asymetric warfare

ess (phil hunt) wrote:

If they can be mass-produced for $10,000 each, then a $1 bn
procurement -- and the sort of countries we're talking about
typically sign bigger weapons contracts than that -- would buy
100,000 missiles.

Procuring the missiles is only the first step. Then you have to train
the crews, and store the missiles until needed, and distribute them
when needed. All three are non-trivial problems in and of themselves.
(And all four steps are vulnerable to disruption.)

D.
--
The STS-107 Columbia Loss FAQ can be found
at the following URLs:

Text-Only Version:
http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq.html

Enhanced HTML Version:
http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq_x.html

Corrections, comments, and additions should be
e-mailed to , as well as posted to
sci.space.history and sci.space.shuttle for
discussion.

(Derek Lyons) wrote:

Procuring the missiles is only the first step. Then you have to
train the crews, and store the missiles until needed, and distribute
them when needed. All three are non-trivial problems in and of
themselves. (And all four steps are vulnerable to disruption.)

That's something a lot of nations can't seem to understand about running
a modern military. Strategy is one thing, equipment design is another,
but logistics is what wins wars.

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

Chad Irby wrote:

(Derek Lyons) wrote:

Procuring the missiles is only the first step. Then you have to
train the crews, and store the missiles until needed, and distribute
them when needed. All three are non-trivial problems in and of
themselves. (And all four steps are vulnerable to disruption.)

That's something a lot of nations can't seem to understand about running
a modern military. Strategy is one thing, equipment design is another,
but logistics is what wins wars.

Yep. Some time back a gentleman asked over on sci.military.naval what
it would take to build a small, modern, and regionally important naval
force. He was quite taken aback when the vast majority of the
responses emphasized all the 'non-sexy' bits. (Repair parts, repair
training, DC training, countermeasures, infrastructure, general
training, communications...)

D.
--
The STS-107 Columbia Loss FAQ can be found
at the following URLs:

Text-Only Version:
http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq.html

Enhanced HTML Version:
http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq_x.html

Corrections, comments, and additions should be
e-mailed to , as well as posted to
sci.space.history and sci.space.shuttle for
discussion.

Derek Lyons wrote:
That's something a lot of nations can't seem to understand about running
a modern military. Strategy is one thing, equipment design is another,
but logistics is what wins wars.

Yep. Some time back a gentleman asked over on sci.military.naval what
it would take to build a small, modern, and regionally important naval
force. He was quite taken aback when the vast majority of the
responses emphasized all the 'non-sexy' bits. (Repair parts, repair
training, DC training, countermeasures, infrastructure, general
training, communications...)

I recall a conversation reported or paraphrased in Proceedings
in the late 1970s. Someone noted to a senior admiral, I think,
that the equipment on paper specs for the new Aegis ships weren't
much better than the previous generation of missile cruisers,
other than the really great multi-target capability from SPY-1.
Missile range, target director capabilities, etc.

The response was "Yes, but now they're working 95% of the time,
rather than 55%".

That lesson is hard even for well funded navies...


-george william herbert

George William Herbert wrote:

The response was "Yes, but now they're working 95% of the time,
rather than 55%".

As I understand it, one of the things that motivated the invention
of integrated circuits was reliability -- of naval electronics
and avionics. The systems were coming up against the limits
of what one could reliably do with discrete components.

Paul

"Paul F. Dietz" wrote:
George William Herbert wrote:
The response was "Yes, but now they're working 95% of the time,
rather than 55%".

As I understand it, one of the things that motivated the invention
of integrated circuits was reliability -- of naval electronics
and avionics. The systems were coming up against the limits
of what one could reliably do with discrete components.

Reliability comes not just from increasing MTBF, but in decreasing
MTTR. BITE (Built In Test Equipment), modular electronics, designing
for maintenance... All these things go into increasing uptime, and
IC's make them all much easier.

D.
--
The STS-107 Columbia Loss FAQ can be found
at the following URLs:

Text-Only Version:
http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq.html

Enhanced HTML Version:
http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq_x.html

Corrections, comments, and additions should be
e-mailed to , as well as posted to
sci.space.history and sci.space.shuttle for
discussion.

(George William Herbert) wrote:
The response was "Yes, but now they're working 95% of the time,
rather than 55%".

That lesson is hard even for well funded navies...

nods And that's where the low cost frightfulness proposed elsewhere
in this thread really falls down.

It's pretty much a given that a decent cruise bird can be built for
around $10k. However, I'd be willing to wager a bottle of beverage of
choice that their reliability won't exceed 50%. That's high enough
for a terror campaign, but as a useful military weapon, it's nowhere
near enough. 'Cheap' weapons aren't nearly as cheap when you have to
launch *four* $10k birds to ensure that *one* lands on target.
Lacking assurance of a kill adds greatly to the difficulties your
offense must face, and complicates your logistics chain.

D.
--
The STS-107 Columbia Loss FAQ can be found
at the following URLs:

Text-Only Version:
http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq.html

Enhanced HTML Version:
http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq_x.html

Corrections, comments, and additions should be
e-mailed to , as well as posted to
sci.space.history and sci.space.shuttle for
discussion.

(Derek Lyons) wrote in message ...
ess (phil hunt) wrote:

If they can be mass-produced for $10,000 each, then a $1 bn
procurement -- and the sort of countries we're talking about
typically sign bigger weapons contracts than that -- would buy
100,000 missiles.

Procuring the missiles is only the first step. Then you have to train
the crews, and store the missiles until needed, and distribute them
when needed. All three are non-trivial problems in and of themselves.
(And all four steps are vulnerable to disruption.)

Let's also not forget that the effort required to develop, test,
produce,
store, train troops for, and, eventually, deploy some massive amount
of
(Low Cost Cruise Missiles/Uninvented Mystery Munitions/Diesel
Subs/whatever)
has to be done in complete and total secrecy. It doesn't do you any
good to come up with your stuff if the first act of teh war is to bob
the depots holding it. Or, if you're favoring a surprise/preemptive
strike, the weapons are observed moving from the depots, thus alerting
the target. While there
may be some holes in U.S. Intel, out ability to find and follow that
sort of stuff us pretty good. (Before you go holding up Iraq as a
counterexample, please note that prior to 1990, there was very little
in-depth coverage of Iraq, so new patterns were hard to spot. They
also managed to score some coups by doing stuff that was unexpected,
such as pursuing the use of Calutrons, long obsolescent for reasons of
inefficiency, for Uranium enrichment. They can, for example, hide the
buildings, but they can't hide the electical generators or the
transmission lines, and it becomes a matter of following the leads.
Or, perhaps, one of the Bright Young Guys following the activity of
your factories in the Trade Publications notes an upswing in certain
activities.

So, to cut short a bit - If producing some massive amount of cheap
somethings
is even feasible, it won't do you a bit of good unless you can hide it
from
the watchful eyes of the NRO and the NSA. You can hide little stuff,
but not the sort of overwhelming swarm that's been postulated so far.

--
Pete Stickney