Best dogfight gun?

"Kevin Brooks" wrote in message et...
Well, if you don't even *have* a gun, that is not going to be a problem, is
it? Of course, neither will the CCT (or its supported ground combat element)
get the CAS effort they want either... As to the value of the guns, it is
interesting to note that one of the comments that came out of the Anaconda
participants was, "Every light division needs a supporting *squadron* of
AC-130's." Pie in the sky statement that may be, it points out the value
those ground folks placed upon aerial gunfire support.

It points out the value that the ground troops placed on AC-130
support. Which is naturally much more effective than fighter strafing
support, as the AC-130 has more, larger guns, on trainable mounts,
with dedicated gunners, and a very long loiter capability. This is
not the same as a fighter that can make two or three 20mm strafing
passes before he's out of ammunition.

OFCS, the separation range mentioned in a couple of the reports (one from a
participating Viper pilot and one from a CCT guy on the ground) was
*seventy-five meters*. Do you want any kind of bomb going off that close to
*your* patrol if there is another method entailing less risk of fratricide
available to be tried first? I wouldn't.

There is a good point buried in here - namely that minimum
friendly-target distance is an important figure-of-merit for CAS
weaponry. It might also be true that the M61 is the best existing
fighter-mounted weapon by that standard. Your mistake is to assume
that this is always going to be the case. The Small Diameter Bomb and
the Advanced Precision Kill Weapons System both address this issue,
and address it very well. And if they don't do a good enough job,
then it's always possible to develop something better.

So if we have (God forbid) another Anaconda situation (and you know as well
as I do that there *will* be someday another force inserted somewhere that
will find the enemy in an unexpected place, in unexpected strength, and find
itself fighting for survival), and our CAS stack is made up of Typhoons and
STOVL F-35's sans guns, you think that is OK?

Depends on what weapons they're carrying. If they have a pair of 2000
pound JDAMs each, probably not. If they've each got 12 SDBs and 38
laser-guided 70mm rockets, then that's a very different story. And in
that case, having STOVL in the case of the JSF or another 15 minutes
on station or another 4 SDBs in the case of the Eurofighter are both
probably more valuable than the three or four strafing runs you get
from a gun.

-jake

"Jake McGuire" wrote in message
om...
"Kevin Brooks" wrote in message
et...
Well, if you don't even *have* a gun, that is not going to be a problem,
is
it? Of course, neither will the CCT (or its supported ground combat
element)
get the CAS effort they want either... As to the value of the guns, it
is
interesting to note that one of the comments that came out of the
Anaconda
participants was, "Every light division needs a supporting *squadron* of
AC-130's." Pie in the sky statement that may be, it points out the value
those ground folks placed upon aerial gunfire support.

It points out the value that the ground troops placed on AC-130
support. Which is naturally much more effective than fighter strafing
support, as the AC-130 has more, larger guns, on trainable mounts,
with dedicated gunners, and a very long loiter capability. This is
not the same as a fighter that can make two or three 20mm strafing
passes before he's out of ammunition.

Well, you kind of snipped away the related bit about the scenario where you
are well within danger-close and under a significant MANPADS threat during
daytime, which sort of eliminates the AC-130 from the running. The point
was that the groundpounders found the guns a better starting point for CAS
during that operation than PGM's. Are you claiming that the 10th LID and
101st AASLT DIV folks did not like getting that 20mm strafe support they
received from the F-15E's and F-16's that day?


OFCS, the separation range mentioned in a couple of the reports (one
from a
participating Viper pilot and one from a CCT guy on the ground) was
*seventy-five meters*. Do you want any kind of bomb going off that close
to
*your* patrol if there is another method entailing less risk of
fratricide
available to be tried first? I wouldn't.

There is a good point buried in here - namely that minimum
friendly-target distance is an important figure-of-merit for CAS
weaponry. It might also be true that the M61 is the best existing
fighter-mounted weapon by that standard.


It is hardly buried, if you bothered to read the previous messages in the
thread--it (being within danger-close range) has been a key point.

Your mistake is to assume
that this is always going to be the case. The Small Diameter Bomb and
the Advanced Precision Kill Weapons System both address this issue,
and address it very well. And if they don't do a good enough job,
then it's always possible to develop something better.

Your mistake is drawing the wrong conclusions based upon different platform
requirements, for starters. APKWS is a Hydra-based (or Hellfire based)
solution (neither is scheduled for USAF use), and just like the option of
using a gun pod, requires specific load out. In other words if your existing
CAS support package does not have it onboard when they show up, or are
routed in based upon urgent need, and the separation between forces
precludes use of larger PGM's, the ground guys are out of luck. OTOH, if
they have their trusty internal cannon the ground guys will get at least
some form of support. SDB is admittedly going to have a smaller danger close
margin than the current minimum 500 pounders, but even a 200-250 pound bomb
is going to have a danger close margin that exceeds 75 meters.


