Best dogfight gun?

On Wed, 10 Dec 2003 14:53:47 GMT, "Kevin Brooks"
wrote:


"Alan Minyard" wrote in message
news
Are you familiar with the concept of guided missiles? If you get into gun
range you have already screwed the pooch. The gun is a last ditch, desperation
weapon in ACM, wasting airframe volume and weight on a honking great,
slow, unreliable gun is not a wise trade off.

Yeah, a terrible tradeoff...right up to the point where you (or, more
accurately those you are supporting below who are locked in a very nasty
"knife" fight that precludes use of JDAM or an LGB) need it, as was found
during Anaconda.

Brooks

The more things change, the more they remain the same. I've only
opined once in this long thread, but thought I'd jump in again after
this.

Some points:

1. The M-61, with roughly fifty years of experience is a reliable gun.
It's been modded and carried in a lot of different systems and made a
number of A/A kills.

A.) It doesn't jam. (It is possible, but it definitely isn't
common.)

B.) The the internal gun and several pod variants are linkless
feed. Some pods are link-fed.

C.) Spin-up time is virtually negligible. Consider that in the
F-105, the barrel in which the cartridge was sparked was still
internal, meaning the gun must rotate to the exposed barrel position
before the bullet leaves the barrel. Pass through of unfired rounds
on spin-up/down was usually counted as six. On scored strafe, the
rounds limiter was traditionally set at 150 round. With that, you
could get four or five strafe passes. A good shooter could score 80%
or higher out of rounds fired and every pass counted those six unfired
rounds. That means spin up is virtually instantaneous. Trigger squeeze
to release on strafe was taught to be .5 seconds. Good strafers could
get a shorter burst. Spin up is negligible.

D.) Projectile size/payload is important, but a trade-off.
Yes, a kill with a 37mm hit is more likely than a 20mm hit. But, if I
can't carry enough projectiles to give me a good density or chance to
hit, then the higher Pk is meaningless.

2. Dogfighting, meaning one-v-one maneuvering to a gun kill is a
foolish endeavor. You might wind up there, but you should studiously
avoid it. Once there, shoot and scoot. This isn't an airshow display
and no one but the survivor will recount the aeronautical skill
displayed. Shoot with missiles. Shoot at the maximum range. Get the
kill confirmed by AWACS.

3. The final insert by Brooks is irrelevant to the discussion. The
question has been about guns and air/air. The question of optimum CAS
weapon isn't trivial and my reply shouldn't be taken as one more
evidence of the AF aversion to support of ground troops. There is
NOTHING more important. But:

A.) First, support of ground troops involves keeping enemy
aircraft from being a player. We've done that successfully in every
conflict since WW II.

B.) CAS does not have to be fifty feet overhead with
snake/nape on "enemy in the wire". It can evolve to that scenario but
doesn't happen as often as common perception would think.

C.) Modern stand-off weapons provide equal or greater
accuracy than close-in laydown and without either jeopardizing the
delivery aircraft or warning the target to hunker down.

D.) While no one can put a value on the life of one American
soldier, a cost/benefit analysis of what strafe can do compared to the
risk involved usually mitigates against strafe being a primary tactic.
It's great for SAR and can be effective on close-in CAS, but it's
better done with an A-10 type system than an A/A optimized platform
(which was what the thread has been talking about.)

E.) While the guy on the ground may be firmly (and rightly)
convinced that his battle is the most important, the commanders must
allocate resources based on priorities which often don't have as much
emotion attached. Getting strafe to the troops in Anaconda wasn't a
readily available option.

F.) Good Forward Observers (FACs or AOs) should be calling
early for support. Good FOs should be GPS and Laser equipped and
getting the job done well before the more spectacular troops in the
wire scenario occurs. JDAMs et. al. are a much better choice. Bigger
payload, greater effect, better accuracy than strafe, more economical,
etc.

At least, those are some of my impressions on the argument.

"Ed Rasimus" wrote in message
...
On Wed, 10 Dec 2003 14:53:47 GMT, "Kevin Brooks"
wrote:


"Alan Minyard" wrote in message
news
Are you familiar with the concept of guided missiles? If you get into
gun
range you have already screwed the pooch. The gun is a last ditch,
desperation
weapon in ACM, wasting airframe volume and weight on a honking great,
slow, unreliable gun is not a wise trade off.

