Best dogfight gun?

In message , Kevin Brooks
writes
"Paul J. Adam" wrote in message
...
Teaball's info was radioed to a relay aircraft, codenamed Luzon (usually
a KC-135), but the radios on Luzon were flaky and prone to interference
and _that_ was the reliability problem.

Also, there was a complex structure of "who controlled what units when"
which varied by mission and depended on "whose radios were working": Red
Crown, Disco, College Eye and Teaball all could be in charge at
different times in a mission.

Sometimes it seems a miracle any of the pilots involved survived.

Based upon a quick perusal, it appears what you are presenting is true, but
not the "whole truth", so to speak. The EC-121's apparently were indeed
performing at least some of the same kind work in support of the
inbound/outbound fighters--FAS mentions that the EC's of the 193rd TEWS
(PaANG) apparently did also have some interception gear onboard, and another
source indicates linguists were indeed included in the crew loads when the
EC's were operating over SEA.

Quoting Michel directly,

"There was considerable SIGINT and other information about the MiGs
available from a variety of sources, but this information was jealously
guarded by the American agencies that collected it: just because
American aircrews were being shot down for lack of this information they
saw no reason to release it."

Teaball was established at Nakhom Phanom in late July 1972 to
co-ordinate the reception, analysis and dissemination of that
information. Direct dissemination just didn't seem to happen, at least
according to Michel.

--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBoxatjrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

"Paul J. Adam" wrote in message
...
In message , Kevin Brooks
writes
"Paul J. Adam" wrote in message
...
Teaball's info was radioed to a relay aircraft, codenamed Luzon
(usually
a KC-135), but the radios on Luzon were flaky and prone to interference
and _that_ was the reliability problem.

Also, there was a complex structure of "who controlled what units when"
which varied by mission and depended on "whose radios were working":
Red
Crown, Disco, College Eye and Teaball all could be in charge at
different times in a mission.

Sometimes it seems a miracle any of the pilots involved survived.

Based upon a quick perusal, it appears what you are presenting is true,
but
not the "whole truth", so to speak. The EC-121's apparently were indeed
performing at least some of the same kind work in support of the
inbound/outbound fighters--FAS mentions that the EC's of the 193rd TEWS
(PaANG) apparently did also have some interception gear onboard, and
another
source indicates linguists were indeed included in the crew loads when
the
EC's were operating over SEA.

Quoting Michel directly,

"There was considerable SIGINT and other information about the MiGs
available from a variety of sources, but this information was jealously
guarded by the American agencies that collected it: just because
American aircrews were being shot down for lack of this information they
saw no reason to release it."

Teaball was established at Nakhom Phanom in late July 1972 to
co-ordinate the reception, analysis and dissemination of that
information. Direct dissemination just didn't seem to happen, at least
according to Michel.

OK, I was apparently confusing the situation with Red Crown. You might find
an article by a USAF intel/EWO type of interest; it indicates Red Crown was
getting its info from EA-3B's and EC-121M's, and then forwarding that info
to the strike packages (though their info may have been only available to
the USN packages). Red Crown was also apparently exchanging info with
Teaball, but did not require Teaball to originate warnings/directions. I am
wondering how accurate the assertion that Teaball info had to come from
Teabll via that relay RC-135 was, since that source also indicates Teaball
was exchanging info with USAF AWACS EC-121's--we know that these early
generation AWACS did also directly control intercepts that resulted in Migs
being downed (first occured in July '67).

Brooks

http://www.dodccrp.org/6thICCRTS/Cd/...k7/012_tr7.pdf

Brooks


--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBoxatjrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

In message , Kevin Brooks
writes
"Paul J. Adam" wrote in message
...
Quoting Michel directly,

OK, I was apparently confusing the situation with Red Crown.

Hey, Michel is good but not perfect. I daresay he's close to the facts,
but I would never claim that Teaball was the one and only SIGINT
distributor - I've read a book, others were _there_. I'm quoting a
participant's book, not Holy Writ.

(Hopefully Ed will offer experience or Guy study, they're the SMEs here)

You might find
an article by a USAF intel/EWO type of interest; it indicates Red Crown was
getting its info from EA-3B's and EC-121M's, and then forwarding that info
to the strike packages (though their info may have been only available to
the USN packages).

I did indeed find it of interest - thanks.

Red Crown was also apparently exchanging info with
Teaball, but did not require Teaball to originate warnings/directions. I am
wondering how accurate the assertion that Teaball info had to come from
Teabll via that relay RC-135 was, since that source also indicates Teaball
was exchanging info with USAF AWACS EC-121's--we know that these early
generation AWACS did also directly control intercepts that resulted in Migs
being downed (first occured in July '67).

I think there was then a significant difference between "AEW or picket
ships controlling intercepts" and "compromising the unbelievable
possibility that the US could both monitor radio frequencies and find
someone who could interpret Vietnamese".

From a very distant perspective, SIGINT folks seem to get jumpy about
their results being used tactically, sometimes with good reason: if
you've got a reliable way to eavesdrop on the enemy and you believe it's
of significant strategic value, is it worth compromising it for a
short-term tactical advantage? Sometimes this approach is justified:
perhaps other times it may be reflex rather than reason.