So if we have (God forbid) another Anaconda situation (and you know as
well
as I do that there *will* be someday another force inserted somewhere
that
will find the enemy in an unexpected place, in unexpected strength, and
find
itself fighting for survival), and our CAS stack is made up of Typhoons
and
STOVL F-35's sans guns, you think that is OK?

Depends on what weapons they're carrying. If they have a pair of 2000
pound JDAMs each, probably not. If they've each got 12 SDBs and 38
laser-guided 70mm rockets, then that's a very different story. And in
that case, having STOVL in the case of the JSF or another 15 minutes
on station or another 4 SDBs in the case of the Eurofighter are both
probably more valuable than the three or four strafing runs you get
from a gun.

Hydra is a rotary delivered weapon, and unless they change their plans to
make it a fixed wing package it is a non-player in the conventional CAS
arena (we are not talking helos here). SDB is still going to have a danger
close margin. So you are back to the question of whether or not you want to
remain flexible enough to provide gunfire support when the situation
precludes use of the bigger stuff. Since the gun also serves as a secondary
air-to-air weapon, IMO retaining it for the foreseeable future is a wise
move.

Brooks


-jake

Since this bit of the thread has drifted into whether or not a gun
should be fitted at all, these are my thoughts on the matter, from
'Flying Guns: the Modern Era' by Emmanuel Gustin and myself, due to be
published in March next year. First, in air-to-air use:

"Modern short-range missiles have minimum ranges as low as 300 m, well
within gun range, and are highly agile, with wide engagement
envelopes, which make them able to hit targets well off to one side of
the firing aircraft, especially when cued by a helmet-mounted sight:
in fact, the capabilities of most recent models are such that the
aircraft carrying them barely need to manoeuvre. This does not mean
that guns are useless for air-to-air work. They have a particular
value in modern 'policing' applications, as they enable warning shots
to be fired in front of suspect aircraft. They also provide an
economical way of engaging low-value targets such as unmanned
reconnaissance drones, transport and liaison aircraft, or
drug-smugglers. In a 'hot' war they still have certain advantages in
close-quarter fighting, for example in 'picking off' an enemy
attacking a wingman, who may be too close for a safe missile shot. The
ability of modern fighters to adopt extreme attitudes, pointing well
away from the line of flight, significantly assists gun aiming in
dogfights. Cannon projectiles have a shorter flight time than a
missile, a significant advantage in a dogfight.

Finally, the gun provides a last-ditch capability if the missiles run
out, or are defeated by advanced countermeasures or simply by
circumstances. The 1991 Gulf War revealed the deficiencies of modern
IR-homing missiles when faced with trying to pick up a low-flying
target against a hot desert background (helicopters being in any case
difficult for IR seekers to lock on to from above). USAF A-10
aircraft achieved two helicopter kills with the GAU-8/A (using 275 and
550 rounds respectively) in one case when the IR missiles failed to
lock on. Furthermore, the performance of even the best missiles cannot
always be guaranteed, for various reasons. In Kosovo, a US fighter
engaging a Serbian plane needed to fire three AMRAAMs to bring it
down. In other engagements in the late 1990s, USAF and USN fighters
fired a total of seven Sparrows, AMRAAMs, and Phoenix missiles against
Iraqi MiG-25s without scoring a single hit (although the Phoenix shots
were taken at extreme range).

In part, the low success rates are due to tactical considerations, in
that missiles may deliberately be launched outside the normal
engagement envelope to distract or scare off the enemy, and sometimes
two missiles are launched at one target to increase the hit
probability. Whatever the reason, this results in missiles being used
up at a high rate, making it more likely that they will run out during
a sortie. A cannon will typically carry enough ammunition for several
engagements, usefully increasing combat persistence at a minimal cost
in weight and performance.

One curious aspect to the use of AAMs in combat is that of the
approximately 1,000 kills achieved between 1958 and 1991, only a
handful were scored beyond visual range, which does raise questions
about the significance of the very long ranges of which some missiles
are capable. It is sometimes argued that modern short-range missiles
are so good that any aircraft with the benefit of long-range sensors
and missiles should use them to try to stay outside the envelope of
the enemy's short-range AAMs. However, it is not always possible to
dictate the terms of an engagement. The Iranians made good use of the
long-range AIM-54 in the war with Iraq, but the F-14s which carried it
still found themselves engaged in gunfights from time to time.