Yeah, a terrible tradeoff...right up to the point where you (or, more
accurately those you are supporting below who are locked in a very nasty
"knife" fight that precludes use of JDAM or an LGB) need it, as was found
during Anaconda.

Brooks

The more things change, the more they remain the same. I've only
opined once in this long thread, but thought I'd jump in again after
this.

Some points:

snip good info


3. The final insert by Brooks is irrelevant to the discussion.

When the comment is made quite emphatically that no gun should be included
in the newer aircraft, by more than one poster, I disagree with your
conclusion of irrelevance.

The
question has been about guns and air/air. The question of optimum CAS
weapon isn't trivial and my reply shouldn't be taken as one more
evidence of the AF aversion to support of ground troops. There is
NOTHING more important. But:

A.) First, support of ground troops involves keeping enemy
aircraft from being a player. We've done that successfully in every
conflict since WW II.

That is only one aspect of support of ground troops. And if anything an
increasingly *less* important one at that--note that we have not faced a
significant air threat to our ground troops since WWII, Ed.


B.) CAS does not have to be fifty feet overhead with
snake/nape on "enemy in the wire". It can evolve to that scenario but
doesn't happen as often as common perception would think.

But it does happen, period. Did it happen during Anaconda or not? The
reports I read said it did--feel free to correct that representation.


C.) Modern stand-off weapons provide equal or greater
accuracy than close-in laydown and without either jeopardizing the
delivery aircraft or warning the target to hunker down.

And what about when the threat you are engaging is well within the danger
close margin? If it comes down to the gun as the best available support
option versus having the CAS folks say, "Sorry, we can't do anything since
we don't have guns, but we wish you the best of luck and will be thinking
kind thoughts of you...", I'd take the former, thank you. Luckily, the USAF
seems to share that view.


D.) While no one can put a value on the life of one American
soldier, a cost/benefit analysis of what strafe can do compared to the
risk involved usually mitigates against strafe being a primary tactic.

Nobody has said it should be a *primary* tactic.

It's great for SAR and can be effective on close-in CAS, but it's
better done with an A-10 type system than an A/A optimized platform
(which was what the thread has been talking about.)

As to "what this thread has been talking about", this thread has also the
comment, "Air-to-ground, guns pull you into IR-SAM range and even for A-10s
that isn't healthy." And the fact is that the majority of CAS missions are
being flown by F-15E's, F-16's, F/A-18's, and most likely in the future by
platforms like the F-35 and even (gasp!) the F/A-22, not by A-10's. See
below for the types of aircraft flying strafe during Anaconda.


E.) While the guy on the ground may be firmly (and rightly)
convinced that his battle is the most important, the commanders must
allocate resources based on priorities which often don't have as much
emotion attached. Getting strafe to the troops in Anaconda wasn't a
readily available option.

It wasn't?! Reports I read indicated it actually occurred, so I wonder how
you determine it "wasn't a readily available option"?

"I had an aircraft overhead carrying 500-pound bombs, but the 'bad guys'
were too close to our position to drop that much ammo without risking our
lives. I waved the pilot off the bomb run. I had him come around and strafe
the area with guns," said the sergeant.
(www.af.mil/news/May2002/n20020529_0868.shtml )

"Then F-15s were overhead and the combat controller was directing them to
the enemy according to my
instructions. I told the combat controller to have the F-15s to strafe the
bunker and have them come in from our right to our left....I told him to
clear them and the rounds hit right by the bunker. I told him to have them
do that over and over again. I think the gun runs were made by both F-15s
and F-16s." (globalspecops.com/sts.html )

Go to Google and search based upon "Operation Anaconda strafe" and you can
find quite a few specific reports.


F.) Good Forward Observers (FACs or AOs) should be calling
early for support. Good FOs should be GPS and Laser equipped and
getting the job done well before the more spectacular troops in the
wire scenario occurs. JDAMs et. al. are a much better choice. Bigger
payload, greater effect, better accuracy than strafe, more economical,
etc.

That is all great and is what we'd *like* to see happen--but as we saw in
Anaconda, it doesn't always flesh out that way. One of the best qualities of
a first-class military is recognition of the importance of
flexibility--taking the strafe capability away from the aircraft that
perform most of the CAS does little to enhance that quality. I hope you are
not arguing that would be the way to go.

