Why is Stealth So Important?

On 09 Jan 2004 23:57:52 GMT, (Denyav) wrote:

ROTFL! Oh really, and what pray tell is your practical insight to draw that
conclusion, compared to that of a combat vet who has a wardrobe full of
'dont that' T Shirts.

Combat vets should try to do what they supposed to do best, we are not going to
re-fight Vietnam war or any war in the past,if f16 or f22 were available during
Vietnam war,it would be magnificent,but it was 30 years ago and science and
technology did not stop in 70s.

Your comment that was refuted was that Boyd & Co. and Stealth were two
concepts gleaned from Vietnam that were proven erroneous or invalid.

Boyd's work on energy maneuverability and three dimensional maneuver
is still the basis for 1-v-1 BFM and led to the development of
supporting element maneuver in multi-plane engagement. Without Boyd,
we'd still have Eagles, Vipers and Raptors running around in fighting
wing.

Stealth, and the idea of denying the defenses accurate az/el/range
data through a variety of technologies is going to be a foundation for
aircraft (and defense) designs for a long time to come.

As for what "combat vets should try to do", please acknowledge that
like all professions, military aviators are not one-dimensional
humans. We do a lot of things in a life time, and don't simply
disappear into the attic when the war is over.

As for the relevance of the lessons of Vietnam to F-16, F-22 or SU-37,
let me point you to Santyana---"those who will not learn the lessons
of history are condemned to repeat them."

Lots of science and technology, but it is directed by the experiences
gathered along the way.

You gotta problem wid dat?


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

Your comment that was refuted was that Boyd & Co. and Stealth were two
concepts gleaned from Vietnam that were proven erroneous or invalid.

Boyd's work on energy maneuverability and three

imensional maneuver
is still the basis for 1-v-1 BFM and led to the development of
supporting element maneuver in multi-plane engagement. Without Boyd,
we'd still have Eagles, Vipers and Raptors running around in fighting
wing.

Everything you said is correct and explains why the ideas of Boyd&Co were
"fundamentally" wrong.
They developed tactics for a world without situational and global awaraness
tools and designed warplanes to excel under such circumstances.
Lets put that way, during Vietnam war US had only rudimentary situational
awareness tools no global awareness tool at all.
Boyd&Co identified wrong problem and tried to solve wrong problem with a step
in the wrong direction,the real reason for not so perfect performance of US
aircraft in Vietnam was not their inability to perform high energy maneuvers or
missing cannons,it was unavailability of situational and global awareness tools
that we have today.
So,it would be much better if Boyd and others should have asked a couple of
questions to themselves before developing their concepts:
a)How it would be if US had total situational awareness in Vietnam?
b)Whats if such tools brcome available in next 10-15 years?
Unfortunately they developed their concepts without answering such questions
and also without fully understanding the direction of technological
development,so we have now full situational and global awareness but also 100 M
$ fighters that are not only capable of destroying MIG17s in dogfights also
capable of doing jack knife type fighting with Red Barons Fokker.
But thanks to such wonderful capabilities that they never ever need under full
situational awareness conditions,their ranges will never meet the criterias.

Stealth, and the idea of denying the defenses accurate az/el/range
data through a variety of technologies is going to be a foundation for
aircraft (and defense) designs for a long time to come.

Thats even worse than Boyds ideas,"passive" stealth was already obsolete in
70s,(Might stay as a foundation for aircraft designs for a long time to come
though,specially if your adversaries are backward third world countries like
Panama,Iraq,Iran,NK,Somalia,Zambia etc)

As for what "combat vets should try to do", please acknowledge that
like all professions, military aviators are not one-dimensional
humans. We do a lot of things in a life time, and don't simply
disappear into the attic when the war is over.

I hope so,but Let me repeat the Battleship example,after Mitchell demonstration
it was obvious the the era of Battleships was over but Admirals all over the
world continued to order bigger better ,more capable and of course more
expensive Battleships (their showboats) till they learn the truth hard way
during WWII,
I am pretty sure,without WWII we,and probably everbody else, would still be
building bigger and better battleships.As for the relevance of the lessons of
Vietnam to F-16, F-22 or SU-37,
let me point you to Santyana---"those who will not learn the lessons
of history are condemned to repeat them."


