asymetric warfare

Paul J. Adam wrote:
phil hunt writes
Paul J. Adam wrote:
Getting a machine to tell a T-72 from a M1A1 from a Leclerc is hard
enough in good conditions

You don't have to. You have to be able to tell whether it's a
vehicle or not, and if it is, is it in an area likely to be occupied
by own forces.

#1 sounds easy until the enemy starts deploying decoys and disguising
targets.

They have to deploy good-enough decoys forwards with the
advancing troops. Consider for a moment how hard it would
have been for the US to get significant quantities of good
decoys forwards of the Kuwaiti border by T+4 hrs.

#2 still requires not only significant navigation, but some
noticeable amounts of real-time intelligence gathering and
communication.

A kill box from thirty kilometers north of the Iraqi border
with Kuwait, going twenty kilometers south of that border,
by T+4 hrs after the US Army breached the border, nine months
ago, would have worked quite well.

_Someone_ has to reliably determine whether the 'US tanks to our front!'
message is a feint, a hasty raid or the real invasion; work out where
those tanks will be by the time the missiles arrive: and reliably get a
message back to the launch unit. This has to be reasonably proof against
deception, EW, jamming, and blunt attack.

A massive invasion, and anything of regimental strength or more
is going to count, is hard to hide. The details of how far and
how fast the front line has moved may be more opaque, but any
serious attack has very real limitations on how fast it can
roll out. One can easily posit kill box limits which are
very easy to justify and will suffer very little blue-on-blue
for the defender. And more to the point, will do far more
damage than any remaining defender forces in those boxes,
and the oncoming attack will presumably wipe those forces
out promptly.

The timing and positioning of the box may require not targeting
your own FEBA of effective resistance, and not targeting the
leading invasion echelons. But that doesn't matter. It took
days for the US forces to finish crossing the border into Iraq.
Kill boxes with the description I gave would have been valid
for much more time than is needed to set up and execute the
cruise missile attack starting.

More to the point, it rules out most resistance and makes life for
refugees short and nasty, since "general area of enemy forces" will
contain both own forces trying to fight (unless these missiles are your
only resistance) and civilians fleeing.

This depends on the geography. Not many Iraqi civilians were in
the kill boxes I specified above.

[...]
I doubt that that is true, assuming a competent comms network.

Landline telephone need landlines and exchanges, easily targeted.
Cellular telephone needs masts and repeaters, ditto. Broadcast radio is
vulnerable to jamming, eavesdropping and spoofing (or simply "bomb the
emitter".

A comms infrastructure that is robust, secure, and prompt is not easy
even for the UK or US to guarantee, let alone a Third World nation under
attack by opponent(s) with air superiority.

We have two types of communications that have to happen successfully,
plus a decision loop.

The reports of the invasion have to make it back to the designated
authority over the missile firings. As stated earlier, it's very
hard to credit any scenario under which it takes even twelve hours
for a country to know the US has invaded.

Then the leader has to make up his mind to fire some or all of the
cruise missiles.

Then the word has to make it back out to the missile sites.

Even without good landlines, the word getting out to the missile
sites doesn't have to be any more sophisticated than an emergency
action message. A single code word, which shifts over time, may be
enough. To suggest that the US can reliably disrupt significant
two way communications is no leap. To suggest that we can reliably
prevent *any* communications, even a broadcast one way message
which can be very brief, is unrealistic.


-george william herbert

(George William Herbert) wrote:
Even without good landlines, the word getting out to the missile
sites doesn't have to be any more sophisticated than an emergency
action message. A single code word, which shifts over time, may be
enough.

Yes, you are correct, many of these things are *conceptually* simple.
But moving from concept to execution, even without the overkill
practiced by the West, contains many hidden and non-obvious snags.

