On this day in 1944..

On 20 Dec 2003 14:43:28 GMT, (ArtKramr) wrote:

On this day in 1944 the Germans began shelling theWirtz-Bastogne crossroad in
an attempt to push the 101st Airborne out of the defense of Bastogne. They
failed. .Temperature went down to below freezing in the bitter cold of that
Belgian winter and the 101st was down to eating K rations. Those that had them.

Arthur Kramer

And, on this day in 1972, the Linebacker II operation experienced the
worst losses of the campaign with six B-52s downed over Hanoi. The
Eleven Days of Christmas, however, drove the recalcitrant North
Vietnamese back to the bargaining table and resulted in the release of
our POWs by March of '73.

And, arguably proved once and for all the Douhet principle that
strategic bombing can be decisive politically without ground invasion.
IMNSHO!



Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

Subject: On this day in 1944..
From: Ed Rasimus
Date: 12/20/03 7:45 AM Pacific Standard Time
Message-id:

On 20 Dec 2003 14:43:28 GMT, (ArtKramr) wrote:

On this day in 1944 the Germans began shelling theWirtz-Bastogne crossroad
in
an attempt to push the 101st Airborne out of the defense of Bastogne. They
failed. .Temperature went down to below freezing in the bitter cold of that
Belgian winter and the 101st was down to eating K rations. Those that had
them.

Arthur Kramer

And, on this day in 1972, the Linebacker II operation experienced the
worst losses of the campaign with six B-52s downed over Hanoi. The
Eleven Days of Christmas, however, drove the recalcitrant North
Vietnamese back to the bargaining table and resulted in the release of
our POWs by March of '73.

And, arguably proved once and for all the Douhet principle that
strategic bombing can be decisive politically without ground invasion.
IMNSHO!



Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8


What a relief Ed. We are finally discussing something that counts in this NG.
Y'know, life, death, victory, defeat flying missions and war. For a while there
I thought that this NG would forever be commited to inane trivialites like the
true meaning of " Fly Boy" or similiar crap.

Regards,

Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

Subject: On this day in 1944..
From: Ed Rasimus
Date: 12/20/03 7:45 AM Pacific Standard Time
Message-id:

And, arguably proved once and for all the Douhet principle that
strategic bombing can be decisive politically without ground invasion.
IMNSHO!

And tactical bombing helped too. IMNSHO ! (grin)




Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

And, on this day in 1972, the Linebacker II operation experienced the
worst losses of the campaign with six B-52s downed over Hanoi. The
Eleven Days of Christmas, however, drove the recalcitrant North
Vietnamese back to the bargaining table and resulted in the release of
our POWs by March of '73.

And, arguably proved once and for all the Douhet principle that
strategic bombing can be decisive politically without ground invasion.
IMNSHO!


You know Ed, I believed (past tense) this too, its what the Air Force teaches
at every step of PME, but after completing a masters course about the air war
in Vietnam, I'm not so convinced anymore. I may get drubbed out of the B-52
community, but I think the BUFFs could have sat the whole thing out and by
early January 1973, Le Duc Tho would have still signed the Paris Peace Accord.
Most of the targets hit by the BUFFs, had already been hit the previous Spring
and Fall during Linebacker I. This is where people usually say; "the bombing
demoralized the population and the politicians of North Vietnam". There are
stories, most from former POWs being held in Hanoi, about the psychological
effect the bombing had on the North Vietnamese, but no proof or any evidence
that the communist party leadership was aware, or if they were, even cared
about the psychological effect on their people. Marshall L. Michel (heck Ed,
you may even know this guy?) wrote an outstanding book titled; "The Eleven Days
of Christmas" where he interviewed NV SA-2 commanders and crews. One SA-2
commander said the politicians who visited his battalian, located close to the
party headquarters, up until the last day, were confident and supportive,
hardly the actions of a demoralized population. Additionally, the government
ordered residence of Hanoi to evacuate, if they were non-essential, and to send
their children to the camps in the country side, both orders were violated en
mass, most Hanoi residents stayed put. Another great book addressing this
issue is Mark Clodfelter's "The Limits of Air Power".

Anyway, just a few opinions to counter current day "common logic". Regardless
of their effect on North Vietnamese politicans, the BUFFs provided moral
support to POWs (fact) and the crews layed the ground work for every BUFF
mission flown today (fact).


BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"

On 21 Dec 2003 13:59:25 GMT, (BUFDRVR) wrote:

And, on this day in 1972, the Linebacker II operation experienced the
worst losses of the campaign with six B-52s downed over Hanoi. The
Eleven Days of Christmas, however, drove the recalcitrant North
Vietnamese back to the bargaining table and resulted in the release of
our POWs by March of '73.

And, arguably proved once and for all the Douhet principle that
strategic bombing can be decisive politically without ground invasion.
IMNSHO!


You know Ed, I believed (past tense) this too, its what the Air Force teaches
at every step of PME, but after completing a masters course about the air war
in Vietnam, I'm not so convinced anymore.

You hit upon one good reason for guys writing memoirs. Too quickly we
wind up with the participants and on-scene observers passing away and
only the historians interpreting stacks of OPREP-4s and cryptic
correspondence then interpreting the runes in the politically correct
light of the day.

As a participant in LB I and II, I would have to debate the
conclusions of the course you took.

I may get drubbed out of the B-52
community, but I think the BUFFs could have sat the whole thing out and by
early January 1973, Le Duc Tho would have still signed the Paris Peace Accord.

The sequence of events from the beginning of the Paris peace talks
through the various political cycles of American presidential politics
make that conclusion debatable. Linebacker started to get the NVN and
VC back to the table. As it progressed they observed the typical
gradualism that had characterized each previous bombing cycle. By
October, Kissinger announced the "light at the end of the tunnel" and
we paused again, only to see the resolve of the NVN and VC return.
When they didn't follow through, Nixon unleased LB II, which raised
the stakes considerably.

Most of the targets hit by the BUFFs, had already been hit the previous Spring
and Fall during Linebacker I. This is where people usually say; "the bombing
demoralized the population and the politicians of North Vietnam".

The intensity of night one where the original frag was for 150 BUFF
sorties. Do the math, even if all of them weren't "big belly" D's.
That's a lot of bombs falling in an area the size of Connecticutt. The
24 hour a day campaign of LB II was unprecedented.

There are
stories, most from former POWs being held in Hanoi, about the psychological
effect the bombing had on the North Vietnamese, but no proof or any evidence
that the communist party leadership was aware, or if they were, even cared
about the psychological effect on their people. Marshall L. Michel (heck Ed,
you may even know this guy?) wrote an outstanding book titled; "The Eleven Days
of Christmas" where he interviewed NV SA-2 commanders and crews.

I know Marshall quite well. You'll find my name mentioned on page 82
of his book.

One SA-2
commander said the politicians who visited his battalian, located close to the
party headquarters, up until the last day, were confident and supportive,
hardly the actions of a demoralized population. Additionally, the government
ordered residence of Hanoi to evacuate, if they were non-essential, and to send
their children to the camps in the country side, both orders were violated en
mass, most Hanoi residents stayed put.

While I have great respect for Marshall's efforts in gaining the NVN
perspective of LB II, let us not forget that he was interviewing
functionaries of a Communist government and their statements "might"
reflect typical revisionism. (For similar conflicting testimonies you
might compare Marshall's "Clashes" with Toperczer on MiG kills.)

Another great book addressing this
issue is Mark Clodfelter's "The Limits of Air Power".

Clodfelter certainly gained renown with his interpretation of the
events, but not all historians agree with him. You might also look at
Wayne Thompson's "To Hanoi and Back" or Karl Eschmann's "Linebacker."

Anyway, just a few opinions to counter current day "common logic". Regardless
of their effect on North Vietnamese politicans, the BUFFs provided moral
support to POWs (fact) and the crews layed the ground work for every BUFF
mission flown today (fact).

Probably most critical (and the major contribution of Marshall's
"Eleven Days" is the acknowledgement that the LeMay elitism of the
strategic bomber force as a "specified" command and not eligible to be
CHOPped to the theater operational commanders is gone. Now, we find
operational aircraft are operational aircraft and wars are fought with
the resources available against the enemy and not in a parochial fight
against each other.



Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

You hit upon one good reason for guys writing memoirs. Too quickly we
wind up with the participants and on-scene observers passing away and
only the historians interpreting stacks of OPREP-4s and cryptic
correspondence then interpreting the runes in the politically correct
light of the day.