There is a continual battle between missile sensor and countermeasure
technology. In the future, stealth technology applied to aircraft may
considerably shorten target acquisition and combat ranges, putting
into question the worth of modern BVR (beyond visual range) AAMs. The
possible future use of anti-radar missile guidance as a way of
overcoming stealth characteristics may force fighters to make minimal
use of their own radars, further reducing acquisition and combat
distances. It may also prove increasingly difficult for either IR or
radar-homing missiles to lock on to their stealthy targets,
additionally protected by extensive electronic jamming and IR
countermeasures.

Of course, modern guns are usually aimed by the plane's radar which
could also be jammed (although less easily than the much smaller and
less powerful missile seekers) but laser rangefinders could make an
acceptable alternative in providing fire control data. If planes
eventually become 'laser-proof' as well, the possibility presumably
exists of linking variable magnification optical sights to a computer
which would be able to analyse the image, identify the plane,
calculate its distance, speed and heading and provide gunsight aiming
information accordingly, all without emitting any signals."

And in ground attack:

"The emphasis in the use of aircraft guns has now shifted more to
air-to-ground work, although even this is becoming increasingly
hazardous in a 'hot' war. With the proliferation of anti-aircraft gun
and missile systems, including MANPADS, even the specialist
ground-attack aircraft, fitted with powerful cannon, have found it to
be safer to rely on the long range of their air-to-ground guided
weapons rather than close to gun range, although as we have seen the
USAF's A-10s still made good use of their cannon against Iraqi targets
in 1991.

This trend is aided by the continued development of air-to-surface
missiles, with the latest ones having autonomous homing systems to
provide "fire and forget" capability over long ranges. Another current
development is the GD Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System, which
aims to achieve low-cost accuracy by fitted a laser homer to the
little 2.75 inch (70 mm) rocket. The target is to achieve a CEP of 1 –
2 m at ranges of up to 5 – 6 km at a price of US$ 8 – 10,000;
one-sixth the cost of a Hellfire anti-tank missile.

However, not all conflicts involve front-line opposition; in fact,
armed forces are now commonly engaged on police work, frequently
dealing with guerrilla forces. In these circumstances, rockets and
missiles may represent an inappropriate degree of destruction, with a
high risk of collateral damage. The RAF was embarrassed during
operations against insurgents in Sierra Leone in 2000 to find that
they had no suitable weapon for their gunless Harrier GR.7 aircraft to
attack small groups of rebels operating close to innocent civilians.
Another advantage of using cannon was demonstrated in the invasion of
Afghanistan in 2002. During an intense infantry battle at Takur Ghar
in late May, in which US forces were ambushed and in considerable
danger, air support was called for. The AC-130 was not permitted to
intervene in daylight due to its vulnerability, so USAF fighters were
sent to help. For a part of the battle the Afghan combatants were too
close to the Americans for rockets or bombs to be used, so the
fighters – F-16s and even F-15s – went in strafing with their 20 mm
cannon, as did the Navy's F-14s and F/A-18s on other occasions. Even
RAF Tornadoes were reported to have carried out gun strafing runs on
at least one occasion. It may logically be argued that it is foolish
to risk an extremely expensive aircraft, with its expensively trained
pilot, to being lost due to very low-tech ground fire, but sometimes
the risk needs to be taken to save friendly lives."

The case rests...

Tony Williams
Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
Military gun and ammunition discussion forum:
http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/

"Tony Williams" wrote:

...

| USAF A-10
| aircraft achieved two helicopter kills with the GAU-8/A (using 275 and
| 550 rounds respectively) in one case when the IR missiles failed to
| lock on.

How many rounds of 25mm or 27mm are they proposing to fit inside of USAF
JSF?

"Brett" wrote in message ...
"Tony Williams" wrote:

...

| USAF A-10
| aircraft achieved two helicopter kills with the GAU-8/A (using 275 and
| 550 rounds respectively) in one case when the IR missiles failed to
| lock on.

How many rounds of 25mm or 27mm are they proposing to fit inside of USAF
JSF?

I don't know - I've never seen a figure quoted.

Tony Williams
Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
Discussion forum at: http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/

"Tony Williams" wrote in message
m...
Since this bit of the thread has drifted into whether or not a gun
should be fitted at all, these are my thoughts on the matter, from
'Flying Guns: the Modern Era' by Emmanuel Gustin and myself, due to be
published in March next year. First, in air-to-air use:

snip good analysis and summary

This trend is aided by the continued development of air-to-surface
missiles, with the latest ones having autonomous homing systems to
provide "fire and forget" capability over long ranges. Another current
development is the GD Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System, which
aims to achieve low-cost accuracy by fitted a laser homer to the
little 2.75 inch (70 mm) rocket. The target is to achieve a CEP of 1 -
2 m at ranges of up to 5 - 6 km at a price of US$ 8 - 10,000;
one-sixth the cost of a Hellfire anti-tank missile.

