.

Comments nearly identical to the one above were very popular in the
early 1960s. And then we got into a real shooting war, and pilots
suddenly needed guns again.

It's an interesting area to actually analyse, particularly when
comparing USAF and USN performance: in Linebacker the USAF shot down
forty-eight MiGs for twenty-four air-to-air losses, while the USN lost
four and scored 24 kills. More interesting yet, the Navy's fighters met
MiGs twenty-six times, for a .92 probability of killing a MiG and a .15
chance of losing one of their own; the USAF had eighty-two engagements,
for .58 kills per engagement but .29 losses.[1]

Ugh! That all sounds dangerously like the "operations research", or
systems
analysis, kind of numeric mumbo-jumbo so characteristic of the McNamara
era---PLEASSSE don't go there! It took us a generation to rid ourselves
of
the most of the "mantle of the number crunchers" (and we were only
partially
succesful--witness the continued use of the POM process in budgeting) as
it
was...

Brooks

snip

OR has been in use since WWII, when it was used to determine such things
as the parameters of an "ideal" depth charge attack. It was quite
effective
at the time, and still is.

But it was taken waaay too far by the McNamara crowd, who felt that all
things were quantifiable by numbers, and numbers were more important than
actual results.

I certainly have no love of McN, he did an amazing
amount of damage to the US Military (the term "McNamara's Nightmare"
was applied to *numerous* systems).

Not to mention his micromanagement in Vietnam, and his later published
fandango about his involvement in the decisionmaking that went into that
conflict.

Brooks


Al Minyard

In message , Kevin
Brooks writes
"Paul J. Adam" wrote in message
...
It's an interesting area to actually analyse, particularly when
comparing USAF and USN performance: in Linebacker the USAF shot down
forty-eight MiGs for twenty-four air-to-air losses, while the USN lost
four and scored 24 kills. More interesting yet, the Navy's fighters met
MiGs twenty-six times, for a .92 probability of killing a MiG and a .15
chance of losing one of their own; the USAF had eighty-two engagements,
for .58 kills per engagement but .29 losses.[1]

Ugh! That all sounds dangerously like the "operations research", or systems
analysis, kind of numeric mumbo-jumbo so characteristic of the McNamara
era---PLEASSSE don't go there!

What do you think my day job is? _Someone_ has to try to work out the
best way to use what we've got, and while the Services take the lead
they also hire some civilian help.


Ed raises some valid criticism of the data as raw numbers, but he agrees
with the main thrust: guns on or off fighters were a trivial factor in
air-to-air combat effectiveness; at least when compared to training,
tactics, doctrine, personnel deployments, maintenance, technology...

Trouble is, the "we did badly because we didn't have guns" mantra is
attractive, seductive... and wrong.


It took us a generation to rid ourselves of
the most of the "mantle of the number crunchers" (and we were only partially
succesful--witness the continued use of the POM process in budgeting) as it
was...

Too little analysis is as bad as too much.

--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBoxatjrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

In article ,
"Paul J. Adam" wrote:

In message , Chad Irby
writes

It's an interesting area to actually analyse, particularly when
comparing USAF and USN performance: in Linebacker the USAF shot down
forty-eight MiGs for twenty-four air-to-air losses, while the USN lost
four and scored 24 kills. More interesting yet, the Navy's fighters met
MiGs twenty-six times, for a .92 probability of killing a MiG and a .15
chance of losing one of their own; the USAF had eighty-two engagements,
for .58 kills per engagement but .29 losses.[1]

Sounds abstract? The services were using the same aircraft,
near-identical missiles (Sparrows and different models of Sidewinder),
but the USAF's F-4Ds and F-4Es had guns (pods for the Ds, internal for
the Es) supposedly as a solution to the problems encountered during
Rolling Thunder. Yet they were twice as likely to be shot down and
barely half as likely to kill, as the gunless Navy fighters. (Only seven
of the forty-eight USAF Linebacker kills were achieved with guns,
despite the efforts made to fit them)

Yep, McNamara is still influencing military thought. I was sure we'd
gotten over that, but what goes around, comes around.

....and you're quoting the same sort of logic they used back then.
You're comparing planes and equipment, but not *missions*.

For example, the Navy planes flew sorties against coastal areas, which
meant that they were flying over relatively undefended airspace on the
run in, as compared to the large number of SAMs that the Air Force
fighters and bombers went over.

One other note: of the 21 MiG kills by the F-4E during Vietnam, five
were gun kills... pretty good for something so useless.

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.