Brooks


At least, those are some of my impressions on the argument.

On Wed, 10 Dec 2003 17:49:17 GMT, "Kevin Brooks"
wrote:


"Ed Rasimus" wrote in message
.. .


The more things change, the more they remain the same. I've only
opined once in this long thread, but thought I'd jump in again after
this.

Some points:

snip good info


3. The final insert by Brooks is irrelevant to the discussion.

When the comment is made quite emphatically that no gun should be included
in the newer aircraft, by more than one poster, I disagree with your
conclusion of irrelevance.

The thread title is "Best Dogfight Gun". The relevance of the comment
is to tactical aircraft employment in support of ground forces, and I
freely conceded the importance in follow-on comments.

The
question has been about guns and air/air. The question of optimum CAS
weapon isn't trivial and my reply shouldn't be taken as one more
evidence of the AF aversion to support of ground troops. There is
NOTHING more important. But:

A.) First, support of ground troops involves keeping enemy
aircraft from being a player. We've done that successfully in every
conflict since WW II.

That is only one aspect of support of ground troops. And if anything an
increasingly *less* important one at that--note that we have not faced a
significant air threat to our ground troops since WWII, Ed.

The prosecution should rest with that acknowledgement. It is my point
exactly. The historic result should not be attributed to wishing and
hoping. It's a result of proper allocation of resources.


B.) CAS does not have to be fifty feet overhead with
snake/nape on "enemy in the wire". It can evolve to that scenario but
doesn't happen as often as common perception would think.

But it does happen, period. Did it happen during Anaconda or not? The
reports I read said it did--feel free to correct that representation.

It happened. But, anecdotal evidence does not necessarily lead to good
conclusions.


C.) Modern stand-off weapons provide equal or greater
accuracy than close-in laydown and without either jeopardizing the
delivery aircraft or warning the target to hunker down.

And what about when the threat you are engaging is well within the danger
close margin? If it comes down to the gun as the best available support
option versus having the CAS folks say, "Sorry, we can't do anything since
we don't have guns, but we wish you the best of luck and will be thinking
kind thoughts of you...", I'd take the former, thank you. Luckily, the USAF
seems to share that view.

Modern warfare is a mix of sophistication and crudity. Can you say
"Claymore"? Seriously, I'm not belittling nor minimizing. There's a
mix of weapons. Some you have available, some you don't. Some are
better than others. CAS strafe is exhilarating to say the least. But,
it isn't the only weapon for danger close situations. Mortars, proper
fortifications, Army aviation assets, etc. all can be considered in
the right time and the right place.

I'm a believer in guns in airplanes. But, I'll freely acknowledge that
the gun isn't the best choice in a lot of scenarios. I'm not willing
to forego the gun in current or future tactical aircraft. However,
I've seen a lot of airplanes lost while shooting trucks. Modern jets
cost a lot more than trucks. Going nose to nose with superior weapons
with a pea-shooter isn't always prudent. It may be necessary, but not
wise.


D.) While no one can put a value on the life of one American
soldier, a cost/benefit analysis of what strafe can do compared to the
risk involved usually mitigates against strafe being a primary tactic.

Nobody has said it should be a *primary* tactic.

Prosecution rest time again.


E.) While the guy on the ground may be firmly (and rightly)
convinced that his battle is the most important, the commanders must
allocate resources based on priorities which often don't have as much
emotion attached. Getting strafe to the troops in Anaconda wasn't a
readily available option.

It wasn't?! Reports I read indicated it actually occurred, so I wonder how
you determine it "wasn't a readily available option"?

It wasn't a readily available option when initially called for.
Remember that Afghanistan is a long way from anywhere. At the time of
Anaconda, the primary tactical assets were carrier based and flying
extremely long duration, multiple refueling sorties. The flexibility
for immediate on-call CAS was not available.

"I had an aircraft overhead carrying 500-pound bombs, but the 'bad guys'
were too close to our position to drop that much ammo without risking our
lives. I waved the pilot off the bomb run. I had him come around and strafe
the area with guns," said the sergeant.
(www.af.mil/news/May2002/n20020529_0868.shtml )

The sergeant has an extremely optimistic view of the strafing accuracy
of the average F-15/16/18 operator, and extremely pessimistic one of
the reliability of PGMs.