Well, it goes both ways Ed. Michel absolutely destroys some of the material
published by actual participants, whose "facts" were quite questionable. Hell
Ed, I can pick up a book called "The View From the Rock" where I can read about
how great the SAC-13th Air Force relationship was. This book was written by
either the Group or Wing Commander at Andersen during LB II.

As a participant in LB I and II, I would have to debate the
conclusions of the course you took.

Don't blame the course, these were my own conclusions. My final paper was on
B-52 targeting effectiveness during LB II. Just a bit of what I discovered;
"They dropped over 4,000 bombs on the Kinh No rail yard and vehicle repair
facility. Impressive, however the Kinh No rail yard had already been disabled
during Linebacker I". 4000 750 pound bombs on an already damaged (and certainly
by the 2000th M-117, destroyed) railyard! I won't even go in to the targeting
of Hanoi Radio, ok...yes I will. Four B-52s were shot down the first week
trying to knock it off the air permanently, over 36 sorties and 2000 bombs to
hit a small building and an antenna. On day number 9 two F-4s dropped three
GBU-10s and knocked it off the air permenantly. If it wasn't the damage being
inflicted by the BUFFs, how can we credit them with forcing the NV back to the
table in Paris?

Linebacker started to get the NVN and
VC back to the table.

Because their conventional offensive had stalled and ARVN units had actually
begun to re-take some of the lost ground.

As it progressed they observed the typical
gradualism that had characterized each previous bombing cycle.

Linebacker I didn't suffer from any of Johnson's "graduated response". The only
mistake Nixon made was to restrict bombing below 20-North when the communists
agreed to resume peace talks.

By
October, Kissinger announced the "light at the end of the tunnel" and
we paused again, only to see the resolve of the NVN and VC return.

The "pause" was not Nixon's fault, or Kissenger's. The agreement reached in
October was reached between the US and North Vietnam, with no input from South
Vietnam. Nixon demanded that Nguyen Van Thieu, South Vietnam's President
approve the deal. The North Vietnamese never admitted its forces were involved
inside the border of South Vietnam, as such, there was nothing in the agreement
about removing them. Thieu refused to "ok" the deal because of this issue.
So...the US and NVN had an agreement in principle, but needed to convince *our
ally South Vietnam* to approve the deal. Bombing never halted, but interdiction
sorties south of the DMZ were reduced to show NVN we were serious about the
deal.

When they didn't follow through, Nixon unleased LB II, which raised
the stakes considerably.

Nixon unleashed LB II after several political catastrophies had occured. First,
in late November several democrats from both the House and Senate *publically*
called for a vote on the suspension of funding for the military operation in SE
Asia. These idiots made this request public on every national TV and newspaper
media outlet and said the issue would be brought for a vote following the
Christmas holiday break. As this was happening, Kissenger was attempting to add
verbage to the Paris agreement stating regular NVN military forces would be
withdrawn from South Vietnamese territory (Thieu wanted the statement to
include all NVN supported forces such as the VC). Kissenger presented this to
Le Duc Tho. The NVN were pretty savy on US internal political issues, they were
well aware of the threat to withdraw funding and they seized this opportunity
to claim we were changing an agreement already agreed upon (we were!) and left
the conferance on 13 December 1972. The NVN were gambling that the House and
Senates resolve to end the war would "hamstring" Nixon who would be unable to
take any bold action, additionally if US funds were withdrawn, this would allow
NVN to get *everything* and a cost of *nothing*. What ended up happening was;
Nixon took strong action, and few members of congress spoke out against it.
The bombing continued for 9 days (Le Duc Tho agreed to return to Paris and sign
the *orginal* agreement on the 27th, bombing continued for two more days.)
without a huge public or congressional outcry. The NVN decided that those in
congress opposed to the war were such a minority that it would be highly
doubtful they would vote to suspend funding. Kissenger literally told South
Vietnamese President Thieu that he was signing the Paris Peace Accord, with or
without Thieu's blessing, so reluctantly Thieu agreed and nothing in the final
Paris Peace Accord mentions the withdrawl of NVN military forces. Basically a
long way of saying that the NVN didn't sign anything more or less than they had
already agreed upon in late October. What they didn't get was the "whole
enchillada" with the complete withdrawl of US forces *and* the suspension of
aid to South Vietnam that they thought they may get should congress vote to
suspend funding. The overall silence from American politicians during LB II
was every bit as powerful as the 750-pound bombs raining down on Hanoi and
Haiphong.