To nitpick, APKWS is not currently slated for use on fixed wing assets--it
is an Army program intended for use on helos only. Even if it were adopted
for fixed wing use, it still leaves the problem of having to identify the
need for its load-out ahead of time (i.e., pre-ATO cycle). The beauty of the
internal gun on these airframes is that it is an asset that is always
available, regardless of the external loadout, so the grunts who are forced
to make an immediate (or "Oh, ****...") CAS request can count on at least
having that strafe support available if/when things go to hell in a
handbasket. That (immediate missions as opposed to pre-planned) is the kind
of mission that this capability will be critical to--if we are *planning* to
get into a "knife-fight" on the ground, other than in the urban fight, then
we have probably already screwed up big-time.


However, not all conflicts involve front-line opposition; in fact,
armed forces are now commonly engaged on police work, frequently
dealing with guerrilla forces. In these circumstances, rockets and
missiles may represent an inappropriate degree of destruction, with a
high risk of collateral damage. The RAF was embarrassed during
operations against insurgents in Sierra Leone in 2000 to find that
they had no suitable weapon for their gunless Harrier GR.7 aircraft to
attack small groups of rebels operating close to innocent civilians.
Another advantage of using cannon was demonstrated in the invasion of
Afghanistan in 2002. During an intense infantry battle at Takur Ghar
in late May, in which US forces were ambushed and in considerable
danger, air support was called for. The AC-130 was not permitted to
intervene in daylight due to its vulnerability, so USAF fighters were
sent to help. For a part of the battle the Afghan combatants were too
close to the Americans for rockets or bombs to be used, so the
fighters - F-16s and even F-15s - went in strafing with their 20 mm
cannon, as did the Navy's F-14s and F/A-18s on other occasions. Even
RAF Tornadoes were reported to have carried out gun strafing runs on
at least one occasion. It may logically be argued that it is foolish
to risk an extremely expensive aircraft, with its expensively trained
pilot, to being lost due to very low-tech ground fire, but sometimes
the risk needs to be taken to save friendly lives."

Exactly.

Brooks


The case rests...

Tony Williams
Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
Military gun and ammunition discussion forum:
http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/

On 11 Dec 2003 23:50:31 -0800, (Tony Williams) wrote:


The case rests...

Tony Williams
Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
Military gun and ammunition discussion forum:
http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/

Writing a book, and writing an accurate book, are two totally different propositions.
You have succeeded in the first instance, let us know when you intend to start
on the second.

Al Minyard

On Fri, 12 Dec 2003 11:50:41 -0600, Alan Minyard
wrote:

On 11 Dec 2003 23:50:31 -0800, (Tony Williams) wrote:


The case rests...

Tony Williams
Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
Military gun and ammunition discussion forum:
http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/

Writing a book, and writing an accurate book, are two totally different propositions.
You have succeeded in the first instance, let us know when you intend to start
on the second.


Coming from a self documenting f8ckwit who couldnt figure out that the BK27
variant as fitted to the JSF was american made, your notion of accuracy is
ever so slightly suspect.


greg

--
Once you try my burger baby,you'll grow a new thyroid gland.
I said just eat my burger, baby,make you smart as Charlie Chan.
You say the hot sauce can't be beat. Sit back and open wide.

On Fri, 12 Dec 2003 19:34:41 +0000, Greg Hennessy wrote:

On Fri, 12 Dec 2003 11:50:41 -0600, Alan Minyard
wrote:

On 11 Dec 2003 23:50:31 -0800, (Tony Williams) wrote:


The case rests...

Tony Williams
Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
Military gun and ammunition discussion forum:
http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/

Writing a book, and writing an accurate book, are two totally different propositions.
You have succeeded in the first instance, let us know when you intend to start
on the second.


Coming from a self documenting f8ckwit who couldnt figure out that the BK27
variant as fitted to the JSF was american made, your notion of accuracy is
ever so slightly suspect.


greg

The BK-27 was an inferior weapon, nominally "produced" by a US
corporation. Your choice of language belies any claim to veracity
on your part.

Al Minyard

On Sat, 13 Dec 2003 11:21:41 -0600, Alan Minyard
wrote:


Your choice of language belies any claim to veracity
on your part.


So tell us about this cannon made by an 'enemy nation' (sic) again. The one
you claimed would be impossible to get spare parts for.

Your inability to make any resembling a cogent argument is noted. Have you
been taking lessons from Tarver ?


greg

--
Once you try my burger baby,you'll grow a new thyroid gland.
I said just eat my burger, baby,make you smart as Charlie Chan.
You say the hot sauce can't be beat. Sit back and open wide.