Interestingly, the report you cite says the fighters fired til
"winchester" but the enemy continued to operate and then...drum roll,
please...he targeted the bunker with the 500 pound bombs. Which took
out the bunker.

Might I suggest that the sergeant's account might be sensationalized
for effect and that he was not an experienced forward air controller.
I don't know.


F.) Good Forward Observers (FACs or AOs) should be calling
early for support. Good FOs should be GPS and Laser equipped and
getting the job done well before the more spectacular troops in the
wire scenario occurs. JDAMs et. al. are a much better choice. Bigger
payload, greater effect, better accuracy than strafe, more economical,
etc.

That is all great and is what we'd *like* to see happen--but as we saw in
Anaconda, it doesn't always flesh out that way. One of the best qualities of
a first-class military is recognition of the importance of
flexibility--taking the strafe capability away from the aircraft that
perform most of the CAS does little to enhance that quality. I hope you are
not arguing that would be the way to go.

Not at all, but I argue regularly that strafe is a weapon of last
resort in modern aircraft.

"Ed Rasimus" wrote in message
...
On Wed, 10 Dec 2003 17:49:17 GMT, "Kevin Brooks"
wrote:


"Ed Rasimus" wrote in message
.. .


The more things change, the more they remain the same. I've only
opined once in this long thread, but thought I'd jump in again after
this.

Some points:

snip good info


3. The final insert by Brooks is irrelevant to the discussion.

When the comment is made quite emphatically that no gun should be
included
in the newer aircraft, by more than one poster, I disagree with your
conclusion of irrelevance.

The thread title is "Best Dogfight Gun". The relevance of the comment
is to tactical aircraft employment in support of ground forces, and I
freely conceded the importance in follow-on comments.

Threads drift. FYI, the introduction of the air-to-ground issue was from
another poster.


The
question has been about guns and air/air. The question of optimum CAS
weapon isn't trivial and my reply shouldn't be taken as one more
evidence of the AF aversion to support of ground troops. There is
NOTHING more important. But:

A.) First, support of ground troops involves keeping enemy
aircraft from being a player. We've done that successfully in every
conflict since WW II.

That is only one aspect of support of ground troops. And if anything an
increasingly *less* important one at that--note that we have not faced a
significant air threat to our ground troops since WWII, Ed.

The prosecution should rest with that acknowledgement. It is my point
exactly. The historic result should not be attributed to wishing and
hoping. It's a result of proper allocation of resources.

Uhmmm...do you or do you not agree that the air-to-ground role has consumed
the vast majority of USAF (and for that matter USN aviation) missions since
WWII?



B.) CAS does not have to be fifty feet overhead with
snake/nape on "enemy in the wire". It can evolve to that scenario but
doesn't happen as often as common perception would think.

But it does happen, period. Did it happen during Anaconda or not? The
reports I read said it did--feel free to correct that representation.

It happened. But, anecdotal evidence does not necessarily lead to good
conclusions.

I'd consider disparate and repeated "anecdotal evidence" of the sort
provided below to be rather compelling. According to what our resident
current Strike eagle driver has posted in a similar thread, the USAF
apparently agrees.



C.) Modern stand-off weapons provide equal or greater
accuracy than close-in laydown and without either jeopardizing the
delivery aircraft or warning the target to hunker down.

And what about when the threat you are engaging is well within the danger
close margin? If it comes down to the gun as the best available support
option versus having the CAS folks say, "Sorry, we can't do anything
since
we don't have guns, but we wish you the best of luck and will be thinking
kind thoughts of you...", I'd take the former, thank you. Luckily, the
USAF
seems to share that view.

Modern warfare is a mix of sophistication and crudity. Can you say
"Claymore"? Seriously, I'm not belittling nor minimizing. There's a
mix of weapons. Some you have available, some you don't. Some are
better than others. CAS strafe is exhilarating to say the least. But,
it isn't the only weapon for danger close situations. Mortars, proper
fortifications, Army aviation assets, etc. all can be considered in
the right time and the right place.