The intensity of night one where the original frag was for 150 BUFF
sorties. Do the math, even if all of them weren't "big belly" D's.
That's a lot of bombs falling in an area the size of Connecticutt. The
24 hour a day campaign of LB II was unprecedented.

Yet most residents refused to leave or even send thier children away.

I know Marshall quite well. You'll find my name mentioned on page 82
of his book.

I finished it in September, but don't recall seeing your name. I've lent the
book to someone, I'll have to check it out when I get it back.

While I have great respect for Marshall's efforts in gaining the NVN
perspective of LB II, let us not forget that he was interviewing
functionaries of a Communist government and their statements "might"
reflect typical revisionism.

Possibly, but this is true for any person.

You might also look at
Wayne Thompson's "To Hanoi and Back"

Not only have I read it, but I've discussed this issue with Dr. Thompson who
attends our staff meetings every Tuesday and Thursday mornings. While I think I
can catagorize his opinion accurately I won't try in case I am misunderstanding
his position. What I can say is; Dr. Thompson did not flat out disagree with
me.

or Karl Eschmann's "Linebacker."

I've read that as well.

Probably most critical (and the major contribution of Marshall's
"Eleven Days" is the acknowledgement that the LeMay elitism of the
strategic bomber force as a "specified" command and not eligible to be
CHOPped to the theater operational commanders is gone.

While I agree whole heartedly with Michel's position (dysfunctional command
chain with bombers), he loses some credibility to make an unbiased judgement in
this area. In the opening chapter he states that for a fighter pilot, a tour in
SAC was like a tour in hell (paraphrasing). If you then read the book cover
jacket, you find Michel was a TAC-born F-4 guy during the 60s and 70s, one of
those guys who though SAC was hell on earth. Bottom line; Michel was correct,
but his position looks awful biased instead of factual based.


BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"

BUFDRVR wrote:

You hit upon one good reason for guys writing memoirs. Too quickly we
wind up with the participants and on-scene observers passing away and
only the historians interpreting stacks of OPREP-4s and cryptic
correspondence then interpreting the runes in the politically correct
light of the day.

Well, it goes both ways Ed. Michel absolutely destroys some of the material
published by actual participants, whose "facts" were quite questionable. Hell
Ed, I can pick up a book called "The View From the Rock" where I can read about
how great the SAC-13th Air Force relationship was. This book was written by
either the Group or Wing Commander at Andersen during LB II.

As a participant in LB I and II, I would have to debate the
conclusions of the course you took.

Don't blame the course, these were my own conclusions. My final paper was on
B-52 targeting effectiveness during LB II. Just a bit of what I discovered;
"They dropped over 4,000 bombs on the Kinh No rail yard and vehicle repair
facility. Impressive, however the Kinh No rail yard had already been disabled
during Linebacker I". 4000 750 pound bombs on an already damaged (and certainly
by the 2000th M-117, destroyed) railyard! I won't even go in to the targeting
of Hanoi Radio, ok...yes I will. Four B-52s were shot down the first week
trying to knock it off the air permanently, over 36 sorties and 2000 bombs to
hit a small building and an antenna. On day number 9 two F-4s dropped three
GBU-10s and knocked it off the air permenantly. If it wasn't the damage being
inflicted by the BUFFs, how can we credit them with forcing the NV back to the
table in Paris?

Linebacker started to get the NVN and
VC back to the table.

Because their conventional offensive had stalled and ARVN units had actually
begun to re-take some of the lost ground.

As it progressed they observed the typical
gradualism that had characterized each previous bombing cycle.

Linebacker I didn't suffer from any of Johnson's "graduated response". The only
mistake Nixon made was to restrict bombing below 20-North when the communists
agreed to resume peace talks.

By
October, Kissinger announced the "light at the end of the tunnel" and
we paused again, only to see the resolve of the NVN and VC return.

The "pause" was not Nixon's fault, or Kissenger's. The agreement reached in
October was reached between the US and North Vietnam, with no input from South
Vietnam. Nixon demanded that Nguyen Van Thieu, South Vietnam's President
approve the deal. The North Vietnamese never admitted its forces were involved
inside the border of South Vietnam, as such, there was nothing in the agreement
about removing them. Thieu refused to "ok" the deal because of this issue.
So...the US and NVN had an agreement in principle, but needed to convince *our
ally South Vietnam* to approve the deal. Bombing never halted, but interdiction
sorties south of the DMZ were reduced to show NVN we were serious about the
deal.

When they didn't follow through, Nixon unleased LB II, which raised
the stakes considerably.

Nixon unleashed LB II after several political catastrophies had occured. First,
in late November several democrats from both the House and Senate *publically*
called for a vote on the suspension of funding for the military operation in SE
Asia. These idiots made this request public on every national TV and newspaper
media outlet and said the issue would be brought for a vote following the
Christmas holiday break. As this was happening, Kissenger was attempting to add
verbage to the Paris agreement stating regular NVN military forces would be
withdrawn from South Vietnamese territory (Thieu wanted the statement to
include all NVN supported forces such as the VC). Kissenger presented this to
Le Duc Tho. The NVN were pretty savy on US internal political issues, they were
well aware of the threat to withdraw funding and they seized this opportunity
to claim we were changing an agreement already agreed upon (we were!) and left
the conferance on 13 December 1972. The NVN were gambling that the House and
Senates resolve to end the war would "hamstring" Nixon who would be unable to
take any bold action, additionally if US funds were withdrawn, this would allow
NVN to get *everything* and a cost of *nothing*. What ended up happening was;
Nixon took strong action, and few members of congress spoke out against it.
The bombing continued for 9 days (Le Duc Tho agreed to return to Paris and sign
the *orginal* agreement on the 27th, bombing continued for two more days.)
without a huge public or congressional outcry. The NVN decided that those in
congress opposed to the war were such a minority that it would be highly
doubtful they would vote to suspend funding. Kissenger literally told South
Vietnamese President Thieu that he was signing the Paris Peace Accord, with or
without Thieu's blessing, so reluctantly Thieu agreed and nothing in the final
Paris Peace Accord mentions the withdrawl of NVN military forces. Basically a
long way of saying that the NVN didn't sign anything more or less than they had
already agreed upon in late October. What they didn't get was the "whole
enchillada" with the complete withdrawl of US forces *and* the suspension of
aid to South Vietnam that they thought they may get should congress vote to
suspend funding. The overall silence from American politicians during LB II
was every bit as powerful as the 750-pound bombs raining down on Hanoi and
Haiphong.

snip

While I have great respect for Marshall's efforts in gaining the NVN
perspective of LB II, let us not forget that he was interviewing
functionaries of a Communist government and their statements "might"
reflect typical revisionism.

Possibly, but this is true for any person.

And since their views of the points at issue in the negotiations agree with the
accounts of Kissinger, Nixon, and the US and SVN government documents, we have lots
of confirmation of their accuracy. They didn't give up the right to keep troops in
SVN, which was the key reason why Thieu refused to sign it at the end of October,
and which he again balked at in January. BUFDRVR is correct in his description of
the negotiations, a point which Marshall and numerous others have long since made.
It seems that we have this discussion every couple of years -- Here's a post I made
about two years ago, which makes the same points BUFDRVR does:
-------------------------------------------------------------------------

Actually, LBII was designed to convince President Thieu of SVN that we
would bomb and provide support if the NVN violated the peace accords,
and to convince the NVN government of the same thing. The NVN had
already agreed to essentially the same terms in negotiations with us
back in October, but President Thieu balked at many of the terms
(which we had agreed to), especially the one that allowed a cease-fire
in place, i.e. the PAVN didn't have to remove their troops from SVN.
So we went back to the N. Vietnamese and started to try and take back
many of the points we'd already conceded, but the N. Vietnamese
weren't willing to accept that. Then THEY started to take back many
of the concessions they'd already made, knowing that we were going to
have to get out regardless, and figuring they might get an even better
deal than they already had, and ultimately the talks came to a halt.

Nixon was well aware that he couldn't continue the bombing for very
long, as Congress would probably cut off all funds for military action
in SE Asia as soon as they re-convened in January (and as they in fact
did later). Nixon ordered LB II, which convinced the N. Vietnamese to
take the deal they'd already agreed to in October but which didn't
improve the terms that Thieu objected to in the slightest. The NVN
government considers LB II a victory for them, as they held firm and
refused to be intimidated into giving up on their critical issues,
such as keeping troops in the south. This virtually assured their
eventual victory. Thieu still balked at signing, so Nixon gave him an
ultimatum, as follows:

"You must decide now whether you desire to continue our alliance, or
whether you want me to seek a settlement with the enemy which serves
U.S. interests alone."

In other words, Nixon was telling Thieu that we were going to sign
and leave with or without his signature; if he signed, Nixon promised
that we'd bomb if NVN broke the accords, and provide SVN with the
military supplies and equipment they needed; if he didn't, we were
pulling out and washing our hands of SVN. Thieu didn't have much
choice, so he signed. "Peace with Honor," it wasn't. It was a
scuttle to get out with whatever dignity we could, rather similar to
Chamberlain's "Peace in our Time," with similar results. Nixon's "No
More Vietnams" gives many of the details (not the exact text of his
message to Thieu, which I found in Stanley Karnow's book), as do many
other works.
---------------------------------------------------

You might also want to read a book titled "The Palace File," written by Thieu's
former personal assistant Nguyen Tien Hung, which includes photos and text of the
actual cables between Nixon, Kissinger and Thieu during the entire period, along
with Thieu's attitude, and further confirms the details.

LB II was never intended to "win the war"; Neither Nixon or Kissinger believed that
could be done, and all they were trying to do was get Thieu to agree to sign the
deal that we had already worked out and then presented to him as a fait accompli.
Here's Nixon, from "No More Vietnams":

"Most of our remaining disputes were hammered out . . . in mid-October. But on one
major issue we could not budge the [NVN] from their position. They refused to
withdraw their forces from South Vietnam . . . . We knew there was no way to force
them to concede this point. . . . Thieu understandably wanted the agreement to
require the North Vietnamese to withdraw the forces from his country . . . As a
result he proposed over 20 changes to the draft agreement, seven of which we knew
the [NVN] would never accept. . . . On November 20 . . . Kissenger presented
Thieu's proposed changes , as well as some of our own . . . After several tough
negotiating sessions, I concluded that if we were to reach an agreement , we would
have to abandon most of Thieu's major demands. I instructed Kissinger to seek a
settlement _along the lines of the October agreement_ [emphasis added]."

Ed, that being the case, do you still hold that LB II somehow _forced_ the DRV to
give up anything major that they hadn't already agreed to (there were a few minor
concessions, none of which were substantive), or that they were the ones who were
being intractable? Or that "strategic bombing," in this case, was "decisive
politically"? After all, Nixon could have given Thieu the exact same "take it or
leave it" offer at the beginning of November as he did in mid-January, with no need
for LB II. Nixon was fully convinced that the DRVN would violate the accords
regardless, and he believed that would give him the excuse he needed to continue to
bomb when necessary (unlikely, given the mood of the recently elected Congress,
which voted mid-year to cut off funds).

Guy

On Sun, 21 Dec 2003 22:36:03 GMT, Guy Alcala
wrote:





"Most of our remaining disputes were hammered out . . . in mid-October. But on one
major issue we could not budge the [NVN] from their position. They refused to
withdraw their forces from South Vietnam . . . . We knew there was no way to force
them to concede this point. . . . Thieu understandably wanted the agreement to
require the North Vietnamese to withdraw the forces from his country .

What was the purpose of any peace agreement between two Vietnamese
countries which didn't require North Vietnamese forces to pull out of
South Vietnam?

How did US benefit from signing such an agreement and especially once
North Vietnamese renewed the invasion?


Drax

On Sun, 21 Dec 2003 16:32:15 GMT, Ed Rasimus
wrote:


The intensity of night one where the original frag was for 150 BUFF
sorties. Do the math, even if all of them weren't "big belly" D's.
That's a lot of bombs falling in an area the size of Connecticutt. The
24 hour a day campaign of LB II was unprecedented.

What were the targets during this operation?


Drax