Thats true but only if learn correct lessons.

Lots of science and technology, but it is directed by the experiences
gathered along the way.

You gotta problem wid dat?

Historically wars,unfortunately,were one of the driving forces behind the
scientific&technological development but calling Boyds ideas and passive
stealth a development would be strecth

Boyd&Co identified wrong problem and tried to solve wrong problem with a step
in the wrong direction,

Would you share with us your combat flight experience?

all the best -- Dan Ford
email:

see the Warbird's Forum at www.warbirdforum.com
and the Piper Cub Forum at www.pipercubforum.com

On 12 Jan 2004 05:58:35 GMT, (Denyav) wrote:

When I said:
Your comment that was refuted was that Boyd & Co. and Stealth were two
concepts gleaned from Vietnam that were proven erroneous or invalid.

Boyd's work on energy maneuverability and three

imensional maneuver
is still the basis for 1-v-1 BFM and led to the development of
supporting element maneuver in multi-plane engagement. Without Boyd,
we'd still have Eagles, Vipers and Raptors running around in fighting
wing.

Denyav responded:
Everything you said is correct and explains why the ideas of Boyd&Co were
"fundamentally" wrong.
They developed tactics for a world without situational and global awaraness
tools and designed warplanes to excel under such circumstances.

You garble apples and oranges here. While situational awareness is
critical, it's not the same issue as developing the principles of
three dimensional maneuver between two aircraft. The analytical tools
of P-sub-s diagramming to compare aircraft and optimize your own
performance are important and whether or not you possess total SA
still going to apply.

Lets put that way, during Vietnam war US had only rudimentary situational
awareness tools no global awareness tool at all.

And, we still don't have total SA. AWACS and data-fusion/sharing are
great advances, but the "fog of war" will remain. We did have Disco,
Red Crown, T-Ball and Combat Tree as well as our own sensors and nav
gear, but a lot of SA was a personally learned and honed skill.

Boyd&Co identified wrong problem and tried to solve wrong problem with a step
in the wrong direction,the real reason for not so perfect performance of US
aircraft in Vietnam was not their inability to perform high energy maneuvers or
missing cannons,it was unavailability of situational and global awareness tools
that we have today.

You really should read a bit more history. While F-4s without guns got
a lot of notice, there were a lot more gun-equipped aircraft than
non-gun. The failures didn't relate to lack of SA as much as to
political gradualism and lack of will to win.

So,it would be much better if Boyd and others should have asked a couple of
questions to themselves before developing their concepts:
a)How it would be if US had total situational awareness in Vietnam?

The answer is easy. It would be great. But, if you are running the war
for political purposes and trying to avoid major power nuclear
confrontation, it doesn't matter what your SA is.

b)Whats if such tools brcome available in next 10-15 years?

What if? What if we had AWACS? Not much difference. What if we had
PGMs? Ahhh, that might have made a difference. What if we had
stand-off weaponry? Ahhh, that would be good to.


Stealth, and the idea of denying the defenses accurate az/el/range
data through a variety of technologies is going to be a foundation for
aircraft (and defense) designs for a long time to come.

Thats even worse than Boyds ideas,"passive" stealth was already obsolete in
70s,(Might stay as a foundation for aircraft designs for a long time to come
though,specially if your adversaries are backward third world countries like
Panama,Iraq,Iran,NK,Somalia,Zambia etc)

I did not distinguish active or passive stealth, but simply refuted
your contention that stealth is a failure. Loss rates for stealth
aircraft are statistically zero and target success rates are very
close to 100%. It makes little difference whether the opposition is
first or third world.

As for what "combat vets should try to do", please acknowledge that
like all professions, military aviators are not one-dimensional
humans. We do a lot of things in a life time, and don't simply
disappear into the attic when the war is over.

I hope so,but Let me repeat the Battleship example,after Mitchell demonstration
it was obvious the the era of Battleships was over but Admirals all over the
world continued to order bigger better ,more capable and of course more
expensive Battleships (their showboats) till they learn the truth hard way
during WWII,

You might want to look into the Treaty of Washington 1922 to see the
status of battleship construction world wide. Mitchell's demontration
a couple of years later was relevant to aircraft vs ships and had
little to with battleships specifically.