For a 'simple EAM' to work, you need a system manned 24/7. If you
don't want to do that, you need a reliable way of 'pre-alerting' your
forces to stand-to. You need to securely create, distribute, and
store the code words. (And an alternate supply of the same in case of
compromise.) You need to procure, supply (spares), train, test, and
maintain the individual components as well as the whole system. (And
complicating the whole affair in many third tier nations are political
issues.)

It is doable, probably even on the cheap, but if you want a useful
system you cannot skimp on the details.

D.
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Derek Lyons wrote:
(George William Herbert) wrote:
Even without good landlines, the word getting out to the missile
sites doesn't have to be any more sophisticated than an emergency
action message. A single code word, which shifts over time, may be
enough.

Yes, you are correct, many of these things are *conceptually* simple.
But moving from concept to execution, even without the overkill
practiced by the West, contains many hidden and non-obvious snags.

For a 'simple EAM' to work, you need a system manned 24/7. If you
don't want to do that, you need a reliable way of 'pre-alerting' your
forces to stand-to. You need to securely create, distribute, and
store the code words. (And an alternate supply of the same in case of
compromise.) You need to procure, supply (spares), train, test, and
maintain the individual components as well as the whole system. (And
complicating the whole affair in many third tier nations are political
issues.)

It is doable, probably even on the cheap, but if you want a useful
system you cannot skimp on the details.

It's made a lot simpler by the operational environment;
an ICBM strike really could come out of the blue, but a divisional
strength US Army invasion is not going to suprise anyone.
The 24/7 requirement only applies to known crisies.

That said, you have to have the capability to operate on that
basis, with those fundamental system capabilities and reasonable
reliability. It doesn't need to be 100%, if you have tens of
thousands of cruise missiles... some firing late is not going
to be the sort of disaster that ICBM partial failures to launch
on warning or partial failures to launch in a pre-emptive first
strike would be.

Doing it on the cheap is probably doable. Doing it on the stupid
would leave it vulnerable to US breaking the command and control
system down.


-george william herbert

In message , George William Herbert
writes
Paul J. Adam wrote:
#1 sounds easy until the enemy starts deploying decoys and disguising
targets.

They have to deploy good-enough decoys forwards with the
advancing troops. Consider for a moment how hard it would
have been for the US to get significant quantities of good
decoys forwards of the Kuwaiti border by T+4 hrs.

As compared to deploying significant quantities of main battle tanks,
infantry fighting vehicles, and the _major_ logistics needed to support
them? If you can do that, adding decoys isn't that bad.

#2 still requires not only significant navigation, but some
noticeable amounts of real-time intelligence gathering and
communication.

A kill box from thirty kilometers north of the Iraqi border
with Kuwait, going twenty kilometers south of that border,
by T+4 hrs after the US Army breached the border, nine months
ago, would have worked quite well.

Hindsight is 20/20.

Again, are you assuming the enemy will be unresisted and your missiles
are the only defence?

Think back to Desert Sabre - if you'd launched your missiles at the
Kuwaiti border, you'd have inflicted casualties but completely missed
the main thrust.

The idea of "don't give the enemy easy DFs" is hardly new.

_Someone_ has to reliably determine whether the 'US tanks to our front!'
message is a feint, a hasty raid or the real invasion; work out where
those tanks will be by the time the missiles arrive: and reliably get a
message back to the launch unit. This has to be reasonably proof against
deception, EW, jamming, and blunt attack.

A massive invasion, and anything of regimental strength or more
is going to count, is hard to hide.

"US tanks overrunning our position, they're killing everyone, we can't
stop them!" is about all you'll get. Is that a raid on an outpost or the
main thrust smashing through your main line of resistance? (Given a
dependence on 'kill anything vehicle-like' missiles, do you even _have_
a MLR?) How long do you have to decide, given the time of flight of
these postulated missiles and how fast US forces can move when
unopposed? Killing some of their logistics will hurt, but having the
troops flying their flag over your palace be tired and hungry isn't much
of a victory.

