![]() |
If this is your first visit, be sure to check out the FAQ by clicking the link above. You may have to register before you can post: click the register link above to proceed. To start viewing messages, select the forum that you want to visit from the selection below. |
|
|
|
Thread Tools | Display Modes |
|
#1
|
|||
|
|||
![]()
"Kevin Brooks" wrote in message et...
Well, if you don't even *have* a gun, that is not going to be a problem, is it? Of course, neither will the CCT (or its supported ground combat element) get the CAS effort they want either... As to the value of the guns, it is interesting to note that one of the comments that came out of the Anaconda participants was, "Every light division needs a supporting *squadron* of AC-130's." Pie in the sky statement that may be, it points out the value those ground folks placed upon aerial gunfire support. It points out the value that the ground troops placed on AC-130 support. Which is naturally much more effective than fighter strafing support, as the AC-130 has more, larger guns, on trainable mounts, with dedicated gunners, and a very long loiter capability. This is not the same as a fighter that can make two or three 20mm strafing passes before he's out of ammunition. OFCS, the separation range mentioned in a couple of the reports (one from a participating Viper pilot and one from a CCT guy on the ground) was *seventy-five meters*. Do you want any kind of bomb going off that close to *your* patrol if there is another method entailing less risk of fratricide available to be tried first? I wouldn't. There is a good point buried in here - namely that minimum friendly-target distance is an important figure-of-merit for CAS weaponry. It might also be true that the M61 is the best existing fighter-mounted weapon by that standard. Your mistake is to assume that this is always going to be the case. The Small Diameter Bomb and the Advanced Precision Kill Weapons System both address this issue, and address it very well. And if they don't do a good enough job, then it's always possible to develop something better. So if we have (God forbid) another Anaconda situation (and you know as well as I do that there *will* be someday another force inserted somewhere that will find the enemy in an unexpected place, in unexpected strength, and find itself fighting for survival), and our CAS stack is made up of Typhoons and STOVL F-35's sans guns, you think that is OK? Depends on what weapons they're carrying. If they have a pair of 2000 pound JDAMs each, probably not. If they've each got 12 SDBs and 38 laser-guided 70mm rockets, then that's a very different story. And in that case, having STOVL in the case of the JSF or another 15 minutes on station or another 4 SDBs in the case of the Eurofighter are both probably more valuable than the three or four strafing runs you get from a gun. -jake |
#2
|
|||
|
|||
![]() "Jake McGuire" wrote in message om... "Kevin Brooks" wrote in message et... Well, if you don't even *have* a gun, that is not going to be a problem, is it? Of course, neither will the CCT (or its supported ground combat element) get the CAS effort they want either... As to the value of the guns, it is interesting to note that one of the comments that came out of the Anaconda participants was, "Every light division needs a supporting *squadron* of AC-130's." Pie in the sky statement that may be, it points out the value those ground folks placed upon aerial gunfire support. It points out the value that the ground troops placed on AC-130 support. Which is naturally much more effective than fighter strafing support, as the AC-130 has more, larger guns, on trainable mounts, with dedicated gunners, and a very long loiter capability. This is not the same as a fighter that can make two or three 20mm strafing passes before he's out of ammunition. Well, you kind of snipped away the related bit about the scenario where you are well within danger-close and under a significant MANPADS threat during daytime, which sort of eliminates the AC-130 from the running. The point was that the groundpounders found the guns a better starting point for CAS during that operation than PGM's. Are you claiming that the 10th LID and 101st AASLT DIV folks did not like getting that 20mm strafe support they received from the F-15E's and F-16's that day? OFCS, the separation range mentioned in a couple of the reports (one from a participating Viper pilot and one from a CCT guy on the ground) was *seventy-five meters*. Do you want any kind of bomb going off that close to *your* patrol if there is another method entailing less risk of fratricide available to be tried first? I wouldn't. There is a good point buried in here - namely that minimum friendly-target distance is an important figure-of-merit for CAS weaponry. It might also be true that the M61 is the best existing fighter-mounted weapon by that standard. It is hardly buried, if you bothered to read the previous messages in the thread--it (being within danger-close range) has been a key point. Your mistake is to assume that this is always going to be the case. The Small Diameter Bomb and the Advanced Precision Kill Weapons System both