Mortars have to have a dedicated logistics effort behind them--during
Anaconda that feature was somewhat stretched, from what I have read.
Fortifications in an offensive operation? Hey, survivability enhancement was
one of our primary considerations as combat engineers, but we rarely plan
for such near the LC during an offensive operation--that sort of went out
with the days of scientific seige warfare with its "circumvalation" and what
not. Army aviation assets are great, but as we saw in Anaconda (and during
OIF as well) there are environments where its capabilities are challenged
such that fixed wing CAS provides a better alternative. Yes, we plan for the
use of all of these whenever possible--but maintaining the strafe capability
in the collective bag of tricks can still come in handy.


I'm a believer in guns in airplanes. But, I'll freely acknowledge that
the gun isn't the best choice in a lot of scenarios.

Agreed. My argument is not that the gun is the paramount, or in most cases
even an "equally important" component of the overall weapons suite, but that
it can be of valuable use in the CAS arena in some circumstances, and that
deletion of gun armament accomplishes little for the loss of some valuable
flexibility.

I'm not willing
to forego the gun in current or future tactical aircraft. However,
I've seen a lot of airplanes lost while shooting trucks. Modern jets
cost a lot more than trucks. Going nose to nose with superior weapons
with a pea-shooter isn't always prudent. It may be necessary, but not
wise.

Agreed again. Taking the fight into the other guy's "backyard", so to speak,
should only be done when the gain is assessed as being worth the additional
risk. During Anaconda that was a no brainer--the Taliban/AQ folks had not
demonstrated any capability with MANPADS (and there had always been
significant doubt as to the viability of those Stingers we heard so much
about due to the storage limits on their batteries, not to mention their
cooling system for the seeker), so the additional risk was marginal, while
the payoff was reportedly quite valuable, in terms of actual target effects
and, likely just as important, I'd imagine the morale of those guys pinned
down in some shallow wadi under close engagement proabably improved every
time one of the fast movers passed overhead.



D.) While no one can put a value on the life of one American
soldier, a cost/benefit analysis of what strafe can do compared to the
risk involved usually mitigates against strafe being a primary tactic.

Nobody has said it should be a *primary* tactic.

Prosecution rest time again.


E.) While the guy on the ground may be firmly (and rightly)
convinced that his battle is the most important, the commanders must
allocate resources based on priorities which often don't have as much
emotion attached. Getting strafe to the troops in Anaconda wasn't a
readily available option.

It wasn't?! Reports I read indicated it actually occurred, so I wonder
how
you determine it "wasn't a readily available option"?

It wasn't a readily available option when initially called for.
Remember that Afghanistan is a long way from anywhere. At the time of
Anaconda, the primary tactical assets were carrier based and flying
extremely long duration, multiple refueling sorties. The flexibility
for immediate on-call CAS was not available.

I have not gotten that impression. Yeah, there was a distance to be covered
(not sure it applied to all CAS assets, as IIRC there were A-10's forward
based in Afghanistan proper rather early, and a couple of airfields located
just north of Afghanistan in one of the other -stans). But there was
apparently a CAS stack of sorts available, which is why these examples of
timely support are evident. I'd be careful about using MG Hagenbach's after
action criticisms of CAS in such a vein.



"I had an aircraft overhead carrying 500-pound bombs, but the 'bad guys'
were too close to our position to drop that much ammo without risking our
lives. I waved the pilot off the bomb run. I had him come around and
strafe
the area with guns," said the sergeant.
(www.af.mil/news/May2002/n20020529_0868.shtml )

The sergeant has an extremely optimistic view of the strafing accuracy
of the average F-15/16/18 operator, and extremely pessimistic one of
the reliability of PGMs.

Interestingly, the report you cite says the fighters fired til
"winchester" but the enemy continued to operate and then...drum roll,
please...he targeted the bunker with the 500 pound bombs. Which took
out the bunker.

Might I suggest that the sergeant's account might be sensationalized
for effect and that he was not an experienced forward air controller.
I don't know.

From reading the full account (see
http://www.robins.af.mil/pa/revup-on...y31-02-all.pdf ), it
is apparent that they went to a rather nasty danger-close bomb effort only
when things were even worse in terms of their situation. What about the
other account? Can you discount it as readily? Or...

