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On Wed, 10 Dec 2003 22:40:10 +0000, "Paul J. Adam"
wrote: In message , Ed Rasimus writes On Wed, 10 Dec 2003 19:00:14 +0000, "Paul J. Adam" wrote: USAF to USN comparisons offer some insight, but strict stats can lead to bad conclusions. To compare sortie count/MiG engagement percentages you would need to consider the various missions, the allocation of the resource, the philosophy of engagement, etc. I would argue that the numbers given have some utility, but there are very clear questions. With large composite strike packages, the AF tended toward lots of specialization. Chaff droppers, SEAD, escorts (that often were used to herd MiGs rather than engage them) and only a few dedicated shooters on TEABALL frequency meant that the numbers could be skewed. True, but if the end result was to triple the effectiveness of the enemy's air defence then there appears to be a problem. I'd say that the effectiveness of the enemy defenses greatly reduced by the AF specialization and packages. The losses/sortie difference between '66/'67 and '72 were significant. Let's not get too tightly wrapped around the MiG axle. The core of the defense was integrated AAA and SA-2. MiGs were a factor, but relatively a small one. In Linebacker, if MiGs got airborne, they generally died. (Or, they never engaged.) However, I don't have the comparative loss figures for ground fire, or any data for results; it's quite possible that the USAF's relative vulnerability to MiGs was balanced by lower losses to SAMs/AAA, and/or by greater effects achieved to the targets. To date this remains a personal interest rather than a funded study ![]() The "relative vulnerability" to MiGs isn't demonstrated by loss ratios, because the mission wasn't to sweep the skies of enemy aircraft. Our mission was to deliver iron on targets. The MiGs mission was to prevent that. While we all wanted to get a MiG, there weren't enough to go around. And while the MiG pilots had the more agile aircraft, their mission was to deter the bomb droppers. Yet they were twice as likely to be shot down and barely half as likely to kill, as the gunless Navy fighters. (Only seven of the forty-eight USAF Linebacker kills were achieved with guns, despite the efforts made to fit them) It would be helpful to consider the USN fighter-vs-attack philosophy as well as the level of experience of the multiple tour carrier force. The USAF "universal pilot" concept and the "no involuntary second tour" policy impacted the competence level. Not at all, Ed. The only problem is that the USAF didn't have guns in its fighters! USAF policy was completely correct in every detail, apart from the unfortunate imposition of a flawed naval aircraft by McNamara. Sorry, not true. During the period of Rolling Thunder, the greater number of sorties were flown into MiG country by gun-equipped F-105s (and on the Navy side, A-4, A-7 and F-8). By the time of Linebacker, there were more F-4Es involved in the Pack VI missions than D's. If anyone was hampered by lack of guns in their fighters, it should have been the USN, but the initial stats offered in this discussion, indicate that the USN had better ratios in LB when they had no guns. Seriously... if the USAF had accepted the political cost of maintaining a similar core cadre of specialist pilots as the USN (the Navy had the justifiable shibboleth of carrier landing, the USAF lacked that and chose to spread the pain) then would their results have been better? I'd certainly guess so. There was much, much more going on than "our fighters don't have guns". Personnel policies and the related errors in applying them, are background to the tactics issues. Clearly the issue can be traced in USAF all the way back to the decision in the late '50's to go with single-track "all jet" pilot training and the assumption of a universally assignable pilot. The Navy used prop aircraft for primary training continually and multi-tracking to get dedicated F/A, heavy and helo pilots. Check USAF today---introducing a prop for primary and multi-tracking. Sco USN 1/USAF 0!! The parenthetical conclusion is a poor one. With TEABALL, the 555th TFW specialists, and the accompanying GCI support, it was possible for the USAF fighters who DID engage, to use their longer range weapons and negate the requirement to close to gun range. Actually, I'd continue to claim it was correct. Why bother with Teaball, Combat Tree, GCI, et al in order to get more performance from those nasty useless missiles, when gun-armed F-4Es are arriving? If "lack of guns" is the real problem, surely gun-armed fighters are a complete and satisfactory answer? I argue that "lack of guns" is not the reason for poor kill ratios. The F-4E "arrived" in 1968--nearly four full years before Linebacker commenced. In 150 missions into North Vietnam, I only went twice without a gun (flying a deployed F-4D from the 35th TFS in Korea during September of '72.) Every other time I had a gun, either in the F-105D or F-4E. I should note that in all of those sorties, I never once had an occasion to fire the gun at another aircraft. Never came close. Never dispatched an A/A missile either. Several times came close. The reality seems to me to be a damn sight more complex, and while having a gun makes for a nice-to-have for the pilot (I'd want one if I were flying...) it doesn't seem to be too significant in terms of results achieved, compared to the other variables.. Ahh, total agreement at last. The issue is complex. It extends well beyond stats and kill rates or calibers and fire rate. I still argue for guns on fighters. |
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Ed Rasimus wrote:
If anyone was hampered by lack of guns in their fighters, it should have been the USN, but the initial stats offered in this discussion, indicate that the USN had better ratios in LB when they had no guns. During the Linebacker time period, the Navy aircraft spent a lot of time dropping mines and hitting coastal targets, which reduced their exposure to the serious SAM defenses. -- cirby at cfl.rr.com Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations. Slam on brakes accordingly. |
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![]() Ahh, total agreement at last. The issue is complex. It extends well beyond stats and kill rates or calibers and fire rate. I still argue for guns on fighters. Better to have it and not need it than to need it and not have it. |
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Scott Ferrin wrote in message . ..
Better to have it and not need it than to need it and not have it. Everything is a tradeoff. For a gun you bring along quite a bit of weight (~100kg+ weight of ammo). What if that mass was fuel? What if it were extra decoys? What if it were more avionics? What if it were more engines? What if that mass was completely dropped to get a more manueverable fighter? Which of those choices allow you to complete the mission most effectively? When making engineering trade-offs, you have to remember that you can have A and not need it, but what about B? If you need B and instead you put all that mass into A and you don't end up needing it, that's bad engineering. Chris Manteuffel |
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