address this issue, and address it very well. And if they don't do a good enough job, then it's always possible to develop something better. Your mistake is drawing the wrong conclusions based upon different platform requirements, for starters. APKWS is a Hydra-based (or Hellfire based) solution (neither is scheduled for USAF use), and just like the option of using a gun pod, requires specific load out. In other words if your existing CAS support package does not have it onboard when they show up, or are routed in based upon urgent need, and the separation between forces precludes use of larger PGM's, the ground guys are out of luck. OTOH, if they have their trusty internal cannon the ground guys will get at least some form of support. SDB is admittedly going to have a smaller danger close margin than the current minimum 500 pounders, but even a 200-250 pound bomb is going to have a danger close margin that exceeds 75 meters. So if we have (God forbid) another Anaconda situation (and you know as well as I do that there *will* be someday another force inserted somewhere that will find the enemy in an unexpected place, in unexpected strength, and find itself fighting for survival), and our CAS stack is made up of Typhoons and STOVL F-35's sans guns, you think that is OK? Depends on what weapons they're carrying. If they have a pair of 2000 pound JDAMs each, probably not. If they've each got 12 SDBs and 38 laser-guided 70mm rockets, then that's a very different story. And in that case, having STOVL in the case of the JSF or another 15 minutes on station or another 4 SDBs in the case of the Eurofighter are both probably more valuable than the three or four strafing runs you get from a gun. Hydra is a rotary delivered weapon, and unless they change their plans to make it a fixed wing package it is a non-player in the conventional CAS arena (we are not talking helos here). SDB is still going to have a danger close margin. So you are back to the question of whether or not you want to remain flexible enough to provide gunfire support when the situation precludes use of the bigger stuff. Since the gun also serves as a secondary air-to-air weapon, IMO retaining it for the foreseeable future is a wise move. Brooks -jake |
#3
|
|||
|
|||
![]()
Since this bit of the thread has drifted into whether or not a gun
should be fitted at all, these are my thoughts on the matter, from 'Flying Guns: the Modern Era' by Emmanuel Gustin and myself, due to be published in March next year. First, in air-to-air use: "Modern short-range missiles have minimum ranges as low as 300 m, well within gun range, and are highly agile, with wide engagement envelopes, which make them able to hit targets well off to one side of the firing aircraft, especially when cued by a helmet-mounted sight: in fact, the capabilities of most recent models are such that the aircraft carrying them barely need to manoeuvre. This does not mean that guns are useless for air-to-air work. They have a particular value in modern 'policing' applications, as they enable warning shots to be fired in front of suspect aircraft. They also provide an economical way of engaging low-value targets such as unmanned reconnaissance drones, transport and liaison aircraft, or drug-smugglers. In a 'hot' war they still have certain advantages in close-quarter fighting, for example in 'picking off' an enemy attacking a wingman, who may be too close for a safe missile shot. The ability of modern fighters to adopt extreme attitudes, pointing well away from the line of flight, significantly assists gun aiming in dogfights. Cannon projectiles have a shorter flight time than a missile, a significant advantage in a dogfight. Finally, the gun provides a last-ditch capability if the missiles run out, or are defeated by advanced countermeasures or simply by circumstances. The 1991 Gulf War revealed the deficiencies of modern IR-homing missiles when faced with trying to pick up a low-flying target against a hot desert background (helicopters being in any case difficult for IR seekers to lock on to from above). USAF A-10 aircraft achieved two helicopter kills with the GAU-8/A (using 275 and 550 rounds respectively) in one case when the IR missiles failed to lock on. Furthermore, the performance of even the best missiles cannot always be guaranteed, for various reasons. In Kosovo, a US fighter engaging a Serbian plane needed to fire three AMRAAMs to bring it down. In other engagements in the late 1990s, USAF and USN fighters fired a total of seven Sparrows, AMRAAMs, and Phoenix missiles against Iraqi MiG-25s without scoring a single hit (although the Phoenix shots were taken at extreme range). In part, the low success rates are due to tactical considerations, in that missiles may deliberately be launched outside the normal engagement envelope to distract or scare off the enemy, and sometimes two missiles are launched at one target to increase the hit probability. Whatever the reason, this results in missiles being used up at a high rate, making it more likely that they will run out during a sortie. A cannon will typically carry enough ammunition for several engagements, usefully increasing combat