"According to the citation, Captain Russell's flight, call sign Twister 52,
made contact with an American ground forward air controlling team that was
taking fire from enemy troops 75 meters away. The ground team restricted
Twister flight to strafe passes due to a "danger close" condition. This
condition meant friendly troops were within minimal risk distances of injury
or death from friendly weapons on enemy locations...Twister flight made six
strafe passes while firing 20-mm rounds from an altitude of 1,500 feet over
the target area. This was well within the threat zone of small arms fire and
surface to air missiles. The ground team reported enemy fire was suppressed
on each pass, but requested more passes to kill steadily increasing numbers
of reinforced Taliban and al Qaeda forces. Out of 20-mm ammunition, Twister
51, the aircraft manned by Maj. Chris Short and Lt. Col. Jim Fairchild,
became the airborne forward air controller and targeted Captain Russell's
jet on four additional low-altitude strafe passes. Due to radio failure,
Twister 51 then passed the tactical lead to Captain Russell's aircraft. With
the ground team's concurrence, Twister flight began employing laser-guided
bombs. The two aircrews attempted to guide each successive bomb closer to
enemy forces without injuring American service members. The aircrews were
able to drop bombs as close as 200 meters from friendly forces."

www2.acc.af.mil/accnews/dec02/02414.ht


Then there is the following from an F-16 pilot who flew some of these
missions during Anaconda:

"When Burt and his wingman arrived, the first words they heard from Slick
01, the ground controller on the scene, were "Danger close, seventy-five
meters." The words sent a chill down Burt's spine. The ground controller
relayed they had two casualties and two critically wounded. Burt made two
passes over the enemy position and emptied all 500 rounds. His wingman then
came in and emptied all his 500 rounds. "We realized how close we were
firing to the helicopter on the ground when we reviewed the cockpit tapes,"
Burt said. Though the F-16 pilots couldn't see exactly where their rounds
were hitting, the troops on the ground indicated that they were getting good
results. With their ammunition spent and the soldiers on the ground still
coming under enemy fire, Burt talked to Slick 01 about bringing in some
heavy ordnance. The enemy's close proximity, however, made a strike
dangerous, even with laser-guided munitions. Burt had to be extremely
careful not to drop his 500-pound bombs too close to the ground troops." [It
goes on to describe how they did subsequently bring the bombs in by walking
them ever closer, but not without at least one close call that caused the
CCT to admonish them for having almost hit their own location]

http://www.codeonemagazine.com/archi.../jul_02/354th/

So it appears there were numerous occasions of strafe missions being
requested from the ground folks.



F.) Good Forward Observers (FACs or AOs) should be calling
early for support. Good FOs should be GPS and Laser equipped and
getting the job done well before the more spectacular troops in the
wire scenario occurs. JDAMs et. al. are a much better choice. Bigger
payload, greater effect, better accuracy than strafe, more economical,
etc.

That is all great and is what we'd *like* to see happen--but as we saw in
Anaconda, it doesn't always flesh out that way. One of the best qualities
of
a first-class military is recognition of the importance of
flexibility--taking the strafe capability away from the aircraft that
perform most of the CAS does little to enhance that quality. I hope you
are
not arguing that would be the way to go.

Not at all, but I argue regularly that strafe is a weapon of last
resort in modern aircraft.

No disagreement there.

Brooks

Ed Rasimus wrote in message

It wasn't a readily available option when initially called for.
Remember that Afghanistan is a long way from anywhere. At the time of
Anaconda, the primary tactical assets were carrier based and flying
extremely long duration, multiple refueling sorties. The flexibility
for immediate on-call CAS was not available.

Ed,

I take issue with your last statement, unless you're limiting the
scope of your answer to tacair only. My wing flew 300 sorties during
Anaconda and dropped 845 JDAM's and 24 Mk84's providing excellent on
call air power. Granted we're a heavy bomber and could fly 1000 miles
and then loiter for a few hours, which the fighter guys couldn't do.
I'm sure BUFDRVR can chime in with the BUFF's contribution to CAS in
Afghanistan. It only goes to back up what you've been saying, methods
of delivering CAS are changing.

Cheers,
Michael Kelly, Bone Maintainer

On 13 Dec 2003 00:21:53 -0800, (Michael E. Kelly)
wrote:

Ed Rasimus wrote in message

It wasn't a readily available option when initially called for.
Remember that Afghanistan is a long way from anywhere. At the time of
Anaconda, the primary tactical assets were carrier based and flying
extremely long duration, multiple refueling sorties. The flexibility
for immediate on-call CAS was not available.

