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In message , Kevin Brooks
writes "Paul J. Adam" wrote in message ... It didn't do them much good, compared to the numerous bombs they called in. Read SSgt Vance's testimony: where the al-Qaeda troops kept firing despite the strafing, their position was destroyed with bombs, and lack of bombs (not guns) was cited as a significant delay in their extraction, which contributed to at least one death (SrA Jason D. Cunningham, who was badly wounded and died before being evacuated) More likely they still enjoyed getting that strafe support for suppression purposes. I note one CCT member's description of the change in situation that finally required sucking up doing the danger-close bomb work: "If we couldn't kill the bunker, we were going to be surrounded," said Brown. "We knew that we had enemy soldiers hiding in the terrain to our (right). Effectively, they were moving in on us and we had nowhere to go." www.af.mil/news/May2002/n20020529_0868.shtml So they only used the bombs when it was a factor of outright survival--understandable IMO. Still hardly a persuasive argument why the guns are indispensible. Why wasn't 20mm able to adequately suppress, deter or destroy the enemy? And that site indicates the controller's name was SSG Gabe Brown, not "Vance"--being as it is a USAF source I'd trust it. To quote SSGt Vance's account again:- "There was a combat controller [CCT] with us named Gabe Brown who was behind me a bit. I turned around and yelled at him to work on getting communications running, he already was working on it. I decided that I needed to be on the line fighting, if I had been on the radio, then the combat controller would have been sitting there doing nothing because he doesn't have the assault training. I decided that he should call in the CAS as I directed him." More than one person has commented on that operation. Is it forever impossible for the USAF to use those weapons, or are they just not in the current plan? APKWS is currently planned for use only on rotary assets, beginning in 2006 IIRC. Again, is that because it is physically impossible to adapt it or develop something similar? Has analysis shown that it would be ineffective? Or is it "not in the plan, we just strafe for danger close"? You can carry plenty of APKWS with the weight freed up by deleting a gun: so an aircraft tasked for CAS gains capability without losing weapons or fuel. Huh? Not if those weapons are not loaded out prior to departure. You do realize the difference between preplanned and immediate CAS requests, right? See later. So where CAS is a likely diversion, then standard loadout includes a seven-round APKWS launcher (just as sorties over parts of the FRY used to require an anti-radar missile either per aircraft or per flight, IIRC). When you've freed up a thousand pounds, using a quarter of that for contingency CAS isn't a large problem. FYI, that little seven load RL still takes up a hardpoint, which is why no, you *can't* plan on it being included as standard. Why not? Again, you keep obsessing about current platforms and systems as though they were the only possibilities and nothing new will ever appear. With very marginal effect, however. Again, since there were repeated requests for just that level of support during Anaconda What else was available? Nothing. You're then using the circular argument that since nothing else was then available, there's nothing else that could ever be used. and given that it is a common sense starting point to use the safest (to your own force) option before moving up the risk category, The safest option is to keep your forces tucked up in bed at home. the gun provides that additional level of flexibility. I seriously doubt were you in the position of calling in that "oh, ****" mission with the bad guys well within the danger close margin for bombs that you'd have leaped immediately to that riskiest of options. "riskiest of options"? (Bear in mind that the first strafe pass was waved off because it wasn't clear whether the F-15 was aiming at the right troops...) You seem to forget that the min separation factor for 20mm is *25 meters* Which tells you much about its lethality, no? , while for bombs that minimum jumps to between 145 and 500 meters (depending upon whether you are in a protected or open position). And those are the only options that can be considered? -- When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite. W S Churchill Paul J. Adam MainBoxatjrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk |
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So they only used the bombs when it was a factor of outright
survival--understandable IMO. Still hardly a persuasive argument why the guns are indispensible. Why wasn't 20mm able to adequately suppress, deter or destroy the enemy? Large dispersion from long slant range by crews who hadn't strafed since the F-15E school house. That isn't the only reason, but it goes a long way towards understanding why the strafe passes didn't work so well. APKWS is currently planned for use only on rotary assets, beginning in 2006 IIRC. Again, is that because it is physically impossible to adapt it or develop something similar? Has analysis shown that it would be ineffective? Or is it "not in the plan, we just strafe for danger close"? Who is to say whether it will be employed on fixed-wing aircraft. 2006 isn't here yet. You seem to forget that the min separation factor for 20mm is *25 meters* Which tells you much about its lethality, no? No, it doesn't. With the dispersion rate of a group of 20mm rounds, you have a lot higher likelihood of hitting what your aiming at and minimizing collateral damage. Bombs can get ugly in a hurry with troops in contact, hence the much larger radius of .1% probability of incompacitation of troops farther from the bomb impact. , while for bombs that minimum jumps to between 145 and 500 meters (depending upon whether you are in a protected or open position). And those are the only options that can be considered? What do you suggest? Since this discussion has digressed from best dogfight gun to why you need (or don't need) a gun for close air support, I'd love to hear what you have to say about the A-10 and pilots who practice with their gun for CAS on almost every sortie. |
