asymetric warfare

(George William Herbert) wrote:

This is all pretty easy to jam, since the frequencies are
all known beforehand, but that general *approach* is very
hard to penetrate with traffic analysis.

note: This is more-or-less how the SSBN comm system works in fact.

It's hard to penetrate with traffic analysis, yes. However a station
transmitting 24/7 is a station that's easily located, and a station
that will eat a gross of ordinance at H hour + .01 second.

D.
--
The STS-107 Columbia Loss FAQ can be found
at the following URLs:

Text-Only Version:
http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq.html

Enhanced HTML Version:
http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq_x.html

Corrections, comments, and additions should be
e-mailed to , as well as posted to
sci.space.history and sci.space.shuttle for
discussion.

On Mon, 22 Dec 2003 08:45:07 GMT, (Derek
Lyons) wrote:

(George William Herbert) wrote:

This is all pretty easy to jam, since the frequencies are
all known beforehand, but that general *approach* is very
hard to penetrate with traffic analysis.

note: This is more-or-less how the SSBN comm system works in fact.

It's hard to penetrate with traffic analysis, yes. However a station
transmitting 24/7 is a station that's easily located, and a station
that will eat a gross of ordinance at H hour + .01 second.

So everyobody goes on red alert as soon as the primary station stops
broadcasting, and the targetting information has to be sent by the
second backup station.

To anticipate some objections, yes, if you get all the backup
stations, you will prevent the sending of the targeting information
(as well as any other sort of C&C activity).

pervect wrote:

:On Mon, 22 Dec 2003 08:45:07 GMT, (Derek
:Lyons) wrote:
:
(George William Herbert) wrote:
:
:This is all pretty easy to jam, since the frequencies are
:all known beforehand, but that general *approach* is very
:hard to penetrate with traffic analysis.
:
:note: This is more-or-less how the SSBN comm system works in fact.
:
:It's hard to penetrate with traffic analysis, yes. However a station
:transmitting 24/7 is a station that's easily located, and a station
:that will eat a gross of ordinance at H hour + .01 second.
:
:So everyobody goes on red alert as soon as the primary station stops
:broadcasting, and the targetting information has to be sent by the
:second backup station.

Then we're back to traffic analysis. If they stay up, they get
killed. If they don't stay up, coming up tells you something is going
on. No way around that.

--
"We come into the world and take our chances.
Fate is just the weight of circumstances.
That's the way that Lady Luck dances.
Roll the bones...."
-- "Roll The Bones", Rush

On Mon, 22 Dec 2003 15:48:46 GMT, Fred J. McCall
wrote:

pervect wrote:

:On Mon, 22 Dec 2003 08:45:07 GMT, (Derek
:Lyons) wrote:
:
(George William Herbert) wrote:
:
:This is all pretty easy to jam, since the frequencies are
:all known beforehand, but that general *approach* is very
:hard to penetrate with traffic analysis.
:
:note: This is more-or-less how the SSBN comm system works in fact.
:
:It's hard to penetrate with traffic analysis, yes. However a station
:transmitting 24/7 is a station that's easily located, and a station
:that will eat a gross of ordinance at H hour + .01 second.
:
:So everyobody goes on red alert as soon as the primary station stops
:broadcasting, and the targetting information has to be sent by the
:second backup station.

Then we're back to traffic analysis. If they stay up, they get
killed. If they don't stay up, coming up tells you something is going
on. No way around that.

Actually there's something I forgot to mention - using similar spread
spectrum techniques as, for instance, GPS, it will in general be
fairly hard to tell that a high tech wide bandwidth low power
transmitter is "up" at all.

So even the 24 hour radiating link might not be terribly conspicuous
from an emissions point of view. And the backup links will be even
less conspicuous.

OTOH I would guess that good (high altitude with good field of view)
locations for antenna systems will be bombed as a matter of principle,
including anything that even looks like an antenna farm.

In any event, one of the first profitable investments for Elbonia
might be a modern C&C infrastructure that will be hard to monitor,
spoof, or take down.

pervect wrote:

:Actually there's something I forgot to mention - using similar spread
:spectrum techniques as, for instance, GPS, it will in general be
:fairly hard to tell that a high tech wide bandwidth low power
:transmitter is "up" at all.

So we've established the following so far in this discussion:

1) Tanks can't kill anything, since it can dodge.

2) ECM doesn't work.

There was another equally silly one, but I forget what it was. No
matter.

Even trolls should know more about their subject than we're seeing
demonstrated here.