Ed,

I take issue with your last statement, unless you're limiting the
scope of your answer to tacair only. My wing flew 300 sorties during
Anaconda and dropped 845 JDAM's and 24 Mk84's providing excellent on
call air power. Granted we're a heavy bomber and could fly 1000 miles
and then loiter for a few hours, which the fighter guys couldn't do.
I'm sure BUFDRVR can chime in with the BUFF's contribution to CAS in
Afghanistan. It only goes to back up what you've been saying, methods
of delivering CAS are changing.

Cheers,
Michael Kelly, Bone Maintainer

Absolutely correct, and a remarkable effort. But, the discussion was
regarding the call for strafe. The image that conjures up of a Bone
rolling in and lining up for a blast of maybe eight internal
wing-mounted 20mm Vulcans delivered at 1800 feet slant range.....

Dale Brown will probably install swiveling M-61s in the swing-wing for
his next fictional foray. "Flight of the Young Pup."

On Sat, 13 Dec 2003 17:06:33 GMT, Ed Rasimus wrote:


Dale Brown will probably install swiveling M-61s in the swing-wing for
his next fictional foray. "Flight of the Young Pup."


ROFLMAO!!!!!


greg

--
Once you try my burger baby,you'll grow a new thyroid gland.
I said just eat my burger, baby,make you smart as Charlie Chan.
You say the hot sauce can't be beat. Sit back and open wide.

In article ,
Ed Rasimus wrote:

Absolutely correct, and a remarkable effort. But, the discussion was
regarding the call for strafe. The image that conjures up of a Bone
rolling in and lining up for a blast of maybe eight internal
wing-mounted 20mm Vulcans delivered at 1800 feet slant range.....

Well, if you're looking at serious ground-attack work, why not just put
in some GAU-8s in the mix?

Or if you're really going to be mean, fly a C-5 over at 40,000 feet and
drop a few hundred pallets of lawn darts out the back...

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

On Sat, 13 Dec 2003 17:06:33 GMT, Ed Rasimus
wrote:

On 13 Dec 2003 00:21:53 -0800, (Michael E. Kelly)
wrote:

Ed Rasimus wrote in message

It wasn't a readily available option when initially called for.
Remember that Afghanistan is a long way from anywhere. At the time of
Anaconda, the primary tactical assets were carrier based and flying
extremely long duration, multiple refueling sorties. The flexibility
for immediate on-call CAS was not available.

Ed,

I take issue with your last statement, unless you're limiting the
scope of your answer to tacair only. My wing flew 300 sorties during
Anaconda and dropped 845 JDAM's and 24 Mk84's providing excellent on
call air power. Granted we're a heavy bomber and could fly 1000 miles
and then loiter for a few hours, which the fighter guys couldn't do.
I'm sure BUFDRVR can chime in with the BUFF's contribution to CAS in
Afghanistan. It only goes to back up what you've been saying, methods
of delivering CAS are changing.

Cheers,
Michael Kelly, Bone Maintainer

Absolutely correct, and a remarkable effort. But, the discussion was
regarding the call for strafe. The image that conjures up of a Bone
rolling in and lining up for a blast of maybe eight internal
wing-mounted 20mm Vulcans delivered at 1800 feet slant range.....

Dale Brown will probably install swiveling M-61s in the swing-wing for
his next fictional foray. "Flight of the Young Pup."

Ed,

What is the difference between direct close airsupport, and close
airsupport, or is it just all lumped together and called close air
support.

On Sat, 13 Dec 2003 12:33:04 -0800, Lyle wrote:


Ed,

What is the difference between direct close airsupport, and close
airsupport, or is it just all lumped together and called close air
support.

Sounds like some sort of semantic argument. I never heard the term
"direct close air support" used in any official context. Close Air
Support is the employment of tac air assets in direct support of
ground units. It would, by its very nature be "direct".

With regard to fire support of ground units, there is the distinction
between direct and indirect fire. That's the difference between aimed
large-bore guns such as tank cannon and parabolic lobbed shells such
as artillery and mortar.

Maybe someone more current than I am in the latest nomenclature can
contribute to the discussion.