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![]() "Hog Driver" wrote , while for bombs that minimum jumps to between 145 and 500 meters (depending upon whether you are in a protected or open position). And those are the only options that can be considered? What do you suggest? Since this discussion has digressed from best dogfight gun to why you need (or don't need) a gun for close air support, I'd love to hear what you have to say about the A-10 and pilots who practice with their gun for CAS on almost every sortie. It says that if CAS requires a gunfire component then we need a 'Hog or 'Hog-equivalent to fly the mission. It says little about whether a gun should be part of the baseline for e.g., the F-35. A-10s are specifically designed for that mission with protection, airspeed and ammo tank size all optimized for it. A fast(er)-mover with no protection, with a small ammo tank is a move back to the "any old fighter will do" school of CAS, the one that the Air Force keeps trying to return to everytime the notion of replacing A-10s with F-16s gets floated. On the other hand, in discussing the baseline for new fighters here, some have drug out the CAS argument to buttress the notion that a gun should be designed into any new fighter. If seems to me that all the arguments in favor of including a gun are along the lines of "marginal utility in all roles but covering many roles, low cost, flexible asset" lines which is fair enough. No one has argued that a gun is a key element of a new fighter, instead we've been discussing how much a gun offers in the margin in both A to A and CAS applications and which gun is best for it. |
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In message , Hog Driver
writes So they only used the bombs when it was a factor of outright survival--understandable IMO. Still hardly a persuasive argument why the guns are indispensible. Why wasn't 20mm able to adequately suppress, deter or destroy the enemy? Large dispersion from long slant range by crews who hadn't strafed since the F-15E school house. That isn't the only reason, but it goes a long way towards understanding why the strafe passes didn't work so well. Which is one of the reasons I'm not convinced that "a gun on every aircraft because we might need it for CAS" is a compelling argument. Again, is that because it is physically impossible to adapt it or develop something similar? Has analysis shown that it would be ineffective? Or is it "not in the plan, we just strafe for danger close"? Who is to say whether it will be employed on fixed-wing aircraft. 2006 isn't here yet. And won't ever be a fixed-wing date (later than 2006 for sure), if the attitude persists that "there's no need for anything better, a strafing pass will do just fine". Which tells you much about its lethality, no? No, it doesn't. Back when I was an infantryman we trained to keep at least ten metres between troops; how many enemy troops can you get per pass with a 25m danger space? And those are the only options that can be considered? What do you suggest? Adapting APKWS for fast movers is one potential, different guns another (maybe something in 30mm firing AHEAD ammunition? The US is adopting it for the AAAV and the Germans for the Puma). Really Small Diameter Bombs with GPS or laser guidance? Is there a need? Quite possibly so. Is it met by existing systems? Not fully, it seems. What's the requirement? Something flexible, multirole, weighing under a thousand pounds (and not too much drag) for several (four or five) shots, with significantly more lethality and effectiveness than the M61, preferably without eating hardpoints. Laser-guided 70mm with multirole fuzes (prox for air targets or dispersed troops, impact for soft targets, delay for bunkers and light armour) is one example candidate. Since this discussion has digressed from best dogfight gun to why you need (or don't need) a gun for close air support, I'd love to hear what you have to say about the A-10 and pilots who practice with their gun for CAS on almost every sortie. Concerns about survivability in a MANPADS environment, but the A-10's gun backed by a trained pilot is a much better tool for the task than a M61 on a F-15. (The A-10 was _designed_ for the job, it would be embarrassing if it wasn't capable) -- When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite. W S Churchill Paul J. Adam MainBoxatjrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk |
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In article ,
"Paul J. Adam" wrote: In message , Hog Driver writes Large dispersion from long slant range by crews who hadn't strafed since the F-15E school house. That isn't the only reason, but it goes a long way towards understanding why the strafe passes didn't work so well. Which is one of the reasons I'm not convinced that "a gun on every aircraft because we might need it for CAS" is a compelling argument. ....and if that were the only argument, you might have a point. But since several people have pointed out other good reasons to have guns on fighters, and since you haven't come up with a good reason to *not* have one (one more missile or a minute's worth of fuel aren't very good reasons at all), the only thing left is to think about cost, and since guns for planes are a very small amount of the final sticker price of a modern plane... -- cirby at cfl.rr.com Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations. Slam on brakes accordingly. |
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In message , Chad Irby
writes In article , "Paul J. Adam" wrote: Which is one of the reasons I'm not convinced that "a gun on every aircraft because we might need it for CAS" is a compelling argument. ...and if that were the only argument, you might have a point. But since several people have pointed out other good reasons to have guns on fighters, and since you haven't come up with a good reason to *not* have one (one more missile or a minute's worth of fuel aren't very good reasons at all), Shame that you give up a lot more than that even for a 20mm installation. the only thing left is to think about cost, and since guns for planes are a very small amount of the final sticker price of a modern plane... If you think that's the case, _you_ pay for integration, installation, maintenance and training. It adds up to a pretty decent chunk of change. -- When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite. W S Churchill Paul J. Adam MainBoxatjrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk |
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In article ,
"Paul J. Adam" wrote: Chad Irby writes But since several people have pointed out other good reasons to have guns on fighters, and since you haven't come up with a good reason to *not* have one (one more missile or a minute's worth of fuel aren't very good reasons at all), Shame that you give up a lot more than that even for a 20mm installation. Not really. Fuel is heavy as hell, and missiles (plus the hardpoints, plus the fire controls for them) aren't as light as you'd think for a useful one. Then there's the external drag and area issues. As long as you're not hauling around GAU-8 installs, the weight isn't that extreme. And especially when you consider the weight per shot (a half-dozen 20mm bursts versus even one or two missiles) is pretty darned reasonable. the only thing left is to think about cost, and since guns for planes are a very small amount of the final sticker price of a modern plane... If you think that's the case, _you_ pay for integration, installation, maintenance and training. It adds up to a pretty decent chunk of change. Not compared to keeping even *more* missiles in the inventory, and the increased inventory of very expensive hardware to keep checking them and making them work. Even something as simple as an AIM-9 takes a boatload of work to keep functional, whether you fire them or not. And when you *do* fire them in practice, you're burning off, in one shot, most of the lifetime cost of a small gun system... -- cirby at cfl.rr.com Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations. Slam on brakes accordingly. |
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In message , Chad Irby
writes In article , "Paul J. Adam" wrote: Chad Irby writes Shame that you give up a lot more than that even for a 20mm installation. Not really. Fuel is heavy as hell, and missiles (plus the hardpoints, plus the fire controls for them) aren't as light as you'd think for a useful one. So you can shovel a thousand pounds of ballast into a F-16 without any concerns? Here's a hint - modern aircraft are more limited by fuel and payload, than by numbers of pylons. Then there's the external drag and area issues. As long as you're not hauling around GAU-8 installs, the weight isn't that extreme. A thousand pounds is a thousand pounds. And especially when you consider the weight per shot (a half-dozen 20mm bursts versus even one or two missiles) is pretty darned reasonable. If you think that's the case, _you_ pay for integration, installation, maintenance and training. It adds up to a pretty decent chunk of change. Not compared to keeping even *more* missiles in the inventory, Which weapons actually get the kills? and the increased inventory of very expensive hardware to keep checking them and making them work. And you don't think there's a significant overhead in keeping aircraft guns maintained, reliable, boresighted, and (crucially) their crews trained in their use? Even something as simple as an AIM-9 takes a boatload of work to keep functional, whether you fire them or not. So does a M61. And when you *do* fire them in practice, you're burning off, in one shot, most of the lifetime cost of a small gun system... Does the "lifetime cost" of a gun system include training? Or are the pilots supposed to just pick it up as they go? -- When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite. W S Churchill Paul J. Adam MainBoxatjrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk |
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In article , Chad Irby
wrote: But since several people have pointed out other good reasons to have guns on fighters, and since you haven't come up with a good reason to *not* have one (one more missile or a minute's worth of fuel aren't very good reasons at all), Shame that you give up a lot more than that even for a 20mm installation. Not really. Fuel is heavy as hell, Well, only because you carry an awful lot of it. It's got a specific density less than one, so it's a fair assumption that replacing a gun installation with a fuel tank saves you weight - even if you assume that 50% of the volume of a gun installation is free air. the only thing left is to think about cost, and since guns for planes are a very small amount of the final sticker price of a modern plane... If you think that's the case, _you_ pay for integration, installation, maintenance and training. It adds up to a pretty decent chunk of change. Not compared to keeping even *more* missiles in the inventory, and the increased inventory of very expensive hardware to keep checking them and making them work. Actually, no. It's the fact that a gun adds a completely different support line than "more of the same" missiles which drives the whole life cost up. Aetherem Vincere Matt -- To err is human To forgive is not Air Force Policy |
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In article , Paul J. Adam
wrote: Large dispersion from long slant range by crews who hadn't strafed since the F-15E school house. That isn't the only reason, but it goes a long way towards understanding why the strafe passes didn't work so well. Which is one of the reasons I'm not convinced that "a gun on every aircraft because we might need it for CAS" is a compelling argument. Let's be fair, this was an aircraft that grew out of a program with the slogan "Not a pound for air to ground". If you're building a multirole aircraft from the start (and, let's face it, what isn't these days - stand fast the F-22 as originally intended), you have to give consideration to the face that the pilots might actually have to influence the ground directly. Aetherem Vincere Matt -- To err is human To forgive is not Air Force Policy |
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