persistence at a minimal cost in weight and performance. One curious aspect to the use of AAMs in combat is that of the approximately 1,000 kills achieved between 1958 and 1991, only a handful were scored beyond visual range, which does raise questions about the significance of the very long ranges of which some missiles are capable. It is sometimes argued that modern short-range missiles are so good that any aircraft with the benefit of long-range sensors and missiles should use them to try to stay outside the envelope of the enemy's short-range AAMs. However, it is not always possible to dictate the terms of an engagement. The Iranians made good use of the long-range AIM-54 in the war with Iraq, but the F-14s which carried it still found themselves engaged in gunfights from time to time. There is a continual battle between missile sensor and countermeasure technology. In the future, stealth technology applied to aircraft may considerably shorten target acquisition and combat ranges, putting into question the worth of modern BVR (beyond visual range) AAMs. The possible future use of anti-radar missile guidance as a way of overcoming stealth characteristics may force fighters to make minimal use of their own radars, further reducing acquisition and combat distances. It may also prove increasingly difficult for either IR or radar-homing missiles to lock on to their stealthy targets, additionally protected by extensive electronic jamming and IR countermeasures. Of course, modern guns are usually aimed by the plane's radar which could also be jammed (although less easily than the much smaller and less powerful missile seekers) but laser rangefinders could make an acceptable alternative in providing fire control data. If planes eventually become 'laser-proof' as well, the possibility presumably exists of linking variable magnification optical sights to a computer which would be able to analyse the image, identify the plane, calculate its distance, speed and heading and provide gunsight aiming information accordingly, all without emitting any signals." And in ground attack: "The emphasis in the use of aircraft guns has now shifted more to air-to-ground work, although even this is becoming increasingly hazardous in a 'hot' war. With the proliferation of anti-aircraft gun and missile systems, including MANPADS, even the specialist ground-attack aircraft, fitted with powerful cannon, have found it to be safer to rely on the long range of their air-to-ground guided weapons rather than close to gun range, although as we have seen the USAF's A-10s still made good use of their cannon against Iraqi targets in 1991. This trend is aided by the continued development of air-to-surface missiles, with the latest ones having autonomous homing systems to provide "fire and forget" capability over long ranges. Another current development is the GD Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System, which aims to achieve low-cost accuracy by fitted a laser homer to the little 2.75 inch (70 mm) rocket. The target is to achieve a CEP of 1 – 2 m at ranges of up to 5 – 6 km at a price of US$ 8 – 10,000; one-sixth the cost of a Hellfire anti-tank missile. However, not all conflicts involve front-line opposition; in fact, armed forces are now commonly engaged on police work, frequently dealing with guerrilla forces. In these circumstances, rockets and missiles may represent an inappropriate degree of destruction, with a high risk of collateral damage. The RAF was embarrassed during operations against insurgents in Sierra Leone in 2000 to find that they had no suitable weapon for their gunless Harrier GR.7 aircraft to attack small groups of rebels operating close to innocent civilians. Another advantage of using cannon was demonstrated in the invasion of Afghanistan in 2002. During an intense infantry battle at Takur Ghar in late May, in which US forces were ambushed and in considerable danger, air support was called for. The AC-130 was not permitted to intervene in daylight due to its vulnerability, so USAF fighters were sent to help. For a part of the battle the Afghan combatants were too close to the Americans for rockets or bombs to be used, so the fighters – F-16s and even F-15s – went in strafing with their 20 mm cannon, as did the Navy's F-14s and F/A-18s on other occasions. Even RAF Tornadoes were reported to have carried out gun strafing runs on at least one occasion. It may logically be argued that it is foolish to risk an extremely expensive aircraft, with its expensively trained pilot, to being lost due to very low-tech ground fire, but sometimes the risk needs to be taken to save friendly lives." The case rests... Tony Williams Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk Military gun and ammunition discussion forum: http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/ |
#4
|
|||
|
|||
![]()
"Tony Williams" wrote:
... | USAF A-10 | aircraft achieved two helicopter kills with the GAU-8/A (using 275 and | 550 rounds respectively) in one case when the IR missiles failed to | lock on. How many rounds of 25mm or 27mm are they proposing to fit inside of USAF JSF? |
#5
|
|||
|
|||
![]()
"Brett" wrote in message ...