--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBoxatjrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

"Paul J. Adam" wrote in message
...
In message , Kevin Brooks
writes
"Paul J. Adam" wrote in message
...
Quoting Michel directly,

OK, I was apparently confusing the situation with Red Crown.

Hey, Michel is good but not perfect. I daresay he's close to the facts,
but I would never claim that Teaball was the one and only SIGINT
distributor - I've read a book, others were _there_. I'm quoting a
participant's book, not Holy Writ.

(Hopefully Ed will offer experience or Guy study, they're the SMEs here)

You might find
an article by a USAF intel/EWO type of interest; it indicates Red Crown
was
getting its info from EA-3B's and EC-121M's, and then forwarding that
info
to the strike packages (though their info may have been only available to
the USN packages).

I did indeed find it of interest - thanks.

Red Crown was also apparently exchanging info with
Teaball, but did not require Teaball to originate warnings/directions. I
am
wondering how accurate the assertion that Teaball info had to come from
Teabll via that relay RC-135 was, since that source also indicates
Teaball
was exchanging info with USAF AWACS EC-121's--we know that these early
generation AWACS did also directly control intercepts that resulted in
Migs
being downed (first occured in July '67).

I think there was then a significant difference between "AEW or picket
ships controlling intercepts" and "compromising the unbelievable
possibility that the US could both monitor radio frequencies and find
someone who could interpret Vietnamese".

From a very distant perspective, SIGINT folks seem to get jumpy about
their results being used tactically, sometimes with good reason: if
you've got a reliable way to eavesdrop on the enemy and you believe it's
of significant strategic value, is it worth compromising it for a
short-term tactical advantage? Sometimes this approach is justified:
perhaps other times it may be reflex rather than reason.

My reasoning was more in the line of Teaball very possibly cuing the EC-121
(which was indeed operating as a primitive AWACS, since they were not only
observing with their radar but also directing the fighters) to likely
threats before they popped into the EC's range.

Brooks




--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBoxatjrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

"Paul J. Adam" wrote in message ...
From a very distant perspective, SIGINT folks seem to get jumpy about
their results being used tactically, sometimes with good reason: if
you've got a reliable way to eavesdrop on the enemy and you believe it's
of significant strategic value, is it worth compromising it for a
short-term tactical advantage? Sometimes this approach is justified:
perhaps other times it may be reflex rather than reason.


Intriguinly, the USAF seemed to have much less trouble utilizing this
sort of information during the Korean war then during the Vietnam war.
Wonder what the difference was?

from: http://www.nsa.gov/korea/papers/sigi...korean_war.htm

"Air Force Support
The Air Force Security Service continued support to the air during the
period of stalemate. The AFSS also adopted a number of innovations to
provide new kinds of support for the air war.

A good example of AFSS support occurred in June 1951. Analysts at an
Air Force intercept site were able to accurately predict a North
Korean bombing raid on UN-held islands. This intelligence enabled the
commanding general of the U.S. 5th Air Force to ensure that the raid
was met with ample defense. one YAK and two IL-10 bombers were downed,
several others were damaged, and two MiG fighters were also damaged.
It is believed that the commander of the 5th Air Force may have been
aware of the impending raid before the commander of the North Korean
attacking unit had received his orders.

In late April 1951, AFSS personnel intercepted messages that indicated
aircraft of the 4th Fighter Squadron were being boxed by Soviet
aircraft. The quick relay of this information to the flight enabled it
to avoid the trap. This kind of warning continued through the war.

Soviet Bloc Air defense doctrine called for control of local fighter
pilots by their tower. These ground control intercept (GCI)
communications were vulnerable to eavesdroppers.

At various periods during the air campaign, COMINT units from the AFSS
were intercepting North Korean, Chinese, or Soviet instructions to
their pilots. These were disguised as "radar plots" and forwarded in
near-real time to U.S. pilots operating over North Korean territory.
When this source was exploited, the U.S. "kill ratio" over MiGs was
quite high; during periods of nonexploitation, the ratio was much
lower.

Monitoring of North Korean, Chinese, and Soviet air communications was
done from listening posts in South Korea, but there were hearability
problems for certain areas at different times of the day. To solve
these problems, in mid-1951 the AFSS established an intercept site on
Paengyong-do - commonly known as "P-Y-do" by Americans - a UN-held
island close to the west coast of North Korea. Since this was close to
enemy territory, the security regulations had to be relaxed, and 5th
Air Force had to provide special evacuation service. Eventually the
Americans abandoned their effort on the island.

Once this activity on P-Y-do proved successful, in the spring of 1952
a similar operation was undertaken on Cho-do, a UN-held island off the
east coast of Korea, near Wonson. Lieutenant Delmar Lang organized
teams of linguists and personnel from the Tactical Air Control Center
to provide near-real-time information to pilots operating over North
Korea. Del Lang, by the way, used this operation as a model for
similar activity during the Vietnam War.

Security Service also conducted airborne collection operations. In
addition to support of the war effort, these flights were useful in
testing intercept equipment and general concepts of operations."

Chris Manteuffel