You might apply your same incorrect logic substituting carrier for
battleship to see the error. Then check Battle of Midway.



Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

You garble apples and oranges here. While situational awareness is
critical, it's not the same issue as developing the principles of
three dimensional maneuver between two aircraft. The analytical tools
of P-sub-s diagramming to compare aircraft and optimize your own
performance are important and whether or not you possess total SA

I think you are contradicting yourself here,you gave an excellent answer to
another poster and explained how things are done in the era of full situational
awareness,as you correctly implied there is no need to acquire target with your
Mk.I eyeballs,you dont even need to acquire target with your own
sensors,somebody else could do it for you,what you need is only to fire your
missiles.
Do you need high energy manouvers or jack knife type fights for that?
If we had current SA tools in 60s,the Missilleer project would be a great
success.

And, we still don't have total SA. AWACS and data-fusion/sharing are
great advances, but the "fog of war" will remain. We did have Disco,
Red Crown, T-Ball and Combat Tree as well as our own sensors and nav

Fog of war will always be part of the business.
Let me give a simple example,
Is there any guarantee that your family will start every time when you turn the
ignition key? No
But no auto manufacturer nowadays offers cranking handle type starting option
in their cars.

You really should read a bit more history. While F-4s without guns got
a lot of notice, there were a lot more gun-equipped aircraft than
non-gun. The failures didn't relate to lack of SA as much as to
political gradualism and lack of will to win.

Factors you mentioned were obviously the main factors at the national decision
making level,but less relevant at air-air combat level.

You really should read a bit more history. While F-4s without guns got
a lot of notice, there were a lot more gun-equipped aircraft than
non-gun. The failures didn't relate to lack of SA as much as to
political gradualism and lack of will to win.

The answer is easy. It would be great. But, if you are running the war
for political purposes and trying to avoid major power nuclear
confrontation, it doesn't matter what your SA is.

Unless you bombed production bases of NV,which were located inside USSR and
China,you would not risk a nuclear war.
Politically it does not matter much how you shoot down an enemy plane,with guns
or with BVR missiles.I did not distinguish active or passive stealth, but
simply refuted

your contention that stealth is a failure. Loss rates for stealth
aircraft are statistically zero and target success rates are very
close to 100%. It makes little difference whether the opposition is
first or third world.

Target success rate during DS I is more close to 1/10 th of what you are
quoting and during Balkan conflict more f117s damaged than convantionel
ones,even though f117s made up only small part of allied air fleet.
Regarding target success rate during whole Balkan war only 3 serbian air
defense radars were destroyed.
Even simple internetting of old serbian radars proved to be very effective
aganist stealth aircraft.
Did you ever wonder why US started destroying Chinese built Iraqi fiberoptic
network months before starting of Iraqi freedom using Special Forces and no fly
zone flights?
Chances of stealth aircraft aganist a sophisticated enemy using multistatics
and/or UKW radars?
Not any better than an old battleship without air cover.

On 12 Jan 2004 17:47:59 GMT, (Denyav) wrote:

You garble apples and oranges here. While situational awareness is
critical, it's not the same issue as developing the principles of
three dimensional maneuver between two aircraft. The analytical tools
of P-sub-s diagramming to compare aircraft and optimize your own
performance are important and whether or not you possess total SA

I think you are contradicting yourself here,you gave an excellent answer to
another poster and explained how things are done in the era of full situational
awareness,as you correctly implied there is no need to acquire target with your
Mk.I eyeballs,you dont even need to acquire target with your own
sensors,somebody else could do it for you,what you need is only to fire your
missiles.
Do you need high energy manouvers or jack knife type fights for that?
If we had current SA tools in 60s,the Missilleer project would be a great
success.

If I am going to enter the air/air arena, I need SA, but I'd better
also have a good understanding of three dimensional maneuver and the
relative performance envelope of both my own aircraft and my potential
adversary's. While the BVR war is the ideal, reality often has a way
of screwing up the perfect world and then you wind up turning and
burning.