The details of how far and
how fast the front line has moved may be more opaque, but any
serious attack has very real limitations on how fast it can
roll out.

True, but then missiles have flyout times too, and the further they are
from their target the longer that is.

One can easily posit kill box limits which are
very easy to justify and will suffer very little blue-on-blue
for the defender.

Equally, that will waste many munitions in fruitless combing of
target-devoid terrain.

And more to the point, will do far more
damage than any remaining defender forces in those boxes,
and the oncoming attack will presumably wipe those forces
out promptly.

The problem with this scenario is that it makes more conventional
resistance suicidal since the lethal drones will kill indiscriminately.
How do you intend to fix your foe for other arms to kill?

The timing and positioning of the box may require not targeting
your own FEBA of effective resistance, and not targeting the
leading invasion echelons. But that doesn't matter. It took
days for the US forces to finish crossing the border into Iraq.

The previous conflict was over in 96 hours, from first border breach to
ceasefire.

Kill boxes with the description I gave would have been valid
for much more time than is needed to set up and execute the
cruise missile attack starting.

They wouldn't be war-winners either.

More to the point, it rules out most resistance and makes life for
refugees short and nasty, since "general area of enemy forces" will
contain both own forces trying to fight (unless these missiles are your
only resistance) and civilians fleeing.

This depends on the geography. Not many Iraqi civilians were in
the kill boxes I specified above.

Not many countries are as blessed in their geography and politics as
Iraq was in OIF. Iraq was nowhere near as fortunate in Desert Sabre.

Landline telephone need landlines and exchanges, easily targeted.
Cellular telephone needs masts and repeaters, ditto. Broadcast radio is
vulnerable to jamming, eavesdropping and spoofing (or simply "bomb the
emitter".

A comms infrastructure that is robust, secure, and prompt is not easy
even for the UK or US to guarantee, let alone a Third World nation under
attack by opponent(s) with air superiority.

We have two types of communications that have to happen successfully,
plus a decision loop.

The reports of the invasion have to make it back to the designated
authority over the missile firings. As stated earlier, it's very
hard to credit any scenario under which it takes even twelve hours
for a country to know the US has invaded.

Sure. Now, _where_ have they invaded? Where's the focus of effort and
what's a diversion? "Enemy troops overrunning us!" is not a great guide
as to where the key point is, to say nothing of where it will be.

Desert Sabre is a good example. So is Overlord, with the Wehrmacht
dismissing Normandy as a diversion because Patton is going to lead a
huge army across the Dover Strait Really Soon Now.

And this is before feints are used to find out what gets broadcast on
what frequencies, and deception is used to put false messages out.

Can the US reliably, completely and reliably deny this link? No. Can it
make it too risky to stake the defence of the People's Republic on? Yes.

Then the leader has to make up his mind to fire some or all of the
cruise missiles.

Then the word has to make it back out to the missile sites.

Even without good landlines, the word getting out to the missile
sites doesn't have to be any more sophisticated than an emergency
action message. A single code word, which shifts over time, may be
enough.

Provided you have a clear and unambiguous target. If you don't, you need
_lots_ of codewords because you'll have a lot of "4th, 7th and 12th
Regiments, launch one unit of fire each at a 50 x 50km box centred on
Grid 123456; 1st, 2nd, 9th and 14th make ready one unit of fire, other
regiments disperse and camouflage" type codes. Which all need to be
promulgated and must not be compromised. Not impossible, but not immune
to espionage either.

To suggest that the US can reliably disrupt significant
two way communications is no leap. To suggest that we can reliably
prevent *any* communications, even a broadcast one way message
which can be very brief, is unrealistic.

True, but that suggests that there's no intelligence and no warning. And
the US doesn't have to completely block that link... just make it
unreliable in combat. The defenders need it to work perfectly: the more
doubt that can be injected as to the utility of the comms, the less use
this system is.

--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBoxatjrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk