asymetric warfare

ess (phil hunt) wrote:

:I've argued elsewhere[1] that middle-income countries should
:consider using a wireless internet mesh as the foundation for their
civilian) information infrastructure. Why not allow the military
:system to piggyback off that? (as a backup: the civilian
:system might be down in an area, and there should be a separate
:military system as well). Now a proper wireless internet
:infrastructure would mean every apartment building, workplace,
:school, hospital, etc being connected. It would be quite difficult,
:both militarily and politically, to shut down such a widespread
:network.

Dirt simple to shut down. You have looked at the various wireless
internet technologies and how easy they are to jam out, degrade, etc,
haven't you? Not to mention all the spoofing that would become
possible (WEP isn't).

--
"Millions for defense, but not one cent for tribute."
-- Charles Pinckney

On Mon, 29 Dec 2003 02:03:52 GMT, Fred J. McCall wrote:
(phil hunt) wrote:

:I've argued elsewhere[1] that middle-income countries should
:consider using a wireless internet mesh as the foundation for their
civilian) information infrastructure. Why not allow the military
:system to piggyback off that? (as a backup: the civilian
:system might be down in an area, and there should be a separate
:military system as well). Now a proper wireless internet
:infrastructure would mean every apartment building, workplace,
:school, hospital, etc being connected. It would be quite difficult,
:both militarily and politically, to shut down such a widespread
:network.

Dirt simple to shut down. You have looked at the various wireless
internet technologies and how easy they are to jam out, degrade, etc,
haven't you?

Are all of them easy to degrade? Even spread spectrum or frequency
hopping ones?

Not to mention all the spoofing that would become
possible (WEP isn't).

Indeed. However wireless internet doesn't necessarily involve WEP.

--
"It's easier to find people online who openly support the KKK than
people who openly support the RIAA" -- comment on Wikipedia
(Email: , but first subtract 275 and reverse
the last two letters).

In article ,
ess (phil hunt) wrote:

Are all of them easy to degrade? Even spread spectrum or frequency
hopping ones?

You should remember that "spread spectrum" is not synonymous with
"unjammable" or "undetectable." As far as that goes, some wideband
jamming techniques can be very effective against normal spread spectrum
communications. There are some major limitations that come with spread
spectrum, mostly having to do with power versus range versus noise.

Frequency hopping is pretty good for keeping people from hearing what
you're saying, but once you know the general band they're working on,
you can either jam them with suitable wideband frequencies, jump on
their frequencies before the receiver can lock on ("fast" jamming) or a
number of other moves.

You can defeat these ECM moves, but the counter-countermeasures cost a
*lot* more money than the countermeasures. And, once again, you're
getting into a technical war with a country that spends a *lot* of money
on that sort of thing.

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

On Mon, 29 Dec 2003 06:26:53 GMT, Chad Irby wrote:

In article ,
ess (phil hunt) wrote:

Are all of them easy to degrade? Even spread spectrum or frequency
hopping ones?

You should remember that "spread spectrum" is not synonymous with
"unjammable" or "undetectable." As far as that goes, some wideband
jamming techniques can be very effective against normal spread spectrum
communications. There are some major limitations that come with spread
spectrum, mostly having to do with power versus range versus noise.

Frequency hopping is pretty good for keeping people from hearing what
you're saying, but once you know the general band they're working on,
you can either jam them with suitable wideband frequencies, jump on
their frequencies before the receiver can lock on ("fast" jamming) or a
number of other moves.

You can defeat these ECM moves, but the counter-countermeasures cost a
*lot* more money than the countermeasures. And, once again, you're
getting into a technical war with a country that spends a *lot* of money
on that sort of thing.

A quick perusal of some webpages on the 802.11 wireless spec suggest
that the direct sequence spread spectrum is probably the more secure
of the two possibilities (frequency hopping is the other possibility).

However, the fairly modest processing gains - only about 10db or so
according to:

http://www.wireless-nets.com/article...per_spread.htm

and the relatively modest and specific bandwidth allocations

902-928 MHz
2.4-2.4835 GHz
5.725-5.850 GHz

suggest to me that digital internet systems based on the 802.11 spec
will probably be relatively easy to jam or detect, especially if the
receivers and transmitters are using low-gain antennas ("isotropic").

It also seems to me that the need for routing signals through multiple
"hops" is going to

1) be vulnerable if any intermediate system is compromised
2) require routing information to be propagated through the internet
which will identify active sites.

There are some other interesting questions, like what the procedure
for adding a node to this internet system is.

Chad Irby wrote in message ...
In article ,
ess (phil hunt) wrote:

Are all of them easy to degrade? Even spread spectrum or frequency
hopping ones?

You should remember that "spread spectrum" is not synonymous with
"unjammable" or "undetectable." As far as that goes, some wideband
jamming techniques can be very effective against normal spread spectrum
communications. There are some major limitations that come with spread
spectrum, mostly having to do with power versus range versus noise.

Frequency hopping is pretty good for keeping people from hearing what
you're saying, but once you know the general band they're working on,
you can either jam them with suitable wideband frequencies, jump on
their frequencies before the receiver can lock on ("fast" jamming) or a
number of other moves.

You can defeat these ECM moves, but the counter-countermeasures cost a
*lot* more money than the countermeasures. And, once again, you're
getting into a technical war with a country that spends a *lot* of money
on that sort of thing.

It doesn't matter what the US spends a lot of money on.
Since what the the idiots don't spend a lot of money is
attenna design.

An except for the paperwork, the FBI's counter-countermeasures
are in the same boat as the CIA's Blackbirds, and the
NSA's typewriter museam:

And as dead as the idiot green grass, and Baltimore Orieole
moron fans they're made out of.


That's simply follows from the fact that the
antenna's they designed for RADAR are like
most US Army Radar antenna's. They were designed
by clerks, for jerks, for the soon to be
repaved California desert.

(ZZBunker) wrote:

It doesn't matter what the US spends a lot of money on.
Since what the the idiots don't spend a lot of money is
attenna design.

Antenna design is the *cornerstone* of ECM, and ignoring antenna design
in ECM is like ignoring wheels on a car.

(Rest of silly rant deleted to save a little of your potential dignity
for future use)

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

(ZZBunker) wrote in message om...
Chad Irby wrote in message ...
In article ,
ess (phil hunt) wrote:

Are all of them easy to degrade? Even spread spectrum or frequency
hopping ones?

You should remember that "spread spectrum" is not synonymous with
"unjammable" or "undetectable." As far as that goes, some wideband
jamming techniques can be very effective against normal spread spectrum
communications. There are some major limitations that come with spread
spectrum, mostly having to do with power versus range versus noise.

Frequency hopping is pretty good for keeping people from hearing what
you're saying, but once you know the general band they're working on,
you can either jam them with suitable wideband frequencies, jump on
their frequencies before the receiver can lock on ("fast" jamming) or a
number of other moves.

You can defeat these ECM moves, but the counter-countermeasures cost a
*lot* more money than the countermeasures. And, once again, you're
getting into a technical war with a country that spends a *lot* of money
on that sort of thing.

It doesn't matter what the US spends a lot of money on.
Since what the the idiots don't spend a lot of money is
attenna design.

Who are the idiots? I know a lot of multipath antenna companies and
the contracts for NSA and the services just provide spill over five
years later for the remnants. And the antenna designers are often
'foreigners'.

An except for the paperwork, the FBI's counter-countermeasures
are in the same boat as the CIA's Blackbirds, and the
NSA's typewriter museam:

And as dead as the idiot green grass, and Baltimore Orieole
moron fans they're made out of.

**** toku deska?

That's simply follows from the fact that the
antenna's they designed for RADAR are like
most US Army Radar antenna's. They were designed
by clerks, for jerks, for the soon to be
repaved California desert.

See above. The U.S. uses real ees to design their antennas, some
design six before breakfast just to keep the pencil moving. You aren't
trying to receive with a transmit antenna are you? And you should see
a doctor, you either are very sick or very hip.

ess (phil hunt) wrote:

:On Mon, 29 Dec 2003 02:03:52 GMT, Fred J. McCall wrote:
(phil hunt) wrote:
:
::I've argued elsewhere[1] that middle-income countries should
::consider using a wireless internet mesh as the foundation for their
:civilian) information infrastructure. Why not allow the military
::system to piggyback off that? (as a backup: the civilian
::system might be down in an area, and there should be a separate
::military system as well). Now a proper wireless internet
::infrastructure would mean every apartment building, workplace,
::school, hospital, etc being connected. It would be quite difficult,
::both militarily and politically, to shut down such a widespread
::network.
:
:Dirt simple to shut down. You have looked at the various wireless
:internet technologies and how easy they are to jam out, degrade, etc,
:haven't you?
:
:Are all of them easy to degrade? Even spread spectrum or frequency
:hopping ones?

Of course.

: Not to mention all the spoofing that would become
:possible (WEP isn't).
:
:Indeed. However wireless internet doesn't necessarily involve WEP.

And so it is even easier to spoof.

I'm curious. Why do you think WE don't do the things you suggest, if
they are so much more effective?

*I* think we don't do them because 'magic' is required for them to
work and in the real world there's damned little usable magic about.

--
"Millions for defense, but not one cent for tribute."
-- Charles Pinckney