--
"Nekubi o kaite was ikenai"
["It does not do to slit the throat of a sleeping man."]
-- Admiral Yamamoto

On Tue, 23 Dec 2003 05:29:52 GMT, Fred J. McCall
wrote:

pervect wrote:

:Actually there's something I forgot to mention - using similar spread
:spectrum techniques as, for instance, GPS, it will in general be
:fairly hard to tell that a high tech wide bandwidth low power
:transmitter is "up" at all.

So we've established the following so far in this discussion:

1) Tanks can't kill anything, since it can dodge.

2) ECM doesn't work.

There was another equally silly one, but I forget what it was. No
matter.

Even trolls should know more about their subject than we're seeing
demonstrated here.

If you think tanks can't kill anything, you might want to explain how
you came to that conclusion, it isn't very apparent to me.

For extra credit, you might try explaining how the issue of whether or
not "tanks can kill anything" has anything to do with what I actually
said about the difficulty of detecting spread spectrum signals.

pervect wrote:

:On Tue, 23 Dec 2003 05:29:52 GMT, Fred J. McCall
wrote:
:
:pervect wrote:
:
::Actually there's something I forgot to mention - using similar spread
::spectrum techniques as, for instance, GPS, it will in general be
::fairly hard to tell that a high tech wide bandwidth low power
::transmitter is "up" at all.
:
:So we've established the following so far in this discussion:
:
:1) Tanks can't kill anything, since it can dodge.
:
:2) ECM doesn't work.
:
:There was another equally silly one, but I forget what it was. No
:matter.
:
:Even trolls should know more about their subject than we're seeing
:demonstrated here.
:
:If you think tanks can't kill anything, you might want to explain how
:you came to that conclusion, it isn't very apparent to me.

Oh, *I* don't think that. However, 'your' side has made the argument
that tank-killing SUVs are practically because tanks can't hit them,
as "all they have to do is dodge by half their vehicle width".

:For extra credit, you might try explaining how the issue of whether or
:not "tanks can kill anything" has anything to do with what I actually
:said about the difficulty of detecting spread spectrum signals.

It doesn't. It's merely another silly contention coming from 'your'
side of the argument. Yours is "ECM can't work".

--
"Millions for defense, but not one cent for tribute."
-- Charles Pinckney

In article ,
Fred J. McCall wrote:

1) Tanks can't kill anything, since it can dodge.

2) ECM doesn't work.

There was another equally silly one, but I forget what it was. No
matter.

3) Everything can be (easily) done in software.

-dms

pervect wrote in
news
In any event, one of the first profitable investments for Elbonia
might be a modern C&C infrastructure that will be hard to monitor,
spoof, or take down.

All this talk about communications misses the point somewhat. The
Americans open most of their imperial conquests by dropping a GBU-28 into
the victim country's central command bunker. Robust communications aren't
all that much use when there's no one left to give the orders.

The goal for Elbonia should not be robust communications alone but rather
to develop a heavily distributed command system that isn't particularly
vulnerable to the kind of golden-BB decapitation strikes that the Americans
have perfected. This is, however, only going to be possible for values of
'Elbonia' along the lines of India, China or the EU.

--
Coridon Henshaw - http://www3.telus.net/csbh - "I have sadly come to the
conclusion that the Bush administration will go to any lengths to deny
reality." -- Charley Reese

pervect wrote:

On Mon, 22 Dec 2003 08:45:07 GMT, (Derek
Lyons) wrote:

(George William Herbert) wrote:

This is all pretty easy to jam, since the frequencies are
all known beforehand, but that general *approach* is very
hard to penetrate with traffic analysis.

note: This is more-or-less how the SSBN comm system works in fact.

It's hard to penetrate with traffic analysis, yes. However a station
transmitting 24/7 is a station that's easily located, and a station
that will eat a gross of ordinance at H hour + .01 second.

So everyobody goes on red alert as soon as the primary station stops
broadcasting, and the targetting information has to be sent by the
second backup station.

And then the secondary system gets targeted PDQ...

To anticipate some objections, yes, if you get all the backup
stations, you will prevent the sending of the targeting information
(as well as any other sort of C&C activity).

You and Phil, and to a lesser extent George, who should know better,
don't seem to realize that killing the enemy C&C is how the US fights
wars today. The days of grinding towards the Capital worrying only
about the front line and hoping a golden bullet takes out the Leader
are dead and gone. This is 2003 not 1943.

D.
--
The STS-107 Columbia Loss FAQ can be found
at the following URLs:

Text-Only Version:
http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq.html

Enhanced HTML Version:
http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq_x.html

Corrections, comments, and additions should be
e-mailed to , as well as posted to
sci.space.history and sci.space.shuttle for
discussion.