"Tony Williams" wrote: ... | USAF A-10 | aircraft achieved two helicopter kills with the GAU-8/A (using 275 and | 550 rounds respectively) in one case when the IR missiles failed to | lock on. How many rounds of 25mm or 27mm are they proposing to fit inside of USAF JSF? I don't know - I've never seen a figure quoted. Tony Williams Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk Discussion forum at: http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/ |
#6
|
|||
|
|||
![]() "Tony Williams" wrote in message m... Since this bit of the thread has drifted into whether or not a gun should be fitted at all, these are my thoughts on the matter, from 'Flying Guns: the Modern Era' by Emmanuel Gustin and myself, due to be published in March next year. First, in air-to-air use: snip good analysis and summary This trend is aided by the continued development of air-to-surface missiles, with the latest ones having autonomous homing systems to provide "fire and forget" capability over long ranges. Another current development is the GD Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System, which aims to achieve low-cost accuracy by fitted a laser homer to the little 2.75 inch (70 mm) rocket. The target is to achieve a CEP of 1 - 2 m at ranges of up to 5 - 6 km at a price of US$ 8 - 10,000; one-sixth the cost of a Hellfire anti-tank missile. To nitpick, APKWS is not currently slated for use on fixed wing assets--it is an Army program intended for use on helos only. Even if it were adopted for fixed wing use, it still leaves the problem of having to identify the need for its load-out ahead of time (i.e., pre-ATO cycle). The beauty of the internal gun on these airframes is that it is an asset that is always available, regardless of the external loadout, so the grunts who are forced to make an immediate (or "Oh, ****...") CAS request can count on at least having that strafe support available if/when things go to hell in a handbasket. That (immediate missions as opposed to pre-planned) is the kind of mission that this capability will be critical to--if we are *planning* to get into a "knife-fight" on the ground, other than in the urban fight, then we have probably already screwed up big-time. However, not all conflicts involve front-line opposition; in fact, armed forces are now commonly engaged on police work, frequently dealing with guerrilla forces. In these circumstances, rockets and missiles may represent an inappropriate degree of destruction, with a high risk of collateral damage. The RAF was embarrassed during operations against insurgents in Sierra Leone in 2000 to find that they had no suitable weapon for their gunless Harrier GR.7 aircraft to attack small groups of rebels operating close to innocent civilians. Another advantage of using cannon was demonstrated in the invasion of Afghanistan in 2002. During an intense infantry battle at Takur Ghar in late May, in which US forces were ambushed and in considerable danger, air support was called for. The AC-130 was not permitted to intervene in daylight due to its vulnerability, so USAF fighters were sent to help. For a part of the battle the Afghan combatants were too close to the Americans for rockets or bombs to be used, so the fighters - F-16s and even F-15s - went in strafing with their 20 mm cannon, as did the Navy's F-14s and F/A-18s on other occasions. Even RAF Tornadoes were reported to have carried out gun strafing runs on at least one occasion. It may logically be argued that it is foolish to risk an extremely expensive aircraft, with its expensively trained pilot, to being lost due to very low-tech ground fire, but sometimes the risk needs to be taken to save friendly lives." Exactly. Brooks The case rests... Tony Williams Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk Military gun and ammunition discussion forum: http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/ |
#8
|
|||
|
|||
![]()
On Fri, 12 Dec 2003 11:50:41 -0600, Alan Minyard
wrote: On 11 Dec 2003 23:50:31 -0800, (Tony Williams) wrote: The case rests... Tony Williams Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk Military gun and ammunition discussion forum: http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/ Writing a book, and writing an accurate book, are two totally different propositions. You have succeeded in the first instance, let us know when you intend to start on the second. Coming from a self documenting f8ckwit who couldnt figure out that the BK27 variant as fitted to the JSF was american made, your notion of accuracy is ever so slightly suspect. greg -- Once you try my burger baby,you'll grow a new thyroid gland. I said just eat my burger, baby,make you smart as Charlie Chan. You say the hot sauce can't be beat. Sit back and open wide. |
#9
|
|||
|
|||
![]()
On Fri, 12 Dec 2003 19:34:41 +0000, Greg Hennessy wrote:
On Fri, 12 Dec 2003 11:50:41 -0600, Alan Minyard wrote: On 11 Dec 2003 23:50:31 -0800, (Tony Williams) wrote: The case rests... Tony Williams Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk Military gun and ammunition discussion forum: http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/ Writing a book, and writing an accurate book, are two totally different propositions. You have succeeded in the first instance, let us know when you intend to start on the second. Coming from a self documenting f8ckwit who couldnt figure out that the BK27 variant as fitted to the JSF was american made, your notion of accuracy is ever so slightly suspect. greg The BK-27 was an inferior weapon, nominally "produced" by a US corporation. Your choice of language belies any claim to veracity on your part. Al Minyard |
#10
|
|||
|
|||
![]()
On Sat, 13 Dec 2003 11:21:41 -0600, Alan Minyard
wrote: Your choice of language belies any claim to veracity on your part. So tell us about this cannon made by an 'enemy nation' (sic) again. The one you claimed would be impossible to get spare parts for. Your inability to make any resembling a cogent argument is noted. Have you been taking lessons from Tarver ? greg -- Once you try my burger baby,you'll grow a new thyroid gland. I said just eat my burger, baby,make you smart as Charlie Chan. You say the hot sauce can't be beat. Sit back and open wide. |
|
Thread Tools | |
Display Modes | |
|
|
![]() |
||||
Thread | Thread Starter | Forum | Replies | Last Post |
AIM-54 Phoenix missile | Sujay Vijayendra | Military Aviation | 89 | November 3rd 03 09:47 PM |
P-39's, zeros, etc. | old hoodoo | Military Aviation | 12 | July 23rd 03 05:48 AM |