And, we still don't have total SA. AWACS and data-fusion/sharing are
great advances, but the "fog of war" will remain. We did have Disco,
Red Crown, T-Ball and Combat Tree as well as our own sensors and nav

You really should read a bit more history. While F-4s without guns got
a lot of notice, there were a lot more gun-equipped aircraft than
non-gun. The failures didn't relate to lack of SA as much as to
political gradualism and lack of will to win.

Factors you mentioned were obviously the main factors at the national decision
making level,but less relevant at air-air combat level.

Air-to-air combat was a minor component of the Vietnam air war. There
was none, absolutely none in S. Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia and little
in the panhandle of NVN. There were only A/A engagements in Route
Package V and VI and from late '68 to spring of '72, we weren't going
there. In 250 combat missions, 150 of which were into N. Vietnam, I
encountered enemy aircraft only a half dozen times.

Given the alternative of better SA tools or better A/A training, I
would have chosen the training.

You really should read a bit more history. While F-4s without guns got
a lot of notice, there were a lot more gun-equipped aircraft than
non-gun. The failures didn't relate to lack of SA as much as to
political gradualism and lack of will to win.

The answer is easy. It would be great. But, if you are running the war
for political purposes and trying to avoid major power nuclear
confrontation, it doesn't matter what your SA is.

Unless you bombed production bases of NV,which were located inside USSR and
China,you would not risk a nuclear war.

You better get a few more books. There was serious concern over the
possibility of any conflict during those years escalating. The
political posture of both the US/NATO and the USSR/WP was that an
"attack on one is an attack on all" and the umbrella of coverage was
repeatedly asserted as covering client states as well.

Politically it does not matter much how you shoot down an enemy plane,with guns
or with BVR missiles.I did not distinguish active or passive stealth, but
simply refuted

your contention that stealth is a failure. Loss rates for stealth
aircraft are statistically zero and target success rates are very
close to 100%. It makes little difference whether the opposition is
first or third world.

Target success rate during DS I is more close to 1/10 th of what you are
quoting and during Balkan conflict more f117s damaged than convantionel
ones,even though f117s made up only small part of allied air fleet.

Really? My statement on losses and target service are referring to
stealth aircraft performance, not the total air effort. To date there
has been only 1 F-117 lost in combat. During DS and IF, there were no
stealth aircraft -117s or B-2s lost or damaged.

Regarding target success rate during whole Balkan war only 3 serbian air
defense radars were destroyed.

Really?

Even simple internetting of old serbian radars proved to be very effective
aganist stealth aircraft.

Networking, not "internetting", but Serbian air defense radars, if we
discount one clueless F-16 "scared rabbit", were ineffective even
against non-stealthy aircraft.



Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

There was serious concern over the
possibility of any conflict during those years escalating. The
political posture of both the US/NATO and the USSR/WP was that an
"attack on one is an attack on all" and the umbrella of coverage was
repeatedly asserted as covering

Only one time during cold war there was a real nuclear exchange danger and it
was during Andropovs' time,because no other USSR leader was coached by a top
product of western capitalismus.

Really? My statement on losses and target service are referring to
stealth aircraft performance, not the total air effort. To date there
has been only 1 F-117 lost in combat. During DS and IF, there were no
stealth aircraft -117s or B-2s lost or damaged.

So what?,only other US aircraft lost during Balkan conflict is a F16.
None of unstealty Eagles or Bombcats were lost,even tough they did the
heavylifting of Balkan air campaign.
If you want to learn why US did not lose any B2 during war,you must first know
why US did not lose any f14 or 15s.

Really?


Yes

Networking, not "internetting", but Serbian air defense radars, if we
discount one clueless F-16 "scared rabbit", were ineffective even
against non-stealthy aircraft.

But in order make them ineffective US had transfer almost every available ECM
asset to balkans,even from very far away places like Japan,and ECM fleet has to
be kept airborne three times longer than planned.
In Balkans every radar that allowed to emit without suppression was a big
danger for any plane,stealthy or not.

On 15 Jan 2004 21:18:34 GMT, (Denyav) wrote:

There was serious concern over the
possibility of any conflict during those years escalating. The
political posture of both the US/NATO and the USSR/WP was that an
"attack on one is an attack on all" and the umbrella of coverage was
repeatedly asserted as covering

Only one time during cold war there was a real nuclear exchange danger and it
was during Andropovs' time,because no other USSR leader was coached by a top
product of western capitalismus.

You certainly make yourself a "moving target"--you say something
outrageous, then when it is refuted you jink into some other
preposterous assertion.

Maybe there was a nuclear exchange danger during Andropov's
administration, but you overlook a lot of conflicts from 1946 onward.
Certainly the level of capability grew, but the perceived possibility
of nuclear war was present during the Berlin Crisis, the Korean War,
the Czech and Hungarian uprisings, the Cuban Missile crisis, etc. etc.
etc.

Really? My statement on losses and target service are referring to
stealth aircraft performance, not the total air effort. To date there
has been only 1 F-117 lost in combat. During DS and IF, there were no
stealth aircraft -117s or B-2s lost or damaged.

So what?,only other US aircraft lost during Balkan conflict is a F16.
None of unstealty Eagles or Bombcats were lost,even tough they did the
heavylifting of Balkan air campaign.
If you want to learn why US did not lose any B2 during war,you must first know
why US did not lose any f14 or 15s.

What you first said, when I asserted that Stealth (active or passive)
has resulted in low losses and high target success rates, was:

Target success rate during DS I is more close to 1/10 th of what you are
quoting and during Balkan conflict more f117s damaged than convantionel
ones,even though f117s made up only small part of allied air fleet.

Now, you come back with "so what" only one F-16, no F-15s, no F-14s,
no B-2s (none participated in the Balkans,) and, of course only one
F-117. The more effective air defense of Iraq had no success against
stealthy airplanes either.



Really?


Yes

Nice editing here. The "Really?" was a follow up to your assertion
he

Regarding target success rate during whole Balkan war only 3 serbian air
defense radars were destroyed.

Which of course, would lead the astute reader to question why, if the
US couldn't put out the radar eyes, they couldn't deter the attacking
aircraft? Either we did kill the radars effectively, thereby enhancing
survivability. Or, we didn't kill the radars and they continued to
operate incredibly incompetently. You've got to choose one horse or
the other to ride.

Networking, not "internetting", but Serbian air defense radars, if we
discount one clueless F-16 "scared rabbit", were ineffective even
against non-stealthy aircraft.

But in order make them ineffective US had transfer almost every available ECM
asset to balkans,even from very far away places like Japan,and ECM fleet has to
be kept airborne three times longer than planned.

I assume your reference to transfer from Japan is about EA-6 carrier
based aircraft. Pacific fleet is in the big ocean, Atlantic fleet is
in the little ocean and usually in the Med.

EF-111s have been retired. ECM, for the most part is self-contained,
carried by the tactical aircraft themselves. Stand-off jamming is
still a part of the equation, but less. SEAD is no longer done by
dedicated single-purpose assets either. Stealth helps considerably
here.

In Balkans every radar that allowed to emit without suppression was a big
danger for any plane,stealthy or not.

There is always a crack in every universal statement. "Every radar" is
not connected to an air defense system. Not every radar can every be
suppressed. Selected radars can be rendered ineffective.

ECM, SEAD, stealth, etc. are not perfect solutions. As they told me
with the deployment of the first generation of ECM pods--they don't
make you invisible, the are used to "increase miss distance".
Increasingly that seems to be adequate.




Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

Ed Rasimus wrote in message . ..
failures didn't relate to lack of SA as much as to political gradualism


Please note that political gradualism worked well enough for Hanoi.
Uniting the North and South took 30 years, which suggests that
patience does have its rewards.

Their response so gradual that Ho Chi Minh had plenty of time
to grow a very long beard. Of course, he didn't live long enough
to see Saigon fall, so maybe you have a point. ; )



and lack of will to win.


Specifically, LBJ's lack of will to occupy Laos, thanks to the
neutrality pact signed by the Kennedy Administration who probably
knew full well that Hanoi would sign it, but never honor it.